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INTRODUCTION

Poetry, Divinity, Politics, Physics, have each their adherents and ad­
versaries; each little guild supporting a defensive and offensive war 
for its own specific domain; while the domain of History is as a Free 
Emporium, where all these beligerents peaceably meet and furnish 
themselves; and Sentimentalist and Utilitarian, Sceptic and Theolo­
gian, with one voice advise us: Examine History, for it is "Philosophy 
teaching by Experience."—Thomas Carlyle, "On History," 1830 
The historical was indeed the common coin of the nineteenth cen­tury, the currency of its most characteristic art, the security for its 
most significant intellectual transactions. Defenders of absolutes, ra­
tional or religious, learned to use history as an asset and not a liabil­
ity; uneasy relativists found some compensation in its didactic value. 
Rival ideologies competed for its sanctions. Poets and scientists 
found in it their inspiration. The Victorians plundered the past for 
the raw stuff of imagination and shaped what they found to their own 
political, social, and aesthetic ends. The explanatory power of the 
biological, the developmental, and the narrative made the historical 
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method the preeminent paradigm of their age. It asserted its authority 
over science and social science; it became the "philosophical" way of 
understanding national as well as personal identity. The Victorians 
found that learning to harness "the Time Spirit of the Nineteenth 
Century" was the best way to escape being driven by it.1 
Formal works of history illuminate most fully the strategies essen­
tial to the nineteenth century's conquest of time. They are documents 
central to both the philosophical and the literary dimensions of the 
Victorian mind. They stand at the intersection of its two ways of 
knowing, the rational and the imaginative. They perfectly reflect that 
conflation of the scientific, the historical, and the philosophical 
characteristic of Victorian thought, and that didactic use of the imag­
ined real that was central to its art. This study uses representative 
examples to explore the strategies at work in Victorian historical 
writing and the needs served by such strategies. My purpose is not to 
reconstruct a "Whig history" of the profession, although the transi­
tion from the man of letters to the professional historian is part of my 
story. I am primarily concerned with examining the ways certain 
nineteenth-century historians negotiated intellectual and moral di­
lemmas specific to their age. I wish to trace in their historical writings 
the shape of the Victorian mind, not the priorities of the future. 
I characterize the writing of history as an activity that exploited the 
didactic strategies of both science and literature (as the Victorians un­
derstood them) to affirm order and value in human society. Like so 
many Victorian thinkers, the historian attempted to bring the meth­
odological authority of the physical sciences to the study of man's 
past. Though acknowledging the limitations of his evidence, he con­
sidered himself to be "scientific" or "philosophical" because he 
analyzed historical data in a systematic and inductive way and be­
cause he derived from his facts patterns and laws capable of guiding 
the present and anticipating the future. Such laws were urgently 
needed given the force with which the rapid current of change was 
undermining traditional assumptions and authorities. The Victori­
ans' narrative histories served the same purposes as the rest of their 
serious literature: to identify what Henry Sidgwick called some 
"higher unity of system" that could provide for both continuity and 
change.2 These histories reflected what to George Eliot was the 
"conservative-reforming" impulse of the period: that attempt to rec­
oncile progress with permanence, to formulate values and institu­
tions that could be both dynamic and stable. Not the least important 
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factor in this attempt was the historian's demonstration that the 
"scientific laws" of history vindicated, rather than threatened, his as­
sumptions about social and spiritual order. 
This demonstration required the historian to reject the materialist 
and determinist biases inherent in a Utilitarian or Positivist empiri­
cism. He wished to be "scientific'' without sacrificing his belief in the 
primacy of free will and moral law—the belief that alone made man 
fully human. The imaginative dimension of the Victorian history 
played an essential role in protecting and substantiating this belief. 
On one level, of course, quite practical concerns motivated the com­
pelling narratives, vivid portraiture, and self-consciously fictive 
techniques that were the stylistic trademark of the "literary" history: 
the historian wished to attract as large as possible an audience to 
profit from his message. But his aesthetic strategies also testified to 
the complex functioning of imagination as a way of knowing and 
understanding the past. In order for historical evidence to have 
"philosophical" credibility, the historian had to resuscitate the living 
reality from the dead facts. Believing that the essential truths of man's 
past were spiritual rather than material, he needed imagination in 
order to recover them. Having privileged morality, will, and emotion 
in historical explanation, he turned naturally to a narrative mode 
with the affective richness to do them justice. The creative side of his 
endeavor was also essential to the didactic. To fashion a coherent nar­
rative that "explained" the past was in effect to guarantee its mean­
ingfulness; the assertion of narrative order was an assertion of moral 
order as well. The style that characterized "literary" history was in­
separable from the value judgments and didactic intentions embod­
ied in it. 
Like many Victorian writers, the historian abjured the willful fal­
sity of the invented and claimed instead the higher authority of events 
that had "really" occurred. But in practice he exploited the tactics of 
both romance and realism. Rendering the historical foreground as a 
pageant of heroism affirmed the potential for human greatness and 
the meaningfulness of moral choice; it released the reader from the 
limits of the ordinary but not from the pressure of duty and emula­
tion. The commonplace asserted different but no less important 
claims. The historian's concern with his heroes' humanizing foibles 
and their public personae, his attention to the life of the people and 
the life of the court revealed the conviction he shared with Victorian 
realism: that the quotidian too was the stuff of vital realities, that the 
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most mundane phenomena often disclosed the highest truths. He 
shared the novelists' didactic strategies as well. Assent to the truths of 
history was finally as much an act of extended sympathy as of rational 
accord. 
The historian's target was not what George Eliot called the ready-
made sympathy elicited by generalizations and statistics. Like the art­
ist, the historian aimed to provide instead the "raw material of moral 
sentiment,"3 to convert readers into participants by providing them 
with a past so detailed and credible that they lived rather than merely 
observed it. Narrative and ethical order also merged on the highest 
level, as the historian emplotted over this carefully authenticated real­
ity the triumphant archetypes of romance: the successive stages of 
Arnoldian progress that incorporated cyclical time in Christian time, 
the trial and triumph of Froude's Protestantism, the Whig history's 
"familiar optimistic shape of loss and restitution,"4 Carlyle's apoca­
lyptic vindication of the True. Qualifications abounded and em­
phases differed in these patterns—in Carlyle, for instance, the victory 
of righteousness seems more a threat than a solace—but their consol­
ing power and their authority were intended to be the same. 
Ultimately, both the "aesthetics of sympathy" and the need to 
demonstrate meaningful system blurred the distinction between the 
created and the discovered.5 Wissenschaftliche order merged with the 
secularized teleology of romance to render the scientist's objectivity 
simply a pose. The historian's undertaking was essentially one of af­
firmation rather than induction. Historical "reality" became more 
sociologically complex, but it was still molded by desired truths. For 
these very reasons, the Victorian history tells us more about the ways 
the Victorians wished to shape their own experience than about the 
shape of the past itself. 
I have chosen six practitioners of the art and science of Victorian 
history to form the basis of this study: Thomas Arnold (1795-1842), 
Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800­
1859), James Anthony Froude (1818-1894), John Richard Green 
(1837-1883), and Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-1892). This selec­
tion reflects their importance relative to their own age. The popular­
ity and prominence of their major works and the significance of the 
imaginative dimension to their didactic purposes weighed heavily in 
my choice. Most important was the self-consciousness of their rela­
tionship to their audience. They shared a sense of vocation. Each 
chose the historian's role to deliver himself of a vision of the past that 
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he hoped would do for society what it had done for him: order and 
make sense of the present. I passed over writers like Sharon Turner or 
Henry Hallam, whose concern with the past was more thoroughly 
antiquarian than imaginative, as well as historians who, because of 
their Utilitarian or Positivist biases, ultimately contributed more to 
the emergent social sciences than to narrative history per se. The pro­
fessional priorities of later Victorians like William Stubbs and S. R. 
Gardiner were influential enough to accord them separate treatment 
in the epilogue. 
The six represent a range of approaches. Thomas Arnold is the 
most eminent historian of what Duncan Forbes called the Liberal-
Anglican School.6 At the beginning of the period he provided the 
classic statement of the morality and unity of western history. In­
spired by German romanticism more than Broad Church Christian­
ity, Carlyle attempted to achieve the same ends as Arnold with a secu­
larized supernaturalism. Macaulay is the foremost of the Whig 
historians, and Green serves as the major social historian of that same 
tradition. Like Freeman and Froude, Green found that he had to rede­
fine and defend his identity as historian when the rival professional 
model began increasingly to assert its claims in the closing decades of 
the century. Froude's supporters considered this disciple of Carlyle's 
to be the chief defender of the "literary" history against the en­
croachment of positivistic science; his detractors found him the most 
blatant example of dilettantism. Froude's nemesis, E. A. Freeman, is a 
transitional figure: one of the most vocal spokesmen for the new pro­
fessionalism, as a practicing historian he was in many ways as deeply 
traditional as any of the six. 
To provide a comparative framework for examining the cultural 
function of the historian, each chapter asks similar questions about 
theory and practice. What factors defined the historian's interest in 
and conception of history? How did he understand and how did he 
balance the need to be philosophical and "scientific" with the need to 
re-create the past as art? What assumptions controlled the patterns or 
laws he found in the past, and what peculiarly Victorian needs did his 
explanatory model serve? In particular, how did he balance the re­
spective claims of the great individual, the social group or class, and 
the spirit of the age in his explanation of change and causality? What 
conception of progress did he offer? What value judgments about 
relevant historical experience did the selectivity and treatment of his 
research imply? How did he shape historical narrative to engage the 
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imagination as well as the reason of his readers? My examination of 
specific historical interpretations focuses not so much on the opin­
ions themselves as on the ways in which characteristic biases origi­
nate and influence historical analysis in other areas. My considera­
tion of methodology is not intended to be exhaustive, but to furnish 
valid bases of comparison among the six. Each chapter pays increas­
ing heed to the emerging confrontation between popular and profes­
sional historiography. Although professionalization challenged 
fundamental assumptions about the cultural functions of history and 
the historian, I will argue in the epilogue that this challenge ended in 
a compromise rather than a split: that in England, the continuing 
vitality of the values served by "literary" history shaped professional­
ism in unique ways. 
To establish a common context for the individual analyses that 
follow, some attention to the major intellectual traditions that con­
verge in the art and science of Victorian historiography is in order. 
The methods and assumptions of Enlightenment, romantic, and 
"scientific" historiography play significant if varied roles in the work 
of each writer. Although the Renaissance had introduced an appreci­
ation of time and process into the static medieval world view and 
raised the standard of historical research, essentially uncritical atti­
tudes towards texts persisted. The use of history as a polemical wea­
pon during the religious and political controversies of the seven­
teenth century had so discredited it that by the early eighteenth 
century many held history in contempt as little more than "popular 
tale-telling, aimless antiquarianism, or political propaganda."7 
Johnson's and Addison's scorn for the slight abilities and superficial 
results of contemporary historians was characteristic; Hume under­
took his History in the belief that "style, judgment, impartiality, 
care—everything is wanting to our historians."8 
In one sense, then, the philosopher task was to establish the legi­
timacy and importance of historical knowledge, and this they largely 
accomplished, notwithstanding exaggerated nineteenth-century 
claims about their "antihistorical" bias. Their empiricist orientation 
emphasized the importance of documentary support, while their 
fight against all forms of superstition set new standards in the critical 
scrutiny of source materials. As William Robertson defined it, "to 
relate real occurrences, and to explain their real causes and effects, is 
the historian's peculiar and only province"; he has "no title to claim 
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assent, unless he produces evidence in proof of his assertions."9 Rob­
ertson amassed an unprecedented amount of material in his attempt 
to compose the "authentic" history of Scotland. In the same way, 
Gibbon felt compelled as much by "a sense of duty" as by his "curios­
ity" to draw from the "fountain-head" of original sources wherever 
possible in the Decline and Fall.10 This resort to the "fountain-head" 
represented a deliberate rejection of evidence based on faith, tradition, 
or conjecture, and thus formed part of a larger attempt to assess the 
reliability of sources in a more critical spirit. 
The Enlightenment historians significantly advanced history's ex­
planatory power as well by subordinating facts to system. The eigh­
teenth century had inherited a long tradition of contempt for mere 
erudition. For Hume as for others, the problem with the "dark indus­
try" of the antiquarian was that his indiscriminate heaping-up of 
facts ignored or obscured the meaningful pattern of history. "The 
part of an historian is as honourable as that of a mere chronicler or 
compiler of gazettes is contemptible," said Gibbon.11 The historian 
had also to be a philosopher; he had to discern amidst the chaos of 
data the shaping principles of human action and to display them in 
such a way as to teach and guide his audience: "History," Gibbon 
wrote, "is for the philosophic spirit what gambling was for the Mar­
quis de Dangeau. He saw a system, relationships, and order there, 
where others saw only the caprices of fortune.''12 It was the historian's 
duty to illustrate the links between events, to determine those general 
causes which form the springs (Ressorts) of action in history: only 
then was he writing en philosophe. Enlightenment thinkers in effect 
applied the same intellectual tools to both nature and history: their 
purpose in investigating both was to replace transcendental with em­
pirical causes. Man might have no access to metaphysical truths, but 
he could, by examining the phenomena of experience critically, de­
termine the relationships between facts and express these in terms of 
rules or laws. History could become part of what Hume called "a 
science of man" to the extent that it involved a systematic effort to 
derive general explanations for human conduct from empirical ob­
servation.13 From his repository of concrete and verifiable evidence 
about human experience, the historian could formulate "general 
theorems" that enabled him "to comprehend, in a few propositions, a 
great number of inferences and conclusions."14 Such theorems in turn 
greatly simplified his decisions about what constituted "relevant" 
data. 
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The process of shaping and selection necessary to demonstrate the 
system in history was as much artistic as philosophical. Hume 
argued, "The unity of action . . . which is to be found in biography 
or history, differs from that of epic poetry, not in kind, but in de­
gree."15 Yet the philosophe was a man of letters in the highest sense 
not merely because his stylistic treatment pleased, but because it in­
structed: artistic selection and control were means to an end. Gibbon 
drew much the same distinction between Livy and Tacitus as Boling­
broke did between Herodotus and Thucydides: the former was merely 
an "agreeable story-teller"; the latter illustrated a "chain of events 
and fill[ed] our heart with the wisest lessons."16 Narrative order rein­
forced ethical order. Vivid representation also served didactic ends. 
History was, after all, "philosophy teaching by examples"; the effec­
tiveness of its "wise lessons" depended upon "a just and perfect delin­
eation of all that may be praised, of all that may be excused, and of all 
that must be censured."17 
Notwithstanding these attempts to make historical study more crit­
ical and more "philosophical," the Enlightenment's largely unexam­
ined assumptions about progress and human nature diluted its objec­
tivity and its appreciation of historical relationships. Obsessed by the 
rise and fall of "civilization," the philosophes judged men and events 
by their relationship to eighteenth-century definitions of rationality 
and progress.' 'Barbarous ages,'' if treated at all, were so handled that 
their "deformity" might teach the present "to cherish, with the 
greater anxiety, that science and civility which has so close a connex­
ion with virtue and humanity."18 No fact was important for its own 
sake. The abridgment necessary to demonstrate history's order and 
lessons justified the historian in excluding as irrelevant all that he 
lacked sympathy with: the primitive, the irrational, the uncouth. 
His assumptions about human nature narrowed his focus in more 
significant ways. The Enlightenment historian was not interested in 
studying men and women so much as in trying to abstract "man in 
general" from the evidence of human history.19 His task was to disen­
gage from the folly and fanaticism of the past the "constant and uni­
versal principles" of man's "true" nature. In effect the Enlighten­
ment tried to include human nature in the presumed uniformity of 
the natural world, for the lessons of philosophical history could be 
practically applied only in a realm where men were considered every­
where and at all times the same. This is precisely what Hume as­
sumed: 
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Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the 
Greeks and Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French 
and English: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the 
former most of the observations, which you have made with regard to 
the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that 
history informs us of nothing new or strange on this particular. Its 
chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of 
human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and 
situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form 
our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of 
human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, fac­
tions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by 
which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his 
science; in the same manner as the physician or the natural philos­
opher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and 
other external objects, by the experiments, which he forms concerning 
them.20 
The philosopher treatment of human nature had inherent limita­
tions. They conceived men as complexes of psychological traits rather 
than as complex individuals. Hume could present contradictory as­
pects of historical figures, but he made little attempt to synthesize 
them into a personality. He de-emphasized or dismissed as inconsis­
tent traits that did not fit and rejected as incredible motives he could 
not sympathize with. His History of England may be read as a more 
concrete elaboration of those abstract principles laid out in the Trea­
tise on Human Nature.21 Gibbon's "human nature" was limited in 
similar ways. He too ascribed "the different characters that mark the 
civilized nations of the globe . .  . to the use, and the abuse, of rea­
son,"22 and relied heavily on the vices and virtues of the Romans to 
explain the rise and decline of empire. The "springs" of national 
character led to the same sort of "ruling passions," writ large, that 
dominated individuals. 
Despite the Enlightenment's scientific pretensions, a priori as­
sumptions clearly limited its laws and stunted its empiricism. Ro­
mantic historiography was still indebted to its pioneering efforts, 
however. Historicism's emphasis on sympathy built upon the eigh­
teenth century's commitment to observation. The connectedness of 
philosophical history was at least a first step toward nineteenth-
century organicism. The philosopher ideal of progress, however un­
historically conceived, did allow the possibility of development 
through time that would be exploited (to different ends) by following 
generations. The work of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Hume ac­
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knowledged the importance of social, cultural, and intellectual fac­
tors in historical explanation. Gibbon advanced farthest toward a rec­
ognition of the complexity of forces—rational and irrational, material 
and immaterial—contributing to national consciousness, and he was 
best able to conceive a more flexible and relativisitic causality. Fi­
nally, the Enlightenment established conclusively the authority of 
the historian as man of letters, a literary artist of powerful intellect 
and broad humanistic culture, and asserted the legitimacy and impor­
tance of "philosophical" history: comprehensive, synthetic, and 
didactic. 
The watershed for the shift in historiographical models was the 
French Revolution. It epitomized the Enlightenment's attempt to free 
itself from the dead hand of the past by trying to destroy it, to build a 
new society on reason rather than on tradition. At the same time, the 
Revolution's results illuminated some of the blind spots of the En­
lightenment mind. As the source of historical change, the Revolution 
replaced the reasoning individual with a mass movement, driven by 
unpredictable and often irrational impulses. It showed the authority 
of abstract reason to be as inadequate as that of a naive fundamental­
ism in explaining human behavior. These changes prepared the way 
for a crucial feature of romantic historiography: the historicism that 
shifted attention from the general to the specific, from the mechanical 
to the organic, and from the judgmental to the sympathetic. As Fried-
rich Meinecke explained it, "The essence of historism is the substitu­
tion of a process of individualising observation for a generalizing 
view of human forces in history."23 Revolting against the concept of 
life and mind governed by a single static law, the romantic reasserted 
the value of the concrete, the individual, and the suprarational. 
Against the abstract rationality of the Enlightenment, Coleridge 
claimed, "Reason never acts by itself, but must clothe itself in the 
substance of individual understanding and specific inclination, in 
order to become a reality and an object of consciousness and expe­
rience."24 To writers like Johnson who counseled the poet not to 
number the streaks of the tulip but rather to exhibit "such prominent 
and striking features, as recall the original to every mind," Blake 
flatly replied that "to Generalize is to be an Idiot. To Particularize is 
the Alone Distinction of Merit."25 Rather than selectively ransacking 
past ages for confirmation of a uniform human nature and valuing 
them only as they resembled the present, the historicist held all ages 
"immediate to God," in Ranke's words. 
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The new historian endowed nations and peoples with the diversity, 
uniqueness, and complexity of personalities, viewing societies not as 
arbitrary aggregates of individuals but as "quasi-biological entities 
which defied analysis by the exact quantitative methods of chemistry 
and physics."26 Like the organism's, the nation's component parts 
existed in dynamic interdependence, so that individual men, values, 
and institutions could be understood only as products of an entire 
complex of conditions. Events were not the result of rational deci­
sions governed by general laws of human nature, but cross-sections of 
a wider and continuous field of forces. Mechanical laws of cause and 
effect could not account for the underlying identity of the organism 
despite its movement through time. The nation's dynamic individu­
ality required an evolutionary concept of change to reconcile per­
manence and development. The physical growth of the plant, the 
intellectual and spiritual growth of the individual, provided the ro­
mantic historian with models for the histories of peoples and institu­
tions. In the same way, Thomas Arnold conceived a nation's history 
as its "biography," and Carlyle charted "cycles and seasons" for the 
mind of mankind. 
Accepting the developmental nature of change prevented the ro­
mantic historian from seeing his own values as ultimate, or from re­
garding past beliefs merely as errors. To apply an arbitrary standard 
to the past was to distort it: his task rather was to open himself un­
judgmentally to the unsystematic variety of historical forms in a 
given age, seeking not resemblances with the present, but the era's 
own self-justifying identity. He restored to the past much that had 
been beneath the "Dignity of History" in the eighteenth century, or 
that, like custom and myth, had been largely inaccessible to its ra­
tionalistic analyses. The romantic derived national consciousness 
from a much wider range of data—geographical, social, and cultural, 
as well as political—and considered the testimony of the masses as 
important as that of monarchs and ministers. 
More importantly, romantic thought legitimized the role of imagi­
nation in the historical enterprise. Dissection into abstract categories 
perverted the nature of a biological entity: the romantic past had to be 
"felt, or intuited, or understood, by a species of direct acquain­
tance."27 To gain access to it, the historian had to follow Herder's 
advice: "First sympathize with the nation . .  . go into the era, into 
the geography, into the entire history, feel [einfuhlen] yourself into 
it."28 Before he could understand the significance of facts he had to 
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"resuscitate" them: he had to re-create the past in all its specificity 
before it would divulge its unique unifying principles. Clearly, the 
mechanical reason and superficial fancy of Hume and Hartley were 
inadequate to such a task. It took a faculty like Coleridge's constitu­
tive secondary imagination to discern the unity underlying past 
events. Only when knowing the truth became an essentially creative 
process could perception be imaginative without becoming imagi­
nary, based on the senses without being limited to their evidence. And 
only then could history as an act of imaginative projection and identi­
fication claim to expose a truth about the past that had been inaccess­
ible to both fictionalizing chroniclers and rationalistic philosophes. 
The romantics tried to reclaim science as well as imagination from 
the philosophes. Enlightenment science, essentially mechanical, 
aimed to rank data on a single scale of value, to subsume individuality 
in uniformity. The understanding of romantic science was relational 
and organic; it illuminated individuality by investigating the organ­
ism's development in time. For the historicist, as Peter Gay explains 
it, the idea that man possessed not a fixed nature but an individual 
history made the historian "the master scientist. The historian is the 
student of change; the central reality of the world is change—who 
more important, then, in the scheme of things, than the historian? 
Again, while other scientists seek universal laws, the historian strives 
to understand individuals on their own terms, and since individuality 
is the central reality of men, who more important for the study of man 
than the historian?"29 In an even more significant sense, the very con­
stitutive power that made the imagination of the romantic historian 
"poetic" made it "scientific" as well. Susan F. Cannon demonstrates 
the distinction made by Wordsworth and echoed by Victorians be­
tween "sciences of classification" that gave only "worthless, superfi­
cial knowledge" and those "true sciences" that revealed "wider and 
wider interrelationships" leading "to an understanding of the system 
of the world and therefore . . . eventually to God."30 The same abil­
ity to perceive relationships was associated with what Philip Har­
wood, in his 1842 analysis of "The Modern Art and Science of His­
tory," called "the historic, scientific imagination": that faculty that 
knew how to "recreate worlds out of the loose, chaotic elements fur­
nished by chroniclers and bards." The modern historian became 
"scientific" not by classifying phenomena but by "combining the 
scattered and fragmentary parts into wholeness and unity, and giving 
a plan to the mighty maze" of past life.31 
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The links between the scientific and the poetic, the empirical and 
the romantic, bear stressing, for they had important ramifications in 
nineteenth-century historiography. The romantic historian's desire 
to sympathize with the object, to realize it in all its individuality, was 
not just compatible with but essential to his "scientific" apprehen­
sion of it. Understanding "the symbolism of facts," as Harwood put 
it,32 might have involved a more conscious creativity than the philo­
sophe acknowledged, but it still began with the historian endeavor­
ing to look steadily at his subject and ended with the identification of 
history's ordering principles. The romantic historian's search for 
laws and patterns led directly to the imposition of what Hayden 
White calls a particular emplotment and argument on the historical 
field.33 But this made him not less inductive or scientific than his 
Enlightenment predecessors—simply different in his conception of 
what constituted valid unities and interrelationships. His desired 
order required a different kind of narrative. Historians might argue 
throughout the century about which "plot" was correct, but their duty 
to demonstrate some kind of order would remain central to their 
claim to be "scientific." 
Neither was a romantic emplotment by definition incompatible 
with the call for a more rigorous evaluation of source materials, the 
other major principle upon which "scientific" history rested. The 
older model of organized, systematized knowledge embodied in Wis­
senschajt could provide the basis for order in history. It was the in­
creasing prestige of the physical sciences that prompted the historian 
to seek analogous ways of isolating, testing, and evaluating his data. 
Although as the century wore on, such "scientific" methodology was 
more and more often linked to assumptions and emplotments inimi­
cal to romantic history, quite the opposite was true at the outset. The 
work of Barthold Niebuhr and Leopold van Ranke, both professors at 
the University of Berlin, provided the romantic historian with an ex­
ample of how he could obtain greater objectivity and rigor in the 
classification and analysis of documents without forfeiting his wider 
and more sympathetic approach to the past. At Berlin from 1810 to 
1859, Niebuhr introduced stricter methods for evaluating the authen­
ticity of source materials. Like the romantic historian, however, he 
valued classes over individuals and customs over law-givers in expla­
nations of the historical process. He first gave serious attention to the 
hitherto neglected ballads of Rome as a valid source for its early his­
tory and broadened the base of historical research to include a much 
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wider range of data. His ability to make critical methods of textual 
analysis serve the ends of imagination would exercise particular in­
fluence on Thomas Arnold's treatment of myth in the History of 
Rome. 
Ranke likewise had allegiances to both romantic and "scientific" 
historiography. In the spirit of Niebuhr, he made the evaluation of 
evidence more "scientific" by insisting on strictly contemporary 
sources and then by analyzing them in light of the author's tempera­
ment, allegiances, his probable access to correct knowledge, and the 
extent of his agreement with other sources. Ranke's intention, as an­
nounced in the famous preface to his earliest work, was to move the 
historian from value judgments to analysis: "To history has been as­
signed the office of judging the past, of instructing the present for the 
benefit of future ages. To such high offices this work does not aspire: 
It wants only to show what actually happened [wie es eigentlich ge­
wesen]."34 This emphasis on the facts of history was motivated as 
much by Ranke's rejection of the romanticized histories of Scott as by 
his repudiation of the value judgments of the Enlightenment. After 
comparing one of Scott's characterizations in Quentin Durward with 
that of Commines, he wrote, "I found by comparison that the truth 
was more interesting and beautiful than the romance. I turned away 
from it and resolved to avoid all invention and imagination in my 
works and to stick to facts."35 
But if history "wie es eigentlich gewesen" rejected the biases of both 
Enlightenment rationalism and historical romance, Ranke was far 
from endorsing a positivistic empiricism. Particularly outside Ger­
many, exaggerated claims for the objectivity of his methods obscured 
his affinities with romantic history.36 He asserted the authority of the 
empirical and the objective to aggrandize the "more interesting and 
beautiful" truth he sought, but this truth was to be known through a 
distinctly romantic sympathizing with individualized facts. It was 
precisely because the past was to be re-created in all its specificity that 
only the most concrete, the most factual data could provide the mate­
rials for the historian. Ranke's claim that "every epoch is immediate 
to God," his fascination with historical personalities, his idealist as­
sumptions, as well as his use of ballad materials and folk traditions, 
further ally his sympathies with those of the romantics. Central to 
Ranke's historiography were foregone conclusions about the preem­
inence of national identity that prevented his investigations from be-
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ing any more genuinely inductive than the romance and rationalism 
he rejected. Ranke's adoption of a more rigorous treatment of sources 
did not prevent the meaning of history from being as much created as 
discovered. "Scientific" history increased the range and reliability of 
historical data, but the plots it constructed out of those data provided 
not so much a greater, but simply a different, truth than that of ro­
mantic history. 
As the century went on, the growing eminence of the factual made 
the subjectivity latent in "scientific" history harder to perceive and 
more heretical to assert. When historians began to professionalize, 
they often based their claims to expertise on their scientific research 
methods, seemingly analogous to those that insured the authority 
and prestige of the physical scientist. What Ranke meant as a modest 
disclaimer was converted into a boast that the historian actually could 
achieve a "scientific" exactitude in showing things as they "really" 
had been. The almost exclusive concentration of the Rankean school 
on political and diplomatic documents added to fears that historical 
study had to satisfy a narrowly positivistic kind of factuality in order 
to be scientific. The rise of Positivism, the true heir to Enlightenment 
rationalism, further encouraged this belief. Because positivistic 
science, which claimed to reduce human behavior to laws as simple 
and monolithic as those that ruled the natural world, rested on sim­
ilar claims to complete objectivity about the data of history, scientific 
historiography and the scientism of Comte often became conflated in 
the popular mind. In the second half of the century, attacks on a 
"science of history" often meant attacks on the Positivist's determin­
ism. Methodological issues were further confused by criticisms of 
"literary" history that made superficial scholarship the necessary 
counterpart of a vivid narrative. As a result "scientific" history re­
mained implicated in the materialism of much nineteenth-century 
science, "literary" history in the license of much imaginative litera­
ture, despite widespread underlying agreement on the importance of 
both critical research methods and effective style in historical writing. 
Of more significance than methodology per se in distinguishing the 
professional's "scientific" position from that of the "literary" histo­
rian was his conscious shift in priorities. The professional's highest 
responsibility was not to instruct or entertain the general public but 
to advance knowledge in the field. In order to preserve the scientist's 
disinterested commitment to facts, many scholars felt they had at least 
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publicly to reject the popular historian's search for moral lessons and 
the popular audience's presumption to judge their work—in effect, to 
reject the duty and the authority of the Victorian sage. 
The historians I consider exemplify varying blends of Enlighten­
ment, romantic, and "scientific" assumptions about history. In En­
gland historical writing remained the domain of the man of letters for 
the better part of the century. At both Oxford and Cambridge, chairs 
of modern history went traditionally to literary men; Charles Kings-
ley won the Regius Professorship at Cambridge as late as 1869. It was 
an age in which a civil servant like George Grote or a lawyer like H. T. 
Buckle could achieve an international reputation for historical re­
search, an age when best sellers by Macaulay or Green could rival the 
popularity of contemporary fiction.37 It was the last age in which the 
historian could expect to command the attention of a large and rela­
tively homogeneous audience of educated general readers and to rest 
his authority on his ability to teach and uplift rather than on his 
advance of historical knowledge. 
Each of these six historians built his public role on a private, essen­
tially romantic, attachment to the past. Each recognized the impor­
tance of imagination to historical reconstruction. Most openly en­
dorsed the romantic view that in order to understand the past event, 
the historian had to relive it through an act of sympathetic projection, 
and that to convince readers of its importance, he had to resuscitate it 
through an act of literary creation. "Literary" history was philosoph­
ical in the highest sense because it claimed a poetic insight into the 
"symbolism of facts." It revealed spiritual truths inaccessible to mere 
reason and compelled the moral sense to acknowledge their reality. 
These historians had also learned from the romantics a widened ap­
preciation of what constituted relevant historical data. Their very 
"realism" depended upon closer attention to history's sociological 
and physical environment. Although in actual practice most achieved 
only limited success in integrating geographical, social, and cultural 
data into the political account, all recognized the importance of such 
materials to a full understanding of historical change. They were par­
ticularly sensitive to the insights that myth, legend, and popular lit­
erature offered into the mind of the past. 
At the same time, all understood and accepted the new standard of 
thoroughness and critical analysis demanded of the historian who 
would establish his facts on a scientific basis. Each wished to aggran-
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dize the authority of his interpretation by basing it on an inductive 
investigation of the past. Whether acknowledged or not, however, the 
accuracy of facts was not an end in itself, but a means of increasing the 
credibility of the laws and patterns each saw in history. Most did little 
or no research in primary sources; those who did, like Macaulay and 
Froude, compromised their claims to accuracy and completeness by 
the ways in which they used such data. Ultimately, none possessed 
the conviction, important to both historicism and "scientific" objec­
tivity, that facts were important for their own sake. Each judged facts 
by the extent to which they vindicated a priori assumptions about 
order and meaning in history. Each sought proof of the operation of 
laws necessary to make sense of the present. 
These laws differed in crucial ways from those of the Enlighten­
ment historians, of course. Macaulay was alone in tacitly accepting 
the eighteenth century's belief in man controlled by associationist 
laws of pain and pleasure and measured against a uniform rational­
ity, and even he believed that he was reacting against just such "ab­
stract" theories. The others set out consciously to refute this behav­
ioral model as it resurfaced in Utilitarianism and Positivism and to 
reassert the greater power of morality and free will in human history. 
Where the philosophes had based progress on the triumph of reason 
and posited a single scale of civilization by which to measure all cul­
tures at all times, the Victorians conceived progress as essentially 
moral and were capable of a more relativistic appreciation of values 
and customs. Their organic conceptions of development permitted 
them to treat ideas, institutions, and customs not as man-made arti­
facts but as products of historical growth whose relationship to their 
own time deserved understanding and respect. 
Nonetheless, all based their judgments on implicitly unhistorical 
standards. Arnold and Carlyle superimposed their own vision of 
moral order on the past in order to demonstrate that history vindi­
cated God's laws. Froude employed a double standard of credibility in 
order to fit the Tudors to a similar proof. The Whig historians reha­
bilitated the "dark" ages scorned by the Enlightenment and invoked 
natural growth and practical accommodation to sanction progress in 
uniquely English institutions. But in defining this growth by 
nineteenth-century priorities and evaluating past events in terms of 
their contributions to the present's triumphant political balance, the 
Whigs proved as myopic as the philosophes. Finally, the "literary" 
historian's responsibility to shape, to judge, and to justify was in­
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compatible with the kind of detachment and restraint mandated by 
professional history. His primary responsibility was not to his facts 
but to his duties as teacher; relativism and objectivity became equally 
culpable if they prevented clear judgments of right and wrong. His 
object was not history for its own sake, but for the sake of a wider 
society in growing need of guidance and reassurance. When emerging 
professionals began to shift their allegiance from the needs of the 
general audience to the demands of their peers, they repudiated—or 
seemed to—a vital cultural function. To measure the dimensions of 
that function is the goal of the chapters that follow. 
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THOMAS ARNOLD

HISTORY AS

PRACTICAL EVANGEL

Thomas Arnold served many nineteeth-century historians as he did former students: he was an abiding presence, a stern guide, a 
demanding example. In various ways he furnished a prototype for the 
historiographic traditions that followed. Keenly aware of the in­
creased importance of both scholarship and artistry to historical writ­
ing, he set out to emulate Niebuhr in his critical evaluation of source 
materials as well as in his imaginative resuscitation of the past. He 
suffused both processes with a moral earnestness characteristically 
Victorian and thereby turned historical writing into a didactic tool 
vitally important for his time. Of even greater significance for the 
characteristic intellectual dilemmas of the period was his concern to 
reconcile the truths of reason with the truths of belief. His develop­
mental model of historical change accommodated the relative and the 
absolute, the constantly evolving with the permanently fixed, and 
thus provided his contemporaries with a means of diffusing the de­
structive potential of scientific thought for the bases of belief. Suit­
ably defined, scientific understanding became an aid, not an obstacle, 
to Christian duty, and the "natural" sanctioned the political and 
moral change Arnold desired for his own society. Arnold's historian 
could challenge Utilitarians with an analysis of progress that was 
"philosophical" without being materialist or mechanical. If the 
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firmness of Arnold's faith in these reconciliations throws him into 
poignant relief against the sceptical generation that followed, his 
conviction that Christian ethics could be a practical force in shaping 
society retained its inspiration even when cut loose from dogmatic 
orthodoxy. This conviction informs his conception of history as well 
as makes his work especially important to interpreting the forms and 
purposes of Victorian historical writing. 
Arnold's intellectual development was shaped by his willingness to 
wrestle with the "multitudinousness" that threatened to overwhelm 
his son. Thomas Arnold's greater confidence in the ultimate har­
mony of the created world gave him the energy for his struggle, but it 
made the task of integrating the moral, the intellectual, and the emo­
tional no less demanding of active effort. His characteristic combina­
tion of Christian earnestness and scholarly rigor first emerged when 
his studies for ordination led him to "distressing doubts" about the 
"proof and interpretation of the textual authority" supporting sev­
eral of the Thirty-Nine Articles.1 He undoubtedly took John Keble's 
advice to "pray earnestly for help and light from above and turn him­
self more strongly than ever to the practical duties of a holy life" (LC, 
16), but his reservations remained, and he took Priest's Orders in 1828 
only upon being allowed to explain his objections to the presiding 
Bishop. In Arnold's discomfort over Subscription, we first hear the 
undertone of a continuing anxiety that historical criticism might 
threaten belief. He faced the challenge of the Higher Criticism most 
directly in his sermons on scriptural interpretation, but we should 
also consider his histories as further attempts to confront and to rec­
oncile conflicts between doctrinal truth and historical under­
standing. 
The work of Arnold's middle years was diverse but motivated by 
consistent intellectual concerns. He produced his first work on Ro­
man history, a series of articles collected as the History of the Later 
Roman Commonwealth, in the mid-twenties. During the same pe­
riod, he also taught himself German in order to read Niebuhr and 
other Germans and began ten years work on his edition of Thucyd­
ides. We can find early evidence of his theory of historical develop­
ment at Rugby, where he adjusted his treatment of different forms to 
their relative levels of intellectual and moral maturity. The famous 
educator actually gained more notoriety as a controversialist in the 
late twenties and early thirties. Arnold's reaction to the widespread 
social distress of these years characteristically fused moral and intel­
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lectual impulses. He considered it part of a Christian's duty to pro­
mote the welfare of the poor, but advocated systematic research into 
all pertinent aspects of lower class existence as the most effective 
means of alleviating their suffering.2 Believing that physical well­
being had to build on a moral foundation, he freely mixed religious 
homilies with economic and political critiques in his short-lived 
Englishman's Register, aimed at effecting "Christian Reform." A 
similar mixture of motives informed his skirmishes with the Tractar­
ians. He found their increased emphasis on sacraments and clergy 
decidedly at odds with his desire for comprehension of dissenters and 
the merger of church and state, and he attacked their rejection of pro­
gress as "unhistorical." By choosing to live in the past, Oxford effec­
tively abdicated moral and intellectual leadership, leaving the people 
it should guide to their own presentist and utilitarian biases. Typi­
cally, Arnold found it hard to distinguish between "intellectual er­
ror" and "moral wickedness" in the Tractarian position, and the in­
temperate tone of articles like his "The Oxford Malignants" played a 
significant role in depriving him of two prospective bishoprics in the 
thirties.3 
Arnold's complex conception of intellectual responsibility quite 
naturally informed his historical writings. He began his History of 
Rome at Rugby and published the first volume in 1838. The second 
followed in 1841, and the third, nearly complete at his death, was 
hardly needed to cement his reputation as a historian. That had been 
recognized in 1841, when he was appointed to the Regius Professor­
ship of Modern History at Oxford. His Introductory Lectures on 
Modern History proclaimed a new breadth and relevance for histori­
cal study and, by implication, a new stature for the historian—a stat­
ure confirmed by crowds unprecedented in the history of the Chair. 
A. P. Stanley's agenda for future lectures suggests that Arnold would 
have continued to use his position to integrate his historical, reli­
gious, and social concerns: to act on his 
long cherished intention of bringing the "Politics" of his favorite Aris­
totle to bear on the problems of modern times and countries,—his anx­
iety to call public attention to the social evils of the lower classes in
England, which he would have tried to analyze and expose in the pro­
cess of their formation and growth,—his interest in tracing the general 
laws of social and political science, and . . . his longing desire . . . 
of unfolding all the various elements, physical and intellectual, social
and national, by which the moral character of the Christian world has 
been affected. (LC, 590-91') 
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In his eminently practical way, Arnold would have made the lectures 
into his own "Tracts for the Times," had he not died suddenly in 
June of 1842. 
We can appreciate the centrality and peculiar intensity of historical 
study for Arnold only after grasping the extent to which a scientific 
and a moral understanding of the world were to him equivalent. 
"The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and for the mere indul­
gence of our intellectual appetite," he considered no more worthy 
than "an excessive desire for food for its own sake, for the gratification 
of our bodily appetite" (MW, 148). But ultimately he viewed "all 
science, whether natural or moral, as a matter of duty rather than of 
simple knowledge" (MW, 411). Like other members of what Susan F. 
Cannon has called the "Cambridge Network" of scientists and Broad 
Churchmen,4 Arnold refused to confine the pursuit of knowledge 
within narrow theological bounds, for he was convinced that the 
search for truth in whatever field could not threaten the fundamental 
bases of faith and, when rightly valued, could indeed be a positive 
support to them. Neither the substance nor the methods of scientific 
investigation were subversive of Arnold's goals. Using the term 
science in the sense of Wissenschaft, Arnold could conceive of only 
one possible sphere of "Truth" and thus could see no reason why the 
truths of natural and moral knowledge should ever contradict one 
another. Of course man's highest happiness was moral, so that 
knowledge of the physical world could not in itself be adequate to its 
fulfillment. But a man who was one of Buckland's "most earnest and 
intelligent" students, and who maintained a life-long interest in 
geology, could hardly be considered hostile to scientific study. "The 
discovery of truth" in all fields he considered "more or less our duty 
. .  . for the benefits of others . .  . or for the improvement of our 
own powers of mind, that so we may act our part in life more effi­
ciently" (MW, 412). 
More importantly, he adopted as being best suited to this "discov­
ery of truth," and thus best suited to the fulfillment of our "duty," 
procedures similar to those of the natural sciences: the critical evalua­
tion of evidence, and the inductive method of observation, generaliza­
tion, and verification. He was convinced that only "by the study of 
facts, whether relating to nature or to man, and not by any pretended 
cultivation of the mind by poetry, oratory, and moral or critical dis­
sertations," would "the understandings of mankind . .  . be most 
Thomas Arnold 
improved, and their views of things rendered most accurate."5 Facts 
alone led to a "philosophical" understanding of the principles that 
structured the moral and the physical worlds. The mind could "exert 
the very fulness of its power" (MW, 404) only when it was engaged in 
understanding "the laws or causes by which . . . phenomena are 
regulated" (MW, 410), and these must be determined by the scientific 
method. The duty to achieve such "philosophical" understanding 
was ultimately moral: mastering those laws would allow mankind to 
"form [Nature] or reform her for our own purposes," and teach us 
"after our most imperfect measure to learn to work like" the God who 
authored them (MW, 408). In this way a scientific understanding of 
the world became an asset rather than a liability in the Christianizing 
of daily life, and the scientific verification of truth an inherently 
moral undertaking.6 One's duty as a Christian was better to under­
stand, so as more fully to conform to, the laws by which God regu­
lated the moral and physical world. Arnold's relentless search for the 
laws that could reveal the truth—whether it be in scriptural, histori­
cal, or scientific study—was thus inseparable from his mission as a 
Christian and infused with a similar earnestness. 
Once shown to be the preeminent moral science, history could play 
a key role in this educational process. Arnold believed that only the 
study of biblical prophecy had a better claim to direct man's attention 
to general principles of good and evil in the world:' 'Whatever there is 
of greatness in the final cause of all human thought and action, God's 
glory and man's perfection, that is the measure of the greatness of 
history."7 Indeed, Arnold ended his short-lived appointment as Exam­
iner in the Arts at the University of London because it did not require 
that the professors of such "moral subjects" as history be Christian 
(LC, 428). Since he considered it the historian's highest duty to "en­
courage the love of all things noble and just, and wise and holy" (LC, 
406), he felt called upon to disparage current, more limited concep­
tions of this calling. He deplored the classical tradition that consid­
ered historical writing no more than a source of literary fame to the 
author or a "means of giving pleasure" to an audience.8 He sternly 
condemned the poetic license of modern work for leading at best to 
frivolity, at worst to falsification: "We may hope that the folly is now 
gone by of studiously painting the manners, institutions and events 
of ancient times in colours most strongly contrasting with everything 
which we know from our own experience. The pictures thus pro­
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duced were striking and beautiful indeed, but nothing practical could 
be learnt from them, since they displayed a world as unreal as the 
fantastic creations of romance."9 
Like Carlyle and many another early Victorian critic of "romantic" 
literature, Arnold felt the artist shirked his duty if he entertained at 
the expense of truth. But Arnold had reason to fear that even legiti­
mate historical writing could be subverted to escapist ends, becoming 
another form of that "intellectual indulgence" he equally con­
demned. Stanley's conjecture that writing the History of Rome af­
forded Arnold "a refuge from the excitement and confusion of the 
present," a retreat from "the painful and conflicting thoughts roused 
by his writings on political and theological subjects" (LC, 268), hints 
at potential struggles with the temptations of escape. Elsewhere Ar­
nold openly expressed worries that the life of the scholar might deflect 
his energies from the duties of the Christian reformer. "How earnestly 
one desires to present to one's mind a peopled landscape of Gaul, or 
Germany, or Britain, before Rome encountered them" he wrote to 
Chevalier Bunsen; "And yet, these indulgences of our intellectual fac­
ulties match strangely with the fever of our times, and the pressure for 
life and death which is going on all around us" (LC, 311). 
Arnold thus had both a personal and a public stake in proving 
history's practicality. By demonstrating that historical study was 
scientific and not merely antiquarian, he could make it proof against 
escapism or self-indulgence. And so as he advised his Oxford au­
dience, "We must remember also not so to transport ourselves into the 
fourteenth century as to forget that we belong really to the nineteenth; 
that here, and not there, lie our duties; that the harvest, gathered in the 
fields of the past, is to be brought home for the use of the present" (L, 
313-14). Not the details themselves, "which are generally worthless," 
but the "great changes, both physical and moral" (LC, 310-11) which 
they could be shown to document, had practical importance for guid­
ing the present. "Antiquarianism is no teacher of wisdom" because 
the antiquarian lacked "that comprehensive view which becomes the 
true historian." Although many of Arnold's assumptions about his­
torical reality were quite romantic, this "comprehensive view" en­
tailed the same things for him as it had for the men of the Enlighten­
ment: the ability to discern beneath the apparent randomness of 
history general patterns that "may really assist in shaping and pre­
paring the course of the future" (L, 84). Far from advocating an his­
toricist immersion in the spirit of past ages, Arnold felt the historian 
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had a duty to judge the past by the priorities of the present. He espe­
cially criticized historians like de Barante who, after "having shown 
himself most capable of analyzing history philosophically" in earlier 
works, had chosen in his study of the dukes of Burgundy "to forfeit 
the benefits of his own wisdom" and describe "the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries no otherwise than might have been done by their 
own simple chroniclers" (L, 314). 
Arnold consciously modeled the historical researcher on the scien­
tist: both tried to separate "what is accidental and particular from 
what is essential and universal."10 He had no doubt that proper in­
ductive methods would yield "truths of historical science" (L, 63) 
when applied to the facts of the past. Because historical periods were 
not viewed "in combination with one another," he argued, "percep­
tion of the general law" was obscured by "circumstances which inter­
fere with its regular operation" and the "scientific character" of his­
torical study was not acknowledged (L, 306). Reveal these laws by 
induction and comparative analysis, however, and human history be­
came not just "a mere aggregation of particular actions or characters, 
like the anecdotes of natural history but . . . besides this the witness 
to general moral and political truths, and capable when rightly used, 
of bringing to our notice fresh truths which we might not have gained 
by a priori reasoning only" (L, 307). 
In practice Arnold's investigation rested upon a priori moral uni­
versals that subverted induction to the same extent as had the philo­
sophers rationalistic ones. He proclaimed himself 
firmly persuaded . . . that setting out with those views of man which 
we find in the Scriptures, and with those plain moral notions which the 
Scriptures do not so much teach as suppose to exist in us, and sanction; 
the laws of history, in other words, the laws of political science, using 
"political" in the most exalted sense of the term . . . may be deduced, 
or . .  . confirmed from it with perfect certainty, with a certainty 
equal to that of the most undoubted truths of morals. (L, 305) 
Arnold projected onto history the moral order he assumed in all hu­
man affairs. For a mind so heavily regimented by general principles, 
an objective measure of the individual datum was virtually impossi­
ble. Stanley describes his "unwillingness . .  . to act in any individ­
ual case, without some general law to which he might refer," suggest­
ing that "at times it would almost seem as if he invented universal 
rules with the express object of meeting particular cases" (LC, 80). 
Contemporary political and ecclesiastical controversies merged in his 
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mind with "the prototypes of the various forms of error and wicked­
ness" denounced in the Bible, and "living individuals . . . and ex­
isting principles, became lost to his view in the long line of images, 
past and future, in which they formed only one link" (LC, 150). In 
such a mind, historical induction inevitably confirmed patterns es­
tablished by "undoubted truths." 
Too much depended upon the existence of these truths to allow the 
historian to accept the scientist's objectivity along with his authority. 
Arnold was keenly aware of the damage that could be done to the 
bases of belief if historical events were allowed to be random in their 
occurrence or relative in their significance, or worse yet, if historical 
and scientific criticism could be shown to compromise revealed truth. 
If historical study could not demonstrate the functioning of moral 
law, "we should be driven to the extremity of scepticism; truth would 
appear indeed to be a thing utterly unreal or utterly unattainable" (L, 
306). This placed great responsibility on the historian. Nothing was 
more culpable than a relativism that deprived laws of their sanction, 
nothing so insidious for a Christian society. Even impartiality—if it 
meant to write "as if there were no truth attainable in the matter, but 
all was mere opinion" (LC, 577)—became morally remiss. Once con­
vinced that political and moral truths existed, the historian could not 
"but wish them to be seen and embraced by others."11 Thus it was far 
from "partiality to say that the support of a bad cause is itself evil, the 
support of a good cause is itself good" (L, 301-2). As Duncan Forbes 
explains it, the impartiality of the Liberal Anglican historians did 
not mean having no standpoint, but rather having the best one—the 
Christian one.12 
Imposing such a viewpoint allowed Arnold to side-step the chal­
lenge that history's sheer variety posed to universal and permanent 
truths. He objected to Strauss's scriptural interpretation not because 
it was too sceptical but because it was not scientific enough.13 Accord­
ing to Arnold's disciple Bonamee Price, Arnold showed in his ser­
mons that the most advanced insights of historical and scientific criti­
cism could be used to place "the supernatural inspiration of the 
sacred writers on an imperishable historical basis . . . proof against 
any attack which the most refined modern learning could direct 
against it" (LC, 168). Arnold was able to turn the Higher Criticism 
against itself because the "scientific'' principle revealed by his "a pri­
on inquiry" into scripture was that its "lower," "historical" sense was 
of a different order from the higher, universal, spiritual meaning of 
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each text.H He could apply the "general rules of interpretation" to the 
historical side of the Bible without fear because he knew the validity 
of its "higher" meaning could not be undermined by its imperfect 
realization in history. Arnold was able, in Price's words, to reconcile 
"the progress of knowledge with Christianity" by limiting the sphere 
in which critical methods had validity, rather than by attempting to 
prove biblical accounts literally correct. 
Arnold overcame scepticism in the secular realm by similarly rul­
ing invalid all challenges to the bases of his belief. The "laws" of 
political science possessed in his mind the same certainty as did the 
tenets of Christian conduct because they were in essence the same 
thing: "The truths of political science belong as much, I think, to an 
historian, as those of theology to a Professor of Divinity" (LC, 577). 
As Stanley reminds us, "The Greek science, TTOXLTIIATI, of which the 
English word 'politics,' or even political science, is so inadequate a 
translation" meant for Arnold "society in its connexion with the 
highest welfare of man" (LC, 170). Moral perfection was the end of 
both civic and individual development and was guided by the same 
laws. Once assume these laws—and he confessed perplexity that any 
could doubt them—and the lessons of history neatly followed. Since 
Arnold was sure that only the presence of some "disturbing causes 
which may be clearly pointed out" could prevent such laws from 
promoting the good of nations, he could conclude that to oppose 
them was simply "to uphold what is bad" (L, 306-7). 
For Arnold the "unity of history" derived in part from the continu­
ing validity of these laws. Believing that the "general rules" of "polit­
ical wisdom" had remained the same for all western society made the 
classics contemporary and the study of ancient history not "an idle 
inquiry about remote ages and forgotten institutions, but a living 
picture of things present, fitted not so much for the curiosity of the 
scholar, as for the instruction of the statesman and citizen" (LC, 148­
49). But Arnold's unity meant more than uniformity. He based his­
tory's practicality on an interpretive tool more powerful than the 
manifestation of universal laws, always and everywhere the same. In 
an appendix to his translation of Thucydides, Arnold enunciated a 
theory of development that gave the additional "scientific" sanction 
of organic similarity to historical comparisons. Inspired by Vico, this 
master law of history held that "states, like individuals, go through 
certain changes in a certain order. . . . But they differ from individ­
uals in this, that though the order of the periods is regular, their dura­
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tion is not so; and their features are more liable to be mistaken, as they 
can only be distinguished by their characteristic phenomena."15 This 
law provided the demonstrable regularity in human history necessary 
to a philosophical understanding of it, while still respecting the 
uniqueness of the developmental process in individual states. Only na­
tions at the same stage of development could be validly compared. To 
impose upon history the "artificial divisions" established by political 
events was to be arbitrary and unscientific: "History is to be studied as 
a whole, and according to its philosophical divisions, not such as are 
merely geographical and chronological."16 Every society had an an­
cient and a modern history, so that "ancient history" was misnamed, 
because it really constituted the "modern history of the civilization of 
Greece and Rome." Empirical comparison of similarities between 
past and present would make clear that "in our moral and political 
views, in those matters which most determine human character," 
there existed a "perfect resemblance" between moderns and ancients 
(MW, 349). As a result the ancient world provided data directly rele­
vant to the historian's theorizing about modern society—data pos­
sessing "all the value of a mass of new and pertinent facts, illustrative 
of the great science of the nature of civilized man" (MW, 350). 
This "science" was governed not by the static categories of man in 
general, but by the stages through which a biological organism ma­
tured. It could account for change without sacrificing identity and 
recognize relative degrees of development without foregoing valid 
generalizations about the developmental process as a whole, or about 
the organism as an entity. The significance of this qualified relativ­
ism is demonstrated by the ways it conditioned Arnold's theorizing in 
other areas. At Rugby the lower standard of morality he tolerated 
among younger boys paralleled that historically tolerated during 
"the boyhood of the human race" (LC, 68). Their limited develop­
ment justified flogging, though reason and responsibility were the 
appropriate means of enhancing the sixth form's greater moral ma­
turity. The "principle of accommodation" Arnold used to interpret 
scripture similarly adjusted rules to circumstances. By claiming that 
"God's revelations to man . . . were adapted to his state at the sev­
eral periods when they were successively made,"17 he could argue that 
injunctions given to one age were only binding upon another to the 
extent that their circumstances were similar. This provided an escape 
from the intellectual discrepancies created by literal interpretation of 
scripture, and more importantly, established grounds for the per­
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manent relevance of Christian doctrine. For Arnold as for Carlyle, 
appreciating relative stages of development ended by shoring up 
rather than undermining what each defined as permanent principles. 
Like Carlyle too, Arnold j ustified his diagnosis of present problems 
with an appeal to the past—an appeal that merged the authorities of 
the historical, the natural, and the divine. The organic metaphor lent 
urgency to the reform movements of the early nineteenth century be­
cause it stressed the inevitability of change and the dangers inherent 
in attempting to subvert the natural maturation of the state. In Ar­
nold's case, however, the state "naturally" progressed toward greater 
freedom and complexity. The tendency of society was to "become 
more and more liberal" as the source of authority shifted from birth, 
to wealth, to numbers.18 Progress toward wider participation repre­
sented the growth of moral as well as political maturity. The transi­
tion from aristocracy to plutocracy was analogous to the transition 
from childhood to manhood:19 accepting the responsibility of self-
government encouraged "that practical vigour of mind" which, 
when properly cultivated, was "the greatest earthly blessing of which 
mankind are susceptible" (LRC, 2:257-58). Since "all the world is by 
the very law of its creation in eternal progress" (LC, 224), attempting 
to resist the expansion of self-government would be like trying to defy 
the order of nature and, by implication, the moral order of God's plan 
for human development. 
Arnold's conviction that this kind of political progress was organi­
cally necessary helps explain those attitudes toward revolution and 
aristocracy that so alarmed the Tories in the twenties and thirties. As 
he explained to Chevalier Bunsen, he took the revolutionary turmoil 
of the thirties as a "sign infallible" of the irreversible breakup of the 
old order. Trying to hinder it could only "derange the process of the 
new birth which must succeed it" (LC, 281). Government by aristoc­
racy was to Arnold "the greatest source of evil throughout the world" 
(LC, 447), because, by attempting to preserve the status quo, they had 
themselves provoked violent disruptions of the social order: "Consid­
ering the people as children, they have restrained the child, but they 
have not educated him; considering them even as lunatics, they have 
confined the lunatic, but have often so irritated him with their disci­
pline as to make his paroxysms more violent and more incurable" (L, 
276). In distinction to Carlyle and other early Victorian conserva­
tives, Arnold stressed that the aristocracy's responsibility was to 
"train up" the lower orders "to the independence of manhood," to 
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elevate and enlighten their inferiors, preparing them for popular 
rule.20 
But those who branded Arnold a dangerous radical missed the in­
herently conservative assumptions behind such views. As his reading 
of Roman history repeatedly makes clear, he condoned expanded 
popular power only when "the natural progress of things" (i.e., the 
spread of wealth and education) made the people "ripe for it" (R, 
1:340-41). Giving them too much power too soon would be as 
"unnatural"—as subversive of God's providence—as refusing to 
change at all (R, 1:491). Like Macaulay and other Whigs, Arnold 
championed reform as the best means of preserving the underlying 
continuity of national institutions. "Every new institution should be 
but a fuller development of, or addition to, what already exists," he 
wrote. "If things have come to such a pass in a country, that all its past 
history and associations are cast away as merely bad, Reform in such a 
country is impossible" (LC, 503). To reject tradition and ignore his­
tory as did the Chartists was to be a "slave," not a citizen (MW, 494). 
Believing that a nation could no more deny its past than could a per­
son the formative events and associations of his own life, Arnold cul­
tivated an attitude toward progress that encouraged further growth 
while respecting national heritage; in this way the English could 
achieve "Democracy without Jacobinism" (LC, 679 n.). 
Human or natural models of change increased Arnold's leverage on 
an undesirable status quo but also posed the problem of decay. To 
allow the history of western culture to be cyclical without being circu­
lar, he needed to argue that improvement had been incremental even 
though development repeated the same pattern in every society. To 
image all history as a static repetition of identical cycles would have 
negated the moral progress implicit in Christianity. Like other Lib­
eral Anglican historians, Arnold believed that modern history exhib­
ited "a fuller development of the human race, a richer combination of 
its most remarkable elements" (L, 26), because it incorporated and 
improved upon the moral excellence attained by previous cultures. 
Unlike Carlyle and Froude, he felt that overvaluing the past was more 
dangerous than undervaluing it; glorifying former times tended to 
hinder progress by "depriving] us of the advantages of our own supe­
rior experience" (LC, 195). To idolize either classical antiquity or the 
middle ages was to permit the possibility that humanity had degener­
ated over time—a conclusion thoroughly incompatible with Arnold's 
belief that history was the arena for the gradual perfecting of the hu­
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man race.21 He allowed that material progress might be equivocal in 
its nature, but not moral progress: 
. . . while the advance of civilization destroys much that is noble, and 
throws over the mass of human society an atmosphere somewhat dull 
and hard; yet it is only by its peculiar trials, no less than by its positive 
advantages, that the utmost virtue of human nature can be matured. 
And those who vainly lament that progress of earthly things, which, 
whether good or evil, is certainly inevitable, may be consoled by the 
thought that its sure tendency is to confirm and purify the virtue of the 
good.22 
Holding center stage in this historical arena was the nation rather 
than the individual. History was foremost "the biography of a politi­
cal society or commonwealth" (L, 5). The institutions of the ad­
vanced state were necessary to cultivate the moral maturity Arnold 
desired in its subjects. The nation expressed the common life and 
common purpose of its members; it focused their efforts to accom­
plish its divinely appointed work. The struggles of even the greatest 
heroes were of interest not for their private triumphs but for their 
advance of the state; the Hector who subordinated himself to his 
country's good was more noble than the selfish and self-sufficient 
Achilles (R, 3:386-87). Even nations diminished in importance when 
viewed through the wider lens of western culture. The individual 
struggles of the Romans and Teutons were significant not in them­
selves but for their advance of civilization. These peoples had been 
chosen by Providence to play leading roles in the spiritual biography 
of western man. 
As inheritors of this legacy, the Victorians bore a grave responsibil­
ity. The possibility of regression always qualified the inevitability of 
progress for Arnold. "Nations, like individuals," he wrote, "have 
their time of trial; and if this be wasted or misused, their future course 
is inevitably evil" (R, 1:252). Indeed, in the history of Rome itself 
loomed the specter of possible defeat: "The great improvements of 
our own days may at some future period be again cut short" (LRC, 
2:386). His confidence in the continuity of progress was qualified by 
the eschatological anxiety that "modern history appears to be not 
only a step in advance of ancient history, but the last step; it appears to 
bear marks of the fulness of time, as if there would be no future history 
beyond it" (L, 28). Because he saw "no new continents peopled by 
youthful races, the destined restorers of our worn-out generations" 
(L, 30), he ruled out the possibility of a "third period of human his­
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tory" beyond classical and modern. It was the apocalyptic culmina­
tion to his pattern of progress that gave historical writing its urgent 
practicality. If "our existing nations are the last reserve of the world," 
he wrote, "its fate may be said to be in their hands—God's work on 
earth will be left undone it they do not do it. But our future course 
must be hesitating or mistaken, if we do not know what course has 
brought us to the point where we are at present" (L, 31). On man's 
success in discerning, understanding, and applying the laws of his­
tory rested the fate not just of England, but of God's favored people on 
earth. And the historical scientist, by virtue of his command of these 
laws, guided the spiritual as well as the political destiny of the world. 
He was not just a scholar, but a sage. 
II 
We can clearly trace the ramifications of Arnold's theories about 
history in his analysis of sources, his artistic reconstruction of the 
past, and his judgments on men, events, and nations. For Arnold as 
for Carlyle, the danger of scepticism intensified the responsibility of 
research. As he warned in his eighth lecture, "If historical testimony 
be really worth nothing, it touches us in one of the very divinest parts 
of our nature, the power of connecting ourselves with the past. For 
this we do and can do only through knowledge which we must call 
historical." If no veracity could be expected from historical state­
ments, if no facts could be established from the physical evidence of 
past civilizations, "our life would be at once restricted to the span of 
our own memory; nay, I might almost say to the span of our own 
actual consciousness. For if no other man's report of the past is to be 
credited, I know not how we can defend the very reports of our own 
memories" (L, 282-83). Identity itself rested on the truths of memory. 
Like Wordsworth's child and man, England too could claim a unified 
self: her political life was "made up wholesomely of past and present, 
so that the centuries of English History are truly 'bound each to each 
by natural piety' " (LC, 680). Critical analysis of source materials 
must not be allowed to produce radical scepticism about historical 
truths, lest the basis for life-giving continuity—the integrity of the 
individual organism over time—be destroyed. That is one reason why 
Arnold so admired Niebuhr's analytical skills. The master possessed 
an "instinctive power of discerning truth" where others saw only 
myth: he "has rescued from the dominion of scepticism much which 
less profound inquirers had before too hastily given up to it" (R, 
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1:218) and thus affirmed the historical validity of Rome's "child­
hood." 
Evaluating the credibility of historical data took on a characteristic 
high seriousness for Arnold. It was not enough for the historian to be 
impartial or free from dishonesty: he must have "an earnest craving 
after truth, and utter impatience not of falsehood merely but of error" 
(L, 293). Significantly, as in scriptural interpretation, Arnold consid­
ered the "scientific" treatment of source materials not only a means to 
truth, but the best guarantee of reaching it. In his "Introductory Dis­
sertation on the Credibility of Early Roman History," he compared 
the evaluation of historical data to that of "natural philosophy": 
what would be unthinkable in the sciences—the confounding of all 
evidence, regardless of its reliability, with fact—must also be avoided 
in the study of history "if we wish to establish the great doctrines of 
history on the same sure base with those of natural philosophy."23 
Arnold's "cross-examination" of historical witnesses is clearly in­
spired by Niebuhr's methods for evaluating textual reliability. He 
tried constantly to be aware of the prejudices, affiliations, and 
temperaments that color the testimony of his sources. He pointed out, 
for instance, that Livy and Dionysius had relied upon the annals of 
great Roman families, and that "each successive version of these, as 
men's notions of their early history became more and more romantic, 
would omit whatever seemed inconsistent with the supposed purity 
and nobleness of the times of their forefathers" (R, 1:239-40). Else­
where in the History of Rome he was careful to separate disinterested 
observation from prejudice in accounts rendered by participants, and 
he remained alert to the ways that friendship between historians and 
their subjects could restrain criticism and exaggerate praise (e.g., R, 
3:382-83). 
Although Arnold was keenly aware that the modern historian 
could no longer gain a "reputation for learning" (R, 1:476) merely by 
repeating the accounts of the ancients, his own work was far from 
original. His primary materials were those available to any educated 
man of the time: the standard accounts and the more modern attempts 
to reconcile them, chief among them Niebuhr's. Arnold followed 
Niebuhr very closely in volumes 1 and 2 of the History of Rome, al­
though he insisted that his work was more than "a mere compila­
tion," insofar as his "own reading and comparison of the ancient 
authorities" was the foundation of every paragraph (R, 2:v). Of par-
tic ular significance for Arnold's romantic sense of national identity, 
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he followed Niebuhr in restoring the myths of early Rome to its his­
tory. Like the German and British romantics before him, Arnold be­
lieved that the best means of discovering the essence of "racial" iden­
tity lay in the literature it had produced. He was aware that given 
"that wider view of the connection of races and languages, which we 
have learnt of late to entertain," historians could no longer "cast . . . 
aside as mere fables" the "mythic reports" of a nation's origins 
(R, 1:481). Besides valuing myths for the "germ of truth" that might 
be recovered from them, Arnold was also committed to a theory of 
history that stressed the organic integrity of all manifestations of na­
tional life at any given stage of its development. The epigraph from 
Mackintosh that opens the History of Rome acknowledges the value 
Arnold placed on the emotional "facts" of national identity: "The old 
songs of every people, which bear the impress of their character, and 
of which the beauties whether few or many must be genuine, because 
they arise only from feeling, have always been valued by men of mas­
culine and comprehensive taste." 
Even in researching later periods Arnold considered popular litera­
ture of unique historical importance. His lectures particularly rec­
ommended a period's second- and third-rate literature to the student. 
In a peculiarly Carlylean image, Arnold compared this literary "rub­
bish" to "mere moss" which "becomes in the lapse of ages, after being 
buried in its peat bed, of some value as fuel; it is capable of yielding 
both light and heat" (L, 75). He found the "colloquial peculiarities" of 
contemporary histories and the "particularity" of an age's legal style 
also worthy of attention because they helped resuscitate the past; in 
reading them the audience could feel "we are in some sort hearing" 
the voices of contemporary speakers (L, 67). The end of research was 
ultimately to galvanize these remains into some semblance of the once 
living whole. Literature was merely the most accessible form of the 
wealth of sociocultural data needed to reveal "not what existing ac­
counts may have recorded of a people or a race, but what the people or 
race really was, and did; we wish to conceive a full and lively image of 
them, of their language, their institutions, their arts, their morals; to 
understand what they were in themselves, and how they have affected 
the fate of the world" (R, 1:476-77). 
Arnold's attention to the geographical evidence also deserves note, 
as it would be shared by Carlyle, Freeman, and especially Green. 
Buckland had first kindled Arnold's scientific curiosities; their con­
tinued vigor manifested itself in plans for a major work "on the con­
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nection between the revolutions of nature and those of mankind" that 
would demonstrate that "nature, no less than human society, con­
tains tokens that it had a beginning, and will as surely have its end" 
(R, 1:498). Geography also had a romantic appeal for one who shared 
Wordsworth's quasi-religious attachment to the Lake District around 
his own Fox How. In his Oxford lectures, Arnold recommended the 
study of geography not just as a pedagogically useful starting point 
for political history, but also because it contained "so much . .  . of 
the most picturesque and poetical character; so much of beauty, of 
magnificence, and of interest, physical and moral" (L, 123-24). Just as 
the life of a nation could to him become as distinct "as that of an indi­
vidual," so too the terrain of a country could take on an anthropomor­
phical individuality. "Let me once understand the real geography of 
a country," he claimed, "its organic structure . . . the form of its 
skeleton, that is, of its hills; the magnitude and course of its veins and 
arteries, that is, of its streams and rivers: let me conceive of it as a 
whole made up of connected parts; and then the position of man's 
dwellings . . . becomes at once easily remembered, and lively and 
intelligible besides" (L, 125-26). In geographical evidence an under­
standing of organic relationships was quite literally the key to mean­
ing; reverence for the poetic feelings nature awakened was the best 
guarantee of "scientific" accuracy in reconstructing its past. Arnold 
criticized Polybius because the "tameness" of his accounts of alpine 
passes crossed by Hannibal revealed that "not one spark of feeling" 
had been awakened in him by the sublime; the "unpoetical character" 
of his mind made his descriptions so "unscientific" as to be unrecog­
nizable.24 Landscape provided history's most palpable terrain. It took 
the eye of imagination to glimpse its true contours, a collaboration of 
poetry and science to fix its extent. It was not just a backdrop, but a 
vital part of historical understanding. 
Arnold's conception of his artistic tasks was informed by a similar 
complexity of moral and creative vision. The writing of history posed 
more than a literary problem: an inadequate narrative failed to make 
sense of the past. So long as it lacked coherent shape, the historical 
account could not demonstrate the unfolding of God's will in the 
universe. Like a paleontologist trying to make the argument from 
design, the historian was left with only scattered bones; what gave 
them identity and unity, "the face, figure, and mind of the living man 
are lost to us beyond recall" (R, 2:82). He had to impose order lest 
vision become nightmare. His task was to "supply, and arrange into 
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an intelligible whole, the disjointed and seemingly unmeaning im­
ages, which our fragments of information offer, as perplexing and 
incongruous as the chaos of a dream" (R, 3:460-61). Arnold admired 
Niebuhr's artistic abilities as much as his scholarship, for his integra­
tive genius allowed him to retrieve "from much, that to former writers 
seemed a hopeless chaos, . .  . a living picture of events and institu­
tions, as rich in its colouring, as perfect in its composition, as it is 
faithful to the truth of nature" (R, 1:219). 
Arnold's early conversion to Wordsworthian romanticism had 
helped convince him that only art could render this coherent truth 
adequately. His college friend J. T. Coleridge had first introduced 
Arnold to the Lyrical Ballads. In Coleridge's eyes becoming a 
"zealous disciple" of Wordsworth was of peculiar advantage to Ar­
nold, whose practical bent too often inhibited his "feeling for the 
lofty and imaginative" (LC, 12). Doubtless Wordworth's ideas also 
played a role in convincing Arnold that "Poetical feelings are merely 
. .  . all the highest and purest feelings of our nature. . . . The very 
essence of poetry is, that it exhalts and ennobles us, and puts us into a 
higher state of mind than that which we are commonly living in" 
(MW, 252-53). It was natural that as an historian he should draw 
upon these feelings in himself and appeal to them in his audience. 
When Arnold confessed to his brother-in-law in 1841 that he had 
begun to regard his own History of Rome "more and more with some­
thing of an artist's feeling as to the composition and arrangement of 
it" (LC, 549), he implied a spiritual and imaginative intensity differ­
ent in kind from the ancients' concern with mere style. Haunted even 
in sleep by images of famous events, he tried to maintain this identifi­
cation and sympathy in the creative process as well. J. C. Hare conjec­
tures that Arnold's manuscript lacked footnotes because "after hav­
ing impregnated his mind with the liveliest conception he could gain 
of the events he was about to record . .  . he was unwilling to inter­
rupt the flow of the narrative by pausing to examine the details of the 
documents" (R, 3:iv). Where he lacked personal experience of the 
kind of events portrayed, he trusted in "his general knowledge of hu­
man nature, his love of great and good actions, his sympathy with 
virtue, his abhorrence of vice" to "assist him in making himself as it 
were a witness of what he attempts to describe" (R, 2:vii-viii). Upon 
the authenticity of this witnessing rested the credibility of the histori­
an's message; his highest credentials were moral, not scholarly. 
Arnold also had quite pragmatic reasons for his artistic choices. It 
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was impossible "to communicate any interest to history," he feared, 
"if it must only record events and not paint actions" (R, 2:562). His­
tory had great potential as a didactic weapon; a lively narrative filled 
with "painted" scenes and portraits was the best means of reaching a 
wide audience. Consistently, the needs of the general reader took 
precedence over those of the fellow scholar in shaping Arnold's histo­
ries. He wished to make his translations "as good as any which they 
are publishing in Germany" but was also anxious that their scholarly 
apparatus not seem superfluous to a "man of plain sense" (LC, 63­
64). He undertook his own history of Rome because he feared that 
Niebuhr's "discoveries and remarkable wisdom" would not become 
"generally popular in England" unless rendered in a form "more 
adapted to our common taste" (R, l:vii). "Common taste" favored a 
higher proportion of story-telling narrative to scholarly "disserta­
tions." Arnold excused the excessive length of volume 2 by claiming 
that further abridgment would deprive it of the interest and particu­
larity that most effectively impressed the memory. Although gener­
ally scrupulous about the reliability of historical data, so that at one 
point he relegated conjectures to an appendix because they were not 
definite enough "to claim the name of history" (R, 2:307), elsewhere 
he allowed audience expectations to override his reservations. He re­
lied on the traditional chronology for the consuls and tribunes of 
Rome because it was fixed in readers' memories in a way Niebuhr's 
more accurate version was not. In Rome's earliest history he was con­
tent to flesh out "an outline of undoubted truth" with specifics that 
were at least "clear from manifest error" and that still preserved 
"some of its most remarkable details, which may be true, and are at 
any rate far too famous to be omitted" (R, 1:531-32). Although vig­
ilant against the distortions of fantasy, Arnold remained sensitive to 
its emotional power. He consciously chose to include events that "are 
so striking in their incidents, as to acquire the interest of a romance, 
and thus retain their hold on the imaginations and moral feelings of 
all ages and countries" (R, 3:259-60). Memory and imagination were 
the keys to living history; the "romance" that nurtured both must not 
therefore be sacrificed completely to the "spirit of inquiry and of fact" 
(R, 1:99). 
Arnold's treatment of the legends of early Rome offers the most 
interesting examples of his attempts to preserve this "romantic" 
quality. Like Macaulay in the Lays of Ancient Rome, Arnold sought 
to capture the voice as well as the message of the ancient world. Too 
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sophisticated a style would be anachronistic; one too prosaic would 
destroy the poetry. No man could tell "such stories in a civilized age in 
his own proper person, with that sincerity of belief, nay even with 
that gravity which is requisite to give them their proper charm" (LC, 
432). Just as Wordsworth attempted to approximate the "language 
really used by men" in his poems of rural life, so too Arnold presented 
the early legends of Rome in what he called "an antiquated and sim­
ple language"; in fact, he told J. T. Coleridge that Wordsworth had 
seen and approved of this treatment (LC, 432). Arnold considered it 
irreverent to follow too closely the most obvious model, the Bible, but 
its stylistic impress still lingers. In the legend of Aeneas that opens the 
History of Rome, Arnold combines touches of archaic diction and 
syntax with balanced cadences to reinforce the mythic details of the 
story: 
When the fatal horse was going to be brought within the walls of Troy, 
and when Laocoon had been devoured by the two serpents sent by the 
gods to punish him because he had tried to save his country against the 
will of fate, then Aeneas and his father Anchises, with their wives, and 
many who followed their fortune, fled from the coming of the evil day. 
But they remembered to carry their gods with them, who were to receive 
their worship in a happier land. They were guided in their flight from 
the city, by the god Hermes, and he built for them a ship to carry them 
over the sea. When they put to sea, the star of Venus, the mother of 
Aeneas, stood over their heads, and it shone by day as well as by night, 
till they came to the shores of the land of the west. But when they 
landed, the star vanished and was seen no more; and by this sign Aeneas 
knew that he was come to that country wherein fate had appointed him 
to dwell. (R, 1:1-2) 
Even in the later history of Rome, Arnold found himself falling "in­
sensibly" into the same measured pace and antiquated inversions 
when confronted by stories historically true in substance but filled 
with "romantic" details, like that of the Gauls' attack on the Capitol 
(R, 1:545). Arnold hoped this treatment would charm, but he also 
intended it to serve more practical ends: it made clear to "the most 
careless reader" that the legends were distinct from "real history" 
(R, l:x, 20). Arnold follows these early legends with analyses, often 
based on a comparison of variants, designed to determine how much 
of the ancient tales could be accepted as true. Still, he distinguished 
between fictions calculated to minister to national or individual van­
ity, and those which were "imaginative but honest . . . not profes­
sing to impart exact knowledge, but to delight, to quicken, and to 
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raise the perception of what is beautiful and noble" (R, 1:393). If the 
former deserved oblivion, it would be "irreverence" to neglect the lat­
ter, serving as they did some of the highest aims of historical writing. 
Reverence and identification were the keynotes of Arnold's recon­
struction of people and events as well. Nowhere were they more im­
portant than in his handling of characterization. Although Arnold 
never indulged in hero-worship for its own sake, he too believed that 
respect for true superiority lay at the base of the modern social order 
and could hardly retain its credibility in the present if it could not be 
made understandable and admirable in the past. The myths of an­
cient Rome served this end by providing some of the commemoration 
that was traditionally "due to the memory of illustrious names" 
(LRC, 1:26). But "real history" demanded recognizable individuals; 
these transformed the "landscape" into "an historical picture." A 
more powerful means of inspiring understanding and admiration 
was the historian's ability to "multiply in some sort the number of 
those with whom we are personally and individually in sympathy." 
Enabling the reader "to recognise amidst the dimness of remote and 
uncongenial ages, the features of friends and of brethren" laid on him 
a claim to belief and assent forged from a common humanity (L, 74). 
Arnold lamented that the utter lack of "materials for painting por­
traits" made his account not only inferior to Niebuhr's, but contrast 
sadly with "those inimitable living pictures with which Carlyle's 
History of the French Revolution abounds" (LC, 448). He strove to 
compensate for this lack in a number of ways. 
Dialogue provided one means of increasing the reality of character­
ization. Arnold felt it "quite essential" to present the legends dramat­
ically, "making the actors express their thoughts in the first person, 
instead of saying what they thought or felt as narrative" (LC, 432). 
Such was the style of the Bible and Herodotus, works from commen­
surate stages of cultural development. For later periods, too, he occa­
sionally fashions direct quotations from the classical sources (e.g., 
R, 3:69), notwithstanding his conviction that such speech-making 
had too easily degenerated into mere rhetorical affectation in many of 
the ancients. Having criticized Livy for drawing "the Romans of ev­
ery period in the costume of his own times,"25 he invents speeches 
only when they would authenticate "the peculiar views of [a] party or 
time"—for instance, Servius Maluginensis' opposition to the Li­
cinian laws (R, 2:48ff.). And yet, while taking care to antiquate the 
language appropriately so as to preserve the flavor of the period ("and 
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if ye had ever found me to be your enemy, it had been ill done in you to 
have tried me yet again this seventh time"), Arnold cannot help find­
ing in Maluginensis' situation a somewhat anachronistic vindication 
of the uses of Christian revelation. He similarly superimposes the 
perceptions of one culture upon another when he advises his au­
dience to read Chatham's speech against the Franco-American coali­
tion in order to duplicate the drama of Appius Claudius's arguments 
aginst peace with Pyrrhus (R, 2:497). Both cases suggest the extent to 
which Arnold's appreciation for particularity remained controlled by 
private typologies. 
Of course, allusions or comparisons to more modern events also 
allowed Arnold to tap the strong enthusiasms and vivid memories of 
his audience and to use them to charge characters with more imme­
diate significance. Arnold exploits both the awe and the patriotism of 
the English by comparing Hannibal's sixteen-year struggle against 
Rome to Napoleon's against England; the personal magnetism of the 
warrior is balanced against the moral necessity of his defeat in both 
cases (R, 3:63). He encourages his readers to view with greater sym­
pathy the apparent mixture of faith and scepticism in Scipio's behav­
ior by suggesting his resemblance to Cromwell. Such comparisons 
easily shade into projections of desired similarities, however. Arnold 
decides that given Scipio's "nobleness of soul," he must have felt the 
contemporary reverence for the invisible and the divine (R, 3:384-85). 
What appears to be hypocrisy Arnold explains as the result of conflict 
in one longing to believe, yet repelled by the "palpable falsehood" of 
Paganism. What seem to us to be time-bound assumptions are of 
course to Arnold permanent truths that render charges of anachro­
nism irrelevant. 
Arnold's insistent faith in heroism controls his attempts to illumi­
nate the minds and characters of great men, so that these figures be­
come not so much fully realized individuals as fulfillments of his own 
ideals. In Scipio's case he sides with Livy because his "truer feeling 
. . . taught him that a hero cannot be a hypocrite." For Arnold, the 
stature of both Hannibal and Scipio endowed them with a manifest 
personal "ascendancy" that he assumes must have overpowered the 
minds and allegiances of lesser men. In the absence of conclusive data, 
he finds no bars to the best construction of equivocal behavior, as 
when he assumes that Hannibal's fervent patriotism was what en­
listed his support of action that wore the appearance of savage cruelty 
(R, 3:133). This devotion to his country's honor becomes the keynote 
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of Arnold's reconstruction of Hannibal's state of mind. He follows 
the classical sources in portraying Hannibal as haunted night and 
day by "his strong sense of being the devoted instrument of his coun­
try's gods to destroy their enemies" (R, 3:70). His own inventions 
reinforce this characterization as they expand the reader's capacity for 
sympathy and imagination. Here, for instance, he encourages us to 
think with Hannibal riding beneath the walls of Rome: 
If anything of disappointment depressed his mind at that instant; if he 
felt that Rome's strength was not broken, nor the spirit of her people 
quelled, that his own fortune was wavering, and that his last effort had 
been made, and made in vain; yet thinking where he was, and of the 
shame and loss which his presence was causing to his enemies, he must 
have wished that his father could have lived to see that day, and must 
have thanked the gods of his country that they had enabled him so fully 
to perform his vow. (R, 3:246) 
The reader's satisfactions are complex. Not only is he for the moment 
privy to the great man's thoughts; confident of the superior strength 
of the unified state and the ultimate piety of the hero's intentions, he 
can also give himself over to the vicarious pleasures of both vengeful 
victory and poignant defeat. 
The individuality of Arnold's characters, especially his heroes, is 
finally subsumed by the ethical imperatives they serve. On the 
broader stage of western history, Rome's ends outweighed Hanni­
bal's in importance and necessarily qualified Arnold's final estima­
tion of his defeat. Arnold acknowledges the ability of great individu­
als like Hannibal to embody the history and "the living spirit" of an 
entire nation. He pays homage to others whose own hands had 
shaped the course of time—to Philip of Macedon, for instance, or to 
Dionysius of Syracuse, "who outtopped by his personal renown the 
greatness of the events in which he was an actor" (R, 1:438). But his 
belief that the state was "the ultimate power in human life" had to 
put into perspective even the greatest heroes. Ultimately, great men 
could act permanently only by forming great nations: "brave and able 
as Dionysius was, active, and temperate, and energetic," he failed be­
cause "he left behind him no beneficial institutions; he degraded 
rather than improved the character of his countrymen" (R, 1:475). 
Hannibal's selfless devotion to the good of his nation made him a 
Hector to Scipio's Achilles, but was inadequate to compensate for 
Carthage's inherent cultural deficiencies. Perhaps Arnold is warning 
himself as much as his audience against "our tendency . .  . to ad­
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mire individual greatness far more than national." Rome's triumph, 
he insists, demonstrated "the wisdom of God's providence. . .  . It 
was clearly for the good of mankind, that Hannibal should be con­
quered: his triumph would have stopped the progress of the world." 
He urges those who regretted Hannibal's defeat to consider how iso­
lated Carthage was, and how ill-fitted to "bind together barbarians of 
every race and language into an organized empire, and prepare them 
for becoming, when that empire was dissolved, the free members of 
the commonwealth of Christian Europe" (R, 3:64-65). Admiration 
for individual preeminence was finally less important than—and 
perhaps distracted from—reverence for the providential, which oper­
ated on the level of the nation. 
Here was a more challenging dramatic problem: Arnold's didactic 
purposes required that the identity of the state be realized with as 
much intensity as that of its great individuals. He follows the roman­
tic historian's lead in seeking "national personality" in phenomena 
such as race, language, religion, and institutions. In the History he 
provides periodic if necessarily sketchy inventories of various aspects 
of Roman culture—their art and literature, their religious festivals, 
their public works, and the sources of their wealth—in order to estab­
lish the character of the people at important junctures (R, l:ch. vi; 
2:446 if.). He also follows his contemporaries in assuming that cer­
tain political traits were innate to certain "races." The love of institu­
tions and order, the reverence for law, and the subordination of indi­
vidual to social good characterized both the Greeks and the Romans, 
needing only the addition of Teutonic morality and domestic virtue 
to produce a racial mixture uniquely suited to promote Arnold's ideal 
Christian democracy. Arnold uses laws to reveal "the deliberate 
mind" of a society. This was particularly true of property laws, since 
in his moralized political order the possession of property "calls forth 
and exercises . . . forethought, love of order, justice, beneficence, 
and wisdom in the use of power,'' thereby determining the social ma­
turity of a given civilization (L, 19). Arnold tries, for instance, to in­
corporate his investigations of various land tenures into a "sort of 
Domesday Book of Italy after the Roman Conquest" (LC, 514) that 
would, like England's, reveal social as well as economic relationships. 
Although he believed that a state's political history at times ob­
scured its "infinitely more important" social condition, in most 
places in the History of Rome he had in large part to rely on the 
former to gauge the latter. In its first half, his sympathy and interest 
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focus on the struggle of the commons to gain legitimate power, his 
criticisms on the obstructions created by burgher and aristocrat to 
such "natural" progress (R, 1:229; 2:19-20; 2:271-72). In volume 3, 
however, his sympathies begin to shift, in part because the aristocracy 
had shown itself willing to share power gradually, but more impor­
tantly, because he found in them a needed embodiment of the "spirit, 
and wisdom, and power of Rome" (R, 3:64), of a collective heroism to 
counterbalance Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Believing that "against a 
whole nation of able and active men the greatest individual genius of 
a single enemy must ever strive in vain" (R, 2:463-64), Arnold needed 
to make the aristocracy demonstrate the same purity of motive he ex­
pected from great heroes. The "unyielding magnaminity" (R, 3:64) 
with which the Roman aristocracy devoted themselves to the defense 
of the commonwealth against Hannibal—their fidelity under duress 
(R, 3:158), their willingness to endure personal sacrifice (R, 3:191), 
their generosity to the commons and the colonies in the face of a 
greater danger without (R, 3:169)—all support Arnold's claim that 
they deserved their ascendancy (R, 3:342). Roll calls of great Roman 
families were the easiest way to individualize this group. Elsewhere 
Arnold tries to render the nation imaginatively palpable by re-creating 
the collective experience of citizens, just as he had tried to reconstruct 
the thoughts of great men. A series of particulars sketches in the Ro­
mans' fears at learning of Hannibal's approach (R, 3:244), for in­
stance, or their jubilation after Hasdrubal's defeat at Metaurus (R, 
3:377-79). Without data to support such particularity, however, he 
more often has to treat the nation metaphorically: Rome was the rock 
standing unshaken in the torrents of war, the special agent of divine 
providence, against which even the greatest powers were fated to 
struggle in vain (R, 3:146, 244). 
Arnold's attempts to objectify his conception of national life fi­
nally carry less narrative weight or interest than his more conven­
tional efforts at military history. Even if the ancient annals had not 
justified this emphasis, Arnold's belief that military heroics excited 
"our deep sympathies" would have. Battles had to be either useful or 
uplifting to justify inclusion: campaigns deserved full coverage only 
when they contained valuable military lessons or were so striking as 
to command "the imaginations and moral feelings of all ages and 
countries." Unlike the "feeble bickerings" of the decaying Greek 
states, the "varied and eventful story" of Hannibal's Italian cam­
paigns laid such a claim on soldier and general reader alike; so too did 
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the Sicilian wars, preserving as they did "the immortal names of Syra­
cuse and Archimedes" (R, 3:260). Arnold was convinced that the truth 
about combat could be discovered neither by those who placed all the 
good on one side, nor by those "unbelievers] in all heroism," who 
brought "every thing down to the level of a common mediocrity; to 
whose notions, soldiers care for nothing but pay or plunder, and war 
is an expensive folly, with no fruit but an empty glory" (L, 301). He 
takes care in his own accounts to weigh the various merits of conflict­
ing sources, reminding his audience, for instance, of the reasons each 
side would have for misrepresenting the circumstances of the original 
Pyrrhic victory at Asculum (R, 2:509) and allotting praise and blame 
to both sides where due. Guided by his own faith in heroism, how­
ever, he willingly credits Livy's claims that when Nero revealed his 
secret plan to destroy Hasdrubal's reinforcements, his troops "felt the 
glory of their mission, and shared the spirit of their leader"—that, 
spurred on by the "universal enthusiasm" of the people, "the soldiers 
would scarcely receive what was offered to them: they would not halt; 
they ate standing in their ranks; night and day they hastened onwards, 
scarcely allowing themselves a brief interval of rest" (R, 3:369). And 
yet, notwithstanding the traditions preserved and the reverence in­
spired by military history, Arnold never forgets that other virtues 
outweigh the soldier's: he criticizes Nero's injustice and inhumanity 
toward the vanquished as much as he does Hasdrubal's decision to 
face certain death with his troops rather than escape to serve his coun­
try once again (R, 3:375-76). 
The moral power of military history depended upon the historian's 
ability to make it vivid and comprehensible to a general audience. 
Arnold draws upon a variety of devices to personalize and make im­
mediate his battle scenes. The Napoleonic wars were still fresh in 
memory and charged with emotion; hence, Sentinum becomes the 
Austerlitz of the second Samnite War (R, 2:346), and Hannibal's de­
liverance of Capua is likened to Napoleon's of Dresden (R, 3:231). To 
convey a clear and concise idea of military tactics, Arnold presents 
them in layman's terms and often from the point of view of partici­
pants. It is more than a mere rhetorical flourish, he claims, to com­
pare the destruction of the Carthagenian fleet at Syracuse to the "de­
struction of the giants by the thunder of Jove" (R, 1:466)—such was 
the comparison actually suggested to eyewitnesses "amidst the ex­
citement and enthusiasm of the actual spectacle." The queer but 
deadly instruments that helped deliver the city a second time come to 
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life through the eyes of the astounded Romans. Those who were not 
shot at through loopholes by invisible enemies.saw long poles "like 
the arms of a giant" dropping stones on their heads and grappling 
hooks reaching down to upset their ships. So daunted by these 
"strange and irresistible devices" did they become that, "if they saw so 
much as a rope or a stick hanging or projecting from the wall, they 
would turn about and run away, crying 'that Archimedes was going 
to set one of his engines at work against them' " (R, 3:286-87). The 
audience is clearly meant to share in the enemy's amusement at such 
spectacles and to see the human side of warfare. 
Closeups on individuals afford another means of humanizing the 
scale of battles and of personalizing even the most legendary expe­
riences. In Hannibal's crossing the Alps, our interest focuses as much 
on the personal drama as on the military feat. We join Hannibal at the 
summit where, according to Polybius, he tried to rally his despairing 
troops: 
He called them together; he pointed out the valley beneath, to which
the descent seemed the work of a moment: "That valley," he said, "is
Italy; it leads us to the country of our friends the Gauls; and yonder is
our way to Rome." His eyes were eagerly fixed on that point of the 
horizon; and as he gazed, the distance between seemed to vanish, till he 
could almost fancy that he was crossing the Tiber, and assailing the
capitol. (R, 3:89-90) 
The infectious self-confidence that arouses his troops at Cannae in 
the face of daunting odds again impresses us with the power of Han­
nibal's personality and the extent of his daring and ambition. The 
narrative that follows this closeup is typical: Arnold counterpoints 
the main lines of the traditional account with a limited amount of 
analysis and picturesque detail. He opens with the obligatory review 
of the troops, but also captures small details of weather that help one 
to visualize the scene: the dusty wind that blew into Roman faces, the 
rising sun that "flashed obliquely on their brazen helmets . . . and 
lit up the waving forest of their red and black plumes" (R, 3:139). He 
attempts some explanation of the Romans' strategic mistakes and 
furnishes comparisons to help his readers grasp the scene: the Roman 
army advanced like the English column at Fontenoy, the final car­
nage found parallel only in the Greeks' butchery of the Persians at 
Platea. For the most part, everyone acts in character in this set piece: 
the stones of the Balearian slingers fall "like hail" on the Roman line, 
the Numidians pursue the enemy with unwearied speed and unspar­
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ing ferocity, the Romans struggle on "against all hope by mere in­
domitable courage" (R, 3:140-42). 
Arnold's battle pieces remain largely conventional: they preserve 
"details too famous to be omitted" and do not significantly modify 
the standard accounts. However, what Hare called Arnold's "singular 
geographical eye" supplied observations that were genuinely origi­
nal. Arnold was among the first to adopt an attitude that soon became 
customary: that the historian had a duty to visit sites in person, to 
confirm the accuracy of his descriptions but also to sympathize with 
and understand events more fully. His use of detail gathered in such 
trips also anticipated techniques used by later historians to draw the 
reader into the scene. He frequently included "personal recollec­
tions" from his Roman travels in the History because he thought they 
would "give an air of reality to the narrative greater than it ever could 
have from maps" (LC, 549). His references to the geography of pres­
ent day Ascoli, for instance, help explain the success of Pyrrhus's ele­
phants against ancient Asculum (R, 2:505). Having seen "those 
strange masses of rock which rise here and there with steep cliffy 
sides" out of the Rhone makes it easier for him to understand how a 
detachment of Hannibal's troops were able to cross it and cut off the 
Gauls (R, 3:76). Elsewhere, he recalls the modern day scene only to 
stress past differences. The famous harbor of modern Carthegena was 
in ancient times a lagoon so shallow that at low tide Scipio's troops 
could cross it on foot, giving credence to their general's claims that 
Neptune himself had intervened on their behalf. Although the coun­
try around the Metaurus River was in Arnold's day an "open, joyous, 
and habitable region," Hasdrubal was trapped while retreating 
through it because "the dark masses of uncleared wood still no doubt 
in many parts covered the face of the higher plain," and the river 
below, "not to be judged of by its present scanty and loitering stream, 
ran like a river of a half cleared country, with a deep and strong body 
of waters," thus preventing his passage (R, 3:372). Arnold's frustra­
tion over the vagueness of Polybius's account was compounded by his 
fear that "accustomed as we are . . . in the present century, to regard 
the crossing of the Alps as an easy summer excursion, we can even less 
than our fathers conceive the difficulties of Hannibal's march, and 
the enormous sacrifices by which it was accomplished," confronted as 
he was by glaciers instead of the blue lakes and "the bright hues of the 
thousand flowers, which now delight the summer traveller on the Col 
of the Little St. Bernard!" (R, 3:480-81). Geographical evidence af­
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forded a measure of eye-witness credibility to the historian, of eye­
witness participation to the reader. Placing the reader in the scene 
gave historical imagination a habitation. Overlaying the familiar 
present with a stranger, wilder past then made sharper the need for a 
conscious act of projection preliminary to sympathy and understand­
ing, a conscious surrender of modern assumptions and scepticism 
preliminary to accurate vision. 
Arnold's keen interest in geography helped make his accounts of 
military campaigns among the most graphic and immediate in the 
History, at least in part because visiting sites afforded a kind of first­
hand insight that his fragmentary and contradictory sources would 
always deny him. In the final analysis, however, the History of Rome 
was innovative in neither its artistry nor its scholarship. Despite his 
belief in the importance of the social and personal dimensions of the 
past, the History remained predominantly a political history, for Ar­
nold lacked the visionary powers to illuminate the lacunae in his 
sources. As both Stanley and Hare acknowledged, his strength lay in 
"combining what was already known, rather than in decyphering 
what was unknown" (LC, 160; R, 3:viii). He admired "the richness of 
[Niebuhr's] learning and the felicity of his conjecture" all the more 
because he could not share them, could not duplicate the "personal 
characters and . . . distinct events" that the German divined so con­
fidently. On the other hand, despite his keen sense of his own dra­
matic failures in this regard, the dimensions of his history are true to 
his own predilections. The nation, as represented by its internal polit­
ical development, was more important than "personal characters"; 
the central fact of Roman history was its fulfillment of providence by 
military defeat of Hannibal. The Roman annals needed a critical and 
chastening appraisal, but only so that their tale of national triumph 
could be accepted with a more "scientific" certitude, and their life of 
the state be read in moral terms. 
Arnold's faith in the order and benevolence of God's world, in the 
living reality of those supreme truths which study of that world could 
only vindicate, unified his life and thought to a degree that many in 
later periods could only envy. This faith remains a major source of his 
appeal and importance for contemporaries. It gave him the confi­
dence to meet head-on the forces that threatened disunity in His so­
ciety. When demographic as well as ideological forces were driving a 
wedge between Church and State, he tried to reunite them by redefin­
ing their roles, making religion practical and government moral. 
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Realizing the danger of allowing scientific and historical modes of 
analysis to be sufficient to an understanding of the world, he co-opted 
both and enlisted them in the service of belief. Seeing that in a modern 
age faith would weaken unless it could be made both intellectually 
and spiritually acceptable, he devised an interpretive model that 
could acknowledge the validity of new critical methods without 
abandoning to them the fundamental bases of belief. Dedicated to 
progress but well aware of the limitations of a strictly Utilitarian con­
ception of it, he substituted the higher usefulness of historical lessons 
for the calculus of pain and pleasure. Sensing how deep was the 
channel of conservatism in English life, but appreciating the strength 
of the current of change working against it, he offered an organic 
model of development that would accommodate both, making re­
form the highest respect for one's forefathers, as well as the fulfill­
ment of one's duties to the present. 
Arnold's skill in reconciling potentially subversive impulses be­
comes clear when his approach to history is put in perspective. In his 
understanding of national identity, in his broadened conception of 
the range of data needed to document that identity, in his respect for 
myth, legend, and other forms of imaginative literature as source 
materials, and in his concern for resuscitating the life of the past 
rather than merely recording events, he was deeply influenced by ro­
mantic historiography. His organic model of change and progress 
also owes much to romantic thought, as does his reverence for the past 
as something that touches us "in the divinest part of our nature." But 
his deepest temperamental biases were more in harmony with the sys­
tematizing "philosophical" spirit of the Enlightenment. He too 
tended to view all history as a repository of facts that could be shown 
to document general laws once inductive methods were applied. He 
also believed that such laws could then be used deductively to judge 
specific cases, and to offer practical guidance for the present. Al­
though he could appreciate the specificity and uniqueness of certain 
kinds of historical data, his intellectual bent was pervasively general­
izing and essentially anti-historicist: data were useful only when they 
had been categorized according to universal types. Imaginative sym­
pathy with past events could move him deeply but never convert him, 
for he went to the past as one of the faithful seeking confirmation, not 
as a doubter seeking proof. Resuscitation of the past was the result, 
not the cause, of conviction; it allowed him to experience and to rep­
resent more fully those particular cases that confirmed what he 
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needed to believe were eternal laws. Knowing that he lacked evidence 
for the kind of fully realized, fully dramatized narrative he advocated, 
he still chose Roman history; Rome's ability to illustrate laws of de­
velopment strategically important for his own day quite outweighed 
its sketchiness in unique "biographical" detail. 
But if his methods were similar to those of eighteenth-century his­
torians, his ends were different in ways that fundamentally trans­
formed his means. In his hands a philosophical, scientific view of 
history confirmed the validity of those very moral truths that the En­
lightenment historian had intended to explode. The regularity that 
Arnold's scientific laws confirmed lay not in the static duplication of 
the same standards for all ages but in the recognition of relative 
standards for different stages of growth. The order of these stages gave 
a scientific regularity to the historical process, a regularity that made 
comparison and generalization about similar stages and the overall 
pattern of history possible, without necessitating that specific phe­
nomena in given stages be uniform from culture to culture. Arnold's 
"science of man" was fully compatible with Christian belief; for him, 
the authority of the natural order and the authority of the moral order 
were one and divine, so that the pursuit of truth could only end in the 
better understanding of God's will. 
Arnold's attitude toward historical study was highly influential for 
his contemporaries because it answered so many of their needs. Here 
was a scholar who embraced the methods of German erudition and 
introduced a new scientific rigor into historical study, thus promising 
to put history's truths on an objective basis. Here too was an artist 
whose narratives were both imaginatively satisfying and braced with 
a healthy dose of didactic uplift. But most importantly, here was a 
great religious teacher who reassured his age that history, rightly un­
derstood and properly applied, could be shown to confirm society's 
fundamental ethical beliefs and give eloquent testimony to a divinely 
ordained order. He could convince the public that the historian had a 
vital and noble role to play as sage and teacher, one who could derive 
the laws of history and show how these could be used to guide society 
through what often seemed like a troubled future. Arnold's concrete 
contributions to historical scholarship in England were not so im­
portant as this tone of high moral seriousness and practicality that he 
lent to it. It would be heard again and again in the Inaugural lectures 
of Regius Professors of Modern History, which after his tenure tended 
to be manifestos of the historian's assumptions about the morality 
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and practicality of historical study.26 Although he didn't live long 
enough to give his theories full embodiment, he provided a statement 
of purpose and direction that would not be seriously challenged until 
much later in the century. 
What Arnold found in history, he had himself brought to it. The 
deepest foundations of his faith admitted no challenges, and so inev­
itably all endeavors—intellectual, artistic, scientific, political, peda­
gogical—wound up confirming faith. Followers who set out to exam­
ine the bases of belief with the same intellectual rigor but without the 
foregone conclusion that they were true found them all too suscepti­
ble to erosion by scientific and historical modes of criticism, and were 
left without an adequate means of coping with the relativism that 
resulted. Arnold's supreme confidence in the certainty of belief was 
the gift of an earlier age, but his attempts to make Christian ethics a 
major force in secular life retained its appeal even when the rare unity 
of the intellectual and the spiritual that Arnold achieved had broken 
down. History, as the best proof of a divine order for believers and the 
best alternative to one for those who doubted, would play a major role 
in this process of secularization in the years that followed. 
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II

THOMAS CARLYLE

HISTORY AS SECULAR

PROPHECY

Thomas Carlyle confronted his century in an uneasy relationship: as a prophet he spoke directly to the Victorian spiritual di­
lemma, but his preachings grew increasingly incompatible with the 
actual direction of change in his day. Despite their resistance to many 
of his views, the Victorians heard in Carlyle one of the most eloquent 
testimonies to their will to believe. He voiced their own desire for a 
source of permanent value capable of sustaining human community 
on earth and their longings for transcendence beyond it—sustaining 
these against the slow erosion of the orthodoxy and authority that had 
formerly ordered their world. His historical writings provide the core 
of this testimony, because history—that is, Carlyle's mystically con­
ceived history—became this source of value. Even as they denounced 
the status quo, his major works (The French Revolution, 1837; Past 
and Present, 1843; Cromwell's Letters and Speeches, 1845; and Freder­
ick the Great, 1858-1865) affirmed sustaining bonds between old and 
new. And for all their idiosyncrasies, his histories both formed and 
reflected influential historiographical traditions. 
Their political and religious differences make Carlyle's and Ar­
nold's agreements about historical study more significant. Carlyle 
too yearned to forge a consciousness in which the religious, the intel­
lectual, and the practical were one. Like Arnold's, his resounding 
conviction that history was the revelation of God's will moving in the 
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world of man increased his sense of urgency about turning history 
from escapist to practical ends. This belief also created high expecta­
tions for the historian, whose job it was to rescue from oblivion proof 
of the supernaturalism of daily life. Central to human history was 
man's attempt to create order out of chaos; likewise, the historian's 
chief task was to create meaning out of the randomness of the histori­
cal record. Lacking the orthodoxy of Arnold's religious belief, how­
ever, Carlyle also lacked his confidence in the ultimate unity of all 
truths. His search for order entailed greater risks and his prophecies 
concealed deeper anxieties. 
Arnold's confidence in this unity allowed him to adapt the system­
atizing instincts of the Enlightenment to romantic and Christian 
ends. Carlyle's romanticism—the most radical of any Victorian 
historian's—was fundamentally antisystematic. His transcendental­
ism made no compromise with material fact. He also stood in the 
most profound opposition to the developing tradition of "scientific" 
historiography in his day. It would not be fair to say that his unparal­
leled success at forging a sympathetic communion between reader 
and past was achieved at the expense of accuracy; his scholarship was 
far more scrupulous than he is often given credit for. But his histori­
cal understanding was essentially metaphorical and symbolic, mak­
ing it not so much incompatible as incommensurate with the goals 
and methods of more traditional historiography. His scholarship 
served the ends of a visionary, not a scientific truth. The laws he ac­
knowledged were of a different order than those conceived by the 
philosophical historian of the past or the "political scientist" of the 
future. Their purpose, however, was the same: to affirm that some 
deeper regularity patterned the disparate phenomena of human life. 
Carlyle's early lapse from orthodoxy left him far more vulnerable 
than Arnold to the tyranny of fact and reason. His "fusion of poetry, 
history, and religion" represented an attempt to salvage the tenor of 
belief from its discredited vehicles and to break the hold of a merely 
mechanistic rationality.1 "Natural Supernaturalism" provided a sec­
ularized way of retaining intact Calvinist notions of God and indi­
vidual duty. The conception of history that he adapted from the Ger­
man romantics provided a secular scripture, an alternative testimony 
to God's presence in the world. History also provided a means to rec­
oncile the poetic to the factual. Like Arnold, Carlyle realized that 
empiricism could be satisfactorily answered not by substituting a 
higher fictional reality but by obliterating the distinction between the 
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poetic and the real. He redefined history to do just this. Although he 
began by believing that poetry most suitably embodied the ideal in 
human life, the biographical gradually edged out the fictional in sig­
nificance as his developing transcendentalism drew his attention 
from the invented to the actual.2 He came to prefer "any fact, relating 
especially to man,"3 for being able to reveal truth in a way works of 
mere poetic "sensibility" could not. He demoted fiction to no more 
than man's attempt to substitute his paltry history for God's. The 
"smallest historical fact" was superior to the "grandest fictitious 
event" because it "did actually occur; was, in very truth, an element in 
the system of the All, whereof I too form part."4 History was a "per­
petual Evangel,"5 the record of mankind's "whole spiritual life" (E, 
2:84). "Genuine poetry" became "the right interpretation of Reality 
and History" (E, 3:79). Like Arnold, Carlyle transformed history into 
a genre that could exploit the creative talents of the artist while dis­
arming Victorian suspicions against frivolous or misleading fictions; 
his history was real and visionary at the same time. 
Carlyle also wished to make the historian the master scientist as 
well as the master poet. In an 1831 notebook entry, he revealed his 
hopes that history might provide a truly "scientific" and "philosoph­
ical" way of grasping the "whole" of divine reality formerly accessi­
ble only to poetry: 
I see some vague outline of what a Whole is; also how an individual 
Delineation may be "informed with the Infinite"; may appear hanging 
in the universe of Time and Space (partly): in which case is it a Poem 
and a Whole? Therefore, are the true Heroic Poems of these times to be 
written with the ink of Science} Were a correct philosophic Biography 
of Man (meaning by philosophic all that the name can include) the 
only method of celebrating him? The true History (had we any such) 
the true Epic Poem?—I partly begin to surmise so.6 
Carlyle needed a "science" far more transcendental than Arnold's to 
find the infinite in the finite, however. He meant for the "historical 
scientific fact" to oppose not just fictions, but the "formulas" used by 
the mechanistic sciences of the early nineteenth century to "dispense 
with God" and to scale down the mystery of creation to easily quanti­
fied limits.7 The implications of such formulas had proved too 
threatening to allow him to share Arnold's confidence that the"regu­
larity of law guaranteed the meaningfulness of facts. Carlyle had 
fallen back from orthodoxy onto the premise that facts at least were 
created by God and inviolable. Lest man's systematizing admit the 
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possibility of rival realities, he had to deny "formulas" the power to 
do more than "label," "compound," and "separate" data. Finally, 
only a science that promised an unmediated contact with facts could 
preserve their integrity for him. Far from entailing the scientist's de­
tachment, this contact presupposed a commitment to seeing the "in­
finite" spiritual reality behind the phenomena of this world. 
The philosophes offered Carlyle the historiographical counterpart 
to this false science. Finding intolerable the conclusions offered by 
their "death's-head Philosophies 'teaching by example,' "8 he de­
nounced their method of writing history. History was not philosophy 
teaching by examples but "an address (literally out of Heaven, for did 
not God order it all?) to our whole inner man." The first step toward 
realizing its miraculous nature "is that we see the things transacted, 
and picture them out wholly as if they stood before our eyes;—and 
this, alas, of all considerations, is the one that 'dignity of History' 
least thinks of."9 The philosophes had not only refused to "look 
fixedly at the Thing" itself—they had substituted a "wretched 
politico-metaphysical Abstraction" for it (E, 3:326). No wonder that 
for them the past was not a soul-sustaining reality but a "godless 
Impossibility" (PP, 239). 
Carlyle redefined history so that its meaningfulness depended 
upon coherences beyond the reach of formula, on patterns invisible to 
the merely empirical eye. It took the talents of a poet-seer to reconsti­
tute the organic relationships that united the parts into a harmonious 
whole. Dryasdust, "being himself galvanic merely," could produce 
only "Chaos," "Dungheaps," "Shot-rubbish," and "dust Whirl­
winds"—pointless compendia of inert data. He was but an antiquar­
ian, an artisan—one of those men "who labor mechanically in a de­
partment, without eye for the Whole" (E, 2:90). Carlyle's ideal 
historian, on the other hand, was a "Psalmist," an "Iliadist," "the 
highest Shakespeare producible."10 He was an artist whose "rhyth­
mic nature"—his ear for the deeper harmonies and internal corre­
spondences—allowed him to "inform and ennoble the humblest de­
partment with an Idea of the Whole, and habitually know that only in 
the Whole is the Partial to be truly discerned" (E, 2:90). False science 
could only dissect and atomize; it could not discern the interrelating 
of parts through which history, like poetry, like nature itself, became 
meaningful and vital. Society was an organism, not a machine; the 
wholeness of its history was that of a reticulation, not of a calculus. 
Each of us was a thread woven by the "Loom of Time" into a "magic 
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web" of historical phenomena, held fixed in a pattern on a "warp of 
mystic darkness" (E, 3:181), knitted into the "Enormous Tissue of 
Existence never yet broken."11 We owed our sense of belonging— 
indeed, our very identities—to the relationships that thus enmeshed 
us. This network also maintained the continuity of ideas and beliefs 
so that some could "continually gravitate back to us" and, in a new 
form, "enrich and nourish us again" (FG, 1:16). Truths that had 
stood the test of time emerged in the "beatified bodily form" of tradi­
tion. Man remained "socially" and "spiritually alive" because he was 
able to breathe the "life-element" of these accumulated truths (HS, 
316). Not all parts of the past possessed this vital power. The true "Art 
of History, the grand difference between a Dryasdust and a sacred 
Poet," lay in the ablity "to distinguish well what does still reach to the 
surface, and is alive and frondent for us."12 
The historian's privileged vision gave him great power over the 
"eyeless" manipulators of fact. He could free the fact from dead ab­
stractions and restore it to the living process that gave it meaning. He 
could rejuvenate "the Thing itself" where others built only painted 
waxworks (E, 3:326). He could discern which beliefs were perma­
nently vital and could translate the "mystic heaven-written Sanscrit" 
intoa "Bible of World-History" (E, 3:251). But with great power went 
even greater risks for one who thus bore the responsibility for histo­
ry's meaningfulness. Carlyle might proclaim as loudly as Arnold that 
the permanent verities endured and manifested themselves to any 
who had (spiritual) eyes to see, but he was much more anxious that 
the facts might elude him. His peevish attacks on the Dryasdusts who 
reduced history to an "infinite grey void" sprang from his own alarm 
at finding the past melting into "sheer formlessness" and "unintel­
ligible maundering" (OC, 1:10) as he groped for meaning. Those in­
dividual events that he could prove to have been real served as no more 
than the kindling of a "wooden lucifer" in the "void night"—only a 
moment of illumination for the spiritual eye to see into the heart of 
the mystery. 
For Carlyle as for Arnold, human identity was sustained by its con­
nectedness to a palpable past; "man was still man" only so long as he 
could identify a continuous and vital history with which to refute the 
Everlasting No. If it were impossible to prove that heroes had once 
existed, it would be "as if we had done no brave thing at all in this 
Earth;—as if not Men but Nightmares had written of our History!" 
(OC, 1:6). If the historian could not make the past "melodious"— 
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resonant with a deep organic unity—"it must be forgotten, as good as 
annihilated; and we rove like aimless exiles that have no ancestors, 
whose world began only yesterday."13 Without historical proof of 
filiation, Carlyle would have left a spiritual orphan; without concrete 
verification of the infinite truth, he would have lost his grip on those 
spiritual moorings he had so carefully constructed to replace defunct 
orthodoxy, and drifted once more into that confused whirlpool of 
values in which so many Victorian minds would flounder. 
Like many of his contemporaries, Carlyle found a willed belief bet­
ter than none at all. For all his exaltation of the authority of fact, he 
was no more truly scientific or historicist than Arnold. Too much 
depended on the outcome of investigation to allow him to risk his 
poetic vision to empirical proof. George Levine aptly calls his turn to 
history and to the "primacy of 'fact' " after Sartor "probably not so 
much an expression of willingness to trust experience as an escape 
from the need to trust it."14 Carlyle saw only those facts that con­
firmed the lessons he needed to make sense of his own world. Rene 
Wellek argues persuasively that "Carlyle was never able to keep con­
sistently to the historical point of view . . . he always introduced a 
set of ethical standards which are not derived from history itself and 
which prevent him from judging the individuality of a man or time 
by its own inherent criteria."15 Despite his political differences with 
the Whigs, Carlyle agreed with them that "there is no use of writing of 
things past, unless they can be made in fact things present."16 His 
polemical purposes similarly undermined sympathy and obscured 
the historical context of the event. Like the Whigs he deduced the 
"facts" of the past from the moral and political order he wished to 
impose upon the Victorian present. 
Carlyle's conception of change offered a powerful reinforcement to 
the patterns he saw in history and to the reordering he desired for the 
present. In change as in unity, his model was an organic one. This 
allowed for the inevitable transformation of social structures and for 
the persistent vitality of essential truths. The analogy between human 
history and nature began as a speculation in an early notebook ("Has 
the mind its cycles and seasons like Nature, varying from the fermen­
tation of werden to the clearness of seyn; and this again and again; so 
that the history of man is like the history of the world he lives in?"17) 
and achieved certainty in The French Revolution, where civilization 
is an organism progressing through cycles of growth, decay, and re­
birth. Earlier essays had elaborated on the nature of these cycles. Ages 
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of scepticism alternated with those of faith, didacticism with poetry, 
stability with revolution. In his "Early German Literature," Carlyle 
also drew explicit comparisons (not unlike Macaulay's) between the 
"history of the universal mind" and that of the individual: youth was 
a time of "poetic recognition" that must inevitably give way to 
"scientific examination" (E, 2:283). 
He dealt more literally than Arnold with the threat of decay built 
into this cyclical model. Arnold and the Whigs stressed the continuity 
of progress, the improvement that survived collapse. Although Car­
lyle's belief in a purposeful universe unfolding according to a divine, 
if inscrutable, will also implied that cycles spiraled upward, his sys­
tem was more a series of renewals than a continuum. Destruction was 
not only inevitable but salutary. Only through decay could "a pruri­
ent element, rich with nutritive influences," be formed to nourish 
new life.18 Only after conflagration could the Phoenix rise from its 
ashes, and only when the "deserted edifices" were torn down could 
people go forward down the "thoroughfare" of human progress. 
Where other historians used organic cycles to lend a scientific regu­
larity to history, Carlyle's theories of change were finally "con­
sciously unscientific and even anti-scientific."19 For Arnold, the fact 
that all nations went through the same stages of development made 
possible the derivation of standard principles governing their growth: 
lessons from one stage of development could be applied with equal 
justice to corresponding stages in the lives of other organisms. Car­
lyle's cycles proceeded according to no law except that of the inevita­
bility of change itself. The fact of periodic change was clear, but his 
periods were far less uniform than Arnold's, and he was far more 
likely to stress their uniqueness. Still less did Carlyle share any real 
sympathy with the positivists' attempts to reduce history to laws ca­
pable of predicting the future, despite parallels between St. Simonian 
theories and his own.20 Carlyle's insistence on the fundamentally ir­
rational and uncontrollable nature of historical change was his 
means of refuting just such "mechanical" philosophies. History's 
unpredictable energy defied simplistic "cause and effect speculators" 
who attempted to read "the inscrutable Book of Nature as if it were a 
Merchant's Ledger" (E, 2:91). In that "web" of history, causation was 
conceived not as a " 'chain' or line, but rather as a tissue, or superfi­
cies of innumerable lines, extending in breadth as well as in length, 
and with a complexity, which will foil and utterly bewilder the most 
assiduous computation" (E, 1:399). 
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The unpredictability built into Carlyle's system finally made con­
tinuity problematic, and progress even more so. Arnold and the 
Whigs used the organic metaphor to emphasize conservative, orderly 
progress. They tried to make the very process of innovating tradi­
tional, arguing that accommodating the new when times were ripe 
was the best means of preserving continuity. For Carlyle change was 
fundamentally catastrophic rather than gradualist, having more in 
common with the conversion experience than with uniformitarian­
ism. Carlyle's idea of history was not a linear progression, not an 
accommodation of old to new, but a constant reassertion of the per­
manently and transcendently true. This required renewal, not preser­
vation, and could not be achieved without a complete destruction and 
purgation of the old. There could be no compromise with what was 
already dying; only apocalypse could cleanse the old world of its 
corruption. 
This vision could reassure Victorians that although change might 
be violent, catastrophic, and unpredictable, it ended by resurrecting 
those ideas and beliefs most essential to human life. The destruction 
of old forms they saw around them need not mean simply loss, but 
loss preparatory to greater gain. More important, however, were the 
uses of Carlyle's theory of change as a weapon against a recalcitrant 
society. Insisting on the unpredictability of change disqualified the 
"computators" of the mechanistic world view and moved historical 
analysis to moral ground, accessible only to believers. The only real 
"law" governing change was that God's decrees could not long be 
transgressed without retribution, and that only what conformed to 
eternal truth would survive. History's one lesson was to cleave to the 
good and abhor evil. The historian used his privileged vision to 
choose his own manifestations of this law. The theory of cyclical de­
struction gave Carlyle a deus ex machina to rid society of those insti­
tutions he could not tolerate, a means of imposing poetic justice 
where the rationalist saw only random process or mechanical cause 
and effect. This model plausibly interpreted the French Revolution's 
destruction of the ancien regime, but fell increasingly short of the new 
reality that followed. Fundamentally out of sympathy with the ad­
vance of democracy in a way Arnold (or the Whig) was not, Carlyle 
looked in vain in his own day for proof of progress toward the truth 
that his theories insisted upon. He locked himself into a more and 
more rigid resistance to advances that contradicted his desired order. 
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By the time he wrote Frederick the Great, that rigidity had already 
started to constrict his confidence about history itself. 
Carlyle's organicism finally justified only a faith in process, not a 
certainty of its end. He left progress explicitly open-ended. He had 
early on adopted Schiller's dictum that truth "immer wird, nie est," 
that truth is never an achieved absolute, but rather an infinitely 
changing, infinitely progressing entity. This left the human soul free 
to "develop itself into all sorts of opinions, doctrines, which go on 
nearer and nearer to the truth." But it also left the process perma­
nently unresolved: "All theories approximate more or less to the great 
Theory, which remains itself always unknown."21 Only on the largest 
scale and in the most general terms did progress occur, and even then, 
since complete knowledge was God's alone, this process never 
reached a specific fulfillment in time. Denied the assurance of arrival, 
Carlyle clung instead to the importance of movement. In "Signs of 
the Times" he took ferment as a sign of vitality and of advance: 
However it may be with individual nations, . . . the happiness and 
greatness of mankind at large have been continually progressive. 
Doubtless this age also is advancing. Its very unrest, its ceaseless activ­
ity, its discontent contains matter of promise. . . . This is as it should 
be; for not in turning back, not in resisting, but only in resolutely 
struggling forward, does our life consist. (E, 2:80) 
As that promise of advance was not fulfilled, "work" became for Car­
lyle an end in itself: the continual struggle of the soul never sure of its 
election—sure only of the damnation that awaited the idle or despair­
ing, the death that succeeded "passive inertness" in the organism. 
Some critics have also considered Carlyle's heroes dei ex machina 
that allowed him to ignore the role of groups and institutions in his­
torical change. In truth, he acknowledged the contributions of all 
three, although he weighted them differently. Given his conviction 
that true history lay in the engagement of the individual with the 
infinite, it was inevitable that the biographical interest would domi­
nate. As he explained in "Biography," the life of any human being 
possessed a "scientific interest" insofar as it instructed others how to 
cope with the "Problem of Existence." As the struggle of "human 
Freewill against material Necessity" called "the Sympathy of mortal 
hearts into action," it also became "the sole Poetry possible" (E, 3:44­
45). A vivid likeness of human life was not in itself enough to make 
biography poetic, however. Although he complimented Scott for 
41

History as Secular Prophecy 
demonstrating that "the bygone ages of the world were actually filled 
by living men, not by protocols, state-papers, controversies and 
abstractions of men," Carlyle considered the Waverley novels lacking 
in any interest deeper than that aroused by "contrasts of Costume" (E, 
4:76-77). He was still harsher on Robertson's History of Scotland for 
providing only a "little Scandalous Chronicle" of Mary Stuart, "a 
Beauty," and Henry Darnley, "A Booby who had fine legs" (E, 3:82), 
when the historian should have been chronicling the effects of the 
Reformation. The biograpical was not an end in itself, but a means of 
illuminating the individual's engagement in the cosmic struggle be­
tween good and evil. 
The power of heroic free-will against necessity is complicated by 
the fact that Carlyle depicted change, especially revolutionary 
change, as operating on a scale far greater than that of any individual 
and believed that "the strongest man can but retard the current par­
tially and for a short hour" (E, 3:122). Although he claimed that "not 
by material, but by moral power, are men and their actions gov­
erned" (E, 1:400), in "Diderot" he gave both sides their due: 
It is a great truth, one side of a great truth, that the Man makes the 
Circumstances, and spiritually as well as economically is the artificer 
of his own fortune. But there is another side of the same truth, that the 
man's circumstances are the element he is appointed to live and work 
in; that he by necessity takes his complexion, vesture, embodiment, 
from these, and is in all practical manifestations modified by them al­
most without limit; so that in another no less genuine sense, it can be 
said Circumstances make the Man. (E, 3:229) 
In this essay he concluded that men had to be judged by the conditions 
of their own time, although these never absolved them from the su­
preme duty of recognizing and furthering the right. Nonetheless, Car­
lyle's heroes were preeminently suited to serve these ends because of 
their ability to see through circumstances to the essentials at their 
core. They were "original men" who could "converse with this uni­
verse at first-hand" (HS, 345). Like Frederick, they swept aside sham; 
like Johnson, they believed where others only supposed; like Crom­
well, they discerned the "inarticulate divineness" of present and fu­
ture "beyond the letter and the rubric" (OC, 2:169). For these reasons 
they were in the best position to "determine, not what others do, but 
what it is right to do" (E, 3:89). They were "modellers, patterns," 
"revealers" of God's purposes, whose role it was to "articulate" for 
lesser men the best way "to conform themselves to the Eternal Laws" 
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of the universe (HS, 1-2).22 They played the key role in social change 
and stability. Carlyle's histories show that only the action of an indi­
vidual hero—like Napoleon, or Abbot Samson, or Frederick—could 
recompose social chaos into new order. Heroes were responsible for 
institutionalizing the "law of habit that makes roads everywhere 
through the pathless in this universe" (HS, 177); they were the chief 
objects of "imitation, that all-important peculiar gift of man, where­
by Mankind is not only held socially together in the present time, but 
connected in like union with the past and the future" (E, 2:394). They 
were custodians of the Traditions that gave meaning to human life; in 
worshipping heroes man celebrated his own need for, and under­
standing of, a divinely appointed order. 
Notwithstanding the preponderant importance of heroes in hu­
man history, Carlyle did not entirely neglect lesser men, as is shown 
by his proposal that "the Court, the Senate and the Battlefield" recede 
in favor of "the Temple, the Workshop and Social Hearth" (E, 3:83). 
He found the conventional stuff of history—"empty invoice-lists of 
Pitched Battles and Changes of Ministry"—as barren as "Philosophy 
teaching by Experience" and sought instead to restore "the in­
numerable peopled luminous Days" in all their fullness (E, 3:325; 
PP 49-50). The corollary of his belief that "history is the essence of 
innumerable Biographies" was that "Social Life is the aggregate of 
all the individual men's lives who constitute society": 
The inventions and traditions, and daily habits that regulate and sup­
port our existence, are the work not of Dracos and Hampdens, but of 
Phoenician mariners, of Italian masons and Saxon metallurgists, of 
philosophers, alchymists, prophets, and all the long-forgotten train of 
artists and artisans; who from the first have been jointly teaching us 
how to think and how to act, how to rule over spiritual and over physi­
cal Nature. (E, 2:86-87) 
These men were at least as relevant an object of the historian's atten­
tion as the Dracos and Hampdens themselves. In principle this re­
cognition of the life of the "common man" suggests the democratiz­
ing influence of the romantic historians and their efforts to write the 
"biography" of whole nations and peoples. In actual practice Car­
lyle's conception of historical development limited his attention to 
lesser men as much as did his individualizing brand of hero-worship. 
The real value of mariners and masons lay in their very obscurity: 
their work contributed to the silent growth of a healthy social organ­
ism. When minor figures do find a place in his writings, they func­
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don as "emblems" of historical phenomena beyond their control. 
They are effects, not causes, of cosmic change. 
The same point might be made about Carlyle's handling of institu­
tional, political, and sociological forces. He might have agreed with 
Arnold that the way people were governed gauged the moral health of 
their society, but he lacked all interest in the political machinery by 
which this governing was accomplished. He scornfully dismissed 
"Redbook Lists, and Court Calendars, and Parliamentary Registers" 
as but "eddies" in the "Life-Current" (E, 3:81). Laws and constitu­
tions were not the "life of man" but merely the house in which it was 
led. His attitude in The French Revolution is typical: the Constituent 
Assembly could devise no more than "a theory of irregular verbs," for 
any constitution that "images" the conviction of real men (FR, 1:215) 
was sanctioned by a cosmic Necessity, and could never be produced by 
parliamentary debate. He gives little attention to the constitutional 
issues involved in Cromwell and skims over Frederick's peacetime 
accomplishments to return to his battles (FG, 5:198). On the other 
hand, he did acknowledge the specific class issues operating in the 
French Revolution. The Girondes had in his eyes tried to exploit the 
Sansculottes in their attempts to bring about a republic of "Respecta­
bilities and Decencies," in which the "Moneybag of Mammon" 
would replace the "Feudal Fleur-de-lys" (FR, 3:115). Naturally their 
pitiful attempt to mount a government based on sham was incapable 
of controlling the organic force of the mob, who represented a ge­
nuine and necessary outburst of nature, the embodiment of anarchy 
capable of destroying the old order but not of building a new. Car­
lyle's symbolic treatment of class finally precluded any more literal 
probing of the issues involved, however. He saw a hierarchical class 
structure as a biological imperative of the social organism and dealt 
with social groups only in terms of the role he prescribed for each. 
The "Twenty-five Millions," "the Sanscullotism," are never more 
than personified abstractions, their needs not differentiated beyond 
the primal imperatives for food and leadership. 
For Carlyle society denoted not so much a set of institutions as the 
structure of belief embodied in institutional forms. His approach was 
designed explicitly to refute those who had mistaken the materials of 
purely "local" history—politics, battles, laws, etc.—for the spiritual 
realities appropriate to "universal" history. In reacting against the 
conventional approach, however, Carlyle tended to lose sight of the 
actual weave of institutions, politics, economic and legal systems in 
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his haste to get beyond them to the forces of which they were merely 
the vesture. G. M. Trevelyan defended him by claiming that he accu­
rately understood and portrayed the effects of these factors on the 
people involved,23 but this does not compensate for neglecting their 
structure. 
The strengths and weaknesses of Carlyle's theorizing spring from 
the fact that it is essentially metahistorical. He wished to use the au­
thority of history to go beyond history. He focussed on the cosmic 
realities behind historical appearances and enjoined his readers to 
look through facts to higher truths that redeemed the failures of the 
phenomenal world. The alternative to traditional faith he thus of­
fered had the same vulnerability as the old one. Assent was finally a 
matter of belief, not of proof. By treating phenomena as merely ap­
pearances, he ruled out verification by fact alone. He simply refused 
to fight on the same ground as those who read the "facts" differently. 
The emotional power of his vision was enough to draw many across 
with him in a leap of faith. Yet if his willed belief delivered many 
from "Descendentalism," it abandoned to the limits of rationalism 
still more who could not make that leap, since he left no middle 
ground between his vision and blindness. 
II 
To obtain the assent that transcended reason, Carlyle needed to 
create a past so experientially real that it compelled the reader's pres­
ence in his vision. His desire to capture both the spiritual essence and 
the fact that embodied it, to reconstruct the very "life of man," posed 
new challenges to the researcher. The historian had both to see and to 
divine; he had to be the scientist as well as the artist to make history 
disclose its meaning: " 'Stern Accuracy in inquiry, bold Imagination 
in expounding and filling-up; these,' says friend Sauerteig, 'are the 
two pinions on which History soars' " (E, 3:259-60). We must ask 
then how "stern" were Carlyle's own standards. On the face of them, 
his research methods seem as unconventional as his narrative tech­
niques. He claimed that after trying various approaches, involving 
everything from note books and bundles to paper bags filled with 
slips of paper, he resolved to avoid taking notes at all by simply mark­
ing relevant passages in his sources. As he explained in an 1845 letter: 
On the whole [I] try to keep the whole matter simmering in the living 
mind and memory rather than laid up in paper bundles or otherwise 
laid up in the inert way. For this certainly turns out to be a truth: Only 
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what you at last have living in your own memory and heart is worth 
putting down to be printed; this alone has much chance to get into the 
living heart and memory of other men.24 
If "The Guises" can be taken as typical of a work in progress, this 
process meant that the construction of the main narrative line took 
precedence over the validation of exact names, dates, and quotations. 
Parenthetical notes mark the places where these are to be inserted, if 
indeed they could ever be found. Despite this somewhat fragmentary 
approach, Carlyle was keenly aware of the importance of solid factual 
data, prizing even insignificant primary sources that could make the 
event "luminous" far more than he did the "sifting and straightening 
out of . .  . old cobwebs" in more comprehensive secondary ac­
counts.25 He also acknowledged high standards of thoroughness and 
accuracy. In writing The French Revolution, he took full advantage 
of the source materials just coming into print and probably used 
twice as many books as he cited.26 When he found that he had in­
cluded an incorrect account of the French warship "Vengeur," whose 
crew supposedly refused to surrender and went down shouting "Vive 
la Republique!", he published a full account of his investigation of 
the error in Fraser's Magazine (E, 4:208-25). Elsewhere he showed 
himself capable of a Rankeian cross-examination of sources, and of­
fered to lay his interpretations open to comparison with the primary 
sources (FG, 2:235). 
But it must finally be said that his earnestness to find the truth was 
simply not strong enough to counterbalance his ambivalence about 
the scholarly side of historiography. When he compared the historian 
to Orpheus returning to the underworld, he was doing more than 
striking a pose: he really did feel that "he that would investigate the 
Past must be prepared for encountering things unpleasant, things 
dreary, nay, ghastly [for] the Past is the dwelling of the Dead" (HS, 
314). His constant lamentation over the difficulty of his task and his 
vituperative outbursts against earlier historians sprang from his anx­
iety to prove his view of the past correct. The more elusive his epic 
portrayal became, the more he blamed the Dryasdusts for not having 
the vision to provide the materials he needed. Also, the more likely he 
was to resort to "abridgment" and "immense omission" in an effort 
to suppress "large tracts" of "mere pedantisms, diplomatic cobweb­
beries, . . . and inhuman matter" (FG, 3:309). Arguing that if 
" 'wise memory' is ever to prevail, there is need of much 'wise obliv­
ion' first" (OC, 1:41) too often meant that what did not fire his imagi­
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nation, like the details of political, legal, or ecclesiastical squabbles, 
or what threatened to diminish the epic stature of his heroes, was 
simply dismissed or sloughed over with a few elliptical metaphors. It 
also meant that the authenticity of what fit with his own conception 
of a movement or hero was not tested so rigorously as that which was 
unfavorable. Arnold made this point about the "Vengeur" case, 
claiming that Carlyle should have been more wary, knowing the un­
reliability of his source.27 Wellek sees a similar gullibility in the mat­
ter of the Squire papers, a set of letters and documents allegedly writ­
ten by Cromwell, of which "copies" were sent to Carlyle by an 
extremely eccentric retired sea captain.28 
Cromwell's Letters and Speeches offers other examples of the way 
Carlyle's preconceptions could compromise scholarly standards. Af­
ter publishing what purported to be a complete edition, he was de­
luged with various new materials, some privately held, but others that 
he had overlooked in published sources. Carlyle asserted that as a rule 
"the new Contributions to any Edition have been slight" (OC, l:vii), 
notwithstanding his addition of more than thirty new letters in the 
Appendix alone. Even had he integrated these into the text, it is ap­
parent that Carlyle would have refused to sacrifice the synthetic form 
he had already given his "Cromwelliad." A biographer, he pro­
claimed, should worry less about whether later interpolations might 
improve his book "as a practical Representation of Cromwell's Exist­
ence" than about whether it would be "swollen out of shape by super­
fluous details, defaced with dilettante antiquarianisms, nugatory tag-
rags" (OC, l:viii). The priorities of hero-worship and artistic 
harmony clearly outweighed those of scholarship. Carlyle's concern 
for eliminating any trace of pedantry that might hinder the general 
reader explains in part some editorial changes in what he called "the 
authentic utterances of the man Oliver himself." In order to make the 
materials easier to read and understand, he alleviated the "encum­
brance" of Cromwell's spelling and tried to help "bring out the 
struggling sense" (OC, 1:79) by adding words (in brackets) here and 
there. But despite Carlyle's lofty claim that he considered it his su­
preme duty "to avoid altering, in any respect, not only the sense, but 
the smallest feature in the physiognomy, of the Original" (OC, 1:79), 
Reginald Palgrave ably demonstrated that he was neither thorough 
nor entirely forthright about his scholarship. Judging him according 
to the standards of the new "scientific" historiography in 1887, Pal-
grave faulted him for inaccurate transcriptions, misrepresentation of 
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his sources, and failure to consult the manuscript version of some 
speeches or to compare modern versions with ones of higher author­
ity. Damning by any standard is Palgrave's evidence that Carlyle 
added misleading interpolations and punctuation, that he omitted 
words, phrases, and even whole sentences, and that he suppressed sev­
eral passages unfavorable to his heroic view of the Protector.29 
It is not enough to excuse such failings by saying that Carlyle's 
purposes were more poetic than historical; he himself would have 
rejected the implications of this distinction. Criticism is warranted 
precisely because he portrayed himself as a heroic truth-seeker, wres­
tling with cosmic forces that threatened to doom men to oblivion. But 
then again, if he was little different in these respects from the partisan 
historians of his own and earlier ages, the truly innovative aspects of 
his approach to research should not be ignored. In his attempts to 
hear the voice and feel the pulse of the past, he embraced the same 
wider conception of evidence as Arnold and Macaulay. He too advised 
the beginning historian to "read himself into the century he studies" 
(E, 4:237), no mean feat considering that for him "all Books, . . . 
were they but Song-books or treatises on Mathematics, are in the long-
run historical documents" (E, 3:167). Even the sheet music of the Qa­
ira could contribute its spark to the rekindling of past consciousness. 
Carlyle also valued portraits and memoirs for their insight into the 
human side of history. He relished the gossipy accounts of a Boswell, 
a Jocelin de Brakelond, or a Princess Wilhemina because they viewed 
the world with the real "human eyes" that history books did not pos­
sess (FG, 1:378). Although he deplored the subjectivity of such sour­
ces, their glimpses into historical reality fitted his own episodic, 
anecdotal style too congenially for him to be highly discriminating in 
their use. 
Like Arnold he prized geographical evidence as much as imagina­
tive. Geography was one of the "two windows of history" because for 
him too familiarity with the physical setting of an event allowed him 
to possess it imaginatively.30 Driven by the demands of his pictorial 
imagination, he sent Mill to look at the sites important to "The Dia­
mond Necklace," and his brother to report back on Versailles and on 
the Place de Greve, where the Tree of Liberty had stood. Maps of 
Paris, groundplans of the Bastille, technical accounts of the em­
bankment of the fens in Cromwell's day, all allowed him to locate 
himself, both figuratively and literally, in past experience. The same 
craving for empathy encouraged several "pilgrimages" to "Cromwell­
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land," where he emotionally relived the experience of his hero in Ely 
Cathedral, in his farmyard, and at Dunbar field on the anniversary of 
Cromwell's triumph there.31 Carlyle considered the topography of 
battle sites particularly essential to studies of wartime: Richard 
Brooks has amply documented the extent of his 1858 tour of German 
battlefields and the process whereby its results were worked into the 
narrative of Frederick the Great}2 No fact, provided that it could il­
luminate some corner of a past reality, was beneath the "Dignity of 
History" for Carlyle. 
The brilliant eccentricity of Carlyle's style may obscure the objec­
tives he held in common with fellow historians: resuscitation, iden­
tification, sympathy, and conversion—in that order. Fearing that 
"till we become Believers and Puritans in our way, no result will be 
arrived at" in the attempt to reform society,33 he aimed to convince his 
quack- and cant-ridden contemporaries that the belief and moral 
purpose they lacked had been realities in the past, and to provide 
them with the opportunity to "connect" themselves imaginatively 
with those same feelings once again (OC, 1:1). Carlyle's peculiar ob­
session with the symbolic immanent in the actual did make him the 
most stylistically innovative of the six historians. He became con­
vinced early that the historian needed to invent a new "language," 
one "melodious," "musical," and "poetic" enough to turn fragments 
into wholes, documents into experiences. He needed a spectrum of 
frankly fictive techniques to create a narrative that destroyed the in­
tervening lapse of time, immersed the reader in the event, and allowed 
him to enter directly into the spiritual dimension of historical reality. 
The French Revolution introduced a range of effects to achieve 
these ends. Its very allusiveness—to Merovingian Kings, to Boston 
Harbors black with tea, to Feasts of Morals mounted by Philosophe-
Sentimentalism—draws readers into the narrative by implying their 
preexisting intimacy with a more densely populated historical realm. 
Carlyle forgoes a discursive analysis of issues and antecedents in favor 
of impressionistic evocations of mood and conjurations of symbols. 
The oracular tone of his digressive sermons and incantations en­
courages the sense that his narrative operates above the level of pro­
saic and limited reality. The nominalization and pluralizing of 
names and beliefs—the "Courtierisms, Conquering Heroisms, Most 
Christian Grand Monarque-isms, Well-beloved Pompadourisms" 
that obscured the inevitable arrival of revolution, for instance— 
signal the reader that individual men and events are being translated 
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into those abstract truths and spiritual realities that coursed beneath 
the appearances of life. The frequent use of the present tense rein­
forces the immediacy and dynamism of events and draws in the au­
dience as living witnesses. 
The obstacles to restoring a contemporary understanding of events 
preoccupied Carlyle. As his hypothetical researcher "Smelfungus" 
explained it, past events were like living plants that eventually de­
cayed into layers of peat: the higher generations pressed upon the 
lower, "squeezing them ever thinner" (HS, 64) and obscuring the 
original contours of significance. One hoped that this process would 
leave standing some "high peaks," some major events, that could give 
their name to the entire region. More often great actions proved "his­
torically barren," while the smallest took root in the moral soil and 
grew to cover "whole quarters of the world."34 To complicate the 
historian's task still further, in retrospect he often failed to distin­
guish between "the real historical Transaction" and the "more or less 
plausible scheme and theory of the Transaction" that tried to "ac­
count" for it in the present. 
In order to rediscover the meaning of the event for himself, the his­
torian had in effect to abandon any attempt at artificial historical 
perspective, any theory about the event. His goal was to attain vision 
from an internal perspective by achieving complete sympathy and 
identification with past actions. Hedva Ben-Israel calls the process of 
creating true history for Carlyle "as subconscious as the process of 
creating poetry was in Wordsworth's theory. To promote a genuine 
reaction, a historian makes sure that the picture that gives the stimu­
lus is authentic. Once the right reaction has been brought about, it is 
this which directs the recreation of reality."35 Historical art, Carlyle 
explained to Sterling, thus began with a "thorough intelligence of 
the fact to be painted. . . . This once blazing within one . . . one 
has to take the whole dexterity of adaptation one is master of" and 
"contrive to exhibit it one way or other."36 To allow the reader a cor­
rect appreciation of historical relationships required "the best in­
sight, seeking light from all possible sources, shifting its point of 
vision withersoever vision or glimpse of vision can be had" (FR, 
1:214). In his "exhibition" of the event, the historian needed in par­
ticular to overcome the fact that "narrative is linear, Action is solid" 
(E, 2:89). The continuity of linear narrative, with no more than me­
chanical cause and effect explanations at its disposal, could not be 
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true to the chaotic interplay of historical forces or the multidimen­
sionality of historical experience. 
Carlyle tried to compensate for the distorting linearity of narrative 
by consciously manipulating perspectives. In what C. F. Harrold 
called his "synoptic view," he was constantly juxtaposing the present 
condition of an object or event with its past and future condition.37 
H. M. Leicester analyzes this same process by dividing Carlyle's modes 
of presentation into "prospective" and "retrospective" points of 
view.38 In the first the historian's ex post facto knowledge about the 
event was suppressed, so that the experience of it was limited to the 
immediate and excluded knowledge of the event's outcome or of alter­
native possibilities. The retrospective view superimposed the missing 
dimensions of the event—the causes, results, and future significances 
that only time could reveal. The advantage of the "prospective" view 
lay in its ability to duplicate the immediacy of an experience unfold­
ing on the spot, making the reader a witness and, in some cases, a par­
ticipant. 
For instance, in recounting the royal family's attempted escape to 
Varennes in The French Revolution, Carlyle positions himself with 
the reader as a contemporary observer with no privileged knowledge 
or hindsight to elucidate the scene. Present tense verbs subvert the 
linearity of narrative by evoking a perpetual present. "We observe" 
Count Fersen often using his Ticket of Entry without realizing what 
it means (FR, 2:158). On the night of 20 June 1791, we watch anon­
ymous figures enter the glass coach in the Rue de L'Echelle: hooded 
dames with children, "a thickset Individual, in round hat and pe­
ruque," who springs a shoe buckle and stoops to reclasp it, a "Lady 
shaded in a broad gypsy-hat" who touches her badine to the spoke of 
Lafayette's carriage. Even when the Lady is revealed as the Queen, the 
indeterminacy of the event is prolonged by questions that leave open 
its outcome: "But is Fersen on the right road?" "If wereachBouillePIf 
we do not reach him?" In the process the point of view also shifts so 
that the reader shares the feelings of the royal party. Carlyle often 
forged this kind of identification for the narrator, increasing the im­
mediacy of the action and the authenticity of his voice by merging 
himself with participants. Thus he is alternately a seventeenth-cen­
tury courtier ("I myself . . . have often assisted at Ben's Masques 
. . . and endeavoured to make acquaintance with a fair friend or 
two" US, 75), a gossipy neighbor of Cromwell ("Doctor Simcock has 
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told friends of mine that he suffered under terrible hypochondria, and 
had fancies about the Town-Cross" HS, 203), or a foot soldier on the 
rainy eve of the battle of Dunbar ("We English have some tents; the 
Scots have none" OC, 2:205). This abandonment of the omniscient 
voice forced the reader to sacrifice pat explanations that tried to "ac­
count" for the event and instead to try to experience it for himself. 
The "retrospective" view, on the other hand, revealed that every 
occurrence was part of a broader network of significance, full of im­
manent meaning. As Leicester points out, the procession of the States 
General in volume 1 of The French Revolution was not just the de­
scription of a concrete event: it introduces all those figures who will 
emerge as important in the ensuing narrative. By the end of the chap­
ter, "the brief moment of the procession has been filled up with refer­
ences, images and significances that were not actually available at the 
time of occurrence, but that body forth the hidden meanings which 
even then, Carlyle would maintain, were present."39 Elsewhere Car­
lyle employs slightly different techniques to implicate seemingly mi­
nor facts in larger patterns of meaning and to reveal the interweavings 
of history's web, invisible to the eye fixed only on one nexus. He often 
depended upon a panoramic sweep of vision that came to rest, pro­
phetically, on those objects that were or that would become most 
pregnant with significance. A geological explanation of the Bog of 
Lindsey opened up to include a survey of all the famous men who had 
dwelt there, starting with King Cnut and funneling down to Crom­
well (HS, 58-60). The account of Cromwell's early biography (OC, 1: 
chap. 4) includes not just incidents in Oliver's life, but milestones in 
the religious controversy that shaped his later career: the Hampden 
Court Conference, the Gunpowder Plot, the collapse of the Spanish 
Match. Carlyle also notes the coincidence of Shakespeare's death— 
ending the first "World-great Thing" of English History—with the 
beginning of the second "World-great Thing," the "Armed Appeal of 
Puritanism," in the form of Oliver's admission to Cambridge. Such a 
lamination of events makes clear that history possesses not a linear 
causality but a layered solidity of meanings, in which each moment 
expands outward in all directions to influence others. 
Carlyle's other answer to the limitations of linear narrative was to 
make his method purposefully fragmentary. Substituting for the 
conventional continuity of major events a series of close-ups on the 
most suggestive occurrences achieved several ends. Like the manipu­
lation of points of view, it too defied conventional causality and the 
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flattening perspective induced by ex post facto theories about events. 
More importantly, his preference for the "minor" details afforded a 
way of demonstrating the fecundity of even the smallest germ of his­
torical reality and of exalting the luminous God-made fact. As he 
pointed out in Past and Present, the very "intermittence" of Jocelin's 
record duplicated the mingled inscrutability and certainty of Nature 
itself (PP, 46). This quality guaranteed the superiority of his account 
to fictions that invented what they could not authenticate and to an­
nals that buried the significant fact in a deluge of shot-rubbish. The 
prosaic detail was particularly useful in helping the reader ' 'domesti­
cate himself" in scenes foreign to his own sceptical age; "Dryasdust 
Torpedoism" could never convince him that the seventeenth century 
had been "an actual flesh-and-blood fact" with "colour in its cheeks" 
and a belief worth dying for in its heart (OC, 1:79-80). In the escape to 
Varennes, Louis's shoe buckle and Marie's badine function in a sim­
ilar way: their very insignificance convinces the reader of the authen­
ticity of the scene. Carlyle most often relied upon the telling detail to 
epitomize a whole range of sociocultural phenomena. For instance, 
The Marriage of Figaro, Paulet Virginie, and The Chevalier de Faub­
las offers the final indictment of the advanced decay of French moral­
ity (FR, 1:59-60); the new style of Empire dandyism in dress and dance 
signifies the "reclothing" of French culture after the Terror (FR, 
3:292-93). 
On a larger scale, this fragmentary method often approximates the 
approach Carlyle praised in Schiller's History of the Revolt of the 
United Netherlands: "The work is not stretched out into a continu­
ous narrative; but gathered up into masses, which are successively 
exhibited to view, the minor facts being grouped around some lead­
ing one, to which, as to the central object, our attention is chiefly 
directed. This method of combining the details of events, of proceed­
ing as it were, per saltum, fiom eminence to eminence, and thence 
surveying the surrounding scene, is undoubtedly the most philosoph­
ical of any."40 "Philosophical," that is, in that it allowed the histo­
rian to show the contours of "Universal History" while still exploit­
ing the particularized factuality of events. The volume subtitles of 
The French Revolution, for instance, locate its "eminences": the Bas­
tille, the Constitution, and the Guillotine. Likewise, each book takes 
its name from the major event, locale, or body highlighted within: 
"The Feast of Pikes," "Varennes," "Parliament First." Volume 3 
offers the most forthright examples of what Carlyle also referred to as 
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his "compendious, grandiose-massive way" of summing up events.41 
There his avowed intention was to "splash down what I know in 
large masses of colours, that it may look like a smoke-and-flame con­
flagration in the distance."42 Throughout these elliptical passages, 
repeated epithets, phrases, labels, and personifications act as leitmo­
tifs to remind the reader of emerging themes and to create a degree of 
cohesion in an otherwise fragmentary account. On one level the 
fragmentary method works to convince the reader that the relation­
ship between historical facts is that of metaphor, not of cause; actions 
are not the "effects" of one another, but are rather linked by their 
common significations of a larger implied historical whole, inacces­
sible by direct observation. 
On another level the fragmentary method forces the reader to con­
front the very process of understanding history, particularly in Fred­
erick the Great. There Carlyle also passes over large areas, providing 
only "glimpses"—selected incidents presented "as if caught-up by 
some sudden photograph apparatus" (FG, 3:41)—that allowed the 
reader to "conceive" the "actuality of this business" for himself. Else­
where his attempts to force the reader into imaginative participation 
become even more insistent: he rapidly sketches in the outline of the 
action, then invites the reader to complete it with his own details (FG, 
3:134-35). In the process the reader begins to share in the historian's 
endeavor to interpret and reconstruct the past. As the massive work 
proceeds, the growing heaps of undigested data and the broader gaps 
in narrative continuity put more and more responsibility on the 
reader. In this sense John Clive has described Frederick the Great as a 
bildungsgeschichte, in which the reader as protagonist gains self-
knowledge and insight by sharing the same experiences the historian 
underwent in his search for truth. To Morse Peckham, however, the 
eventual breakdown of narrative coherence in later volumes reveals 
Carlyle's gradual loss of faith in the possibility of penetrating sham to 
read the world as a symbol of the divine.44 Thus a narrative method 
that began as a search for more profound explanations of historical 
truth ended in Carlyle's tacit admission that all historical explana­
tion was at best illusory. 
Notwithstanding their ultimate subversion of narrative integrity, 
Carlyle's methods were highly effective in realizing specific people 
and events. His treatment of character makes good use of the telling 
detail. Indeed, minor characters themselves function as such details, 
synecdoche for larger phenomena. The angry old women in Past and 
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Present, their property confiscated in lieu of reaping silver, brandish 
their distaffs not just against the Cellararius, but against all the mis­
rule of Hugo's tenure (PP, 64). Jenny Geddes takes aim at all decayed 
sacramentalism when she pitches her stool at the Anglican priest 
(OC, 1:96). The vividly specific types who labor to complete the Field 
of Mars for the Feast of Pikes make palpable the way "Patriotism" 
inspired and leveled an entire society. Carlyle presents a mosaic in 
which "long-frocked tonsured Monks, with short-skirted Water-
carriers, with swallow-tailed well-frizzled Incroyables of a Patriot 
turn" labor side by side, where "snowy linen and delicate pantaloon" 
alternate with the "soiled check-shirt and bushel-breeches." "Does 
one distrust his brothers?" answers "a certain person" of wealth when 
warned against leaving his watches unguarded; at once anonymous 
and specific, he exposes the beautiful but flimsy "noble-sentiment" 
that only hastens collapse in a society incapable of weaving sentiment 
into duty (FR, 2:57-59). The "antiquarian" clothing of Cromwell's 
cousins is used to somewhat different effect. Their "fringed trouser-
breeches" and "starched ruff," vividly real again for the moment of 
the historian's notice, only underline the disintegrating power of 
time, which has rendered their "soul's furniture" as quaintly anti­
quated as their "spanish boots and lappet caps" (OC, 1:102). 
The figurative significance of such characters and details finally 
works against the very literalness of their portrayal. All their lumi­
nous uniqueness is a means to an end. Like metaphors, their impor­
tance lies not in the image itself but in the relationships it reveals. In 
this context H. M. Leicester has argued that "there are really two sets 
of characters going under a single set of names" in Carlyle's histories: 
"the actual men, whose real nature is lost in the past and therefore 
unknowable; and Carlyle's leitmotifs, which act out the parts allotted 
to them" in the drama of Universal history.45 Characters embody not 
individual personalities but historical purposes: the historian's 
"compressive imagination" concentrates the entire Reign of Terror 
in Marat, the spiritual bankruptcy of all France in the Arch-Quack 
Cagliostro. In the process John Holloway has said, "Their individu­
ality is volatized and disintegrated by the abstractions of which they 
are the vehicles."46 Carlyle breathes life into minor characters so that 
they can give their testimony to the reality of attitudes, beliefs, phe­
nomena, but after their task has been accomplished, he as easily ex­
changes them for other "emblems" that serve his purpose just as well. 
Major characters are realized more fully as individuals, although 
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their individuality is finally subordinated in similar ways to figura­
tive ends. Like others of his contemporaries, Carlyle believed that 
sympathy with the public man rested on a humanity shared with the 
private one within. Here the commonplace detail played an impor­
tant role in helping the audience to recognize in even the most le­
gendary beings kindred worthy of sympathy and compassion, while 
at the same time offering its own tacit commentary on the signifi­
cance of human actions. Queen Sophie Charlotte's smuggled pinch 
of snuff at Friedrich Wilhelm's coronation is not only in character 
with the familiar, down-to-earth woman Carlyle earlier "reads" in 
her portrait; that "symbolic pinch of snuff" also represents a quiet 
protest against cant and ostentation, a grasp of realities that her son 
inherits (FG, 1:53). Carlyle passes over the fifty-seven questions asked 
at Louis's trial in favor of the bit of bread he begs of Chaumette after 
withdrawing from the Salle de Convention: "The King eats of the 
Crust . . . asks now, What he shall do with the crumb? Chaumette's 
clerk takes it from him; flings it out into the street. Louis says, It is 
pity to fling out bread, in a time of dearth." The muted pathos of this 
exchange invites our sympathy for the "poor innocent mortal" who 
"soquietly . . . waits the drawing of the lot," but Carlyle expects us 
also to sense the irony in this solicitude for mere crumbs, come too 
late to a monarch unseated by Twenty-five Hungry Millions (FR, 
3:93-94). 
Carlyle took most literally the romantic injunction to resuscitate 
the past. He advised readers to "repress . . . that too insatiable scien­
tific curiosity" about the details of history so that their "aesthetic 
feeling" could free their imaginations (E, 3:360), and relied himself 
on techniques frankly dramatic and at times fictional to restore char­
acters to a fully credible humanity. Dialogue fashioned from source 
documents is a standard device in his histories; his choice of Crom­
well's letters and speeches confirms his regard for authentic speech. 
His desire to make his dramatizations serve his own didactic and artis­
tic ends increasingly blurs the boundaries of his evidence. In Freder­
ick the Great he will sometimes fashion exposition into his own ver­
sion of quoted dialogue, claiming, "that or something equivalent, 
indisputably was" (FG, 4:118), or will cite as actually spoken what he 
allows might be only "a mere French epigram, . . . put down for 
fact" (FG, 6:273). Sometimes he even renders the commentary of his 
source historians in a colloquial voice, as when he makes Henry 
Lloyd (History of the Late War) reply to hopes of an easy French 
56 
Thomas Carlyle 
victory, "No general will permit himself to be taken in flank with his 
eyes open; and the King of Prussia is the unlikeliest you could try it 
with!" (FG, 6:273). In addition to personalizing his narrative, Carlyle 
thus makes Lloyd reinforce precisely the characterization he is creat­
ing; like Arnold, he uses invention to flesh out the full dimensions of 
heroism. 
His artistic license extends farther yet in the battle of Hohenfried­
berg. There he translates Frederick's actual words into distinctly Car­
lylean turns of phrase ("You see the ranks beginning to shake, and 
jumble towards indistinctness"), phrases that project onto Frederick 
the historian's own contempt for the French (FG, 5:125). The sources 
barely mention Frederick's irritation at Adjutant Gaudi's discompo­
sure as the enemy approaches. From them Carlyle extrapolates a 
pungently specific vignette that epitomizes the plain-speaking Fred­
erick of his imagination: 
"Well, and if he do? No flurry needed Captain!" answered Friedrich,— 
(not in these precise words; but rebuking Gaudi, with a look not of 
laughter wholly, and with a certain question, as to the state of Gaudi's 
stomachic part, which is still known in traditionary circles, but is not 
mentionable here). (FG, 6:273-74) 
Such fictive techniques make palpable Carlyle's claim that the eye of 
the imagination often saw more deeply into the essence of the man 
than the eye of the pedant, for all his data. Sometimes he also took 
literally his comment that the historian must become a Shakespeare, 
resorting to frankly histrionic devices in order to recapture the drama 
inherent in historic encounters. Rather than follow verbatim the ac­
count of an audience with Frederick "reported by the faithful pen" of 
the English Ambassador, Robinson, Carlyle "compresses" it in order 
to make the King's character "vividly significant." Moreover, he 
stages the reenactment as a one-act play, starring the young Frederick 
who easily punctures the hot-air balloons of diplomacy with the in­
flexible steel of Realpolitik. The frame combines the appeal of spec­
tacle (complete with dramatis personae, costumes, stage directions, 
and lines) with parenthetical insights that illuminate the real feelings 
and thoughts of each participant (FG, 4:231 ff.). No State Paper could 
allow the reader to experience the past as a dramatic transaction, to 
see it from the inside out. Carlyle similarly restores the dynamic di­
mension to history in his "extensions" of Cromwell's speeches. He 
scatters stage directions in brackets throughout the text, here indicat­
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ing the audience's response—"hear! hear!" "a grim smile on some 
faces"—there the mode of delivery—"Oliver's voice somewhat ris­
ing"—even stopping occasionally to correct the misapprehensions 
that "Groans from Dryasdust" indicate (OC, 3:46-59). These devices 
pull three-dimensional characters from the linear narrative, set into 
motion the drama frozen by time into tableaux. And yet we must to a 
large extent agree with Emerson: "We have men in your story and not 
names merely; always men, though I may doubt sometimes whether I 
have the historic men."47 Carlyle defied the limitations of time and 
memory by creating a credible humanity to plead for belief and as­
sent, but their testimony supports his vision of the past, not necessar­
ily their own. 
We find the same concerns and devices in Carlyle's treatment of 
action, particularly in his battle scenes. Although he might profess to 
esteem "the Social Hearth" over "the Battlefield," military history 
loomed large, particularly in Cromwell and Frederick. In fact it 
served Carlyle's purposes just as well if not better than domestic his­
tory. Like Arnold, Carlyle did not find warfare indiscriminately in­
teresting. Battles deserved to be remembered when they proved to have 
been the "travail-throes of great or considerable changes" (FG, 4:144). 
It was not necessary to furnish the strategist with materials for study, 
however; just enough detail "to assist the reader's fancy in conceiving 
it a little" for himself (FG, 5:120) would do. Rich in action, emotion, 
and heroism, battle scenes provided direct opportunities to forge an 
imaginative link between the reader and his ancestors, and thus to 
reconnect him with the values they found worth fighting for. Carlyle 
consciously appeals to the layman's eye and the brother's heart. Bat­
tles emerge from the dusty pages of the tacticians with a human face 
and compelling verisimilitude. 
The main intention of his version of the storming of the Bastille, 
for instance (FR, 1:186-95), is to duplicate the experiential reality of 
the scene rather than to provide an exact account of military maneu­
vers: the fact that the cannon of the Gardes Francaises played the key 
tactical role in taking the Bastille is obscured in the jumble and rush 
of events. Throughout the account, Carlyle maintains a tension be­
tween the imaginative and the moral by shifting back and forth be­
tween the vividly immediate and the ultimately symbolic impact of 
events—the prospective and the retrospective views. Present tense 
verbs, speech set in dialogue, syntax as choppy as the action itself, 
draw the reader into the action until he and the historian merge with 
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the participants: "We fall, shot; and make no impression ["Against a 
chaotic background, Carlyle's focus skips from individual to indi­
vidual, closing in just long enough to grasp their personal response 
to these events or to prefigure their role in later ones. Concurrently, 
the voice of Carlyle the moralist is pealing out its judgment: "Wo to 
thee, DeLaunay, in such an hour, if thou canst not, taking some one 
firm decision, rule circumstances." Typically, events seem to accom­
plish themselves: "straw is burnt," "blood flows," and, at the crucial 
moment, "sinks the drawbridge . . . rushes-in the living deluge: the 
Bastille is fallen!" Each individual action is propelled by the same 
relentless inevitability possessed by the Revolution as a whole, be­
cause this "Fire-Mahlstrom" is the instrument of divine judgment on 
a corrupt France. 
In the battle scenes of Cromwell and Frederick, Carlyle goes out of 
his way to restore human interest and draw the reader into the action. 
By translating source documents into direct address and slipping into 
present tense verbs and first person pronouns, he converts the reader 
from spectator into participant. He is more successful than Arnold in 
exploiting his firsthand knowledge of battle sites: by shifting from his 
modern day impressions to the field's appearance on the day of a 
famous battle he achieved what Emerson called a "stereoscopic" 
time-effect, drawing the reader from present into past. In Cromwell 
Carlyle often drops the formal and omniscient voice and lets one or 
two eye-witness narratives suffice for the battle account (OC, 1:175­
77). Their insight into authentic human emotion is more important 
to him than their military accuracy or completeness. Elsewhere, Car­
lyle simply hands over full responsibility to the reader, advising him 
to imagine a battle for himself as "the most enormous hurlyburly, of 
fire and smoke, and steel-flashings and death-tumult, ever seen in 
those regions" (OC, 1:187). Carlyle's account of Dunbar battle (OC, 
2:197-209) furnishes a useful illustration of these techniques in 
action. He begins with present day Dunbar, then invites the spectator 
to look landward to "a barren heath of Hills." In front of them we 
find Oliver's tents, pitched on a "very uneven tract of ground; now in 
our time all yellow with wheat and barley . . . but at that date only 
partially tilled . . . [and] terribly beaten by showery winds that day, 
so that your tent will hardly stand." In the space between "our times" 
and "your tent," Carlyle has already merged the Victorian with the 
Roundhead. He dwells on one relatively insignificant event: Lesley's 
capture of a one-armed Puritan musketeer on the day before the bat­
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tie. He quotes the man's defiant answers to Lesley because Carlyle sees 
in this "most dogged handfast man" a symbol of Puritan tenacity. 
Carlyle then closes in on the battlefield itself, conjuring his readers to 
"look even with unmilitary eyes at the ground as it now is" until some 
"small glimmerings of distinct features," "some spectrum of the 
Fact," become visible, and they can see that "the footprint of a Hero, 
not yet quite indistinguishable, is here!" The reader's participation is 
further reinforced as Carlyle surveys the battle lines on the rainy eve of 
Dunbar—"We English have some tents; the Scots have none"—and 
as he continues to refer to Cromwell's troops as "we" for the rest of the 
account. The fighting itself he conveys in one rapid-fire paragraph 
that sacrifices exact detail to achieve a sense of confused movement 
and emotion. The action shifts in short present tense sentences from 
one side to the other, from men's thoughts to their actions, until we 
"break them, beat them, drive them all adrift" and the Scottish army 
is "shivered to utter ruin." 
Like characterization, battle scenes in Frederick exercise even 
greater dramatic license to achieve drama and identification. Brooks 
demonstrates how Carlyle combed his travel notebooks and his 
sources for picturesque, anecdotal details to personalize and high­
light individuals in the major battle scenes in this work. Straining for 
a plausible reality, he actually invented emotions, actions, and likely 
dialogue to flesh out the human shapes dessicated by his military 
sources. For instance, by furnishing thought, action, and speech he 
helps us to "fancy" Niepperg's reaction when Frederick's attack sur­
prises him at dinner: "Quick, your Plan of Battle, then? Witherward; 
How; What? answer or perish! Niepperg was infinitely struck; dropt 
knife and fork: 'Send for Romer, General of the Horse!' " (FG, 4:121). 
Later in the same account of Mollwitz, he invents dialogue to suggest 
the frustration of Romer's troops—"Are we to stand here like miles­
tones, then, and be all shot without a stroke struck?" (FG, 4:124)—and 
to imply the comradery among the men whom Winterfield encour­
ages with, "Steady, meine Kinder; fix bayonets, handle ramrods!" 
(FG, 4:127-28). Admitting that "no human pen can describe" nor in­
tellect discern how the Prussians triumphed at Sterbohol, he substi­
tutes instead a brief vignette that imagines Field Marshall Schwerin 
turning back his retreating troops with a "Heran, meine Kinder," the 
cry they take up "with hot tears" as he falls: "Heran, On!" until "they 
manage to do the work at Sterbohol" (FG, 6:134-35). The mousetrap 
image in the battle of Hohenfriedberg and the "Theseus and the Mi­
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notaur over again" at Zorndorf are other inventions like the "Heran" 
that organize and focus an event for the reader. Carlyle's narratives 
proclaim that the emotional reality of an event is more important 
than its literal occurrences; they attempt to make his reader under­
stand the past by experiencing it with contemporaries. At their best 
his techniques create a comprehension beyond the merely historical, 
but they are controlled by and finally limited to a past he invented to 
make sense of the present. The more his confidence in his own vision 
faltered, the more insistently he imposed his fictions on an uncooper­
ative or fragmentary reality. As a result we wind up agreeing with 
contemporary reviewers, who found the work "a curious psychologi­
cal study, more interesting and valuable perhaps in a History of 
Thomas Carlyle than a History of Frederick the Great."48 
The idiosyncrasies of Carlyle's style always made his reputation as 
an historian controversial. He never succeeded in convincing his con­
temporaries that the created and the historical were one and the same. 
In fact his works played an important role in defining the split be­
tween "scientific" and "literary" history from its beginnings. The 
Saturday Review began to distinguish between the two as early as 
1858, when J. F. Stephen used The French Revolution to exemplify 
"the especial advantages and disadvantages of the literary tempera­
ment" in the historian. Pointing out the ways imaginative excess 
could falsify history, Stephen expressed a fear common among de­
fenders of "scientific" history: that the more powerful the historian's 
literary ability, the greater the potential for misleading readers.49 Ro­
bert Vaughan had similarly criticized Cromwell for sacrificing 
"proof" to "vivacity."50 Frederick of course deviated farther and 
farther from what reviewers expected in a history, distorting perspec­
tive and obscuring the leading facts of the epoch in an effort to enter­
tain.51 Because they considered it a particular abuse of his genius to 
glorify might as right, reviewers claimed Frederick as proof that the 
"literary" historian was as dangerous a moral teacher as he was un­
reliable a scholar.52 By the 1880s, when the battle lines between "men 
of science" and "men of style" had been clearly drawn, Carlyle was 
almost uniformly condemned by defenders of professionalism as "a 
literary historian pure and simple."53 Oscar Browning's analysis of 
Carlyle's factual errors in the flight to Varennes exemplified the at­
tack of the academic historian on the artistic license of his "literary" 
rivals.54 Looking back in 1886 on The French Revolution, Frederic 
Harrison noted the change in critical climate: "A generation ago the 
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influence of it was great; it is now seen to be a poem, with the vision, 
the movement, the exaggeration of poetry, but without the one indis­
pensable quality for history, solid historical science and true social 
philosophy."55 With the general public, however, Carlyle's influence 
remained great. In the closing decades of the century, he was held up 
as a paradigm for the strengths as well as weakness of "literary" 
history. 
Taking Carlyle's measure as an historian is no simple matter. Like 
Arnold he combined elements of various historiographic traditions. 
His theory of history was romantic in its organic concept of change, 
in its focus on the process of spiritual revolution, and in its recogni­
tion of the contributions of the life of the common man to the life of 
nations. He also borrowed techniques and attitudes characteristic of 
the romantic poet. The prophetic role he assigned to the historian, 
the merging of historian and event that preceded the act of imagina­
tive reconstruction, and his attempt at forging a new language that 
could portray the spiritual dimension of events, all link him to ro­
manticism. But in practice his sternly moralistic purposes prevented 
him from escaping the judgmental tendencies of preceding histori­
ans, and thus restricted the process of empathetic identification so 
fundamental to romantic historicism. The overriding purpose of his 
histories was to impress upon his readers the lesson learned in the 
history of the Jews: all men must keep God's commandments or be­
come the instruments of His wrath. His Calvinistic biases were con­
stantly imposing on events and characters a set of ethical standards 
not derived from history itself. 
If Carlyle's elevation of human history to the level of cosmic drama 
gave his work a timelessness that other historians may not be able to 
claim, it also entailed serious drawbacks. Because his interest in 
events was essentially metaphorical or allegorical, he rarely gave 
them the close analysis that they demanded. He largely ignored his 
own collectivistic and developmental theories about the way history 
operated. Unlike Arnold he tended to reduce any epoch to a kind of 
psychomachia in which institutions, law, economics, politics, or 
class were only effects, not causes, of change. While asserting that 
custom, convention, and tradition played a vital role in human activ­
ity and thought, Carlyle seldom went beyond a symbolic explanation 
of their interrelationship. With characters as with institutions, his 
sins were usually those of omission. The allegorical function he at­
tributed to individuals always limited the depth of their characteriza­
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tion. When faced with evidence incongruous to his own formulation 
of a character's importance, he did not misrepresent so much as he 
simply ignored. Undeniably he possessed a rare ability for bringing 
historical characters back to life, but they walked as the ghosts of his 
own prejudices and not as self-validating personalities. 
Out of his very weaknesses, however, come some strengths. If he 
was insufficiently critical of those men who represented the forces of 
good, he escaped the cynicism of utilitarian theories that reduced all 
motivation to the level of pleasure or pain. If he allowed a metaphori­
cal view of an event or character to preclude rigorous analysis, at least 
in the case of Cromwell and The French Revolution he provided a 
much-needed corrective to prevailing prejudices. If he depended too 
heavily on moral absolutes as standards of judgment, they did save 
him from what were later recognized as the dangers of excessive his­
torical relativism: a refusal to judge, a blind trust or equally blind 
fatalism concerning the course of history. If his techniques drew more 
heavily on the subjectivity of the poet rather than on the professional­
ism of the scholar, they allowed for a dimension in historical writing 
rare in later days of overspecialization. Carlyle, in James Russell Lo­
well's phrase, saw "history, as it were, by flashes of lightning";56 the 
luminous clarity and insight of his best passages more than atone for 
the intervening obscurity. 
We should also keep in mind that Carlyle's conception of history, 
whatever its limits, suited the needs and interests of the Victorians. 
Without making them feel they were escaping from their duty in the 
present, he offered them reconnection with the "vigorous whole-life" 
of "rough strong times, wherein those maladies of ours had not yet 
arisen" (E, 4:56). His view of change acknowledged the mutability of 
material things that was so constant a reality to them while offering 
reassurance that the "organic filaments" of spiritual continuity still 
survived destruction of the familiar. He devoted his major works to 
the most thorough changes in modern Europe, seeking ways to inter­
pret the changes of his own day. These works acted as both a warning 
to his own age to follow God's laws and a reassurance that in the long 
run Good would triumph. His transcendental conception of time and 
history satisfied Victorian hunger for moral uplift while allowing his 
readers to forget the specific theological dilemmas of their own age. 
The theory of hero-worship, however repugnant its objects, offered a 
heartening denial of the diminution of individual stature in a ran­
domly determined universe and a means of obtaining secular saints 
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for a generation now forced to live by "Admiration, Hope, and Love." 
Natural Supernaturalism held out the promise of spiritual trans­
cendence without requiring a repudiation of the facts of this world, 
thus suggesting a means of unifying the scientific, the religious, and 
the imaginative, faculties that seemed to many to operate at cross 
purposes. 
That Carlyle's teachings could not retain their orginal credibility 
tells us as much about the times as the man. In one respect he—unlike 
Arnold—simply outlived that generation for which the contradictory 
pulls of science and religion could be balanced without fragmenta­
tion of belief. He had made a leap of faith to conquer scepticism, but 
in the latter half of the century that leap simply fell short of the reali­
ties of the age. As the century wore on, the scientific conception of 
change and progress silently refuted claims that history was governed 
by divine purpose and direction. The progress of religious scepticism 
made Natural Supernaturalism all the more attractive as an inspir­
ing, if vague, alternative, but one that either failed to provide practi­
cal objects for worship, or that expressed itself in a worship of force 
repellent to the Victorian moral sense. The changing social fabric 
most decisively distanced Carlyle from his times. The sage seemed an 
atavism in an age of professionalism and specialization, the hero-
worshipper an anomaly in an age of democracy and mass culture. 
Carlyle's refusal to acknowledge democracy's strength in the modern 
world was his most unhistorical blindspot. With the repudiation of 
his social teachings implicit in the political drift of the latter nine­
teenth century, what had begun in him as an appreciation for indi­
vidual excellence and wise guidance hardened into a blind absolutism 
and worship of force that repelled readers otherwise quite receptive to 
the moral quality of his message. 
That Carlyle could be so wrong-headed about the actual course of 
change in his own day only underlines the fact that his strengths and 
weaknesses were those of the visionary. He was a powerful critic of his 
own society, but an inadequate reformer, because in the long run he 
wanted not to confront time and change so much as to overleap them 
into a world of eternal verities. He had a keen insight into the spiri­
tual malaise of his age and a profound understanding of man's spiri­
tual needs. However else they may have failed, his histories succeeded 
admirably in nourishing these. One reviewer noted that in failing to 
realize his own version of Utopia, Carlyle had also failed in his wish to 
make "himself . .  . the hero of this modern age."57 One suspects, 
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however, that it was precisely his example—as one voice struggling 
with incomparable eloquence to express man's continuing need to 
reaffirm the possibilities for faith, order, excellence, and transcen­
dence—that assured his heroic value even for an age that outgrew his 
teachings. 
65 
Ill

THOMAS BABINGTON

MACAULAY

HISTORY AS WHIG VIA MEDIA 
That the two most acclaimed historical artists of their era, Thomas Babington Macaulay and Thomas Carlyle, could be so emphati­
cally different provides an important commentary on the Victorian 
frame of mind. If Thomas Carlyle was the prophet most opposed to 
his age, Thomas Macaulay was, in Leslie Stephen's words, the very 
Prince of Philistines.1 If Carlyle epitomized the Victorians' yearning 
for a natural supernaturalism, Macaulay epitomized their pragma­
tism and dogmatic common sense. Where Carlyle illuminated the 
mystery of the past with romantic imagination, Macaulay flooded its 
shadows with enlightened rationality. While Carlyle enacted his age's 
painful transcendence of the Everlasting No, Macaulay sidestepped 
its most painful moral and intellectual dilemmas. No wonder Car­
lyle found Macaulay "unhappily without divine idea," and Macaulay 
considered him a "charlatan."2 Yet Macaulay's tendency to yoke 
rather than to reconcile the dichotomies of his age makes him the 
more powerful a spokesman for the Victorian middle classes whose 
historical tastes he consciously shaped. His startling literary success 
argues that his vision of history satisfied powerful and widely felt 
needs even for those who fully acknowledged his limitations. 
Macaulay no less than Arnold and Carlyle tried to reconcile the 
demands of reason and imagination in a form of history both scientif­
ically sound and artistically compelling. He too sought in the past a 
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stable center for a diversifying society. But his version of the "Whig 
view of history" sought not so much to locate a source of moral value 
in history as to substitute a political order for that moral one. He 
institutionalized an interpretation and infused it with a patriotic self-
satisfaction that cut across party lines. By showing how English insti­
tutions reconciled tradition and innovation, Macaulay provided a 
secularized source of meaning and stability. Shaped by a yearning for 
order no less powerful than Carlyle's, his view of history proved more 
useful because it co-opted rather than tried to subvert democracy. He 
used the past to endow Victorian success with ethical value and, in so 
doing, provided a focus for national pride and identity. His over­
whelming popularity resulted as much from his reassuring view of 
progress and permanence as from the brilliant style that reinforced it, 
a style making as few demands on understanding as his explanation 
of history did on faith. The shallowness of his response to the intellec­
tual crises of his time should not detract from his importance as a 
barometer of Victorian taste and thought. He reveals the trouble spots 
of nineteenth-century consciousness no less because he tried to side­
step where he could not transcend. The theoretical incongruities be­
neath the monotonous lucidity of his style yield important insights 
into the transitional state of Victorian historiography. 
John Clive and others have helped clarify how Macaulay's early 
years contributed to the "making of the historian."3 He shook off 
much more easily than did Arnold and Carlyle the effects of his stern 
religious upbringing in the Clapham sect. His father's typically 
evangelical disapproval did little to decrease Macaulay's lifelong pas­
sion for novels and other imaginative literature. As early as his Cam­
bridge days, his continuing respect for evangelical codes of conduct 
was no longer matched by a similar doctrinal orthodoxy. With or­
thodoxy he discarded any reliance on a moral truth transcending time 
and place—the kind of reliance that focused Carlyle's and Arnold's 
historical consciousness. His own focus was always more political 
than religious. His Whig view defined itself against the backdrop of 
the Napoleonic wars abroad and the continuing potential for revolu­
tion at home. As pressure for reform mounted in the twenties, he like 
Arnold became convinced of the inevitability of change and looked to 
history to justify the accommodations it required. The early "essays 
and his fragmentary History of France articulated ideas that coalesced 
in his parliamentary speeches in support of the first Reform Bill.4 
The extension of the franchise became part of a tradition of change 
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that preserved by progressing and ordered by expanding the privi­
leges necessary to maintain balance. These views would become the 
pattern for all his further thought on history and the state. 
The characteristic bent of his literary temperament formed early as 
well. Cambridge debating encouraged the versatility of imagination 
and rhetorical acuity that would become as crucial to the historian as 
to the M. P. His work on the Indian legal code further sharpened his 
facility for marshalling historical examples to support general prin­
ciples. The Lays of Ancient Rome (1842), whose publication Arnold 
encouraged, proved even more dramatically than the Essays Macau-
lay's skill in reconstructing the mind of the past. That same skill 
combined with his highly gratifying view of the English past to make 
the first two volumes of the History best sellers in 1849 and to secure 
the triumphant success of the third and fourth volumes in 1855. Al­
though when he died in 1859 the History covered barely one fourth of 
his original prospectus, it was no less suitable a monument to his 
rhetorical genius and to his complacent vision of Victorian success. 
Macaulay's use of history mediated specific conflicts in a mind 
marked by pronounced contrasts. At first glance his intense imag­
inative devotion to the past matches oddly with his bumptious enthu­
siasm for progress. His sternly empirical rationalism seems scarcely 
compatible with his romantic love of time-traveling, of imagining 
himself "in Greece, in Rome, in the midst of the French Revolution" 
or in conversation with famous historical figures.5 In fact, the pecu­
liarly quantitative nature of his imaginative capacities allowed him 
to indulge his fancy while still satisfying the demands of reason. As he 
explained to his sister Margaret, it was his very love of "castle­
building" that encouraged the accuracy with which he retained facts: 
"Precision in dates, the day or hour in which a man was born or died, 
becomes absolutely necessary. A slight fact, a sentence, a word, are of 
importance in my romance" (LM, 1:171). Although Macaulay valued 
the conscious fantasies of "romance" too much to be a mere rational­
ist, he used imaginative detail in a thoroughly practical and quanti­
tative way to increase the reality of what he knew was only an illusion. 
If anything, his particular exercise of imagination ended by more 
effectively divorcing fact from fantasy. As Margaret Macaulay pointed 
out, she and Tom were imaginative without being "romantic"; their 
reveries allowed them to escape into a fantasy world but "would never 
make us do a foolish thing, or indulge very extravagant expectations, 
in which we should not be borne out by what we see passing in the 
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world around us."6 History was in this respect a perfect outlet. It pro­
vided a fully-formed imaginative world while remaining true to the 
laws of experience; it indulged the fancy while remaining firmly 
rooted in fact. Macaulay's handling of the Lays reinforces this distinc­
tion. The mythic part of ancient history appealed to him because it 
possessed that "peculiar character, more easily understood than de­
fined, which distinguishes the creations of the imagination from the 
realities of the world in which we live."7 The boundaries between the 
real and the unreal were so clearly marked that there was no chance of 
confusing them; one could escape completely into the latter without 
jeopardizing one's status in the former. Arnold, too, had expected the 
"poetic" quality of the myths to distinguish them from "real his­
tory," but for him the poetic also gave access to a spiritual insight 
closed to Macaulay. 
Macaulay's distance from Carlyle is even greater. Carlyle valued 
facts over fiction because facts were a means of transcending the limits 
of mortal experience and gaining access to a higher truth; Macaulay 
valued facts because they more clearly defined those limits. Where 
both felt a priori deduction to be an inadequate means of accounting 
for reality, Carlyle opposed "formulas" because they intervened be­
tween man and divine reality, while Macaulay in effect replaced faith 
in any such reality with faith in facts alone.8 Where Carlyle attempted 
to interpret events by seizing on the revelatory details and illuminat­
ing their spiritual significance, Macaulay argued by piling up exam­
ples of similar circumstances and generalizing from them. Jane Mill-
gate calls his process of reasoning "illustrative and analogical rather 
than analytic."9 It determined truth not through a cognitive leap to a 
higher reality but by the sheer weight of similar cases. 
Even had Macaulay's characteristic intellectual biases not drawn 
him to history, his more complex emotional needs would have, as 
George Levine and others have shown.10 He took up the History after 
his return from India and the loss of his two favorite sisters, Hannah 
to marriage, Margaret to death. He was frustrated by the opposition 
his legal reforms had aroused and disenchanted with public office. 
The "desertion" of the sisters upon whom he had concentrated his 
strong affections intensified his desire to retreat from active life. In a 
telling letter to Margaret, he confessed that his disappointment over 
Hannah's engagement had intensified his "passion for holding con­
verse with the greatest minds of all ages and nations, my power of 
forgetting what surrounds me, and of living with the past, the future, 
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the distant, and the unreal."n The writing of history became far more 
than an avocation: it became a way of establishing an ideal world that 
guaranteed him protection from the emotional risks and losses of real 
life: a controlled world of reason and experience, a source of emo­
tional sustenance and intellectual stability more dependable than any­
thing his own life afforded. In this sense Macaulay represents another 
variation on that Victorian pattern of outer confidence and inner 
doubt. His reiterated conviction that the present was superior to the 
past did not prevent history from offering a static retreat from the 
disequilibrium that change and progress necessarily caused. 
His desire to balance the claims of reason and imagination and of 
change and permanence shapes his theorizing. Although he did not 
possess a coherent philosophy of history, certain ideas first articu­
lated in the 1828 essays "History" and "Hallam's Constitutional His­
tory" provide a working definition: history should combine reason 
and imagination, it should use particular examples to identify 
general principles of human conduct, and it should document not 
just public events, but the "silent revolutions" in thought and taste of 
which those events were only the outwardsigns. "History, at least in 
its state of ideal perfection, is a compound of poetry and philosophy," 
wrote Macaulay in the Hallam essay: "It impresses general truths on 
the mind by a vivid representation of particular characters and inci­
dents" (W, 5:162). Unfortunately, in his own day poetry and philoso­
phy were treated as "hostile elements": historical fiction invested the 
past with flesh and blood, but the historical essayist had "to extract 
the philosophy of history, . .  . to trace the connexion of causes and 
effects, and to draw from the occurrences of former times general les­
sons of moral and political wisdom" (W, 5:162). Macaulay's ideal his­
torian would combine the sculptor's eye for external reality possessed 
by Sir Walter Scott with the anatomist's eye for structure and causality 
possessed by Hallam; ideal history would join the coloring of a 
"painted landscape" with the "exact information as to the bearings of 
the various points" supplied by a map (W, 5:163). Only thus could 
history provide instruction "of a vivid and practical character" that 
would be not merely "traced" on the mind, but "branded into it" 
(W, 5:160). Macaulay's ideal history was to perform a task that in 
"Milton" (1825) he had considered impossible in a modern age: to 
unite "the incompatible advantages of reality and deception, the clear 
discernment of truth and the exquisite enjoyment of fiction" (W, 5:7). 
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In other words it was to accomplish what Macaulay himself did in his 
highly factual fantasy world. 
Macaulay's insistence on the mutual exclusivity of reason and im­
agination proceeded as much from his belief that "as civilisation ad­
vances, poetry almost necessarily declines" (W, 5:4) as from his at­
tempt to be imaginative without being "romantic." The very factors 
that made history more "scientific" decreased its imaginative vigor. 
For Macaulay as for Arnold, history became "philosophical" insofar 
as it identified those principles of conduct that comprised "the 
science of government." Like other "experimental sciences" that ar­
rived at generalizations through induction, historical interpretation 
was generally in a "state of progression" (W, 5:145). Because the mod­
ern historian had a wider inventory of experience on which to base his 
reasoning, he surpassed the ancient in the ability to distinguish 
"what is local from what is universal; what is transitory from what is 
eternal; to discriminate between exceptions and rules; to trace the op­
eration of disturbing causes; to separate those general principles 
which are always true and everywhere applicable from the accidental 
circumstances with which . . . they are blended" (W, 5:151). How­
ever, this march of mind robbed history of its "picturesque" qualities; 
the generalizations necessary to advance knowledge blunted the par­
ticularity necessary to "brand" them into the imagination. Macaulay 
wished to restore this imaginative vividness to history while remain­
ing faithful to its "scientific" purposes. As Levine has argued, he 
sought in history what many Victorian writers sought in realistic fic­
tion: "a genre which allowed critical intelligence and a greater fidel­
ity to the possibilities of real experience to combine with what re­
mained of modern man's enfeebled imaginative powers."12 
To achieve this reconciliation, Macaulay, like Carlyle, reversed the 
relationship of creativity in fiction and history, although with signif­
icantly different effect. He did not share the realist novelist's belief 
that fiction could—and should—test and explore reality. He consid­
ered fiction "essentially imitative. Its merit consists in its resemb­
lance to a model with which we are already familiar." Fiction was in 
effect deductive, history inductive: "In fiction, the principles are 
given, to find the facts: in history, the facts are given, to find the prin­
ciples." As a result behavior that ran contrary to expectations was 
"shocking and incongruous" in novels, but "delightful as history, 
because it contradicts our previous notion of human nature, and of 
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the connections of causes and effects." "What is called the romantic 
part of history is in fact the least romantic" (W, 5:131), for it could 
serve to enlarge and correct one's expectations about human nature. 
History could thus satisfy the demands of both the imagination and 
the reason: it allowed one to indulge one's propensity for the exotic, 
the improbable, the fantastic, while retaining its didactic function. 
In actual practice Macaulay succeeded in reconciling imagination 
and reason in history only by severely limiting both. For him the 
transforming creativity of the romantic artist was not just unneces­
sary to the historian, but positively inappropriate. It was rather a 
"lower kind of imagination" that the historian required: "The object 
of [his ] imitation is not within him; it is furnished from without. It is 
not a vision of beauty and grandeur discernible only by the eye of his 
own mind, but a real model which he did not make, and which he 
cannot alter" (W, 6:83). Since Macaulay's reality did not possess the 
spiritual dimensions of Arnold's and Carlyle's, reconstructing it was 
a matter of imitating the seen, not intuiting the unseen. Carlyle 
would of course have dismissed the results of Macaulay's historical 
inductions as lying "formulas." For him and for Arnold, the aim of 
shaping detail into narrative was to break the tyranny of appearances. 
They relied on the eye of the spirit to illuminate the pattern beyond 
the facts. For Macaulay narration created an accurate illusion of an 
unquestioned reality. It selected and arranged such parts of the truth 
as most nearly "produce the effect of the whole" (W, 6:83). This pro­
cess depended wholly upon the eye of the senses; Macaulay's concep­
tion of the true gave him no cause to seek further testimony. 
Macaulay's conception of science was as mechanical as his concep­
tion of imagination, and it depreciated fact in a way equally contrary 
to the romantic temperament. At first glance his hostility to deductive 
reasoning and his enthusiasm for concrete detail might seem to un­
dermine the character types and behavioral "laws" that obstructed a 
historicist appreciation of individuality. In practice treating histori­
cal facts as merely the "materials for the construction of a science" (W, 
6:259) prevented Macaulay from valuing or completely comprehend­
ing any fact or event for its own sake. Despite his keen eye for telling 
detail, he still believed that "facts are the mere dross of history. It is 
from the abstract truth which interpenetrates them . . . that the 
mass derives its whole value" (W, 5:131). To him no past event was 
intrinsically significant; it was valuable "only as it leads us to form 
just calculations with respect to the future" (W, 5:155) or reveals "a 
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general truth" about human nature (W, 6:260). This of course is sig­
nificantly different from Ranke's belief that all ages were immediate 
to God, or even Carlyle's dedication to ideas that still bore spiritual 
fruit in the present. For Macaulay, the legacy of history was a set of 
generalizations by which likely outcomes could be calculated; for 
Carlyle, a set of spiritual absolutes that no man or nation could trans­
gress with impunity. 
Macaulay's reductively pragmatic approach to historical laws ef­
fectively ruled out any absolute, political or moral. Notwithstanding 
his early attacks on the Utilitarians for their dependence on "ab­
stract" theory, he shared their goals—to provide the greatest good for 
the greatest number—and he favored whatever political strategies 
would bring this about. He might use scientific analogies to describe 
the "laws" of political science or talk about the "philosophy of his­
tory" (W, 5:543),13 but his own laws designated neither universal rela­
tionships nor a philosophical basis for government. They were, at 
most, thoroughly pragmatic rules of thumb. The declaration that "a 
good government, like a good coat, is that which fits the body for 
which it is designed" (W, 7:687) summed up the extent of Macaulay's 
"philosophy." All other values yielded to utility. Constitutions were 
evaluated not by ideals served or traditions preserved, but by how well 
they suited the needs and interests—and thus increased the happiness 
—of those subject to them. A "wise man" valued liberty itself not as 
something "eternally and intrinsically good" but rather for the 
"blessings" of political stability and progress that resulted from it (W, 
7:686). Even party allegiances paled before such worldly wisdom. Jo­
seph Hamburger demonstrates that as both politician and historian 
Macaulay was less a Whig than a trimmer.14 He favored not a consis­
tent party line, but rather those forces that stabilized opposing politi­
cal interests in order to achieve the balance necessary for prosperity 
and progress. The illogic of political positions was irrelevant so long 
as they achieved their ends (see, e.g., W, 2:367). Macaulay was in a 
sense more ruthlessly utilitarian than the Utilitarians themselves. 
The gap between Macaulay's conception of the "laws of political 
science" and Arnold's was of course even more profound. Arnold as­
sumed that the political order mirrored the ethical order and that its 
laws confirmed the "undoubted truths" of morality. For Macaulay, 
"all questions in morals and politics are questions of comparison and 
degree" (W, 5:152). The landscape of political action was not a path 
marked by absolutes, but rather a shadowy "frontier where virtue and 
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vice fade into each other" (W, 2:189). In this territory the exigencies of 
political expedience shaped "laws," not timeless standards of right 
and wrong. His belief that "no man ought to be severely censured for 
not being beyond his age in virtue" (W, 6:18) might point toward a 
relativism not characteristically Victorian, but it also revealed a pro­
found disillusionment with the possibility that any permanent ideals 
transcended ordinary experience the way Arnold's Christianity or 
Carlyle's Natural Supernaturalism did. Macaulay was largely spared 
from imposing alien standards of conduct on other ages because he 
acknowledged the value of no ideal standard. 
Although in their dominant sense, "laws" merely described logical 
expectations about behavior, there was one law that possessed a pre­
scriptive authority amounting to divine decree: the overall progress of 
human civilization. Macaulay in places treated society's advance as 
simply the logical outcome of the development of experimental 
science and of the individual's drive to better his position. But else­
where he added the sanction of God and Nature as well. He took the 
"natural tendency of the human intellect to truth" and of "society to 
improvement" as evidence of those "general laws which it has pleased 
[God] to establish in the physical and in the moral world" (W, 5:365). 
It was no more logical to expect to stem progress than to "change the 
courses of the seasons and of the tides" (W, 8:73). The necessary and 
predictable advance of civilization in this sense attained a status Ma­
caulay accorded to no other phenomenon in his world of transient 
values. And, John Clive points out, Macaulay had sound reasons for 
these conclusions. Looking around him he saw a world that wasdem­
onstrably better—in morals, in social consciousness, in religious 
zeal—than the age that preceded it, largely as a result of reforming 
impulses like those that inspired the Clapham sect. Evidence of mate­
rial progress would thus merely have "reinforced the lesson taught by 
the confident Evangelicalism of Macaulay's youth" and gained for 
itself a quasi-religious authority. The man who found the Crystal 
Palace a sight "beyond the dreams of the Arabian romances" (LM, 
2:226) did not merely welcome the material advances of the industrial 
revolution, but found in them "the source of something akin to what 
the Romantic poets were finding in nature."15 This significantly 
shifted the emotional fulcrum for Macaulay's assessment of history. 
For Carlyle the persistence of tradition sanctified the present. Macau-
lay, on the other hand, reverenced tradition because of the present 
successes it had made possible. 
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The full implications of this reorientation were to an extent 
masked by Macaulay's rhetoric. His argument for progress gained 
strength from organic analogies similar to Arnold's and Carlyle's. 
Comparing the development of nations to that of individuals in 
"Milton" allowed him to argue for a cultural as well as an individual 
maturation toward logic and abstract reasoning. In the History this 
analogy insured continuity in national identity: "the groundwork of 
[national] character" had remained "the same through many genera­
tions, in the sense in which the groundwork of the character of an 
individual may be said to be the same when he is a rude and thought­
less schoolboy and when he is a refined and accomplished man" (W, 
1:330-31). More importantly, this developmental model allowed Ma­
caulay to argue that nations, like individuals, needed forms of gov­
ernment adapted to their relative stage of maturity: "The very means 
by which the human mind is, in one stage of its progress, supported 
and propelled, may, in another stage, be mere hindrances" (W, 1:37). 
Like Arnold he supported reform because the "law of growth" gov­
erning societies decreed that as the people's strength and experience 
increased, government could "no longer confine them within the 
swaddling bands . . . of their infancy" (W, 8:75). They must be ac­
corded political power commensurate with their increased intellec­
tual and economic strength in order to bring "the legal order of so­
ciety into something like harmony with the natural order" (W, 8:84). 
Like the natural order, the pattern of history was also governed by 
cycles. For Macaulay this meant that societies advanced through a 
series of actions and reactions in politics and public opinion. It also 
meant that for no nation was development without limit. The fact of 
decay gave cause for optimism, because the death of social organisms 
contributed to new birth. Here the metaphors are distinctly Carlylean: 
"The corruption of death" after Charlemagne's fall ultimately "fer­
mented] into new forms of life" (W, 6:389); the Reformation and 
French Revolution had acted like volcanoes whose fiery deluges 
ended by fertilizing the soil they devastated (W, 5:595). But there was 
cause for melancholy as well. For all his commitment to the march of 
mind, Macaulay did not see England forever in its vanguard. Arnold 
looked in vain for new races to carry on the next stage of development; 
Macaulay could envision a time "when some traveler from New Zea­
land shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken 
arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's" (W, 6:455). 
More often, however, he took the shorter view, assuring his audience 
75

History as Whig Via Media 
that despite the "recoil which regularly follows every advance," the 
great tide of progress was steadily coming in on English shores (W, 
6:97). 
The rhetoric of organic change is deceptive, for beneath it lay as­
sumptions that significantly distanced Macaulay's position from Ar­
nold's and Carlyle's. His enthusiasm for the present was only one 
distinguishing factor. His model of progress was actually closer to 
that of the Utilitarians and the Scottish conjectural historians. The 
notion of developmental stages he derived from the latter allowed 
him to dismiss as primitive whatever challenged his norm for civiliza­
tion. 16 By measuring all societies on one and the same scale he ruled 
out Arnold's appreciation of how different nations could translate a 
common pattern of development into terms appropriate to them­
selves. Praising the ancients at the moderns' expense irritated him 
because by virtue of their very modernity his contemporaries occu­
pied a higher rung on the ladder of progress. There was, after all, no 
"well authenticated instance of a people which has decidedly retro­
graded in civilisation and prosperity" without the agency of external 
calamity (W, 5:366). More importantly, his measure of "civilization" 
ruled out the moral growth that Carlyle and Arnold considered essen­
tial to the social organism. Improvement in the physical realm meant 
the increase of material prosperity and population; in the intellectual 
realm, it meant the dispersion of superstition and the march of mind 
toward scientific rationalism. By moral improvement Macaulay 
meant little more than the change in manners from rude to refined, 
barbarous to humane. Once he contrasts the modern gentry's polish 
and accomplishments with the "unrefined sensuality" of their swill­
ing, swearing counterparts in 1685, it does not occur to him to look for 
further proof of moral advance (W, 1:250). Not only did he ignore 
spiritual progress in the sense Arnold intended—he saw it as impos­
sible: "A Christian of the fifth century with a Bible is neither better 
nor worse situated than a Christian in the nineteenth century with a 
Bible" (W, 6:457-58). 
Macaulay epitomized that "faith in machinery" that Matthew Ar­
nold would later single out as the "besetting danger" of Victorian 
society. His concept of cycles reinforced not the organic integrity of 
all social organisms but a mechancial cause and effect. Situations are 
not so much evolved as provoked by opposite extremes. The license of 
the Restoration was caused by the prudery of Puritanism, the violence 
of revolutions corresponded to the degree of misgovernment that 
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brought them about. That is why the balancing hand of the trimmer 
was so necessary. The whole logic of trimming was averse to the kinds 
of catastrophic destruction of the old that Carlyle deemed necessary to 
purify society. For Macaulay the goal was to effect change through a 
series of accommodations between old and new, action and reaction. 
For the sake of social stability he was quite willing to tolerate much of 
the corruption that Carlyle was eager to purge. Compromise, not 
conversion, was always his desideratum. 
Macaulay's attitude toward the individual distanced him farthest 
from Arnold and Carlyle. To the "cool and philosophical" observer 
like Macaulay, the human nature that drove all men amounted to 
little more than enlightened self-interest responding quite predictably 
to pain and pleasure. Believing that "man . .  . is always the same," 
he also assumed that marked differences between two generations 
could be explained solely by the differences in "their respective cir­
cumstances" (W, 5:217). The mainspring of historical change was for 
him neither ideals nor heroes, but an externalized "spirit of the age." 
Macaulay declared unequivocally that the age formed the man, not 
the man the age. Just as no man should be expected to rise above the 
morality of his time, neither could he escape its prevailing mental 
climate. The progress of society in all its forms—political, economic, 
cultural, and intellectual—operated with a momentum and an inev­
itability of its own. Changes destined to occur would do so indepen­
dently of specific men, great or small. He declared that 
without Copernicus we should have been Copernicans,—that without 
Columbus America would have been discovered,—that without Locke 
we should have possessed a just theory of the origin of human ideas. 
Society indeed has its great men and its little men, as the earth has its 
mountains and its valleys. But the inequalities of intellect, like the in­
equalities of the surface of our globe, bear so small a proportion to the 
mass, that, in calculating its great revolutions, they may safely be ne­
glected. (W, 5:85) 
There was little room for Carlylean hero-worship in such a funda­
mentally deterministic view of change, or even for the recognition of 
original genius. Even in the arts the laws of progress "operate with 
little less certainty than those which regulate the periodical returns of 
heat and cold, of fertility and barrenness." The "electric impulse of 
change" reduced Shakespeare to a shock wave of the Reformation, 
Wordsworth to a spark of the French Revolution. There was no Car­
lylean transmutation in this galvanic current, no reciprocity in the 
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social organism. No man could resist "the influence which the vast 
mass, in which he is but an atom, must exercise on him" (W, 6:353). 
Those who appeared to lead society "are, in fact, only whirled along 
before it; those who attempt to resist it, are beaten down and crushed 
beneath it" (W, 8:73). 
Macaulay's complacency with the modern, his celebration of both 
progress and continuity, and his faith in the "laws" of history all 
come together in the "Whig view of history" he epitomized. As Her­
bert Butterfield demonstrated,17 the Whig view denotes an attitude 
toward the past as much as a particular political affiliation: the ten­
dency to judge events by the degree to which they led toward the con­
dition of the present. The major drawbacks to this view lay in its 
tendency to fashion precedents where there were only superficial 
resemblances and to attribute causality where only sequence existed. 
Macaulay was aware of how this bias could operate, particularly in 
England where the appeal to precedent had always played so large a 
role in political debate. And yet so clear to him were questions of 
correct and incorrect political action, of improvement and regression, 
that he could not see when he was himself guilty of judging the past 
by the present. Like Arnold he did not think that making allowance 
for the past state of political science and morality precluded "looking 
at ancient transactions by the light of modern knowledge." It was in 
fact "among the first duties of a historian to point out the faults of the 
eminent men of former generations" (W, 6:94). His comments on Hal­
ifax in the History make clear his most significant criterion for judg­
ment. What distinguished Halifax from other contemporary states­
men was that "through a long public life, and through frequent and 
violent revolutions of public feeling, he almost invariably took that 
view of the great questions of his time which history has finally 
adopted" (W, 4:127). Macaulay might try to re-create in loving detail 
the circumstances that produced the thoughts and feelings of his an­
cestors, but finally only those men whose judgments were vindicated 
by later developments earned the historian's full esteem and sym­
pathy. His praise for James Mill's histories reveals the goals of his 
own as well: 
We know of no writer who takes so much pleasure in the truly useful, 
noble, and philosophical employment of tracing the progress of sound 
opinions from their embryo state to their full maturity. He eagerly culls 
from old despatches and minutes every expression in which he can dis­
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cern the imperfect germ of any truth which has since been fully devel­
oped. He never fails to bestow praise on those who, though far from 
coming up to his standard of perfection, yet rose in a small degree above 
the common level of their contemporaries. It is thus that the annals of 
past times ought to be written. It is thus, especially, that the annals of 
our own country ought to be written. (W, 6:95) 
J. W. Burrow illuminates the tensions in traditional Whiggism 
that Macaulay tried to reconcile.18 Nineteenth-century Whigs needed 
to steer between the conservative's "antiquarian" insistence on prece­
dent and the radical's repudiation of it, to balance a reverence for 
tradition against the practical need to adapt political institutions to 
changing social and economic reality. Macaulay largely adopted the 
"Whig compromise," which looked for precedent not in an "ancient 
constitution" but in the thirteenth-century parliament and which 
held that the Glorious Revolution reaffirmed norms more ancient 
than the aberrant Stuart despotism. Lest Tories block further change 
by viewing 1688 as a new and final precedent, it was also important to 
make further progress traditional as well. "In the very act of innovat­
ing," England had "constantly appealed to ancient prescription," 
Macaulay argued (W, 5:634); this helped make her revolutions defen­
sive, her reforms preservative. The argument for continuity was still 
crucial, but this continuity demanded accommodation to social and 
economic progress as the polity matured. By claiming that "the pres­
ent constitution of our country is, to the constitution under which she 
flourished five hundred years ago, what the tree is to the sapling, what 
the man is, to the boy" (W, 1:20), Macaulay could make the trimming 
and compromise he advocated essential to the "natural" development 
of the political organism. 
Macaulay's interpretation had a peculiar appeal in the early years 
of the century, marked by the agitation for reform and the fear of 
revolution. John Clive points out that in the years preceding the first 
Reform Bill, political positions were often so overlapping and amor­
phous that history became "an enkindling agent, supplying touch­
stones and confrontations lacking in the contemporary situation."19 
For Macaulay England's seventeenth-century vindication of both 
popular representation and ancient tradition provided a paradigm 
for the change he wished to see in the present. By lifting the civil wars 
to the level of a "great conflict between . . . liberty and despotism, 
reason and prejudice," in which "the destinies of the human race 
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were staked on the same cast with the freedom of the English people" 
(W, 5:23), Macaulay gained additional rhetorical leverage on his au­
dience. He could then capitalize on patriotic pride by stressing the 
parallels between the nineteenth and the seventeenth centuries: 
It will soon again be necessary to reform that we may preserve, to save 
the fundamental principles of the Constitution by alterations in the 
subordinate parts. It will then be possible, as it was possible two 
hundred years ago, to protect vested rights, to secure every useful insti­
tution, every institution endeared by antiquity and noble associations, 
and, at the same time, to introduce into the system improvements har­
monizing with the original plan. It remains to be seen whether two 
hundred years have made us wiser. (W, 5:237) 
In this way what might have been a subversion of ancient authority 
was transformed into the fulfillment of a noble tradition. What might 
have represented a threat to stability and prosperity manifested the 
type of political behavior that, by insuring domestic stability, had 
been responsible for the march of mind and material progress in the 
last two hundred years. Macaulay brought the argument full circle 
after 1832 by claiming that the English had been able to effect a reform 
amounting to a revolution "by the force of reason, and under the 
forms of law" because their "moderation and humanity" were them­
selves "the fruits of a hundred and fifty years of liberty" (W, 5:624-25). 
Macaulay's version of the Whig view also allayed fears that En­
gland might be pulled into the tides of revolution sweeping the con­
tinent in the first half of the century. The threat of revolution, should 
accommodation through reform fail, was an important argument for 
change. Macaulay held up the organic continuity of English institu­
tions as proof that England would not go the way of France. This 
continuity made England quite different "from those polities which 
have, during the last eighty years, been methodically constructed, 
digested into articles, and ratified by constituent assemblies" (W, 
3:465)—and which, he need not have added, endured bloody revolu­
tions to put those constitutions into force. The strength of the En­
glish lay in the fact that they "have seldom looked abroad for models; 
they have seldom troubled themselves with Utopian theories; they 
have not been anxious to prove that liberty is the natural right of men; 
they have been content to regard it as the lawful birthright of En­
glishmen" (W, 5:634). In short they had been able to depend on his­
tory rather than abstract theory to sanction government, and had been 
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able to accommodate change without completely breaking with the 
past. Completing chapter 10 of the History in November 1848, when 
"all around us the world is convulsed by the agonies of great na­
tions," Macaulay drove his point home: "Now, if ever," he wrote, "we 
ought to be able to appreciate the whole importance of the stand 
which was made by our forefathers against the House of Stuart." En­
gland remained a center of calm because the English had "never lost 
what others are wildly and blindly seeking to regain. It is because we 
had a preserving revolution in the seventeenth century that we have 
not had a destroying revolution in the nineteenth" (W, 2:397-98). 
The Whig tradition, Burrow notes, allowed the English "to cherish 
the past while denying it binding force."20 In Macaulay's hands this 
tradition became a powerful device for mediating between the need 
for permanence and the inevitability of change in the Victorian pe­
riod. Macaulay took major credit not only for popularizing this view 
of government, but for endowing it with a quasi-religious intensity 
all Englishmen could share. What he could not find in human rela­
tionships or public life—a source of permanent value that could still 
accommodate change—he found in his interpretation of history. 
II 
If Macaulay bore the impress of Enlightenment thought far more 
deeply than did Arnold or Carlyle, the ways he redefined the scope 
and nature of historical writing showed that romantic influences also 
marked his work. He wanted the historian to reclaim those details 
appropriated by the novelist in order to illustrate the history of the 
people as well as the history of government: "to call up our ancestors 
before us with all their peculiarities of language, manners, and garb, 
to show us over their houses, to seat us at their tables, to rummage 
their old fashioned wardrobes, to explain the uses of their ponderous 
furniture" (W, 5:162). He expressed the same interest in sociological 
detail that animated Carlyle and the same contempt for the "dignity 
of history" because it had led earlier historians, "for fear of alluding 
to the vulgar concerns of private life . . . [to] take no notice of the 
circumstances which deeply affect the happiness of nations" (L, 2:56). 
The circumstances that most influenced this happiness, "the changes 
of manners and morals, the transitions of communities from poverty 
to wealth, from knowledge to ignorance, from ferocity to humanity," 
Macaulay defined as "noiseless revolutions" whose "progress is 
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rarely indicated by what historians are pleased to call important 
events" (W, 5:156). That he intended to rectify such errors in his own 
History he makes clear in its opening pages: 
It will be my endeavour to relate the history of the people as well as the 
history of the government, to trace the progress of useful and ornamen­
tal arts, to describe the rise of religious sects and the changes of literary 
taste, to portray the manners of successive generations, and not to pass 
by with neglect even the revolutions which have taken place in dress, 
furniture, repasts, and public amusements. I shall cheerfully bear the 
reproach of having descended below the dignity of history, if I can suc­
ceed in placing before the English of the nineteenth century a true pic­
ture of the life of their ancestors. (W, 1:2-3) 
The famous third chapter of the History offers the clearest example 
of how he achieved this end. The survey of everything from agricul­
ture to urban growth, literature to economics, entertains readers with 
curious detail but also resuscitates for them an otherwise alien past. 
Interwoven throughout the rest of the work one also finds commen­
tary on everything from the rise of newspaper printing to the inge­
nious stockjobbing swindles induced by the glut of middle-class 
wealth (W, 3:612-13; 4:171). Most often his source was the litera­
ture—popular more so than belletristic—of the period. In the discus­
sion of stockjobbing, Macaulay refers to the parodies of such 
swindlers in Shadwell's plays; in another instance, Tom Brown's 
Descriptions of a Country Life (1692), he documents the hardship of 
the middle classes by noting that "in this year, wine ceased to be put on 
many hospitable tables where [Brown] had been accustomed to see it, 
and that its place was supplied by punch" (W, 3:592). Macaulay was 
scarcely exaggerating when he replied to critics that only someone 
who had also "soaked his mind with the transitory literature of the 
day" was capable of judging the accuracy of his portrayals in chapter 
3 (LM, 2:162n.). 
In addition to supplying and corroborating specific details, literary 
sources were used by Macaulay as they were by Carlyle and Arnold, to 
document the values and beliefs of an age or nation. He defended even 
the most licentious Restoration comedy for "the light it throws on the 
history, polity, and manners of nations" (W, 6:491). In the spirit of 
Carlyle's celebration of Boswell, Macaulay pronounced a set of love 
letters to be worth their weight in state papers for illustrating the 
mind of the time (W, 6:261). He too advocated a process of "reading 
oneself into" a period and often spent hours in the British Museum, 
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turning over seventeenth-century pamphlets, tracts, and newspapers; 
in doing so, he wrote, "The mind is transported back a century and a 
half, and gets familiar with the ways of thinking, and with the habits, 
of a past generation" (LM, 2:196). 
A random scan of his footnotes suggests further the breadth and 
diversity of his research: architectural and geographical detail, notes 
of visits to historical locations, lists of sources collated into one ac­
count, extrapolations from population and industrial statistics, notes 
from foreign sources, ballads, old maps, manuscripts recently pub­
lished by antiquarian societies, all can be found there and in the text 
itself. He also pored over manuscripts in the Archives of the House of 
Lords with a zest only a fellow parliamentarian could share, and 
underlined their authenticity with references to parchments "em­
browned with the dust of a hundred and sixty years" and cancella­
tions and emendations on the original (W, 2:468; 3:626). This journal 
entry made shortly after the publication of volumes 1 and 2 suggests 
the amount of research he considered necessary before sitting down to 
write: 
I have now made up my mind to change my plan about my History. I 
will first set myself to know the whole subject:—to get, by reading and
travelling, a full acquaintance with William's reign. I reckon that it
will take me eighteen months to do this. I must visit Holland, Belgium,
Scotland, Ireland, France. The Dutch archives and French archives 
must be ransacked. I will see whether anything is to be got from other
diplomatic collections. I must see Londonderry, the Boyne, Aghrim,
Limerick, Kinsale, Namur again, Landen, Steinkirk. I must turn over 
hundreds, thousands, of pamphlets. Lambeth, the Bodleian and the 
other Oxford Libraries, the Devonshire Papers, the British Museum, 
must be explored, and notes made: and then I shall go to work. (LM, 
2:157-58) 
As did Carlyle he considered field research essential to take in the 
atmosphere of historical places like Turnham Green (site of the assas­
sination attempt in Chapter 21) and to collect concrete detail that 
could be found nowhere else (LM, 2:234-35). Trevelyan claimed that 
"the notes made during his fortnight's tour through the scenes of the 
Irish war are equal in bulk to a first-class article in the Edinburgh or 
Quarterly Reviews" (LM, 2:159). On-the-spot research also provided 
an opportunity to investigate fortifications, to sketch ground plans of 
city streets, and to interview any "inhabitant who was acquainted 
with any tradition worth the hearing" (LM, 2:159). 
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Macaulay's shrewd and sceptical temperament proved a keen wea­
pon in determining the credibility of his sources, although that 
shrewdness also proved susceptible to partisan misuse. He was adept 
at singling out the reliable parts of a given account—St. Germain's 
Life of James the Second, for instance—by distinguishing between 
sections based on personal memoir and the self-interested revisions of 
James's son or the later work of an "ignorant compiler" (W, 2:313 n.). 
In other cases he uses discrepancies in the different accounts of an 
incident to argue against the credibility of certain sources (e.g., W, 
2:413 n.). Although most contemporary critics acknowledged his vast 
learning, some challenged him on specific points. James Spedding 
charged with some accuracy that Macaulay willfully ignored pub­
lished refutations and corrections of his History, or at best corrected 
only errors of detail while leaving substantially inaccurate interpreta­
tions standing.21 More damaging charges were made by John Paget, 
who showed that Macaulay often overgeneralized from literary 
sources, applying casual or obviously biased comments to an entire 
country or group and selectively ignoring contradictory evidence, 
even in the same source. Paget was the chief defender of Marlborough, 
one of Macaulay's blackest villains, and he refuted Macaulay's defa­
mation with copious evidence. He also made clear how Macaulay's 
biases make the same faults—conjugal infidelity, for instance—venial 
in the good William, detestable in the evil James. Identical virtues 
were respected in one and condemned in the other, and sources dis­
carded as unreliable when they refuted Macaulay's prejudices were 
willingly appropriated when they concurred.22 
In the hands of his most thorough critic, Sir Charles Firth, Macau-
lay came off reasonably well in accuracy and breadth of documenta­
tion, especially considering the limitations of the data available in his 
time. In his Commentary on Macaulay's History of England (1938), 
Firth gave Macaulay credit for having rested his narrative on a greater 
mass of evidence than could be claimed by any of his predecessors. He 
admitted, however, that compared with Ranke's, Macaulay's treat­
ment of his sources was relatively superficial: Macaulay stood com­
pletely outside "one of the great achievements of the nineteenth cen­
tury," the "development of a more scientific method of treating 
historical evidence." Firth echoed Paget's criticism that Macaulay 
was less critical with those sources that corroborated him than with 
those who questioned his interpretations.23 Macaulay was always too 
much the rhetorician to be a sober judge. His analysis of data, while 
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possessing the outward trappings of thoroughness, left his funda­
mental prejudices untouched. 
Although it was most often the brilliance of the rhetorician and not 
the insight of the poet that Macaulay brought to the creative part of 
the historian's task, he approached his artistic responsibilities with 
quite as much gravity as Carlyle. He repeatedly stressed the ephemer­
ality of his review essays as works of art, but he sat down to write the 
History with "the year 2,000, even the year 3,000, often in [his] mind" 
and believed he "sacrificed nothing to temporary fashions of thought 
and style."24 At the same time, he frankly sought wide popular suc­
cess, as his famous claim indicates: "I shall not be satisfied unless I 
produce something which shall for a few days supersede the last fash­
ionable novel on the tables of young ladies" (LM, 2:52). His desire to 
reach a wide audience was grounded in intentions no less serious than 
those of Arnold and Carlyle. Macaulay considered novelistic tech­
niques, in particular the illustration of general conditions with "ap­
propriate images," essential to "branding" practical instruction on 
the mind. He desired popular success not as an end in itself, but as the 
sign that he had reached a significant portion of the new and rapidly 
growing reading public of the mid-nineteenth century. Too few of 
those "who read for amusement" could be attracted by the gravity of a 
Mill or the obscurity of a Niebuhr.25 Macaulay intended to interest 
and to please those readers "whom ordinary histories repel" (LM, 
2:210). 
His purposes in gaining the ear of this public were manifold. Ma­
caulay chose his subjects with the express purpose of filling in gaps in 
his countrymen's knowledge of the success story of their own empire. 
He likewise hoped the History would illuminate a portion of their 
past that was "even to educated people almost a terra incognita" in 
the 1840s (LM, 2:52). Apart from the better understanding of human 
nature or specific arguments for political precedent to be gained from 
the History, Macaulay felt that England deserved an account of her 
heritage consistent with her modern stature. As we have seen, for him 
the imaginative value of the past gained force from the imaginative 
power of the present. Who else could have gone to the Great Exhibi­
tion and "felt a glow of eloquence, or something like it" that inspired 
"some touches which will greatly improve my [account of] Steinkirk" 
in the History (LM, 2:166)? Believing, as did Arnold and Carlyle, that 
"a people which takes no pride in the noble achievements of remote 
ancestors will never achieve anything worthy to be remembered with 
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pride by remote descendants" (W, 2:585), Macaulay set out to justify 
that pride in a way all his contemporaries could appreciate. 
His unique style owes much to this concern to make his writing 
widely accessible. Trevelyan attributed its great clarity to "an honest 
wish to increase the enjoyment, and smooth the difficulties, of those 
who did him the honour to buy his books" (LM, 2:169). Indeed, the 
biography is filled with references to making transitions without dis­
tracting the reader, to arranging ideas so as most effectively to illumi­
nate complex relationships, to fashioning passages that "read as if 
they had been spoken off, and may seem to flow as easily as table talk" 
(LM, 2:182, 211,213). According to his nephew, "He thought little of 
recasting a chapter in order to obtain a more lucid arrangement, and 
nothing whatever of reconstructing a paragraph for the sake of one 
happy stroke or apt illustration" (LM, 2:165). However, this preoc­
cupation with ease and effect had its drawbacks: too often ideas were 
tailored to fit the demands of style, rather than vice versa. His was a 
prose that asserted rather than persuaded, that tried to convince with 
the sheer weight of accumulated effects—highly patterned word pairs 
and repetitions, periodic phrasing, biblical and poetic cadences, as­
sonance, alliteration—rather than the careful working out of a com­
plex argument.26 His recurrent patterns of allusion, point, and an­
tithesis provided an influential model for "high popularisation" 
later in the century, but its very adaptability to the prose of "opinion, 
information" and "political persuasion" blunted his style's effec­
tiveness in dealing with any subject requiring subtler and more even­
handed consideration.27 Macaulay's stylistic trademark, the balanced 
antithesis ("It is because we had freedom in the midst of servitude that 
we have order in the midst of anarchy" W, 2:398), inevitably encour­
aged pat formulas rather than fine distinctions. His much vaunted 
clarity was the appropriate counterpart of his "unquestioned faith in 
the obviousness of truth" and of his impatience with all that was not 
accessible to reason, logic, and common sense.28 
The larger narrative structure of his major work is shaped by a 
similar concern for entertaining and instructing and by similar lim­
itations in perspective and insight. For all its "propulsive" drive for­
ward, there is a peculiarly static quality to the History.29 Macaulay 
effectively renounces the tension of suspense in the majestic opening 
paragraphs: we read on, safe in the knowledge that this historical 
romance will have the archetypal happy ending. Once he has estab­
lished the essential pattern of obstacles overcome, contraries recon­
86 
Thomas Babington Macaulay 
died, crimes punished and virtues rewarded, it remains for us simply 
to sit back and enjoy the way he can dramatize and particularize the 
story. Macaulay clearly wanted to control this narrative as completely 
as he did his private historical "romances," and he knew that for all 
its excesses, melodrama had safer limits than genuine drama. Sug­
gesting alternative outcomes to specific events as he periodically does 
only heightens "the reader's sense of the fatality of events which have 
actually occurred," in William Madden's words; we have the sense of 
watching characters ''enact their appointed destinies'' rather than ex­
ercising free will.30 The dynamic of the narrative is controlled by the 
same pull of opposites that renders his phrasal antitheses so brittle. 
J. W. Burrow maps the History as "the agony of the constitution fol­
lowed by deliverance and partial renewal."31 The same general pat­
tern is duplicated in intermediate cycles of factiousness and reconci­
liation that advance the action. The outcome is perhaps no less 
inevitable than in Carlyle's histories; for both men the archetypal 
need in human history was for order to master disorder. But where 
Carlyle knew the daemonic had to take its course, Macaulay con­
stantly tried to control it. He polarizes the dynamic of experience 
where Carlyle celebrates its multiformity. With Macaulay we feel the 
limits, not the potentiality, of the possible. Conflict and tension may 
arise, but Macaulay manages them in a predictable way: opposing 
extremes are reconciled in compromise, basic laws of political science 
and human nature are vindicated, justice—be it divine or secular—is 
satisfied. The overall arrangement of the History indulges the imagi­
nation, while never leaving any doubt that the "laws of reason and 
experience" will be confirmed. 
Macaulay's management of detail also reflects his characteristic in­
tellectual biases. His passion for concrete examples (the exact facts 
and dates that were crucial to his historical "romances") sharpened 
his eye for telling detail and made his use of it in the History particu­
larly effective. Never content with a generalization, he always strove 
to gather together a representative sampling of concrete examples to 
make it explicit. He drives home the "barbarism" of the northern 
shires in 1685 with the ferocious bloodhounds, the fortified farm­
houses, the stones and boiling water ready to meet the plunderer (W, 
1:223-24), and makes palpable the economic chaos caused by James's 
issuance of base money in "a mortgage for a thousand pounds . . . 
cleared off by a bag of counters made out of old kettles" (W, 2:566). 
Detail could also imply moral judgments. Macaulay accomplishes 
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two ends by bringing before us the fine paintings, Japanese cabinets, 
and Parisian tapestries that filled the apartments of the Duchess of 
Portsmouth. He makes vividly particular Charles's extravagant in­
dulgence of his favorite, while tacitly commenting on the vanity of 
human wishes when she collapses in grief over his death "in the midst 
of this splendour" (W, 1:337). 
This elaboration of detail was clearly in keeping with Macaulay's 
dislike of abstractions and his tendency to define by examples rather 
than by analysis. It also widened the appeal and accessibility of the 
past by demonstrating the impact of major events on a quotidian real­
ity recognizable to every reader. Macaulay's motivation, however, is 
less George Eliot's commitment to "the faithful representing of 
commonplace things" than the desire to reinforce his own claim that 
the welfare of the state was based on the well-being of individuals. To 
allow his readers to "enter into the feelings" of British exultation 
when the French fleet was routed at La Hogue, Macaulay attributes 
them not just to national pride, but to a sense of relief that he renders 
tangible: "The island was safe. The pleasant pastures, cornfields and 
commons of Hampshire and Surrey would not be the seat of war. The 
houses and gardens, the kitchens and dairies, the cellars and plate 
chests, the wives and daughters of our gentry and clergy would not be 
at the mercy of the Irish Rapparees . . . or of French dragoons" (W, 
3:552). In a similar vein, to show how little misgovernment affected 
the common people, he summons up a crowd of tactile, sensuous 
images: "Whether Whigs or Tories, Protestants or Jesuits were up­
permost, the grazier drove his beasts to market: the grocer weighed out 
his currants: . . . the harvest home was celebrated as joyously as ever 
in the hamlets: the cream overflowed the pails of Cheshire: the apple 
juice foamed in the presses of Herefordshire" (W, 4:189). The exam­
ples are so appealing that it is easy to overlook the materialistic as­
sumptions that inspire them: that economic well-being and physical 
security are the measure of all things. 
Analogous biases characterize his treatment of place, notwith­
standing Macaulay's fascination with historical sites. He manipu­
lates detail not just to re-create scenes, but to exact judgment. His 
sketch of Covent Garden in the seventeenth century gains impact 
from well-placed specifics, but also from the proximity of high to 
low: "Fruit women screamed, carters fought, cabbage stalks and rot­
ten apples accumulated in heaps at the thresholds of the Countess of 
Berkshire and of the Bishop of Durham." The disorder that was in 
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itself a sign of social backwardness is summed up in the haranguing 
mountebanks and dancing bears who congregated each night within 
yards of Winchester House (W, 1:280). Usually comparisons between 
past and present are much more explicit. Macaulay's attempts to rein­
force the differentness of the past almost always end by congratulat­
ing the materially better present: 
We should greatly err if we imagined that the road by which [James II] 
entered that city bore any resemblance to the stately approach which 
strikes the traveller of the nineteenth century with admiration. At pres­
ent Cork . . . holds no mean place among the ports of the empire. 
The shipping is more than half what the shipping of London was at 
the time of the Revolution. The customs exceed the whole revenue 
which the whole kingdom of Ireland, in the most peaceful and pros­
perous times, yielded to the Stuarts. The town is adorned by broad and 
well built streets. . . . In 1689, the city extended over about one tenth 
part of the space it now covers . . . a desolate marsh . . . covered the 
areas now occupied by stately buildings. . . . There was only a sin­
gle street in which two wheeled carriages could pass each other. 
(W, 2:531-32) 
The "gigmanity" Carlyle scorned becomes Macaulay's measure of 
success: the Manchester without a single coach in 1688 supported 
twenty coachmakers in 1841; the Leeds of seven thousand souls now 
numbered its people one hundred fifty thousand (W, 1:267). The 
"facts" speak for themselves. Macaulay's "stereoscopic" vision pro­
pelled readers toward the present rather than engaging them more 
fully in the past. When Carlyle looks around Samson's Bury St. Ed­
monds, he sees water not yet polluted by the dyer's chemistry, land not 
yet possessed by the Steam Demon. He mourns Time as both a bearer 
and a devourer. Macaulay faces resolutely forward. He senses the fac­
tories, the gins, the market emporium not yet there as a loss, a disor­
ienting absence (W, 1:266-67). 
Macaulay lacked any romantic sensitivity to landscape that might 
have provided other dimensions to place. He could wax eloquent 
about the pastoral idyll of modern Killiecrankie, where fine summer 
days find the "angler casting his fly on the foam of the river . .  . or 
some party of pleasure banqueting on the turf in the fretwork of shade 
and sunshine." His object, however, is only to heighten the barbarity 
of the ravine in William's day, when the river suggested to "our ances­
tors thoughts of murderous ambuscades, and of bodies stripped, 
gashed, and abandoned to the birds of prey" (W, 3:82-83). He dryly 
comments that modern ecstasies over the Highlands' sublimity 
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were made possible only by civilization's advance: "A traveler must be 
freed from all apprehension of being murdered or starved before he 
can be charmed by the bold outlines and rich tints of the hills" (W, 
3:42). But his limitations go beyond this. Even in his cityscapes we are 
allowed to indulge in quaint and picturesque detail only so that we 
feel the presentness of the modern day more fully. Macaulay lacked 
what Burrow calls "a kind of imaginative archaeology, a sense of 
man's shaping and penetration of the landscape through many gen­
erations."32 This sense allowed Carlyle to see the past as both contain­
ing and nourishing the present. Macaulay did not deny the heritage of 
the past, but he did impoverish its complexity. In all other realms but 
the political, the uncouth oddity of former societies was indulged 
only because it was outgrown, and in that sense, denied. Macaulay 
condescended where Carlyle revered; to him the facts argued not for 
the continuing reality of habit but for its outdatedness. 
The same kind of condescension diminishes his success in re­
creating the mind of the past. Macaulay defends popular literature 
and lore as worthy evidence notwithstanding the "large mixture of 
fable" found in such materials. Whether true or false, such tales "were 
heard by our ancestors with eagerness and faith," and thus furnished 
important insights into the mind of the past (W, 1:300). Too often, 
however, psychological insight gives way to celebrations of the 
march of mind. To Macaulay the rumors that circulated at Charles's 
death furnish 
a measure of the intelligence and virtue of the generation which eagerly 
devoured them. That no rumour of the same kind has ever, in the pres­
ent age, found credit among us, even when lives on which great inter­
ests depended have been terminated by unforeseen attacks of disease, is 
to be attributed partly to the progress of medical and chemical science, 
but partly also, it may be hoped, to the progress which the nation has 
made in good sense, justice, and humanity. (W, 1:345) 
Macaulay is always too busy propagandizing to sympathize. As 
George Levine points out, he includes the superstitions of the vulgar 
because they indulged the reader's taste for the exotic, the fantastic, 
the fictional, while not transgressing the dictates of reason main­
tained by the ' 'mature'' mind.33 He could exploit their affective poten­
tial as evidence of a more primitive form of consciousness without 
losing the modern perspective. 
He uses representative social types in similar ways. Purporting to 
demonstrate that no natural inferiority existed between Celt and 
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Saxon, Macaulay exploits the apparent inferiority and simultane­
ously celebrates the virtues of modern civilization. He first titillates 
his audience with all the lurid detail of Highland savagery—huts 
swarming with vermin, men smeared with tar, meals of grain and dried 
blood. But he redeems himself from mere sensationalism by pointing 
out that "an enlightened and dispassionate observer" would even 
then have predicted that the civilizing influence of Protestantism, 
English, and a good police force would make the clans the Saxons' 
equal (W, 3:46-48). The uncouth country squire of chapter 3 is a sim­
ilar exaggeration intended to congratulate contemporaries on one 
hundred and fifty years of social progress. 
Macaulay's condescension to the uncouth and the irrational, com­
bined with his mechanistic conception of human nature and his sub­
ordination of the man to his age, limit severely his powers of charac­
terization. Just as major events unfold in a preestablished pattern, 
individual actions conform to an essentially static conception of 
character. Jane Millgate identifies this approach with that of the 
seventeenth-century genre of Character. The individual is perceived 
as a "whole rather than as something developing in time; qualities 
and actions are treated of in essence rather than in sequence; works 
and opinions are invoked as illustrations in the service of a static 
judgment and not as the motive power by which a dramatic presenta­
tion is moved forward."34 Since major changes in consciousness or 
government come about of their own accord, Macaulay's characters 
need only typify the spirit of the age. For this purpose individual 
complexities merely get in the way: stereotypes throw the real forces 
of change into higher relief. Hence, those portraits that round out the 
sociological contours of his narrative are marked by the distortion of 
caricature rather than the faithfulness of miniatures. Even his major 
characters are too externalized: we know William's "bitter and cynical 
smile" (W, 2:222), and the meager, wrinkled face that betrayed Dan-
by's ambition (W, 2:194), but the internal man eludes us. No wonder 
Carlyle found Macaulay's characters "a series of empty clockcases."55 
Macaulay's characterizations are flattened by the paradoxical link­
ing of opposing qualities. This was more than a stylistic tic, although 
obviously his balanced antitheses made such contrasts irresistible: 
"The Puritan was made up of two different men, the one all self-
abasement, penitence, gratitude, passion, the other proud, calm, in­
flexible, sagacious. He prostrated himself in the dust before his 
Maker: but he set his foot on the neck of his king" (W, 5:38-39). He 
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might deplore the two equally distorted views of the Highlander, one 
a "coarse caricature" by scornful Cavaliers, the other a "masterpiece 
of flattery" by romanticizing moderns (W, 3:52). But his own portraits 
thrived on the same kind of contrasts. The Highlanders combined 
sordid barbarity with admirable valor. The country gentleman 
"spoke with the accent of a carter," but "was ready to risk his life 
rather than see a stain cast on the honour of his house" (W, 1:252). 
Even major characters are inconsistent rather than complex. His 
James I is "two men, a witty well-read scholar, who wrote, disputed, 
and harangued, and a nervous, drivelling idiot, who acted" (W, 
6:167). 
Macaulay has no real patience with, or insight into, psychological 
complexity. Leslie Stephen was among the first to note his resulting 
tendency to reduce individuals to "bundles of contradictions" rather 
than trying (as Carlyle would have) to find some underlying organic 
unity that would integrate disparate personality traits.36 He has no 
appreciation for a devotion to ideals that could unify character or 
transcend self-interest. He shares none of Arnold's trust in the purify­
ing power of heroism, none of Carlyle's belief in the ways faith trans­
forms the man. The spiritual ideals that draw Carlyle to the seven­
teenth century are to Macaulay merely fanaticism: a manifestation of 
mental imbalance dangerous to the state. 
The realist novelist, the Eliot or the Trollope, might similarly de­
flate the pretensions and posturing of romantic heroism by exposing 
the all-too-human foibles of their protagonists. But their purpose is 
to deepen our sympathy by confronting us with evidence of a shared 
fallibility. Macaulay wishes us to assume the superiority of that "cool 
and philosophical observer" who frankly acknowledges the absurd 
inconsistencies of human nature. He had found himself all too 
vulnerable to betrayed ideals and contradictions between emotion 
and reason. His way of controlling these is to adopt an attitude of 
complete cynicism. He criticizes the tendency of earlier historians to 
make individuals overly consistent personifications of good or bad 
because he claims that no such purity of motive or character could 
survive the assault of circumstance or betrayal by one's passions. Af­
ter all, had not everyone seen "a hero in the gout, a democrat in the 
church, a pedant in love, or a philosopher in liquor" (W, 7:685)? He 
professes only scorn for those who would think otherwise: "as if his­
tory were not made up of the bad actions of extraordinary men . .  . as 
if nine-tenths of the calamities which have befallen the human race 
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had any other origin than the union of high intelligence with low 
desires" (W, 6:175). It is because Macaulay knows that "the line of 
demarcation between good and bad men is so faintly marked as often 
to elude the most careful investigation," and not because he appre­
ciates the ambiguities of human personality, that he sees character as 
black and white, but without shades of grey (W, 7:685). To expect 
consistency from individuals is as unreasonable as to expect predic­
tion from "abstract" theory: the laws of experience prove that in per­
sonality as in political action, all is just rough give-and-take between 
extremes. 
His theory of Zeitgeist and his far-reaching cynicism make it diffi­
cult to talk of heroes in his work. William and James dominate the 
History, but as embodiments of political vice and virtue moving to­
ward inevitable rewards and punishments, not as men. In keeping 
with the Whig view, those men who supported the triumphant cause 
were by definition heroic in the broader scope of history. The Essays 
suggest that "the great body of the middle class" would have become 
in a sense the collective hero of the History. They shared leadership in 
the march of progress that summed up his vision of English history: 
"The higher and middling orders are the natural representatives of 
the human race. Their interest may be opposed in some things to that 
of their poorer contemporaries, but it is identical with that of the 
innumerable generations which are to follow" (W, 5:265). Cromwell 
succeeded not because of his Puritan zeal, but because "no sovereign 
ever carried to the throne so large a portion of the best qualities of the 
middling orders" as he did (W, 5:214). Chief among these qualities is 
the instinct for order and self-control so important to Macaulay per­
sonally. Burrow characterizes Macaulay's Hastings and Clive as other 
middle-class conquerors whose manly energies mold an effeminate, 
decadent east into empire. The bourgeois respectability of Macaulay's 
own day depended upon the same concern for manliness and order; 
such respectability connoted not manners alone, but opposition to 
the revolutionary "state of nature" that for Burrow represents Macau-
lay's deepest fears for society: the unleashing of lawless ambition, the 
riot of fanatical delusions, "the negligence or hatred of all boundaries 
to will, passion and appetite." The "middling orders" continued to 
offer the clearest examples of the traits Macaulay had historically as­
sociated with the Whig balance between absolutism and radicalism: 
rational control of feeling, openness, accountability, decorum, pro­
priety.37 Seen in this light, the Essays and the History become at­
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tempts to provide the Victorian middle classes with a history of their 
own rise to power over the preceding two centuries—the process by 
which they shed the backward ways of the seventeenth century and 
aligned themselves with values and behavior that insured the tri­
umphs of constitutional and social order in the present. 
The very desire for control and clarity that stunted Macaulay's 
rendering of character made him a highly effective narrator. He ri­
valed the latest novel by borrowing many of its techniques. If his nar­
rative "V' is less obtrusive than Eliot's or Trollope's, its coercing pres­
ence is felt throughout. It summarizes Macaulay's didactic intentions 
at the outset and allies the reader with it in the "we" whose proper 
reactions—pride, shame, awe—it is constantly prescribing. Macaulay 
carefully controlled the pace of dramatization, narrative, and transi­
tion for maximum effect. He alternates chapters of exposition with 
those of action and intensifies the sense of endings by closing chapters 
and volumes with climactic events: the fall of the Hydes, the flight of 
James, the proclamation of William and Mary. By his own admission 
he embellished his account with "grand purple patches" (LM, 2:204) 
that catered to his audience's taste for high drama and memorable 
tableaux. Like Carlyle, he emphasized peaks in the action—Charles 
on his deathbed ("And do not let poor Nelly starve"), Jeffries on the 
Bloody Circuit ("Show me a Presbyterian, and I'll show thee a lying 
knave")—by rendering his sources in direct address.38 
Although Macaulay lacked Carlyle's profound capacity for em­
pathy, he found ample opportunities for identification, particularly 
in political debate. From a wide range of debates and documents con­
cerning James's deposition, he constructs speeches that he puts into 
the mouths of the statesmen of the day: "If, these politicians said, we 
once admit that the throne is vacant, we admit that it is elective" (W, 
2:375). As he proceeds tags like "so the politicians said" recede into 
the background and Macaulay seems to place himself among the 
"we" he paraphrases (see also W, 2:310). Shifts into the present tense 
and first person work in similar ways to pull the reader into the train 
of events leading up to the Popish plot: 
The reigning King seemed far more inclined to show favour to [the 
Catholics] than to the Presbyterians. . . . The Catholics had begun to 
talk a bolder language than formerly. . .  . At this juncture, it is ru­
moured that a Popish plot is discovered. A distinguished Catholic is 
arrested on suspicion. It appears that he has destroyed almost all his 
papers. A few letters, however, have escaped the flames. (W, 6:107) 
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And yet, where Carlyle's use of the present tense helps to dissolve the 
artifice of linear narrative, Macaulay's always reminds us of the 
showman behind the scenes. Those paraphrased speeches are too con­
trivedly Macaulayean in their balance and tension. He may rightly 
claim to restore the voice of "a whole literature which is mouldering 
in old libraries" when he reconstructs Tory or Whig positions, but 
the tonal ironies are distinctly his own: "The sycophants, who were 
legally punishable, enjoyed impunity. The King, who was not legally 
punishable, was punished with merciless severity" (W, 2:405-7). Ma­
caulay's art is finally an ingenious ventriloquism, not Carlyle's trans­
forming magic. 
Still, as a showman, his histrionic talents were considerable. As we 
would expect from one who tended naturally to frame even his own 
experiences as historical set pieces,39 he remains keenly attuned to the 
literary potential of events that, like the trial of the Bishops, retained 
"all the interest of a drama" even when "coolly perused after the lapse 
of more than a century and a half" (W, 2:171). He carefully orches­
trates this event to join high drama with human interest, historical 
immediacy with historical perspective. After assembling the cast of 
characters—the prosecution and defense teams—he reconstructs the 
legal maneuvering with a barrister's eye. Arguments over technicali­
ties are ticked off and dispensed with one by one, with the pivotal 
exchanges rendered in dialogue. All seems in order. The bishops are 
on the point of being acquitted when the importunity of one of their 
own counsel delays the proceedings just long enough to bring the 
Lord President with damning evidence against them. Macaulay 
quotes from contemporary letters to authenticate the "intense anx­
iety" that prevails that night as the jury deliberates. Although voices 
"high in altercation" are heard within the jury room, "nothing cer­
tain was known" until, in the "breathless stillness" of the courtroom 
the next morning, the verdict of "Not Guilty" is delivered (W, 2:177). 
The action ranges from the most personal to the most symbolic. We 
have human interest. One of the jurymen, the King's brewer, comes 
alive again in his bitter complaints: "If I say Not Guilty, I shall brew 
no more for the King; and if I say Guilty, I shall brew no more for 
anybody else" (W, 2:171). We learn that Thomas Austin's stout resis­
tance ("I will stay till I am no bigger than a tobacco pipe" W, 2:177) 
personally faced down the last hold-out for a guilty verdict. We have 
melodrama. As his people and his troops celebrate his defeat, James, 
the villain of the piece, slinks away with an ominous, "So much the 
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worse for them" (W, 2:179). We have epic scale. By tracing the crowd's 
reactions to the verdict, Macaulay enlarges the stage on which the 
drama is acted and underscores its status as a national event. He fol­
lows the shouts of triumph as they echo from the benches and galler­
ies, to the great hall, to the throng outside, to the boats covering the 
Thames, until it seems that all London reacts with one voice. We get 
sensational detail in the guise of historical curiosity. Surveying the 
"spectacles" that drew the "common people" that night provides him 
a characteristic way of informing and entertaining at the same time. 
While tacitly deploring the "grotesque rites" involved in burning ef­
figies of the Pope, Macaulay takes this opportunity to refresh his 
readers on the more colorful aspects of this "once familiar pageant" 
(W, 2:181). And we get a moral. The account ends as do most of his set 
pieces, with an elongation of historical perspective. This event stands 
alone in English history as the one time when love of Church and love 
of Freedom were in harmony. Macaulay is thus able to close with 
another variation on that favored pattern of reconciled opposites, as 
Tories and Whigs, Dissenters and Churchmen, join symbolically in 
the "vast phalanx" against the government. 
Although wars of ideas interest him more than wars of arms, Ma­
caulay as fully exploits the dramatic interest of his battle pieces. He 
increases their immediacy with conventional techniques—quoted 
battle cries, details of weather, references to terrain he has himself 
visited. He paces and orders action for maximum effect, duplicating 
the mounting tension at crucial junctures in terse, declarative sen­
tences, or rapidly shifting from one part of the fighting to another. 
Military life includes elements of pure spectacle he finds irresistible. 
Under the pretext of the recording sights "well fitted to gratify the 
vulgar appetite for the marvelous" in William's entry into Exeter, he 
converts the procession into a brilliant mummery. Clearly he ex­
pected the exotic Africans in turbans and feathers and the Swedish 
horsemen in black armor and fur to dazzle his own audience as much 
as they did the simple throng at Exeter (W, 2:258). The story of the old 
woman who dodges through the drawn swords and curvetting horses 
to touch the hand of the deliverer is another concession to the anec­
dotal, although it also affords him an opportunity to drive home the 
historical significance of the moment: perhaps, he speculates, she is a 
zealous Puritan who had waited twenty-eight years for this deliver­
ance, or perhaps she had lost a son to Sedgemoor or the Bloody Cir­
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cuit. Here as elsewhere the roll call of famous warriors in William's 
train provides an opportunity to commemorate their other famous 
exploits. The immediacy of such scenes is thus enriched with the 
deeper resonance of a noble tradition. 
Like other historians of his era, Macaulay surveyed warfare with a 
civilian's eye. Technical maneuvers recede in favor of details that en­
liven and humanize the scene. What we remember about Steinkirk is 
less the fighting than the carefully disordered neckerchiefs that took 
their name from it—a reference to the "glittering . . . lace and em­
broidery hastily thrown on and half fastened" by the French princes 
roused from "their couches or their revels" to head their army (W, 
3:581). A man's tactics are less important than his mettle; each ac­
count includes closeups on selected heroes and cowards (e.g., W, 
3:295-96). William is always at his best in battle: "Danger acted on 
him like wine, opened his heart, loosened his tongue, and took away 
all appearance of constraint from his manner" (W, 3:296). He inspires 
the Eniskilleners with touching gratitude at the Boyne. The light of 
memory softens his features still further at Landen: "Many years later 
grey-headed old pensioners who crept about the arcades and alleys of 
Chelsea Hospital used to relate how he charged at the head of Gal­
way's horse, how he dismounted four times to put heart into the in­
fantry, how he rallied one corps which seemed to be shrinking: 'That 
is not the way to fight, gentlemen. You must stand up close to them. 
Thus, gentlemen, thus' " (W, 4:23). These eye witness accounts con­
vey William's personality and suggest the human element in military 
experience far more convincingly than a technical account could 
have. 
Macaulay pulls out all the stops to bring the first half of the History 
to a rousing close with the siege of Londonderry. He first intensifies 
the desperation of the besieged inhabitants with grisly detail. As fam­
ine spreads, dogs "battened on the blood of the slain" become luxur­
ies and rats are eagerly hunted and greedily devoured (W, 2:579-80). 
Although even in their extremity the general cry remains "no sur­
render," there are not wanting voices that murmur, "First the horses 
and the hides; and then the prisoners; and then each other."40 Having 
brought the people to the verge of atrocity, Macaulay steps back to 
reveal relief finally at hand. English ships attack the boom that 
blockades the river. The action seesaws back and forth in spare, paral­
leled exchanges: 
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The huge barricade cracked and gave way: but the shock was such that 
the Mountjoy rebounded, and stuck in the mud. A yell of triumph rose 
from the banks: The Irish rushed to their boats, and were preparing to 
board: but the Dartmouth poured on them a well directed broadside 
which threw them into disorder. . . . The Mountjoy began to move, 
and soon passed safe through the broken stakes and floating spars. But 
her brave master was no more. (W, 2:582) 
The use of detail here makes the people's relief no less palpable than 
their desperation. To replace the dogs and rats come "great cheeses, 
casksofbeef . . . kegsof butter . . . ankersof brandy." "It is easy" 
for the historian "to imagine with what tears grace was said" by men 
who the preceding night had dined on tallow and salted hides (W, 
2:582). 
Such human drama prevails throughout. Its "peculiar interest" 
lies not in the military maneuvers, which would have "moved the 
great warriors of the Continent to laughter," but to the fact that it was 
a contest "not between engineers, but between nations; and the vic­
tory remained with the nation which, though inferior in numbers, 
was superior in civilisation, in capacity for self government, and in 
stubbornness of resolution" (W, 2:583). The reality of this account 
gains amplitude from Macaulay's visits to the site. We can easily im­
agine him reliving the siege as he roamed Londonderry in search of 
landmarks that anchored his personal "romance" at the time and cer­
tified the authenticity of the scene in the History. He has talked to 
people who tasted the fruit of the pear tree by which Lunday escaped 
(W, 2:547); he knows that gardeners still find skulls and thighbones 
beneath the flowers in what was once the besiegers' burial ground (W, 
2:555).41 At the end of the piece, we walk the walls and streets of the 
city with him, reverencing the relics found there and calling to mind 
the annual commemoration of the siege. Although deploring the ra­
cial animosities such ceremonies keep alive, Macaulay considers this 
respect for the past fundamental to national greatness. The History 
itself, of course, is dedicated to the same consecration of memory. 
Macaulay's brilliant management of detail and action is rightly 
acclaimed. In the final analysis, however, there is something oddly 
distancing about his style, for all the vivid life in the panorama, for all 
the force of the argument. Macaulay's richly quantitative imagina­
tion ends by constricting rather than by expanding the multidimen­
sionality of the past. For Carlyle detail symbolizes the whole. For Ma­
caulay detail sums it up. The weight of detail is always pressing 
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toward judgments that too much imaginative sympathy might sub­
vert. Macaulay's desire to control experience works against the sur­
render that such sympathy demands; his commitment to empiricism 
impoverishes other dimensions of reality. The surface of the action is 
so highly polished that the reader must remain an observer: As theater 
it is incomparable, as argument overbearing. Yet even Macaulay's 
contemporaries left it without that deeper emotional assent that gen­
uine imaginative participation brings.42 
The rise and fall of Macaulay's stock as an historian is no less repre­
sentative of Victorian tastes than the man himself. Opinion was al­
ways divided about the vices and virtues of his style. Early reviewers 
like Thackeray, Bagehot, and William Greg agreed in admiring Ma­
caulay's brand of "intellectual entertainment," his ability to combine 
"conscientious and minute research" with a style as "irresistible as 
the most absorbing novel."43 The perils of that style were nonetheless 
clear: it oversimplified issues and turned analysis into polemic. Arch­
ibald Alison and Margaret Oliphant were particularly apprehensive 
about the way "the power of the rhetorician" overpowered the "re­
flection of the sage" in his pages.44 
At the same time, there was striking agreement with the essence of 
Macaulay's interpretation of British history. James Moncrieff claimed 
the History as a "great national work" that had for the first time illus­
trated the true nature of the Constitution. David Brewster wished that 
an abridged version might be prepared as "the safest expositor of our 
civil and religious liberties" for the schools. Despite Mrs. Oliphant's 
qualms about Macaulay's exaggerations, she too rejoiced that "a 
story so brilliant, lifelike, and vivid, a chronicle so dignified and able, 
should mirror forth to the public of England the beginning of the 
modern era of national history—the groundwork and foundation of 
the liberties and blessings of our own time." Even John Croker, long 
Macaulay's political and literary adversary, declined to dispute the 
History's account of "the progress of the constitution." His very dis­
missal of this interpretation as commonplace shows how widely 
shared was the Whig view.45 The chorus of praise for Macaulay's cele­
bration of English history predictably reached a crescendo at his 
death in 1859. One expects to find the Edinburgh reviewers applaud­
ing his expansion of Whig principles until "they embraced the no­
blest destinies of man." It is more surprising, particularly consider­
ing the Saturday's stern standards for historical writing, to find J. F. 
Stephen in qualified agreement. Whatever the limitations in Whig 
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principles of continuity and precedent, Stephen wrote, "It is an un­
questionable truth that their assertion has been closely allied, not 
only with a course of national greatness and prosperity unequalled in 
human history, but also with a spirit of reverence and affection for the 
past which in other countries has hardly ever been separated from a 
love for despotism and bigotry."46 
By 1876 when the Life and Letters was reviewed, attitudes toward 
historical writing were changing, and a second generation of Victori­
ans was ready to condemn as Philistine what their fathers had praised 
as art. Macaulay's very representativeness proved his limitations. 
Froude identified "the key to his extraordinary popularity" as the fact 
that "what his own age said and felt, whether it was wise or foolish, 
Macaulay said and felt." John Morley and Leslie Stephen dealt the 
most telling blows. For Morley it was "Macaulay's substantially 
commonplace" ideas that made him so "universally popular" with 
the new generation of middle class readers: "His Essays were as good 
as a library: they made an incomparable manual and vade-mecum for 
a busy uneducated man, who has curiosity and enlightenment 
enough to wish to know a little about the great lives and great 
thoughts, the shining words and many-coloured complexities of ac­
tion, that have marked the journey of man through the ages." Macau-
lay succeeded by his unparalleled skill in offering "incense" to the 
popular idols of patriotism and freedom; his "unanalytical turn of 
mind kept him free of any temptation to think of love of country as a 
prejudice, or a passion for freedom as an illusion." Stephen broad­
ened these criticisms by linking Macaulay's "contempt of the higher 
intellectual interests" to the pervasive Whiggism and Philistinism of 
the middle classes. He found in Macaulay no genuine "experiential 
philosophy," only common sense and a "crude empiricism." Never­
theless, like Morley, Stephen could not deny that the successes of his 
age were due largely to those "deep-seated tendencies of the national 
character" that Macaulay epitomized. He might deplore the narrow­
ness of Macaulay's patriotism, but he admitted that "it implies faith 
in the really good qualities, the manliness, the spirit of justice, and 
the strong moral sense of his countrymen." Macaulay's "manliness," 
that Victorian code word for rectitude, common sense, blunt straight­
forwardness, and transparent honesty, found admirers among many 
of Macaulay's critics in an age increasingly given over to aestheticism, 
doubt, and compromise.47 
With increasing frequency Macaulay was also held up as a prime 
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example of those offenses to which "literary" historians were particu­
larly prone. Morley found his "habitual recourse to strenuous super­
latives . . . fundamentally unscientific and untrue." Oliphant 
chided audiences taken in by his style: "To see Macaulay followed by 
Froude should have been a sharp lesson to such lovers of the pictur­
esque." Cotter Morison blamed Macaulay's indifference to "the most 
important reform in historical studies ever made," the application of 
"a critical method to the study of the past," on the fact that he "cared 
for little beside his own success as an historical artist." Like Morison, 
Stephen felt that Macaulay's "unscientific" approach obscured the 
true "causes and nature of great social movements."48 
But Macaulay found defenders, too. Far from finding impartiality 
necessary, the Eclectic reviewer considered it the historian's duty to 
judge characters and events from a clear position—"the more liberal 
and expansive indeed the better." In view of her earlier criticism, it is 
noteworthy that by 1892 Mrs. Oliphant was recommending Macaulay 
as a healthy antidote for the latest casualty of professionalized history, 
the "lecture-dried student, whose interest in history only tends to the 
answering of questions at an examination, or . . . to endowing pos­
terity with a set of cut and dried annals."49 Several critics had begun to 
defend the differences between Macaulay's kind of popular history, 
which brought "the matured results of scholars to the man in the 
street in a form that he can remember and enjoy," and that scientific 
scholarship which was by definition more restrained in style and more 
restricted in appeal.50 Others renewed claims that his services to Brit­
ish patriotism more than compensated for his scholarly failings.51 As 
late as the 1920s, the History was still being recommended as "one of 
the best instruments we possess for beginning the education of future 
citizens."52 Macaulay was finally so representative as to become a na­
tional institution despite his limitations. 
But those limitations remain. Despite the breadth of his experiences 
in the world—far wider than those of Carlyle and Arnold—Macaulay 
never overcame the limits of his singularly "inexperiencing nature," 
as Bagehot called it.53 He was essentially the same man at 59 that he 
had been at 20; if the circumstances of his own life had not penetrated 
his biases, there was little reason to expect the circumstances of the 
past to do so. His imaginative impartiality was not matched by a sim­
ilar impartiality of sympathy. He could depict the past in vivid detail 
but was incapable of reaching beyond its surface realities. For him 
human nature was too uniform, self-interest too much stronger than 
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principles, to allow any reality beneath the surface. The style was 
indeed the man: it was capable of great clarity and force, but little 
subtlety or insight. It conveyed vigor without passion, light without 
heat. His ability to produce clear contours from masses of evidence, to 
assert narrative control over vast quantities of information, amounted 
to a kind of genius, but was achieved at the cost of an oversimplifica­
tion which to many minds denied the highest purposes of historical 
writing. 
Herein lie his greatest differences from Carlyle. Gladstone noted 
that despite their radical political and philosophical differences they 
were both honest if highly partisan, more powerful in expression 
than in thought. But there was nothing in Macaulay to correspond to 
the spiritual dimension Carlyle created in history.54 To be sure, some 
contemporaries angered by Carlyle's denigration of the present or 
bewildered by his "riot of the imagination" valued Macaulay for be­
ing pedestrian.55 But Stephen knew that to gain "clearness and defini­
tion Macaulay has dropped the element of mystery" in human life. 
He could make the past come alive, but he lacked the ability "to 
emancipate us from the tyranny of the present . .  . to raise us to a 
point at which we feel that we too are almost as dreamlike as the men 
of old time."56 Even in an increasingly secularized age, there re­
mained a longing for some kind of transcendence that Macaulay's 
historical writings could not fulfill. 
And yet, despite Macaulay's emotional and imaginative limita­
tions, it is incorrect to say that his mind issued "straight from the 
eighteenth century, completely untouched by the Romantic move­
ment."57 It is true that his dominant traits were Augustan. His cynical 
and mechanistic view of human nature, his materialistic and ra­
tionalistic conception of progress, his complacency with the present, 
precluded the empathy that could grasp the spirit as well as the sub­
stance of the past, or could appreciate its passions as well as its ap­
pearances. His "science" stressed classification and prediction, not 
discovery and induction. His foregone conclusions about the inevita­
bility of progress and the dominance of self-interest and inconsistency 
in human nature were as tyrannical as any of the "abstract theories" 
for which he had so much scorn. They precluded an objective view of 
the past, they blunted an appreciation of the fact for its own sake, just 
as much as Arnold's and Carlyle's quite different moral assumptions. 
Still, Macaulay was undeniably touched by the romantic spirit of his 
age. His avid interest in evidence of popular culture, his desire to 
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broaden the sociological dimensions of history, his fascination for 
time traveling, his vivid particularity in re-creating the past, his abil­
ity to make his readers spectators, if not participants, in historical 
moments, all register the influence of romantic historiography on his 
work. If romantic thought had relatively little impact on his meta­
physical assumptions, it still opened up to his readers a new and im­
mensely influential relationship with the past. 
I would argue that his amalgamation of eighteenth- and nine­
teenth-century historiography was more representative of the transi­
tional state of many Victorian minds than was Carlyle's transcendental 
union of the two. Macaulay offered his contemporaries all the roman­
tic strangeness of the past while reassuring them that they still lived in 
a world accessible to reason and common sense. Just as his own work 
as an historian provided a psychic retreat from the risks and disorder of 
real life, so too his historical writings offered his readers an emotion­
ally satisfying portrait of their past without challenging their beliefs 
or disturbing their prejudices. The Whig view of continuity recon­
ciled progress with permanence and reassured his contemporaries 
that, far from sacrificing tradition to progress, their present achieve­
ments represented the vindication of the most vital principles of their 
national identity. By substituting the ideals of political and intellec­
tual liberty for more conventional religious or chivalric ones,58 he 
provided a secularized source of value that retained its usefulness even 
as traditional orthodoxies began to crumble. If he did not attain the 
vision of the Victorian sage, neither did he incur its dangers. Disciple­
ship to Macaulay never meant risking the security of belief for a leap 
of faith one might not be able to complete. Although his convention­
ality might be a limitation in the eyes of posterity, it constituted his 
chief value for many contemporaries. If he led his readers into new 
territory, it was not a wilderness of vaporous or exploded ideals, but a 
past as familiar as the present, because he reconstructed it in the same 
image. From its dim reaches emerged the familiar contours of nation­
al character and political structure so dear to the present. His geneal­
ogy of bourgeois liberalism gave the Victorian middle classes a stabi­
lizing sense of identity while lending all the authority of history to 
continued development in the future. 
Macaulay was the greatest of the nineteenth-century popularizers. 
He was instrumental in fostering the taste for history in a rapidly 
widening audience and in shaping their expectations about its pur­
poses. Demonstrating the humanizing force of patriotism, he gave the 
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historian as man of letters new stature in the public eye and made 
historical writing part of the national literature. His historical narra­
tives retain their brilliance as works of art even while many of their 
assumptions mark them as artifacts of a world view already breaking 
down at his death. They epitomize the realistic romances dear to the 
Victorian historical imagination and illuminate its longing for both 
order and progress. 
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JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE

HISTORY AS

PROTESTANT APOLOGIA

Hilaire Belloc hinted at the paradoxical nature of Froude's life when he described him as "kneaded right into his own time and 
his own people . .  . in tune with, even when he directly opposed, 
the class from which he sprang, the mass of well-to-do Protestant 
Englishmen of Queen Victoria's reign."1 The sources of opposition 
were plentiful. From the scandalized outcry that met The Nemesis of 
Faith to the indignation that succeeded the Life of Carlyle, the chain 
of controversies forming that life stretched unbroken. And yet the 
links were forged from issues typically Victorian. Froude's rejection 
of the Gospel of Newman for the Gospel of Carlyle was a paradigm of 
the 1840s; that same gospel made his consequent hostility to Liberal­
ism in all its forms conventionally unorthodox in the fifties and six­
ties. His unabashed support for white Anglo-Saxon supremacy ag­
gravated the sorest points of racial and cultural relativism in the 
seventies and eighties. As an historian too he was at the center of the 
ideological storms of his day. By rehabilitating the Tudors, his His­
tory of England challenged aspects of the Whig view with an alterna­
tive explanation of modern success. As if that were not controversial 
enough, the popular appeal of his brilliant style and the suspect na­
ture of his scholarship turned Froude into a test case in the definition 
of professional authority. 
There is a tension of paradox in Froude's writing and thinking 
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about history that shows the stress of intellectual dilemmas widely 
shared. In history he confronted the conflict between knowledge and 
wisdom, the need to prove versus the need to believe. He was a dog­
matic doubter, both a chastiser and a celebrator of English ways. Al­
though he rebuffed the challenge of opposing beliefs, both theologi­
cal and scientific, by denouncing all interpretation as fictional, such 
scepticism actually freed him to argue more forcefully for his own 
providential fictions. He combined a Macaulayean belief in the over­
whelming power of Zeitgeist with a Carlylean worship of heroes; a 
whiggish justification of past policy by present successes with a Tory 
conception of the ideal social order. In his historical interpretations, 
hard-headed English pragmatism fulfilled transcendental ideals. Al­
though he argued eloquently for sympathy with the past, judgment 
repeatedly subverted sympathy. The vision he projected back in time 
answered highly personal needs, but it also shaped the Victorians' 
public identity in important ways. 
The impress of Froude's early years on his historical writing was 
deep and direct beyond comparison with his five contemporaries. Af­
ter his mother's early death, his stern father and his adored brother 
Hurrell exercised a predominant influence over his emotional and 
intellectual life.2 His father's disappointment and his own humilia­
tion were keen when he failed to follow Hurrell's brilliant academic 
example. He was brought home from three "wasted" years at West­
minster and left to his own desultory studies in his father's library. 
There, while his brother was emerging as a leader of the early Oxford 
movement, James Froude was first encountering modern historians 
like Gibbon and Sharon Turner. His understanding of both the En­
glish past and English Protestantism jarred oddly with the historical 
reversals implicit in Hurrell's Tractarian doctrines. 
Froude finally entered Oriel College in 1836, under the shadow of 
his brother's recent death. The priesthood had always been supposed 
his ultimate destination, and he took deacon's orders in 1845, con­
vinced that his belief in the general truth of the Gospel outweighed 
his growing confusion about its proofs. In his early years at Oxford, 
Froude attempted to resist the "strange fascination" of John Henry 
Newman by remaining purposefully aloof from the circle in which 
Newman tried to include him. Nevertheless, he clearly felt the attrac­
tion of the Tractarian position in those turbulent forties that called 
all institutions into doubt. He feared that he might have succumbed 
to the movement that was "sweeping with it the most brilliant of the 
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rising generation" had it not been for the countervailing influence 
of Carlyle and Emerson. Their writings taught him that the basis for 
religion must be found in "the present reality of our actual life and 
experience," rather than in ingenious arguments for the historical 
continuity of the Church (B, 72). 
Ironically enough, Newman reinforced these conclusions by enlist­
ing Froude's help on "The Legend of St. Neot" for his Lives of the 
English Saints. Rather than strengthening Froude's faith, this "ex­
cursion among the Will-o'-the-wisps of the spiritual morasses" con­
vinced him of the futility of trying to satisfy the intellect with histori­
cal proofs for Christian belief.3 Instead of following Newman into 
Romanism to end his continuing "confusion and perplexity" about 
religion, Froude decided that he had mistaken his profession and be­
gan to think how he might escape the legal strictures that bound him 
to it. He was planning to resign his fellowship at Exeter quietly and 
take a teaching post in Tasmania when his Nemesis of Faith un­
leashed a storm of controversy in 1849. The story of a young clergy­
man who resigns his orders and converts to Roman Catholicism laid 
bare Froude's continuing spiritual dilemmas; it also made the au­
thorities question his fitness as a teacher and revoke their offer of a 
position. 
Thus was Froude cut adrift in 1849, in his own eyes a martyr to 
intellectual freedom, but a pariah at Oxford and once again a disap­
pointment to his family: a prime example of the intellectual and emo­
tional casualties of the 1840s. In light of the catastrophe of his clerical 
career, his choice of historian as an alternative vocation takes on par­
ticular significance; in view of his complicated relationship to the 
Oxford movement, so does the subject matter of his major work. Hav­
ing retreated to North Wales with his wife in 1850, he soon settled 
down to work on a book-length treatment of Elizabeth's reign. The 
vocation of historian clearly represented a safe footing in the doctrin­
al quagmire that had proved so ruinous for him. In beginning the 
History, Froude wrote, "I had done with speculation over the insolu­
ble problems. I was feeling ground under my feet, and was actively 
engaged on what promised to be a profession with which I could 
support myself" (B, 172). An 1853 letter to Charles Kingsley further 
demonstrates his hope of building out of the factual material of his­
tory a bulwark against the dangerous currents of conflicting theory. 
After scornfully dismissing the theological wrangling that led to F. D. 
Maurice's expulsion from King's College, he defends his own deci­
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sion to stick to his project, for "at any rate [in writing history] one has 
substantial stuff between one's fingers to be moulding at, and not 
those slime and sea ladders to the moon 'opinion.' "4 
Like Carlyle caught in the crossfire of conflicting ideologies, 
Froude sought in history a refuge from scepticism; like him too, he 
concentrated on periods that could refute the most threatening of 
those theories. Writing the History of England from the Fall of Wol­
sey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada served emotional needs far 
more important than the merely economic ones that had led him to 
take it up. Burrow notes its national recapitulation of Froude's auto­
biographical pattern: the pilgrim's progress from false to true faith.5 
The History allowed Froude once and for all to exorcise the danger­
ously attractive spirits of Newman and Hurrell by repudiating the 
Tractarian view of the Reformation. At the same time it served as an 
atonement to his father, who was convinced by its success not just that 
Froude's view of Henry was correct, but that good might finally come 
of his son after all (B, 200). Froude also regarded the work as a formal 
recantation of his heterodoxy at Oxford. Hoping to be considered for 
the vacant Regius Professorship of Modern History in 1858, he of­
fered his attempts to "clear the English Reformation and the fathers 
of the Anglican Church from the stains which have been allowed to 
gather on them" as proof that "if I ever return to Oxford it will be 
with the object of defending the Church of England from all enemies 
within and without" (B, 273). In the History's final pages, written in 
1870, Froude still pursued the enemy of Roman superstition—a su­
perstition even more dangerous in the present insofar as it threatened 
to betray society to the "godless secularity" of modern science by di­
vorcing Christianity from intellect.6 Clearly in writing this history, 
he found not just an alternative career, but in many respects an alter­
native creed, one far more useful than the doctrinal orthodoxy he had 
forsaken. 
Despite its controversial interpretations of the Tudors, the History, 
which appeared in two-volume installments from 1856 to 1870, 
firmly established Froude's claims as a major historian. His second 
major work, The English in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century, ap­
peared from 1872-74 and stirred up a furor on both sides of the Irish 
Sea for its dogmatic insistence that "might makes right" when deal­
ing with an "inferior race" like the Celts. Froude's biographical stud­
ies of Becket, Julius Caesar, and John Bunyan also appeared in the 
seventies and increased his reputation as a popularizer. All this popu­
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lar success made him the target of professional criticism. His scholar­
ship had been subject to attack throughout the sixties; the Becket 
study only intensified the assaults of his most strident critic, E. A. 
Freeman, who consistently attempted to make an example of 
Froude's alleged dilettantism. This did not prevent Froude from suc­
ceeding Freeman as Regius Professor upon the latter's death in 1892. 
Having recently published a follow-up volume to the History, The 
Divorce of Catherine ofAragon, he produced three more works based 
on his Oxford lectures during his two short years as Regius Professor: 
The Life and Letters of Erasmus, English Seamen in the Sixteenth 
Century, and The Council of Trent. Although Froude made some 
effort to induct students into the mysteries of manuscript research, his 
work in the Regius Chair was informed by the same beliefs in the 
preeminently moral and imaginative nature of history that he had 
enunciated forty years earlier. 
Notwithstanding the relief with which Froude retreated from 
theology to history, his relationship to historical facts was from the 
first problematic. His early speculations made him sound like the 
most sceptical historian of his age. He responded to the dogmatism of 
both orthodox faith and positivistic science with a "theory of history" 
that declared all such theories merely projections of what one wished 
to believe about what one could not know. Lured into a spiritual 
wilderness by Tractarian claims to provide "objective" validation for 
the "subjective" truths of religion (SS, 4:227), Froude reacted by deny­
ing objective truth to all formulas, religious, political, and philo­
sophical. Like Carlyle he argued that theories "vitiate[d] the observa­
tion of fact," that formulas struck "half the life" out of truth.7 But 
where Carlyle had tried to transcend the division between the truths of 
knowledge and the truths of belief, Froude felt he could only disarm 
the challenge of history to faith by making these two types of truth 
mutually exclusive. Carlyle had claimed poetic history as the truly 
real; Froude turned all historical knowledge into fiction. 
Writing "A Legend of St. Neot" molded his thinking about both 
religious and historical knowledge. In its introduction he admitted 
that hagiography represented not historical fact but edifying myth, a 
product of the biographer's imagination. Rather than distinguishing 
religious from secular history on these grounds, however, he went on 
to hold that the difference between this biography and our own was 
merely one of degree. "We all write Legends," and all history is "more 
or less fictitious,"8 insofar as we relate facts not as they really hap­
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pened, but as they appear to us. Memory can not retain facts in isola­
tion, so it rearranges them "in a more conceptional order" according 
to its preexisting prejudices. Just as increasing years modify our in­
terpretations of personal history, so too each age absorbs and fuses 
and remodels historical facts to suit its own altered perspective. His­
tory, he wrote elsewhere, is like "a child's box of letters" (SS, 1:1); we 
can rearrange its facts to spell whatever message we wish. 
Like George Eliot's similar admission that she presented not the 
facts in themselves, but men and things as mirrored on her mind, 
Froude's proclamation that "all history is mythic" actually ended by 
throwing greater weight on the testimony of the myth-maker.9 As if 
like Eliot in a "witness-box,"10 the historian was sworn to represent 
accurately his personal vision. This witnessing depended not on sight 
but on insight, not on facts but on belief. Far from concluding that 
legends like Neot's were meaningless because "untrue," Froude 
argued that their meaningfulness depended on their spiritual mes­
sage, not on their verifiability. The soundest empirical facts were val­
ueless if their story taught us nothing about moral truth. All interpre­
tation might be based on assumptions, but not all assumptions were 
for Froude equally valid. 
Froude manipulated his sceptical attitude toward historical facts so 
as to protect assumptions crucial to his own values. He might warn, 
for instance, that "the most earnest efforts of intellectual sympathy" 
could but half solve the enigma of history (H, 4:14), or that "no effort 
of the imagination . . . will ever enable us to place ourselves exactly 
in the position of any man."11 Such pessimistic claims were simply 
maneuvers to deflect a pseudoempiricism that excluded morality 
from its assumptions about "human nature." Arguing that all histor­
ical theories were subjective and all facts malleable not only undercut 
an untenable fundamentalism, but served equally well to deny the 
"destructive" conclusions of positivistic science, whose claims had 
been forcefully established by H. T. Buckle's History of Civilization 
in England (1857'-61). In "The Science of History" (1864), Froude de­
nied Buckle's assertion that historical study could imitate science by 
arguing that its facts could be neither exhaustively nor accurately de­
termined, let alone repeated experimentally. He had graver objec­
tions to Buckle's pretensions to predict future behavior, since such 
predictions could rest only on the Utilitarian assumption that human 
action was controlled by a "law" of self-interest. So long as one be­
lieved, as did Froude, that moral choice could override material neces­
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sity, that man was neither consistently selfish nor consistently noble, 
there was no adequate science of him: "You will make nothing of him 
except from the old-fashioned moral—or, if you please, imagina­
tive—point of view" (SS, 1:16). 
Although Froude in a sense by-passed facts, he arrived at the same 
position as did Carlyle—that point at which the moral and the imag­
inative became one in willed belief, where spiritual truths were 
transmuted into "the great poem of human history" ("Inaugural," 
143). He risked nothing by admitting that this poem's interpretation 
depended entirely upon one's assumptions about life's ultimate 
value, because he never doubted the superior truth of his own as­
sumptions. For the believer, one romance formula preempted all 
other myths. There was no danger of real relativism for a man con­
vinced that "one lesson, and only one, history may be said to repeat 
with distinctness; that the world is built somehow on moral founda­
tions; that, in the long run, it is well with the good; . . . it is ill with 
the wicked" (SS, 1:14). He might describe the past as one endless flux 
of creeds, opinions, and manners, but he never doubted that "the 
moral law is written on the tablets of eternity" (SS, 1:18). Just as much 
as did Carlyle and Arnold, he believed that the student's duty was to 
determine "the rule under which we are governed by the Almighty 
Lord of the world . . . to what forms of faith or action is the grace of 
God most emphatically rewarded."12 The answer to such questions 
would allow the student to see through the controversies that had so 
long perplexed human history to the one truth in their midst. 
At times he wrote as if this ideal truth were scarcely attainable in the 
fallen world of human time. Man would never write "faithful and 
literal history . . . until perfect knowledge and perfect faith in God 
shall enable him to see and endure every fact in its reality; until perfect 
love shall kindle in him under its touch the one just emotion which is 
in harmony with the eternal order of all things" (SS, 1:369). But in the 
meantime, the most important facts of human existence were still 
proof against the onslaught of so-called "scientific" approaches to 
history and were uncompromised by ephemeral ceremonies and 
dogmas. Like Carlyle, Froude defined the "fundamental axiom of all 
real life" in conveniently nondoctrinal terms: holiness, purity, and 
"obedience to the everlasting laws of duty" (H, 2:44) best served God. 
Here were goals one needed no controversial theology to reach and 
that no scientific proofs could suspend. 
Froude's distinction between the higher truths of imagination, 
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creativity, and faith and the lower ones of reason, philosophy, and 
intellect led him naturally to a poetry rather than a science of history. 
For all his scepticism, he could not simply dismiss facts. Even while 
acknowledging the influence of interpretation on data he still admit­
ted that history "depends on exact knowledge, on the same minute, 
impartial, discriminating observation and analysis of particulars 
which is equally the basis of science" (SS, 2:462). He tried to resolve 
the contradictions in his position by making the historian's ability to 
perceive such particulars depend on a "high faith" capable of uniting 
Intellect (which, working alone, was merely destructive) with the 
"creative faculties— . . . Love, Idea, Imagination" (SS, 1:369). He 
claimed to avoid the distortion of formula by focusing on "facts" of 
emotion and action—facts whose integrity could be preserved only by 
the conditions of art: "If Poetry must not theorise, much less should 
the historian theorise, whose obligations to be true to fact are even 
greater than the poet's. If drama is grandest when the action is least 
explicable by laws, because then it best resembles life, then history 
will be grandest also under the same conditions" (SS, 1:23). He found 
the most perfect history in Shakespeare's plays, where actors, circum­
stances, and motives existed as dramatic facts unmediated by interpre­
tation. It is no coincidence that Shakespeare wrote during that epoch 
whose political and spiritual health it was Froude's purpose to illumi­
nate. He explicitly linked what he considered a healthy society to an 
accurate poetic vision. Shakespeare's "directness of insight" and 
"breadth of sympathy" would again be possible only when "the 
common sense of the wisest and best" had replaced the theorizing of 
factions and when all "speculative formulas" had surrendered to "the 
few but all-important truths of our moral condition" (SS, 2:487). 
This, of course, is effectively to prejudge which traits insight and 
sympathy will confirm as factual and to assign his own assumptions 
the status of axioms, not theories. 
Conceiving history as a stage on which "good and evil fight out 
their everlasting battle" (SS, 1:16-17) suited Froude's hero-worship­
ping purposes in a number of ways. "To myself the object of history is 
to discover and make visible illustrious characters, and pay them un­
grudging honour," he affirmed in his Inaugural Lecture as Regius 
Professor: "The history of mankind, says Carlyle, is the history of its 
great men. To find out these, clear the dirt from them and place them 
on their proper pedestals, is the function of the historian. He cannot 
have a nobler one" ("Inaugural," 162). To science the individual was 
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nothing, the species all. Only the conditions of art allowed the indi­
vidual his full weight and dimensions. Only poetry was adequate to 
re-create the greatest natures (SS, 1:337). By conjuring up "real hu­
man creatures who would bleed if we pricked them,"13 the historian 
appealed directly to the identification and sympathy necessary for 
moral education. By restoring heroes to their full proportions he en­
larged the ethical capacities of every reader: 
The address of history is less to the understanding than to the higher 
emotions. We learn in it to sympathise with what is great and good; we 
learn to hate what is base. In the anomalies of fortune we feel the mys­
tery of our mortal existence, and in the companionship of the illus­
trious natures who have shaped the fortunes of the world, we escape 
from the littlenesses which cling to the round of common life, and our 
minds are tuned in a higher and nobler key. (SS, 1:24) 
Although Froude was as unequivocal as Carlyle about the impor­
tance of great individuals to history, he allowed more weight to the 
spirit of the age, which established the conditions by which the hero's 
achievements were to be judged. Indeed, at times he rivals Macaulay 
in the weight he assigns to historical circumstances. He claims that 
even the great individual genius of a Shakespeare or a Raphael "is 
never more than the highest degree of an excellence which prevails 
widely round it, and forms the environment in which it grows" (H, 
1:74). Convinced that the Reformation "could never have been 
brought about constitutionally according to modern methods" (B, 
202), Froude portrayed it from the beginning as the work of the two 
powerful sovereigns, Henry and Elizabeth. But he defined Henry as a 
"practically effective" leader precisely because he was advanced "only 
slightly beyond his contemporaries." In such leaders "the motive 
force which bears him forward is not in himself, but in the great tidal 
wave of human progress. He is the guide of a great movement, not the 
creator of it, and he represents in his own person the highest average 
wisdom, combined necessarily in some measure with the mistakes 
and prejudices of the period to which he belongs" (H, 3:71). There is 
little opportunity here for the penetrating and molding intellect of 
the Carlylean hero. Those leaders who could read the signs of the 
times at best rode the crest of the "tidal wave," those who could not 
were left in its wake. 
If some of Froude's metaphors sound Macaulayean, they serve a 
significantly different model of change. We find in both men the us­
ual organic analogies. For Macaulay, however, the individual was 
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merely a passive receptor of the current of progress; for Froude he was 
the instrument of Providence. Macaulay might use the authority of 
the natural for rhetorical leverage, but his "nature" served rationalis­
tic ends and argued for an underlying uniformity in human expe­
rience. History was cyclical because without the trimmer's balancing 
hand mankind was constantly oscillating between extremes. Like 
Carlyle's, Froude's model of change allowed him to stress the unique­
ness of ages unfolding according to a divine, if mysterious, plan. 
Froude's particular historical arguments depended upon the sponta­
neity, irrationality, and irreversibility of organic process. He too rec­
ognized cyclical alternation in history: times of increasing knowledge 
alternated with periods of consolidation and "moral cultivation" (H, 
1:11-12). But unlike Macaulay's, his cycles insured diversity, not uni­
formity. Cyclical change refuted the rationalist's appeal to a law of 
averages because it left no two generations exactly alike. 
Froude relied on the Carlylean cycle of institutional growth, decay, 
and rebirth to justify the Reformation. He too viewed institutions as 
but the outward forms of eternal truths, forms that remained vital 
only so long as they credibly represented man's relationship to 
heaven. While still green and young, the Catholic Church had nour­
ished its people. When it reached the end of its life cycle, as all institu­
tions must, its language became dead, its symbols hollow, its "living 
robe of life . .  . a winding-sheet of corruption" (H, 2:45). Not just 
Henry, but nature herself, decreed its demise. All honorable men, 
once they realized that their religion no longer corresponded to truth, 
turned away from its dead forms and fell back upon "the naked ele­
mental life" (H, 2:46). The very spontaneity with which discontent 
sprang up among Teutonic people everywhere proved that Protes­
tantism was rooted in an appreciation of vital and invincible truths. 
Luther's spark only ignited an explosion that, like the French Revo­
lution, fulfilled a higher imperative, consuming away the rotten fruit 
and clearing the ground for new growth (H, 2:39). This vindication of 
elemental truths was beyond conscious human control: "The genius 
of change . . . car[ed] little for human opposition . . . the truth 
stole into men's minds they knew not how" (H, 4:441). 
Froude's argument for organic necessity actually worked less to 
diminish the role of the individual than to celebrate (as did the Whig 
view) those who had supported the "right" cause. Its most important 
use was to rationalize desired political and social behavior. The Tu­
dors had correctly read the "signs of the times"; the organic as well as 
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the divine sanctioned their ends and so justified their means. In the 
English in Ireland, the natural "law" that might makes right justified 
the repression of an inferior people. Since the world was so consti­
tuted that man must be ruled by strength, "nature also has allotted 
superiority of strength to superiority of intellect and character."14 Ire­
land's inability to win her freedom militarily was proof that she lacked 
the maturity to justify self-rule. Julius Caesar summed up Froude's 
tract for the times. Statesmen could not prevent the inevitable decay of 
outworn institutions, he argued, but could check the progress of the 
evil by recognizing the symptoms in time. According to his own diag­
nosis, Victoria's England shared the ills of Caesar's Rome: birth had 
been superseded by wealth, religion by cant, patriotism by party. Pop­
ular government had given control of the state to those who could not 
even control themselves. The lesson was clear: the "forces . . . which 
control the forms in which human things adjust themselves" would 
once again make an end of free institutions unless duty and justice 
replaced pleasure and material expediency as the basis of govern­
ment. 15 Froude's "forces" in effect exchanged the materialist necessity 
of Utilitarianism and Positivism for a moral necessity which, while 
no less binding, insisted on the importance of self-sacrifice and indi­
vidual responsibility. 
Froude, like Carlyle, used organic change selectively; cycles justi­
fied the preservation of an approved status quo and sanctioned the 
destruction of undesirable institutions. But his conception of change 
lacked the apocalyptic violence of Carlyle's. It was more evolutionary 
than revolutionary. Even movements so clearly propelled by truth as 
the Reformation coalesced slowly, moved forward hesitantly, and 
preserved fragments of old and new in glaring contradiction (H, 
1:161). Froude's need to justify the Reformation was intensely per­
sonal and complex. The influence of this justification on his model of 
historical change necessarily introduced strain and ambiguity into 
his argumentation about progress and decline. It was not enough for 
Froude to vindicate the Reformation by proclaiming that it discarded 
falsehood for truth. He wanted the extra sanction that subsequent 
social and intellectual progress gave to the Reformers' choices. Al­
though he admitted that he found the true interest of the past not in 
the growth of "material and mechanical civilisation" but in the 
drama of human emotion (SS, 1:17), he used sociocultural evidence 
no less polemically than Macaulay or Carlyle to reinforce his judg­
ments. Fleshing out the ethnic and economic proportions of the Re­
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formation in England provided him with further means of demon­
strating its historical importance and inevitability. 
Endorsing Victorian conceptions of race, for instance, he presents 
the new religion as being taken up instinctively by the Teutonic 
mind, with its "craving for a higher life" (H, 2:39). The Reformation 
plays a crucial role in the intellectual and material progress that con­
stitute Froude's own version of the march of mind. Because their 
minds were freed from the old religious superstitions, England's mer­
chants were more receptive to the astronomical innovations revolu­
tionizing sea travel and consequently were able to lay the base for her 
maritime prosperity and colonial empire. The influx of highly 
skilled Protestant emigrants fleeing the persecution in Holland and 
Flanders further strengthened the economy. As a result the English 
flourished, but because of the "Spaniard's choice" of Catholicism, 
"his intellect shrivelled in his brain, and the sinews shrank in his 
self-bandaged limbs"—a fate typical of Celts (H, 8:436). Looking 
with satisfaction at England's power and influence in the nineteenth 
century, Froude concluded that the Reformation had been "the root 
and source of the expansive force which has spread the Anglo-Saxon 
race over the globe, and imprinted the English genius and character 
on the constitution of mankind."16 
Although this view of progress lent a brisk argumentative momen­
tum to parts of the History, it deepened inherent contradictions in 
Froude's position. This march of mind was implicitly out of step 
with the silent, organic, un- (if not anti-) intellectual growth Carlyle 
associated with true faith. Making Protestantism the religion of "men 
of active and original vigour of understanding," while resigning Ca­
tholicism to the uneducated, the "imaginative," and the traditional 
(H, 7:10), undercut distinctions Froude himself maintained elsewhere 
between the theoretical sophistry of the false faith and the unreflective 
simplicity of the true. We might attribute these contradictions to 
Froude's rhetorical opportunism, his willingness to switch from wily 
Jesuits to superstitious dupes as needed to make his point. Such op­
portunism does explain many contradictions in his argument. But 
the very dynamic of that argument is controlled by more profound 
conflicts that cannot be resolved so easily. 
Not the least of the paradoxes of Froude's History is the deeper 
undertow of nostalgia for a lost world that pulled against this trium­
phant wave of progress. Although Burrow reminds us that Froude's 
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enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon empire glorified a national and not a 
commercial triumph,17 it still conflicted with his equally intense en­
thusiasm for the feudal. The forward thrust of Froude's Protestant 
ideal carried him inevitably toward a deeply antipathetic present. It 
was part of his strategy to make explicit the differences between this 
present and the past. His most comprehensive examination of eco­
nomic and social evidence occurs in chapter 1,' 'The Social Condition 
of England in the Sixteenth Century." An obvious parallel to Macau-
lay's chapter 3, this discussion seeks not to celebrate the extent of 
modern advance but to assess its limitations. Froude's version of Car­
lyle's medieval idyll is intended to reconfirm the spiritual choices 
made by men and masters in the sixteenth century. But Froude had to 
strike some damaging emotional compromises in order to aggrandize 
both the wisdom and virtue of the old society and the progress that left 
this world in its wake. 
Froude portrays sixteenth-century England as a society in which 
the rules of political economy were neglected in order "to bring the 
production and distribution of wealth under the moral rule of right 
and wrong" (H, 1:91); a world before labor was looked upon as a 
market commodity, in which men were held together "by oaths, free 
acknowledgments, and reciprocal obligations" rather than by the 
"harsher connecting links of mutual self-interest" (H, 1:26). In his 
eyes a law that raised the cost of cloth by limiting weavers to two 
looms was motivated not by a desire to restrict trade but to retain the 
people "in the condition not of 'hands' but of men" (H, 1:63). The 
guild system existed not to monopolize commerce but to enforce hon­
est dealing in honest goods (H, 1:56). Overlooking their use in con­
trolling scarce labor after the Plague, Froude disposed of the stringent 
vagrancy laws as legislation that simply "harmonized with the iron 
temper of the age, and . . . answered well for the government of a 
fierce and powerful people, in whose hearts lay an intense hatred of 
rascality, and among whom no one need have lapsed into evil courses 
except by deliberate preference for them" (H, 1:90). Even when con­
fronted with the palpable discrimination of the forest laws, he pro­
fessed to believe that "they served only to enhance the excitement [of 
poaching] by danger" and cited the Robin Hood ballads as evidence of 
the "warm genial spirit" with which such petty class warfare was con­
ducted (H, 1:72). All in all, in Tudor society "the people were ruled as 
they preferred to be ruled" by an aristocracy who demonstrated their 
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fitness as leaders by their self-sacrifice in defense of their country (H, 
1:45) and by their submission to the "moral authority" of legislation 
like the sumptuary laws (H, 1:25). 
The essential health of this body politic naturally insured the 
healthiness of the spiritual choices it made. Demonstrating that the 
majority of the populace under Henry were "prosperous, well-fed, 
loyal and contented" at once refuted Whig arguments about Tudor 
tyranny and forced specific parables on a present dominated by atom­
istic democracy, buccaneering capitalism, and political economy. 
But Froude's is an idyll already dissolving as he contemplates it. He 
detects the snake of greed and self-interest already stealing into the 
feudal paradise as the commercial middle classes gain in power under 
the Tudors. Although he pointedly notes that forced military train­
ing was an effective deterrent to "self-seeking tendencies in the mer­
cantile classes" (H, 1:71), he must concede that mammonism soon 
destroyed the feudal constitution. 
Macaulay and Green were able to maintain the forward thrust of 
the Whig view by allying Protestantism to the expansion of middle 
class power. They could celebrate the development of modern intel­
lect, industry, manners, and politics as analogous manifestations of 
one unified current of progress. For Froude the course of history was 
divided against itself. The energy of the new religion propels him 
forward, the decay of the social system drags him back. The progress 
that he had needed to label inevitable for the sixteenth century left 
him longing for the harmony of the past and explaining away the 
disharmonies of the present. Carlyle was saved from escapism by his 
ability to universalize his heroes and project them into the present. 
Froude's heroes were too thoroughly controlled by the spirit of their 
age. His own struggles with faith and doubt had left him overawed by 
the mutability of ideals. A willed transcendence was for him more a 
hope than a possibility. Despite his discipleship, he could never com­
fortably adopt Carlyle's decisive voice. History itself had taught him 
that it was impossible to predict the future: "We should draw no horo­
scopes . . . we should expect little, for what we expect will not come 
to pass" (SS, 1:18). Arguing that change worked in mysterious ways 
was for him more a defense against the unknowable than a defiant 
assertion of faith. His calls for reform hold out only warning of pun­
ishment, not a vision of a reformed world. He tried to evade modern 
political and economic realities by abandoning progress itself as 
mythic and seeking refuge in the permanently true. Duty, self­
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sacrifice, and self-control were verities sufficiently nonsectarian to 
offer a key to all mythologies, but they left too many troubling details 
still in need of interpretation. Much of what struck Froude's contem­
poraries as paradoxical in his writings resulted from his unwilling­
ness to trust either facts or ideals completely. Even the most universal 
truths at times needed a pragmatic rationale; even the most practical 
means required the extra sanction of providential ends. Building 
myths out of an all too fallible reality required constant, often unac­
knowledged, compromise. 
II 
For Arnold and Carlyle, identity itself rested upon the historian's 
ability to retrieve the truth about the past. Froude, on the other hand, 
had conceded that even "our knowledge of one another is mythic . . . 
for in every act of perception we contribute something of our own" 
("Inaugural," 153). Far from following this conclusion into solip­
sism, however, Froude arrived at what was at least superficially a con­
siderably more "scientific" conception of contemporary documenta­
tion and a notably more historicist point of view. Precisely because he 
considered it impossible to reach an objective understanding of the 
past, he argued that readers must either accept the impressions of 
events formed by contemporaries competent to judge them or "give 
up history in despair."18 Far from scorning "parchment Chartular­
ies" as did Carlyle, Froude looked to them for the real life of the past. 
He advocated studying the statute books of the sixteenth century be­
cause in them one found "the deliberate expression of [our ancestors'] 
collective thought, on the high questions of faith, and life, and law, 
and duty"—a glimpse of the "inner side" of human experience, of the 
secret passions and motives that alone made intelligible the "out­
ward" history of wars and politics ("Teaching History," 73). The 
language itself exhaled an atmosphere in which "the forms of de­
parted things rise up and take shape before you" ("Inaugural," 159). 
Nor was it only the imaginative value of primary sources that Froude 
prized. His Carlylean defense of fact against formula led him to de­
fend the pedagogical importance of texts in terms strikingly similar 
to those Freeman used while debating the first reforms at Oxford. 
Froude scorned the "universal knowledge" purveyed by London 
University, and he argued that unless teaching in the new school of 
Modern History at Oxford were to fall to the level of Gower Street or 
the popular press, the close reading of manuscript sources for limited 
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periods must replace the cramming of epitomes and historical com­
pendia "philosophised into unity" by the theories of modern specula­
tors ("Teaching History," 57). 
Moreover, Froude practiced what he preached far more thoroughly 
than did Freeman. He made exhaustive studies of manuscripts at the 
newly opened archives in Simancas, Spain, as well as consulting doc­
uments in the archives of Paris, Brussels, and Vienna, at Hatfield 
House, the British Museum, and the Rolls House. In order, he 
claimed, to enable his readers to form their own opinions, he swelled 
the History with copious extracts from original documents and manu­
script sources in which "the principal actors unfold their character 
and motives in their own language."19 Convinced that history would 
be "but a dumb show of phantoms" without some investigation of 
the daily life beneath the official events, he also amplified his research 
with a range of sociocultural evidence. His first chapter employs sta­
tistical projections of population to gauge the country's material 
growth (H, 1:13), inventories of country homes and banquet menus to 
suggest genteel life styles (H, 1:47-52 n.), and comparisons of wages 
and prices with modern buying power to determine the relative stan­
dard of living enjoyed by workers (H, 1:28-35). Like other historians 
working under romantic influences, he also paid particular attention 
to evidence of the popular mind—the literary, the legendary, the 
irrational. 
In actual practice it was neither historicist sympathy nor "scien­
tific" objectivity that Froude was after in his devotion to contempo­
rary evidence, but support for a particular kind of polemic. Objectiv­
ity was no part of his historian's responsibility. He freely admitted 
that he considered "moderate views . . . but the husk of history; the 
real grain is beaten out before they can be manufactured." A student 
left adrift in noncommital studies was likely to become hopelessly 
confused or, worse yet, fall into "a somewhat trenchant scepticism as 
to the credibility of any history whatsoever" ("Teaching History," 
59). This end Froude feared as much as did Arnold and Carlyle. Im­
partiality was not only foreign to human nature but also, where great 
questions were at issue, was "but another name for an unworthy in­
difference" ("Teaching History," 78). Looking back at the History in 
The Divorce of Catherine of A ragon, Froude claimed no such impar­
tiality: "I believe the Reformation to have been the greatest incident 
in English history. . .  . I am unwilling to believe more evil than I 
can help of my countrymen who accomplished so beneficient a work, 
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and in a book written with such convictions the mythical element 
cannot be wholly wanting."20 
As we have already seen, it was not all theorizing about the past that 
Froude objected to, but theorizing that disagreed with his own 
"myths" about history and human nature. Carlyle had feared that the 
sceptical, utilitarian mentality of the 1840s would render incompre­
hensible a period of genuine faith like the seventeenth century; 
Froude professed similar anxieties about the Reformation. He identi­
fied the salient trait of modern historians as a talent for depreciation, 
for reducing the stature of great men to fit the limited moral and intel­
lectual understanding of the general reader.21 He doubtless had in 
mind Macaulay's contemptuous dismissal of Cranmer when he 
singled him out as being especially guilty of taking "mean and low 
views of men, and of human nature" (B, 544). Modern political econ­
omists similarly considered human nature incapable of the self-
sacrifice and moral character Froude assumed in the Tudor aristoc­
racy. The prevailing fashion of interpreting the past, he complained, 
was to seek the causes of great movements in the whims and caprices 
of mean minds and thus to reduce merry old England to "the nursery 
of everything most pitiful, most base, and most contemptible" 
("Teaching History," 71). Froude claimed that by using contempo­
rary documents, he could rescue the reputation of Reformation lead­
ers from the cynicism of modern "philosophers" as well as from the 
calumnies of Catholic fanatics. 
Froude's own sympathies prove to be as selective as those he criti­
cizes. For instance, he accepts the evidence of the popular mind only 
when it corroborates his point of view. He cites popular ballads to 
establish the outcry of a "high-minded people" against ecclesiastical 
corruption (H, 1:190) or quotes street ballads to create a sense of wide­
spread indignation over what he has presented as the cold-blooded 
murders of Darnley and Murray (H, 9:83; 9:590 n.). He might be more 
respectful than Macaulay of religious belief, but only if it revered a 
living truth and not a dying sham. Catholicism is usually the religion 
of the weak-minded in his pages. Reports of signs and portents illus­
trate the "fevered imaginations" of Catholic fanatics at the return of 
Mary Tudor (H, 5:308) or at the death of Edward (H, 6:15). The crav­
ing after prophecies in the 1530s is not just symptomatic of intellec­
tual revolution, but the logical result of a religion built on supersti­
tion; it is particularly to Henry's credit that he remained proof against 
such madness (H, 2:192). Froude examines at length the Nun of 
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Kent's jeremiad against the divorce, only to dismiss her as a young 
woman of bad health and irritable nerves, whose success exemplified 
merely the charlatanism of the Church and the perennial insatiability 
of human credulity (H, 1:295). His prejudgments stunt empathy al­
most as thoroughly as did Macaulay's. 
What appeared to be an effort at historicist reconstruction in the 
History usually became a not-so-subtle form of special pleading. 
Froude chose to take state papers at face value because their self-
serving pronouncements affirmed his own assumptions about the 
righteousness of the Reformation. The Statute book presented events 
as originating not in the venality or caprice of self-interested individ­
uals, but as "rising out of the national will, and expressing the na­
tional judgment" ("Teaching History," 66)—in other words, as a 
spontaneous flowering of the spirit of the age. It was hardly any 
wonder that Froude found that "the story of the Reformation as read 
by the light of the statute book is more intelligible and consistent than 
any other version of it, doing less violence to known principles of 
human nature, and bringing the conduct of the principal actors 
within the compass of reason and probability" (H, 3:355 n.). Indeed, 
it would have violated his conception of "human nature" to assume 
that "statesmen engaged in so magnificent an enterprise" as the Re­
formation "would make themselves accomplices in enormous crimes, 
the complacent instruments of a licentious and capricious tyranny."22 
He fell back on false dilemmas to establish guilt or innocence: if Anne 
Boleyn were not guilty then one would have to assume that English 
noblemen and gentlemen had degraded themselves in inventing the 
heinous charges against her; if Mary Stuart had not masterminded 
Darnley's murder, then Elizabeth and her advisors must be con­
demned for imprisoning her. 
The latter conclusions were simply inadmissable for one who had 
in effect already determined on his own "Whig view" of Reformation 
history. The legislation of Henry VIII was to Froude no less than "the 
Magna Charta of the modern world." It allowed England to accom­
plish peacefully what had been achieved in Europe only by long and 
bloody wars. The Reformation in England represented for Froude 
what the Glorious Revolution had for Macaulay: in both "the stake 
played for was the liberty of mankind."23 Once concede that the 
choices of the sixteenth century had been vindicated by the nineteenth 
and writing history became a simple matter of selectively reconstruct­
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ing events so that they anticipated future success. This method con­
veniently conflated past motives with present results, allowing 
Froude to press for agreement on the grounds that "if the present law 
of England be right, the party in favour of the divorce was right" (H, 
1:118 n.). 
To be sure, Froude's reassessment of the period served some useful 
functions. By stressing the political significance of Henry's various 
marriages, he toned down the portrait of the capricious Bluebeard 
and revealed a monarch driven at least as much by policy as by per­
sonal inclination. More often, however, his historicist arguments 
were undermined by double standards. For instance, he conceded that 
Catholics and Protestants were alike guilty of persecution, and that 
given the spirit of the age, it was unreasonable to expect either to have 
acted differently (H, 10:251). Catholics, however, he blamed for lack­
ing the humanity that could have overriden the political logic of their 
position (H, 1:165); Protestant persecution, on the other hand, was 
but "the natural resource of a vigorous government placed in circum­
stances of extreme peril." Had Elizabeth's ministers "been embar­
assed with modern scruples" about "outrooting . . . truth" through 
torture, her government would have come to a swift end (H, 10:293-94). 
Froude was caught in a dilemma: he wanted to mount a Macau­
layean argument for pragmatism while retaining for his favorite 
causes a Carlylean purity of purpose. He called awkwardly on Provi­
dence to justify executions that Macaulay could have accepted as mere 
expediency. Froude chooses to see an "even hand of justice" at work 
repaying Catholics for the persecution of heretics (H, 2:328) and ex­
cuses even "needless cruelty" as "an instance of the wide justice of 
Providence, which punishes wrong by wrong, and visits on single 
men the offences of thousands" (H, 3:270). Providence exacted Cather­
ine Howard's execution as well, in a rather selective retaliation 
against those who had disfigured its high ends by mixing them with 
"worldly intrigues" (H, 4:139). Although growing ever wearier with 
the machinations of Reformation politics, Froude chose to believe 
that "the good remained, the corrupt perished"—that the higher 
morality of the ends justified and ultimately overrode the question­
able morality of the means. In short, his apparent historicism and 
relativism were argumentative ploys. He drew upon the contempo­
rary justification of events because it provided a self-validating view 
of the transactions in question. He did not so much judge the past on 
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its own terms as choose the rationalization most consistent with his 
own beliefs. Viewing the English Reformation through the long 
perspective of three hundred years of Protestant success, he confused 
his enthusiasm for its effects with a just assessment of its causes. 
Froude set out consciously to revise history. Taking fiction and 
drama as his models, he aimed quite as frankly as Macaulay at popu­
lar success, for he realized the power of art as an instrument of conver­
sion. In keeping with his pronouncement that history was "only a 
stage on which the drama of humanity is acted out" ("Inaugural," 
162), he framed much of the action as theater: the divorce is a "great 
drama" unfolding act by act, Cromwell the protagonist in a lesser 
"tragedy" (H, 2:443; 3:474). In line with his argument that the truest 
art was based on unmediated facts and taught best when it taught 
least, much of his "characterization" consists of long quotations (or 
paraphrases presented as direct quotations) from the letters, speeches, 
and papers of public figures and from contemporary views of col­
leagues. Anne Boleyn's ravings in her cell, he points out, are "as 
touching as Ophelia's" but claim a higher authority: they are not just 
a poet's invention, but the actual words of a suffering fellow mortal 
(H, 2:467). At times Froude goes beyond mere quotation, condensing 
documentary evidence into dramatized dialogues. Thus we see the 
Emperor Charles "wincing" and "muttering" at Paget's plain 
speech; we attend court as Henry accuses the heretic Lambert in per­
son; and we witness Mary Stuart's confrontation with John Knox 
(H, 4:377; 3:314-15; 7:377). Like Carlyle, Froude prized even inciden­
tal evidence if it could offer an authentic insight. He records a stray 
letter from an English gentleman because it kindles "a small spark of 
English life" during the visitation of the monasteries (H, 2:418), and 
includes the story of Dalaber's persecution which, in its "minute 
simplicity, brings us face to face with that old world, where men like 
ourselves lived, and worked, and suffered, three centuries ago" (H, 
2:54). For Froude as for George Eliot, the testimony of eye witnesses 
"like ourselves" pleaded for the sympathy and understanding based 
on recognition of a shared humanity. Froude accorded these dramatic 
truths of emotion and experience an authority he denied to other 
kinds of historical interpretations. 
Froude's other means of restoring credibility and human interest to 
history lay in his novelistic talent for clothing abstractions in a fabric 
of concrete particulars. He rivaled Macaulay in his ability to individ­
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ualize the experience of the past and to suggest the way change per­
meated the daily reality of an entire society of people "like ourselves": 
Every parish pulpit rang with the divorce, or with the perils of the 
Catholic faith; at every village ale-house, the talk was of St. Peter's keys, 
the sacrament, or of the pope's supremacy, or of the points in which a 
priest differed from a layman. Ostlers quarreled over such questions as 
they groomed their masters' horses; old women mourned across the 
village shopboards of the evil days which were come or coming. (H, 
1:291-92) 
Froude's was less Carlyle's eye for symbol than Macaulay's eye for the 
startling antitheses that revealed social cleavage. The disorder pro­
duced by great intellectual change springs vividly to life in the "peas­
ant theologians" who come to blows as they dispute the mysteries of 
justification over their ale, or in the lawyer who lifts a small dog in 
derision as a priest lifts the host (H, 3:341, 343). Froude employs sim­
ilar economy of detail to establish the full ignominy of superstition's 
overthrow in an Oxford where "the divinity schools were planted 
with cabbages" and "laundresses dried clothes in the School of Arts" 
(H, 5:255). 
The situation Froude portrays, when extremes of Protestant and 
Catholic fanaticism threaten to rend the social fabric, fits a peculiarly 
Macaulayean pattern. However, Froude's interest is less in exploiting 
sensational polarities than in transmuting them into something 
more closely resembling that "galvanic mass" of forces Carlyle saw 
moving chaotically toward revolution. In the early stages of reform, 
Froude tells us, "each separate human being . . . was whirled along 
the rapids which formed the passage into a new era" (H, 3:219). To 
capture the confusion of change in progress he passes before our eyes 
a series of fleeting images like the "pictures in a magic slide"— 
representative events that convey us with a present-tense immediacy 
into both sides of the conflict. First we view a friar mendicant con­
demning heresy in a local village. "The friar disappears. A neighbour 
of the new opinions . . . takes his place, and then begins an argu­
ment" denouncing him (H, 3:219-20). "The slide again moves" and 
"we are in a village church" where a groom from the court scornfully 
challenges the sainthood of Becket, depicted there "in a window gor­
geously painted." "We are next at Worcester, at the Lady Chapel, on 
the eve of the Assumption," where a citizen publicly mourns the dese­
cration of the Virgin's statue (H, 3:222). By the time this slide show 
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ends, the contradictions of England's movement forward, "rocking 
and reeling" into the new age, have been effectively captured in 
Froude's kaleidoscopic vision. We have been made to sympathize 
with both the loss and victory entailed in this "under-current of the 
war of opinions, where the forces were generated which gave to the 
time its life and meaning" (H, 3:219). 
For all his special pleading, there is a degree of impartiality and 
wonder in Froude's re-creation of the past that Macaulay could not 
claim. It is not just that he was willing (like Carlyle) to invite the 
reader to "call his imagination to his aid, and endeavour, if he can, to 
see the same object in many shapes and many colours, to sympathize 
successively with those to whom the Reformation was a terror, and 
with those to whom it was the dearest hope" (H, 3:61). Froude's own 
imaginative eye was keen to the nuance and detail that authenticated 
empathy. Despite his distaste for Catholicism, he pities its mutilation 
in terms that make us share the pain: "It was no light thing to the 
village peasant to see the royal arms staring above the emply socket of 
the crucifix to which he had prayed" (H, 5:64). He helps us feel the 
baldness of loss in chapels after the statues had crashed from their 
niches by imagining the sunlight that "stared in . .  . on the whit­
ened aisles" and the commandments written on whitewashed walls 
"where the quaint frescoes had told the story of the gospel to the eyes 
of generation after generation" (H, 5:47). He finds heroic virtues, 
"courage and self-sacrifice" beautiful in enemy and friend alike; mar­
tyrdom, so long as it was "nobly borne," is worth our witnessing 
whether in those who "bought England's freedom with their blood" 
or those who were tinged with the sunset glory of an old faith 
(H, 2:338-39). 
Yet nostalgic sentiment is finally no match for prejudice.24 Despite 
Froude's encouragement that we judge and feel for ourselves the posi­
tions of both sides, his partisanship controls our sympathy, and his 
judgments limit our experience of the past. Froude held to the righ­
teousness of his cause with a Carlylean tenacity and indignation. 
Truth vindicates itself with a relentless inevitability that truncates 
empathy. Change is a tide whose flow cannot be turned, a seed forcing 
relentlessly through the soil, a clock inexorably counting down to the 
hour of reckoning: 
Slowly the hand had crawled along the dial-plate; slowly as if the event 
would never come: and wrong was heaped on wrong; and oppression 
cried, and it seemed as if no ear had heard its voice; till the measure of 
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the circle was at length fulfilled; the finger touched the hour, and as the 
strokes of the great hammer rang out above the nation, in an instant the 
mighty fabric of iniquity was shivered into ruins. (H, 1:193) 
He never permits the imaginative interest of history's pageantry to 
carry us away from the judgment exacted by God. Witnesses to Thom­
as More's execution, we are allowed to find uplifting the cheerful 
faith with which he meets his death. But More's own eloquence is 
swiftly drowned out by the voices of Protestant martyrs "crying un­
derneath the altar" for vengeance from "the throne of the Most High" 
(H, 2:377). The cosmic righteousness of retribution for Catholic 
wrongs necessarily trivializes our sympathy for More the man. 
The coronation of Anne Boleyn reveals a similar antagonism be­
tween sympathy and judgment. There is something distinctively Car­
lylean in this set piece that grafts the immediate onto the symbolic 
and turns brilliant spectacle into a sermon on the vanity of human 
wishes. Froude spares no effort in bringing back to life "the blazing 
trail of splendour" that once filed down London streets, now so 
"black and smoke-grimed," but then "radiant with masses of colour, 
gold, and crimson, and violet" (H, 1:424-25). The rich costumes, the 
glittering jewels, the fountains running with wine, the monuments 
and tributes, all coalesce in an extravagant pageant at whose center 
we find "fortune's plaything of the hour, the Queen of England— 
queen at last— . . . breathing the perfumed incense of greatness 
which she had risked her fair name, her delicacy, her honour, her 
self-respect, to win" (H, 1:425). Froude poses Anne as both symbol 
and victim of the social earthquake convulsing her society: a "poor 
silly soul" tempted into moral chaos by the fatal gift of greatness. We 
are inclined at least to pity, if not to sympathize with her, when 
Froude clouds the sunshine of her triumph with a foreshadowing of 
that day three years hence when she would leave the Tower "a poor 
wandering ghost, on a sad tragic errand, from which she will never 
more return" (H, 1:426). In the long run, however, Froude knows we 
cannot sympathize with both Henry and Anne, and at the moment of 
her coronation he exacts at her expense the indignation for Cather­
ine's treatment that he would not allow us to direct against the King. 
When Anne was anointed Queen, he asks, 
Did any vision flit across her of a sad mourning figure which once had 
stood where she was standing, now desolate, neglected, sinking into the 
darkening twilight of a life cut short by sorrow? Who can tell? At such a 
time, that figure would have weighed heavily upon a noble mind. . . . 
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But Anne Boleyn was not noble and was not wise,—too probably she
felt nothing but the delicious, all-absorbing, all-intoxicating present, 
ent. (H, 1:429) 
He tries to manipulate our pity into disgust at the callous vanity of 
the other woman in this maudlin melodrama, and to prepare us for 
the adultress' further outrages against womanly feeling. In the pro­
cess, however, his Carlylean grip on transcendent truths slips and the 
heavy-handedness of the special pleader takes over. Froude's censo­
riousness makes his sympathy for her seem condescending and 
insincere. 
This need to judge and justify constantly intervenes between us and 
Froude's characters. He might aspire to create an "overmastering 
human interest" in history that "transcends explanation,"25 but in 
practice he does not trust human interest alone. In analyzing Henry's 
marriages, for instance, he maneuvers the reader through a maze of 
double standards. While commending Henry for letting political ex­
pedience override sentiment in divorcing Catherine, he blames Pope 
Clement for letting "worldly prudence"—in the person of Emperor 
Charles—enter into his deliberations on the divorce. He applauds 
Henry's decision to force the dispute to an issue by marrying Anne 
Boleyn and yet condemns her for acquiescing to such an equivocal 
position. He argues that the personal feelings of Catherine and Mary 
should not be allowed to obstruct a national good, but summons up 
considerable pity for Henry's personal dislikes and domestic unhap­
piness in order to justify his divorces. 
Froude in effect wants to make a Carlylean hero out of Henry—a 
hero who acts rather than talks, who defends order against chaos, who 
instinctively separates sham from truth. Although he blames the 
"barren disputings" in which Henry entangles himself on his early 
theological training, Froude is clearly embarrassed that it took the 
King so long to trust to his "instincts as an English statesman" and 
affirm the simple truth in his heart rather than entering into a "legal 
labyrinth" to justify the divorce (H, 1:268-70). Froude is obviously 
relieved when Henry is forced to defy the Pope openly. In contrast to 
the distracted Clement who snivels and fawns, falls back on "Italian­
ate cunning" when flattery will not serve, he can pose Henry as a 
Frederick the Great, a general in a state of war, with no time to mince 
words in his swift commands for swift obedience (H, 2:235-36). In the 
end Froude argues that Henry's "honest inconsistency," the trait of 
"men of practical ability in times of change," was in fact the key to his 
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ultimate success. It allowed him to bring the nation through "the 
hardest crisis in its history " without revolution and to lay the founda­
tions of modern England (H, 4:490, 492). Guided by common sense 
rather than theory and exonerated by time, Henry is, as Burrow sug­
gests, a distinctively whiggish hero—notwithstanding Froude's ef­
forts to endow him with Carlylean grasp on transcendent truths.26 
Froude needed villainy as much as heroism to maintain the tension 
in his "mythic" view of the Reformation. If Henry is the incarnation 
of the silent truths of Protestantism, Mary Stuart is the epitome of 
Roman Catholic duplicity. Froude is wary of the sentimental and 
sensational appeal she traditionally had for English readers. By exag­
gerating rather than blunting the drama of her life he makes its ob­
vious theatricality proof of all the falsehood for which she stands. She 
is from the beginning never more than a wily hypocrite and consum­
mate actress, a genius that thrived only in the "uncertain twilight of 
conspiracy" (H, 8:83). Her religion would have been enough to con­
demn her in his eyes, but he will not allow her sincerity even in that. 
Elizabeth's equal in intellectual gifts, Mary lacked her ability to feel 
"like a man an unselfish interest in a great cause" (H, 7:368). She 
cared only for the gratification of her own selfish passions, and "sacri­
ficed her own noble nature on the foul altar of sensuality and lust" 
(H, 9:44). To be sure, she gains a certain stature in her very villainy. 
Froude accords her grudging admiration for her physical courage and 
singlemindedness, both of which contrast markedly with Elizabeth's 
ambivalence and vacillation. Scenes in which she figures most 
prominently—the murders of Rizzio and Darnley, for instance—are 
among the most lively in the second half of the History. But Froude 
allows us to appreciate them only because we know they are virtuoso 
performances by a woman who sins with full knowledge of her guilt. 
When facts are missing, invention makes his cause. He encourages us 
to sympathize with Darnley's growing fears by suggesting that Mary's 
plan to remove him to the isolated Craigmillar "had an ominous 
sound. The words were kind, but there was perhaps some odd glitter 
of the eyes not wholly satisfactory" (H, 8:365). He makes her assumed 
complicity in Darnley's murder even more appalling by imagining 
that she went to bed, "to sleep, doubtless—sleep with the soft tran­
quility of an innocent child," after leaving Darnley to his fate (H, 
8:370). 
Froude controls our point of view to the end. It is not enough that 
we merely witness Mary's execution: its "human interest" derives 
129

History as Protestant Apologia 
from our "knowing" that it was all a charade. In Froude's eyes there is 
no doubt of this: "It would be affectation to credit her with a genuine 
feeling of religion." Mary's insistence that she died as a martyr to her 
faith rather than as a conspirator against Elizabeth's life was but a last 
desperate gesture at a revenge that might outlive her (H, 12:352). Her 
very effrontery earns her his back-handed compliment: her fortitude 
in the face of death was all the more noteworthy because it could not 
spring from devotion to a higher cause (H, 12:353). The "elaborate 
care" with which she prepared to encounter her end provides evidence 
of how skillfully she stage-managed her last performance. She ex­
changes the plain grey dress for a sumptuous black satin hung with 
crucifixes and paternosters, her false hair veiled in white. She resorts 
to tears in order to wheedle permission for some of her own people to 
witness her death: she could not, after all, leave in the hands of Puri­
tans responsibility for reporting the "religious melodrame" she con­
templated. She sweeps into the execution chamber "as if coming to 
take a part in some solemn pageant," and drowns out the prayers of 
the Anglican dean with her own "powerful deep-chested tones," in­
terspersing English with Latin so the audience might be sure in 
which faith she left the world. 
Lest we miss the point, Froude punctures her piety with trenchant 
irony: "She prayed for the Church which she had been ready to betray, 
for her son, whom she had disinherited, for the Queen whom she had 
endeavoured to murder. She prayed God to avert his wrath from En­
gland, that England which she had sent a last message to Philip to 
beseech him to invade. She forgave her enemies, whom she had in­
vited Philip not to forget" (H, 12:358). The black dress is removed to 
reveal a blood red costume that, he surmises, must have been carefully 
studied for the appalling "pictorial effect" it would create as she stood 
on the scaffold, surrounded by black figures. He turns the final action 
into a ghastly symbol of her own duplicity and of the degeneration of 
the Church she represents: "The coif fell off and the false plaits. The 
laboured illusion vanished. The lady who had knelt before the block 
was in the maturity of grace and loveliness. The executioner, when he 
raised the head . . . exposed the withered features of a grizzled, 
wrinkled old woman" (H, 12:361). Froude allows the brilliance of the 
acting but cuts short "the admiration and pity which cannot be re­
fused her." He sternly reminds us that "she was leaving the world 
with a lie upon her lips. She was a bad woman, disguised in the livery 
of a martyr" (H, 12:362). Misplaced sympathy for her tragic end had 
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obscured the fact that her execution, far from being the one blot on 
Elizabeth's reign, had been instrumental in paralyzing Catholic re­
sistance and allowing the Queen to meet the Armada at the head of an 
undivided nation. 
Arguments for political expedience notwithstanding, in this case 
Froude's eloquence backfired. Even readers with no illusions about 
Mary's innocence were repelled by the violence of his rhetoric and 
found his gloating triumph over her final humiliation in question­
able taste.27 Froude would perhaps not have strained so hard to 
blacken Mary had the contrasts between her and Elizabeth been 
sharper. His "mythic" view of the Reformation had dictated perspec­
tives hard to maintain without some artificial heightening of the 
background. The heroine he needed to satisfy his melodrama formula 
dissolved in his hands, leaving only the crassest of pragmatists to em­
body the "good" cause. He originally conceived Elizabeth as a plain-
dealing Tudor foil to Mary's caricature of Stuart fraud. She was to be a 
solitary heroine "braving and ruling the tempest" of Reformation 
politics (B, 172). She starts out as the perfect daughter to her manly 
and straightforward father: here was a queen who "rode, shot, jested, 
and drank beer; spat, and swore upon occasions; swore not like 'a 
comfitmaker's wife,' but round, mouth-filling oaths, which would 
have satisfied Hotspur" (H, 11:17-18). But he found Elizabeth's plain-
dealing as hard to sustain as her heroism. As he delved deeper into 
archival evidence, Froude became more and more convinced that Eliz­
abeth's greatness had actually been that of her advisors, and that she 
had been the champion of the Reformation in spite of herself. 
At the outset he had refused to believe of Elizabeth what he so easily 
credited in Mary: that one exposed to great personal risk as leader of a 
country in crisis could be heavily influenced by personal motives. 
Further research revealed disquieting similarities between the two 
women, however. Having distinguished Mary from Elizabeth by the 
former's indulgence in her own licentious pleasures, he had with 
some embarrassment to account for Elizabeth's extended dalliance 
with Sir Robert Dudley, "technically honourable" though it might 
have been. He can rely only in part on our sympathy for the loneliness 
of the young queen with no one to guide her choice of friends, or for 
the isolation of the mature woman concealing the emotional empti­
ness of her life by idling with her human playthings. He tries shifting 
the blame to Anne Boleyn, arguing that Elizabeth's great and sover­
eign nature must have been "dashed with a taint which she inherited 
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with her mother's blood" (H, 7:88). Nevertheless, one can trace his 
growing impatience as she trifled with half the crowns of Europe, too 
infatuated with Dudley to marry any, until it gathers to the final 
condemnation: 
Queens do not reign for their own pleasure, and the ignoble passion
which had prevented her from making an honourable marriage when
she was young, with a prospect of children, was no justification of her 
barren age which [in 1580] threatened the realm with convulsions. In­
dividuals may trifle at their foolish will with character or fortune; sov­
ereigns, on whom depends the weal of empires, contract duties from
their high places, which their private humours cannot excuse them for 
neglecting. (H, 11:185) 
His claim that Elizabeth's "unselfish interest in a great cause" al­
lowed her to resist the personal temptations to which Mary suc­
cumbed also falters as evidence accumulates. He attempts at first to 
excuse a dishonesty and unscrupulousness equal to Mary's own by 
arguing that Elizabeth's "object in itself was excellent, and those who 
pursue high purposes through crooked ways, deserve better of man­
kind . . . than those who pick their way in blameless inanity" (H, 
11:27-28). As he proceeds, however, he must more frequently ac­
knowledge that her only object was to protect her throne and that she 
furthered the Reformation only insofar as it helped accomplish this 
end. Although wearied by repeated instances of her deceit, at the be­
ginning of volume 12 he still defends her: dishonesty that would have 
irretrievably compromised a man's honor, deception that if pursued 
for a personal object would have been called "detestable treachery," 
might be "half pardoned for the general rectitude of her purpose," as 
well as for the inherent weakness of her sex (H, 12:25-26). 
His final analysis affords only the most qualified praise, nonethe­
less. Vacillation must be expected from one who had no theological 
convictions. Elizabeth had realized (like the young Froude) that "the 
speculations of so-called divines were but as ropes of sand and sea-
slime leading to the moon," but she had no larger or deeper convic­
tions with which to replace them. If her insight were keen and her 
mind sharp, she lacked the "intellectual emotions which give the 
human character its consistency and power" (H, 12:583). Her per­
sonal bravery and economy hardly redeemed the grotesqueness of her 
vanity and affectation. In the end what was a powerful claim for 
Henry has faded to grudging acquiesence: "The greatest achievement 
in English history . . . was completed without bloodshed under 
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Elizabeth's auspices, and Elizabeth may have the glory of the work" 
(H, 12:587). One cannot help feeling that it was really Froude's disil­
lusionment with his badly tarnished heroine that convinced him to 
end his study at the Armada rather than follow her life out to its close 
as originally planned.28 
This History of England is preponderantly a drama of palace in­
trigue. We get out of the court and stateroom periodically to the vil­
lage, the battlefield, and the high seas, but we still miss that deep 
responsiveness to place that triggered the 'imaginative archaeology" 
of Arnold and Carlyle and allowed even Macaulay to make cityscapes 
as real as his people. The battle of faith and its defenders carries for 
Froude much more weight than battles of men and ships. Granted, 
the materials for military history were disappointing. The vacillation 
and stinginess that were Elizabeth's trademarks told most heavily on 
her army and navy. The military chronicle of her reign offers an al­
most unremitting tale of ignominious defeats and ambiguous victo­
ries (e.g., H, 7:236, 529; 8:25). The heroism of English soldiers is re­
peatedly undercut by the pusillanimity of their commander-in-chief. 
Notwithstanding Froude's contempt for the Irish, their very barbarity 
informed their wars with an unqualified bravery and singleminded­
ness that inspires a lyric intensity he seldom could muster for the 
English (e.g., H, 8:429). 
Luckily the Armada's defeat provided an unambiguous victory of 
surpassing historical importance. "It is all action," he wrote, "and I 
shall use my materials badly if I cannot make it as interesting as a 
novel." He closes his massive work in a "blaze of fireworks" (B, 310) 
that illuminated a moment of national triumph and solidarity. From 
the start Froude establishes his claim over the patriotic sympathies of 
his readers by presenting Spain's challenge as essentially political. By 
brushing aside theological issues, he treats England's response as a 
spontaneous outpouring of the national will—a rallying to the de­
fense of age-old traditions of British freedom and independence that 
sets aside all differences of religious opinion. The spark of resistance 
flares first in the coastal towns, where news of the Spanish approach 
sets off saddling and arming and sends musters flocking to the ports. 
As it penetrates every corner of the country, the tidings set on fire "the 
patriotic heart of England" (H, 12:488). In the heat of this passion, 
chivalry is born anew and the commonplace is apotheosized into the 
heroic as all classes join in mutual support: "from Lyme, and Wey­
mouth, and Poole, and the Isle of Wight, young lords and gentlemen 
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came streaming out in every smack or sloop that they could lay hold 
of, to snatch their share of danger and glory at Howard's side"; if their 
strength was negligible, their presence proved to the crews that "the 
heart of England was with them" and thus "transformed every com­
mon seaman into a hero" (H, 12:489). Heroism and fortitude are 
needed all the more because of the government's inadequate support 
of its own troops. Froude's growing disgust with the Queen who 
"clung with the maddened grasp of passionate avarice" to the Bur­
gundian diamonds while her navy starved, and niggled over every 
grain of powder while her admiral lay with empty magazines before 
an enemy twice his strength, is obvious. If it undercuts his portrait of 
national solidarity, this added disadvantage serves only to make the 
navy's final triumph over such great odds the more impressive. 
Although himself an avid seaman, Froude viewed the action with 
the eye of the novelist rather than of the admiral. Precise, if largely 
imagined, details of weather and terrain place the reader on the scene: 
the early summer sun "shining softly on the white walls and vine­
yards of Coruna" as the majestic Armada drifted out on the purple 
waters, the "gibbous moon" that revealed to the Spanish the ap­
proach of the first English opposition, the "wild west wind" and 
"rolling breakers of the Atlantic" that wreck the remainder of the 
Armada on the Irish coast. We understand why the superstitious Span­
iards view the English fireships, sent to force them away from Calais, 
as "some terrible engines of destruction," because Froude restores the 
scene as it would have appeared to them in all its shocking detail: 
"Certain dark objects which had been seen dimly drifting on the tide 
where the galleons lay thickest, shot suddenly into pyramids of light, 
flames leaping from ruddy sail to sail, flickering on the ropes and 
forecastles, foremasts and bowsprits a lurid blaze of conflagration" 
(H, 12:499). Major engagements are sketched in with sharp pictur­
esque strokes: the Spanish ships moving like "Thames barges piled 
with hay" are never any match for the sharp low English ships, which 
shoot away "as if by magic in the eye of the wind" (H, 12:482). The 
decisive British attack pours "one continuous rain of shot" into the 
Spanish fleet, driving them into a confused and helpless mass; they 
are "hunted together as a shepherd hunts sheep upon a common" and 
herded onto the Flanders coast (H, 12:503). As the galleons heeled 
over, "their middle decks were turned into slaughter-houses, and in 
one ship blood was seen streaming from the lee scuppers" (H, 12:504), 
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The taunts of the Spanish crews, daring the "Lutheran hens" to 
board, proved only "an idle bravado." The proud Castilian spirit was 
broken, and the remainder of the Armada chose to slink home via the 
Orkneys and Ireland. Froude drives home the ignominy of defeat by 
tracing out the grisly scenes of Spanish destruction as the survivors 
are savaged equally by the elements they had believed God controlled 
in the their favor and by the Irish whose religious camaraderie dis­
solves under the lure of plunder. Regardless of their position on the 
theological issues at stake, all readers could join in appreciating this 
brilliant celebration of English victory and proudly accord the His­
tory a place among the English classics.29 
From the beginning Froude's work was better received by the gen­
eral public than by the critics. And yet his brilliant style, unorthodox 
interpretations, and questionable accuracy would have made him no 
more controversial an historian than Carlyle or Macaulay had it not 
been for the much wider debate about the historian's function that 
crystallized around his career. His success crested at a time when the 
definition of "serious" history had begun to shift under the imposing 
pressures of a mass market and an emergent professionalism. Al­
though his work supplied "scientific" scholars with ammunition 
against a popularization that they felt both challenged and under­
mined" their standards, the general reader defended it as an eloquent 
testimony to the moral and imaginative power that the specialist 
would deny to history. Except among his staunchest supporters, 
Froude's revisions of sixteenth-century history converted few readers. 
But even many who disagreed with his interpretations paid tribute to 
the brilliance of his style and to the skill with which he brought to life 
actors in a thrilling historical pageant.30 
Froude's accuracy found fewer defenders. The difficult work of de­
ciphering and translating hundreds of manuscripts would have been 
a formidable challenge to any scholar. Froude proved an exception­
ally careless copyist who compounded his errors by failing to make 
clear where he substituted paraphrases within quotations or excerpted 
without ellipsis marks. Goldwin Smith and E. A. Freeman were 
among the first to take him to task for factual errors in sixteenth-
century history, and in later years T. Rice Holmes and W. S. Lilley 
found his Caesar and Erasmus similarly marred by misreadings, mis­
translations, and mistakes.31 Most reviewers recognized that his grav­
est errors concerned not accuracies of fact but accuracies of judg­
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ment—strong prejudice, not intellectual dishonesty, led him into so 
many misstatements and distorted emphases. But the same claims had 
been made against Macaulay, without branding him "essentially a 
rhetorician and not an historian," as A. V. Dicey said of Froude.32 
When all is said and done, Froude's inaccuracy alone was not 
enough to disqualify him as a serious historian as defined by the stan­
dards of the 1870s and 1880s. It was certainly not enough to have 
turned "Froude's disease" into a byword for "constitutional inaccu­
racy" by the turn of the century had not more been at stake than errors 
alone.33 As Freeman's attack makes clear, Froude served as a lightning 
rod for those who promulgated a new definition of the historian. 
Freeman's Anglican and Liberal sympathies were powerful sources of 
antipathy toward Froude, but professional jealousy was even 
stronger. Freeman resented the overwhelming popular success of a 
writer who ignored what he considered professional standards. The 
fact that Froude had undertaken far more primary research than 
Freeman did not absolve him of "original sin"; Freeman still claimed 
that he had tried to write about "a very difficult period of history 
without any proper apprenticeship to historical writing."34 Froude's 
errors were "just the sort of things which superficial writers care 
nothing about, just the sort of things which superficial readers think 
it hypercritical to complain of; but . . . just the sort of things by 
which scholars judge whether a book is to be trusted or not."35 Free­
man and others attributed Froude's failings as much to the very na­
ture of "literary" history as to the man himself. Goldwin Smith found 
it natural to find inaccuracy in a writer consumed by the desire for 
"pictorial effect."36 He was joined by other commentators who wor­
ried about the way Froude's "historical romances" might warp 
the judgment of unsophisticated readers.37 
Many reviewers blamed the readers themselves for encouraging 
unprofessional standards. As Henry Reeve put it, a "fiery spirit of 
partisanship" might be incompatible with justice and truth, but it 
"only renders the work more interesting and attractive to the 
reader."38 William Donne unwittingly corroborated this charge by 
asserting that Froude's enthusiasm for the Protestant cause was a 
"better element in an historian's composition, than cold negation 
and apathy.''39 The tremendous vogue of historical writing of all sorts 
had, in the eyes of its critics, created an audience that was not just 
undiscriminating, but that actively preferred an entertaining style to 
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solid scholarship, "pictorial effect" to accuracy. Frederic Harrison 
and Andrew Lang simply confirmed attitudes widely held at the turn 
of the century when they argued that it was impossible to combine the 
histrionic effect, sweeping judgments, and compelling narration es­
sential to "literary" history with the cool objectivity, meticulous 
scholarship, and "infinite complexity of circumstance" demanded by 
scientific scholars.40 
And yet, if some professionals believed they could uphold profes­
sional standards only by rejecting both the claims and methods of 
"literary" history, others were moved by the very violence of the at­
tack against Froude to reaffirm the importance of imagination to full 
historical truth.41 Nonprofessionals rallied in overwhelming num­
bers to support Froude, and by doing so to reaffirm the human and 
patriotic importance of history. Even Harrison admitted that the 
most meticulous scholarship was valueless if it never reached the pub­
lic. Better that the general reader be beguiled into too lenient a view of 
the Tudors than that he "should feel no interest at all in them as men 
with purpose, brain, and courage."42 T. Rice Holmes, like many 
readers, preferred the flawed diamond to the perfect crystal—the liter­
ary masterpiece that stirred the pulse and braced the patriotism of all 
who read to the scholarly omniscience that left them cold.43 Even the 
Saturday Review, Froude's old nemesis, came to his defense in the 
nineties, affirming that minute accuracy was only "the small game of 
history," and that Froude's literary genius constituted adequate qual­
ification for a Regius Professor.44 If late Victorians acknowledged 
valid distinctions between a good historian and a good historical 
scholar, they still preferred the former as their public spokesman. Pol­
itics had much to do with Froude's appointment as Regius Professor, 
but so did the belief, still strong at the end of the century, that elo­
quence was at least as vital as scholarship—that it was as important to 
keep history alive in the imagination and in the heart as to satisfy the 
reason with cold hard facts and an austere objectivity. 
Froude stands as one of the last great Victorian amateurs. Adopting 
the historian's vocation played a crucial role in his recoil from doubt 
into dogmatism. It gave him a way of legitimizing himself both pro­
fessionally and ideologically. History was to him, as it was to Carlyle 
and Macaulay, a terrain reconstructed so as to make the present intel­
ligible. He had found it necessary to free divine will and human pur­
pose from their dependence on conflicting orthodoxies in order to 
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protect the core of faith. In the long perspective of time, the doctrinal 
tides that had nearly shipwrecked him appeared as so many eddies on 
a stream whose course for the good was never turned aside. It is true 
that in order to vindicate this ultimate benevolence he felt he needed 
to find an historical refutation of specific doctrines. But his particular 
interpretations of the past were less important to his audience than 
his conviction that history taught morally and politically uplifting 
lessons and his genius at impressing these on the heart by way of the 
imagination. 
In addition to endorsing Carlyle's political and social doctrines, 
Froude followed his example in the primary tenets of his historical 
faith as well: in his conviction that the elemental truths of the uni­
verse were manifested in the cyclical growth of beliefs and institu­
tions, that man's nature was divine and its development consistent 
with moral law, that God's will was revealed in "the one great Bible 
which cannot lie": the history of the human race.46 Like Carlyle he 
preserved historical truth from the corrosive effects of rationalism by 
locating it in the imagination, not the reason, and by declaring it 
accessible to poetic insight, not analytic proof. He too rejected "theo­
ries of history" as the tools by which idealogues manipulated this 
truth to legitimize their own world views, although he somewhat 
more forthrightly acknowledged the extent to which his own 
"myths" did the same. For both men history was a dramatic spectacle 
in which heroes and heroines were to enlarge our moral capacities by 
their example. Froude chose those heroes and heroines on the as­
sumption that they would reinforce certain ideals, and like Carlyle 
with Frederick, he confronted difficult dramatic problems when he 
found them unequal to their task. 
Despite this close affinity with Carlyle, in other respects Froude's 
artistic temperament had more common with Macaulay's. He lacked 
Carlyle's visionary power. His genius was narrative rather than meta­
phorical, better adapted to vivid outlines than to complex symbolism, 
and was never more brilliantly displayed than when engineering the 
melodramatic exposure of criminal queens and other traitors to the 
cause. His special pleading makes his characters seem more often 
paradoxical than complex. If he did not share Macaulay's cynicism 
and his insensitivity to the spiritual, he allowed his partisanship to 
determine which actions were consistent with "human nature" and 
which beliefs could be brushed aside as "mere" superstition. His 
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casuistry, too, incurred charges that he was morally insensitive and/ 
or intellectually dishonest, when in fact he was simply too convinced 
of the righteousness of his cause to recognize that what he saw as right 
and wrong others saw as a double standard. His investigation of 
manuscript sources, like Macaulay's immersion in popular litera­
ture, broke important ground in historical research, even while his 
mishandling of these materials discredited him as a serious scholar. 
A family friend once described Froude as a man "apparently con­
tradictory, almost inconsistent, because of his profound reverence for 
essential truth, and unsparing effort to arrive at it."46 In hisown intel­
lectual journeying, Froude never seemed to find a secure resting place 
between Macaulay's sceptical reserve and Carlyle's leap of faith. For 
Macaulay truth was obvious because it was so limited. He never ques­
tioned whether his vision of reality was true—logic and common 
sense assured him it was. As for moral absolutes, it was enough to say 
that they were absurdly unfitted to guide practical behavior. For Car­
lyle truth was obvious because it dissolved all appearances. Moral 
absolutes were the only reliable reality. When Froude looked through 
facts he was overwhelmed by the fictionality of appearances but not 
by the reality of unified truth behind them. He posited the existence of 
such truth, but lacked the visionary power to sweep away all intellec­
tual obstacles to reaching it. His strategy was one of compromise, not 
of transcendence. At times he placed truth beyond the reach of reason, 
but at others he appealed to reason to refute false truths. His scepti­
cism was sometimes a weapon, sometimes a defense. If his struggle to 
arrive at truth led him into paradox, the journey was still necessary. 
Even readers who criticized him appreciated his willingness to under­
take that journey for them. 
The unprecedented amount of controversy over Froude's reputa­
tion does not indicate that he was below the standard of Victorian 
historiography so much as that he stood on the border line between 
conflicting definitions of what the historian should do and be. The 
very vigor of that controversy underlines the seriousness with which 
Victorians viewed the issues involved. Despite his scholarly failings, 
Froude became something of a patriotic fixture to a nation willing to 
overlook the eccentricities of his historical creed for his service in im­
mortalizing great moments of the national past. To Frederic Harri­
son, the very fact that Froude was "attacked, admired, and con­
demned" by his readers was proof that at least his work would not be 
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"put upon the shelf."47 If he would always remain a talented amateur, 
a "popular writer of history" rather than a great historical scholar, 
still his narrative abilities served a vital purpose by nurturing the 
popular commitment to history's moral and imaginative functions at 
a time when the rise of professionalism was already beginning to 
fragment the audience for historical writing and to realign its 
priorities. 
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Although forgotten by many now, John Richard Green was a best­selling historian in his day, one whose popularity rivaled Ma­
caulay's. In the last quarter of the century, his Short History of the 
English People—the first serious work to give major emphasis to 
England's intellectual and social development—sold over 235,000 
copies in England alone and enjoyed wide use as a school text.1 He 
owed his success to many of the same sources as Macaulay: to his own 
highly engaging style and compelling historical imagination, as well 
as to a burgeoning middle class audience eager to improve themselves 
and particularly receptive to his cultural confirmation of whiggish 
progress. Green's divided allegiances made his position more anom­
alous than Macaulay's, however. If the success of the Short History 
placed him in the front rank of popularizers, his intellectual sympa­
thies as well as his personal friendships have traditionally identified 
him as a member of the "Oxford School" of historians, along with E. 
A. Freeman and William Stubbs, other pioneering medievalists who 
brought a new rigor and thoroughness to the study of their period. 
The fact that Green felt the need to legitimize himself as a serious 
historian by following the Short History with two more original and 
minutely documented studies of early England suggests the conscious 
pressures of his position. Ultimately, years of invalidism took their 
toll on the quality of his scholarship, and his early death cut short the 
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most promising late Victorian effort to bridge the gap between popu­
lar and professional expectations. Green's career has interest as much 
for his efforts to accommodate the popularizing impulse of Victorian 
history to the increasingly incompatible demands of the new scholar­
ship, as for his success in providing the middle classes with a Whig 
history of their own social, intellectual, and economic evolution. 
Green grew up steeped in the history of his native Oxford, where he 
was born in 1837.2 He shook off the conservative influences of his 
childhood even sooner than Macaulay and Freeman, rebelling 
against his Tory, High Church family as early as 1850, when he was 
temporarily banished from his uncle's house for ridiculing the up­
roar over "Papal Aggression." The Whig sympathies of his prize es­
say condemning Charles I so alarmed his headmaster at the Magdalen 
College School that he recommended the boy be sent to a private tutor 
in 1852. Under his tutor's supervision Green prepared to win an open 
scholarship at Jesus College, where he matriculated in 1855. His reac­
tion to the newly established School of Law and Modern History con­
firmed the criticisms made by its adversaries on the Oxford Reform 
Commission. He found the study of law dull and rebelled against the 
expectation that the student should confine himself to those selected 
fragments of books that would "pay" in the schools. Scorning the 
competition for prizes on these terms, he instead pursued an eclectic 
study of eighteenth-century writers and settled for a pass in physical 
science. He might have continued indefinitely his boycott of histori­
cal study had not he made the acquaintance of A. P. Stanley, then 
professor of ecclesiastical history. Stanley offered Green an example 
of a scholar for whom work was not simply a matter of classes and 
fellowships, and under his influence Green soon resumed his studies. 
These bore their first fruit in a series of twenty-two colorful narrative 
sketches of Oxford life in the eighteenth century, which appeared in 
the Oxford Chronicle during 1859 and I860.3 Although perhaps in­
spired by the contemporary popularity of Macaulay's History, these 
articles show how early Green developed his own distinctively pictur­
esque and and anecdotal grasp of social history. They also illustrate 
his life-long conviction of the importance of municipal history in 
England's past, for they intentionally tell the story of Oxford's life as 
a town and not just <is a university. 
In "a fit of religious enthusiasm," Green took orders in 1861; in­
spired by Christian Socialism, he deliberately chose to work in the 
squalid parishes of London's East End for the next seven years. De­
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spite its demands on his time and already fragile health, Green always 
felt that his ministry among the poor had been vital to his under­
standing of history, convincing him that due attention should be 
given to the social condition of the masses in any account of the past. 
During this same period his sympathies with nationalism were also 
developing. With his friend Boyd Dawkins he founded a short-lived 
Jesus College magazine in 1862 to explore the College's roots in 
Welsh culture and history. Green's historical interests gravitated to­
ward the early and middle ages, and although projected histories of 
Somersetshire, Ireland, the Archbishops of Canterbury, and the An­
gevin Kings were never completed, a paper on Dunstan he read before 
the Somersetshire Archaeological Society in 1862 won him the atten­
tion of E. A. Freeman. The acquaintance blossomed into a warm 
friendship and scholarly camaraderie despite their differences in 
temperament and historical approach. Through Freeman's interven­
tion Green became a Saturday reviewer in the late sixties and early 
seventies, when the magazine was shaping educated opinion about 
"serious" history. 
The strain of working late into the night turning out reviews and 
"middles" to defray mounting parish expenses eventually took its toll 
on Green's consumptive constitution. By the end of 1869 he had al­
ready been advised that his chances for life were precarious. The 
forced termination of all parish duties was fortuitous, for it enabled 
Green to avoid that break with the Church his growing scepticism 
would soon have necessitated. He had from early years acknowledged 
the authority of science, believing at first that it might be used to 
aggrandize the authority of religion by clearing away false interpreta­
tions from "True Revelation."4 He hoped to find the "faith of the 
future" in the union of a nondoctrinal "Mysticism" with freedom of 
thought and inquiry (LG, 80). He stretched the limits of Broad 
Church liberalism to their utmost in an effort to accommodate the 
spirit of rational inquiry to sincere belief, but instead he wound up 
marooned between the separate spheres of "intellectual credence" 
and "religious faith" (LG, 164). In 1867 he noted with regret that he 
had lost Stubbs's confidence in "the old simple lesson that the world's 
history led up to God" and had found nothing to replace it (LG, 176). 
He avoided breaking openly with Christianity by settling for an assur­
ance that "formularies" no longer literally credible might still be 
honored because they "have . . . an ideal truth, embody a great doc­
trine, continue the chain of Christian tradition" (LG, 164). Like 
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Froude, Green exchanged the vocation of priest for that of historian, 
shifting his efforts from reconciling reason with dogma to the less 
controversial ground of historical interpretation. Green, however, 
sought no retreat from the perils of free thinking or from the anti­
pathetic realities of the present. He not only approved the modern tri­
umphs of liberalism but reconstructed history to justify them. As his­
torian he transformed a gospel of Christian striving and conscience 
into a gospel of secular progress and social consciousness. If less ex­
plicitly providential than the interpretations of earlier historians, the 
national success story he told fulfilled the same romance patterns: the 
discovery and maturation of true identity, the struggle and triumph 
of the "good" cause. 
The threat of death shadowed the remainder of Green's life. He 
began work on the Short History in 1869, hoping that if he lived it 
would serve as an introduction to future studies and that ten years of 
research would not be wasted should he die shortly after its comple­
tion. Forced to protect his health by spending his winters away from 
England and English libraries and receiving little support even from 
his friends for his then unorthodox approach to social history, he 
often found the History discouraging work. But his efforts were more 
than rewarded when it became an overnight best-seller after its release 
in December of 1874. Its success freed Green from his financial wor­
ries, and a temporary arrest of his disease allowed him to hope that 
time remained for more substantial achievements to answer the critics 
who would brand him merely a popularizer. He continued his histor­
ical labors through the decade, enlarging the Short History into the 
four-volume History of the English Peop Ze (1877-80), editing a histor­
ical reader for the schools, supervising a series of historical and liter­
ary primers, and publishing with his wife A Short Geography of the 
British Isles (1879). He went on to expand his account of England's 
earliest days yet again in his most original work, The Making of En­
gland (1880). His desire to complete its sequel, The Conquest of En­
gland, kept him alive long after his doctors had given up hope, but he 
left the book to be finished and published posthumously by his wife 
after his death in 1883. To the end of his days Green remained an 
ardent liberal, deeply sympathetic with nationalistic movements in 
Europe and Ireland and driven by the desire to make real for his own 
people the evolution of their national identity and of the freedoms he 
believed were fundamental to it. 
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In an early diary, Green accused himself of a dislike for "abstract 
thought" that tempted him to "subordinate general tendencies to 
particular events and principles to individuals" (LG, 104). He was 
perhaps too hard on himself, for what he later called his "impulse to 
try to connect things, to find the 'why' of things" (LG, 438) informed 
his "Herodotean" celebration of the particular with powerful ex­
planatory continuities.5 Underpinning these continuities was his 
conventional Whig belief in the "unity" of western history in general 
and English history in particular. In his earliest writings, cyclical 
recurrence unified past and present. Just as infancy more closely re­
sembled senility than did robust manhood, he argued, so too in the 
history of mankind analogous cultural phenomena seemed to recur at 
varying intervals (OS, 27-28). The nineteenth century had more in 
common with the moral spirit of the Renaissance than with that of 
the worldly eighteenth century and shared a greater intellectual sym­
pathy with the age of Pericles than with that of Dunstan (OS, 233; 
LG, 176). However, the dominant pattern of Green's thought lay not 
in the Carlylean alternation of epochs or in an Arnoldean comparison 
of cultures, and it was something more than a Whig celebration of 
political continuity. Green's ultimate aim was to depict "the organic 
life of a nation as a whole" (LG, 427), to reconstruct the evolution not 
of the English constitution but of the English people. He made literal 
the metaphor of national identity used by Carlyle and Arnold. His 
sense of continuity, like the tools he brought to the task, was that of 
the geologist or archaeologist. He set out to retrieve as many artifacts 
of his culture as possible, to demarcate the significant strata in which 
they were deposited and to extrapolate from external evidence the in­
ternal harmonies that defined each stage of evolution. 
National identity was for Green the central reality of history. His 
conception of national life went far beyond even Arnold's moralized 
politics. "A State," Green believed, "is accidental; it can be made or 
unmade; but a nation is something real which can be neither made 
nor destroyed" (LG, 391). Political decrees could no more establish 
national consciousness than they could a mountain or a river: things 
that were not artifacts but organisms, the product of forces sometimes 
violent but always working from within to modify, not to create. To 
Green the conventional stuff of history constituted but "the outer 
forms" of a people's inner life, of that collective personality or state of 
mind that was central to his romantic sense of nationalism. He 
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pointed to the French Revolution as proof that the "spiritual forces" 
sneered at by the philosophes were in fact "the deepest and strongest 
of realities" in political life, the mainspring from which the "outer 
phenomena" of change proceeded.6 For Green two intertwined 
strands of national consciousness—the aspirations for brotherhood 
and for liberty—lay at the heart of these "spiritual forces." He con­
demned Disraeli's foreign policy for its insensitivity to the nationalis­
tic sympathies reshaping nineteenth-century Europe and took care to 
make his own histories "spiritual" biographies of national life. 
Because they recorded the history of states rather than peoples, po­
litical documents could supplement and correct history, but they 
could never be history in Green's eyes (LG, 150). To explain the great 
impulses that determined national identity, the historian needed to 
base political history on social history in its widest sense. Green could 
not rest satisfied with the limited attention given to sociocultural de­
tail along "the old traditional lines of English historians"—Gibbon, 
Hume, Macaulay;7 he became a crusader for nothing less than history 
that gave major weight to the moral, social, and intellectual devel­
opment of the English people. Hence his manifesto in the introduc­
tion to the Short History: 
Whatever the worth of the present work may be, I have striven 
throughout that it should never sink into a "drum and trumpet his­
tory." It is the reproach of historians that they have too often turned 
history into a mere record of the butchery of men by their fellow-men. 
. . . If some of the conventional figures of military and political his­
tory occupy in my pages less than the space usually given them, it is 
because I have had to find a place for figures little heeded in common 
history—the figures of the missionary, the poet, the printer, the mer­
chant, and the philosopher.8 
Focusing on national identity became in effect Green's way of im­
posing the analytic insight of the "scientific'' historian on the miscel­
laneousness of the antiquarian. Green shared with Freeman an early 
love of architectural history; nonetheless, he later ridiculed the ped­
antry of archaeological societies for setting aside "the real life of the 
people" for "fights over mouldings and endless discussions over con­
ventual drains." He believed this same failure of "philosophic" in­
sight prevented history's importance from being fully appreciated.9 
The Short History represented his attempt to "put facts on a philo­
sophical basis" by showing political events to be "the outcome of 
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social or religious currents of thought" (LG, 359). His scientific his­
tory was explicitly progressive: the historian escaped from "a mere 
bondage to details" by describing the moral, social, and intellectual 
"advance" of man.10 
The beauty of Green's "philosophy" was that, like Carlyle's 
"science," it still guaranteed the primacy of the individual, the hu­
man, the suprarational. To Green, Freeman's exclusive attention to 
constitutional changes showed that he was not enough convinced of 
"the superiority of man in himself to all the outer circumstances that 
surround him."11 Political documents were merely the manifestation 
of that "inner life" determined by thought, feeling, spirit. To com­
prehend this inner life, the historian had to sympathize with the age, 
to value the smallest datum for the genuine insight it offered into 
human experience. If he had periodically to step back from the crowd 
to get the "general effect" of where they were headed, he had also to 
move and feel with them. Thus Green's historian could still indulge 
the antiquarian's love of detail for its own sake and the romantic's 
yearning for empathy without forfeiting his claims to be "philosoph­
ical." 
Philosophical insight guaranteed the traditional moral dimension 
in history as well. Green agreed with William of Malmesbury that 
history was the chief part of ethics and that "no historical teaching 
can be really sound or effective which shrinks from recognizing the 
power of human lives in the past over human conduct in the pres­
ent."12 He was as sceptical as Arnold of the value of strict impartiality 
or historicism, for either might subvert this didactic function. Criti­
cizing Edith Thompson's School History of England, he argued that 
"there is no real impartiality in this avoidance of all expression of 
love for what is good and of hatred for what is evil in human conduct; 
and to avoid them, in fact, is to take the very soul out of history."13 In 
Green's own judgments, morality unequivocally outweighed politi­
cal expediency. The "moral grandeur" of Alfred's life lifted him to 
the level of the world's greatest men despite the narrowness of his 
impact on world history, but Godwin's complete lack of integrity 
made it a misuse of terms to call him "great" no matter how impor­
tant his contributions to English unity. Like Arnold, Green believed 
the historian who posed as a mere chronicler similarly shirked his 
duty. Value-free narration was as impossible as it was undesirable. A 
principle of selection and judgment necessarily governed which facts 
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were presented to readers, and to pretend, as Froude appeared to do, 
that readers were free to judge the facts for themselves was either dis­
ingenuous or simply irresponsible.14 
Green proudly proclaimed his own point of view: he would go on 
"loving freedom" to the end (LG, 477). Focusing on national identity 
as the pulse of historical change was the logical fruition of his demo­
cratic sympathies. He opposed a "great man" theory of causation be­
cause he believed in the greater importance of "the people." Hero-
worship, in addition to blinding the historian to the moral failings of 
the men he would deify (witness Froude's Henry or Freeman's God­
win) also ignored the weight of Zeitgeist in effecting change. Individ­
uals still played a major role in Green's histories, but he treated them 
as he expected the subjects of a projected series of biographical prim­
ers to be treated, as types of their time, representative men (LG, 249­
50). His point in arguing that the thoughts of even the most original 
thinkers were but "the expression of the great tide of feeling which is 
sweeping them, like the world around them, unconsciously on" was 
not to make the Zeitgeist all powerful as had Macaulay or Froude. 
Green stressed the power of these "tides of feeling" precisely because 
he considered them swelled by "great currents of popular sentiment." 
His anonymous millions did not need the efforts of a Carlylean hero 
to marshal them into order; they in effect created the real order of 
history. They shaped the spiritual progress of mankind far more than 
they were shaped by it.15 The "spiritual forces" behind history were 
inherently more egalitarian for Green than for Carlyle, even if their 
purpose was the same: to make history morally meaningful by assert­
ing the greater importance of mind and will over the material ma­
chinery of life. 
Where Froude and Carlyle returned to the past to find principles for 
reordering the present and Macaulay to rejoice in disorder outgrown, 
Green affirmed constant principles of order unifying past and pres­
ent. He sought to understand and to reconstruct the way the different 
layers of social, cultural, and political experience had formed that 
order. Notwithstanding their belief in underlying continuity, Carlyle 
and Macaulay both call attention to the disjunctures of history: to 
what had been lost, superseded, replaced, for better or worse. Green 
emphasizes the connectedness of past and present. He is always strain­
ing for the resemblances that reveal the kernel of identity in the trans­
formation of the features over time. Reading history becomes for him 
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a series of recognitions, of discerning the points at which the foreign 
becomes the familiar, the new the traditional. 
The most obvious form this process took was in his extrapolation 
of the Whig view back before the thirteenth century. Along with 
Stubbs and Freeman, Green helped give scholarly credibility to the 
argument that representative democracy could claim the most ancient 
precedents, being implicit in the Teutonic institutions of the earli­
est "true" Englishmen.16 Although able to criticize Freeman for a 
"Teutonic fanaticism," Green was no less convinced that the Teu­
tonic invasions of the fifth century wiped out the whole organization 
of Roman government and society along with the people governed by 
it. The basis of Teutonic society was the free landholder, its guiding 
principle representation. At the heart of this society was the moot, 
where the kinfolk, later the wise men, met to dispense justice, frame 
their laws, and choose leaders who in peace time remained narrowly 
bounded by the customs and advice of their people. Green, like other 
Whig medievalists, traced a direct line between these village moots 
and modern parliament, and between representative democracy and 
Victorian success. No wonder that in his eyes 
it is with a reverence such as is stirred by the sight of the headwaters of 
some mighty river that one looks back to these village-moots of Fries­
land and Sleswick. It was here that England learned to be a "mother of 
Parliaments" . . . talk is persuasion, and persuasion is force, the one 
force which can sway freemen to deeds such as those which have made 
England what she is. The "talk" of the village moot, the strife and 
judgment of men giving freely their own rede and setting it as freely 
aside for what they learn to be the wiser rede of other men, is the 
groundwork of English history. 
In the lineal descent of their institutions, Green's readers found proof 
that despite enormous change, they were "the same race still." It 
might be difficult to see the resemblance between the oak and the 
acorn, but the assurance of continuity between them guaranteed the 
stability and permanence of national identity.18 
Green's account included the other fixtures of the Whig view as 
well. He emphasized more heavily the fact that the degradation of the 
freeman in a government becoming increasingly feudal and oligar­
chical was what allowed the successful Danish conquests of the elev­
enth century, although he also believed that neither these nor the 
Norman Conquest severed the social and political continuity of the 
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English nation. He viewed the Great Charter as a reaffirmation rather 
than a manifesto of legal rights and dated modern political England 
from the reignx>f Edward I. He dispensed with York and Tudor chal­
lenges to parliamentary power in a more novel way, by labeling these 
reigns "The New Monarchy." The Tudor view of monarchical privi­
lege "was the result, not of any gradual development, but of a simple 
revolution; and it was only by a revolution that the despotism of the 
New Monarchy was again done away" (SH, 303). The Long Parlia­
ment confirmed a historical truth as well as a legal one when it in 
effect returned English political development to the point where it 
had broken off, with the constitutional precedents of the Lancasters. 
Green's more democratic sympathies led him to assert that in En­
gland, "a reverence for the traditions of the past was made broad and 
living" by both "a deep conviction of abstract human right" and by 
"a practical sense of present necessities."19 Despite this unwhiggish 
enthusiasm for "abstract" rights, he still agreed that reliance on pre­
cedent, not theory, accounted for the stability of English govern­
ment and that by supporting the natural unfolding of progress, the 
English had attained a supremacy destined to grant them "the pri­
macy of the world" in future ages.20 
Green set his own stamp on the Whig view by tracing over this 
traditional Whig skeleton the more distinctive lineaments of "the 
people's" political advances. "In England, more than elsewhere," he 
reminded his readers, "constitutional progress has been the result of 
social development" (SH, iv). An early enthusiast for municipal his­
tory, he found the most significant role in this progress played by the 
urban middle classes. They emerge from his pages as the true custodi­
ans of English freedoms. Unlike their continental counterparts, En­
glish towns were coeval with the foundation of English society; the 
guild was an inevitable development of Teutonic life, the burgher the 
freeman within the walls.21 English municipal freedom, like national 
freedom, was insured by the necessities of kings andby the slow 
growth of wealth and popular spirit, rather than by the violent revolts 
necessary to wrest liberty from continental seigneurs (OS, 21). Far 
from deploring the growth of commercial wealth, as had Froude, 
Green asserted that it had allowed towns of the eleventh century to 
buy back those freedoms that had passed from the people at large into 
the hands of the feudal nobility, and from them into the hands of the 
Norman kings (SH, 94). The men of the borough-mote and merchant 
guilds had thus done more than knights and barons to make England 
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what she is: "In the silent growth and elevation of the English people 
the boroughs led the way: unnoticed and despised by prelate and no­
ble, they had alone preserved the full tradition of Teutonic liberty. 
The rights of self-government, of free speech in free meeting, of equal 
justice by one's equals, were brought safely across the ages of Norman 
tyranny by the traders and shop-keepers of the towns" (SH, 121). 
Green was far from insensitive to the injustices provoked by class 
interest. Nonetheless, he found the urban middle classes defining the 
contours of virtually every significant stratum of English history. He 
documented far more fully than Macaulay the collective heroism of 
the middling orders. When he too sought a modern paradigm in Ab­
bot Samson, he based it not on the Abbot's wise paternalism, but on 
his foresight in renewing the municipal liberties of Bury St. Ed­
mond.22 In his eyes Magna Charta claimed no liberties not already 
won by those plain burghers whom the barons despised. The decisive 
factor in Simon de Montfort's rise to power was the "new democratic 
spirit" at work in the towns, where "the purely industrial classes" 
were eventually successful in challenging the wealthy merchants for 
control of municipal administration (SH, 178). The union of the bar­
onage with the commerical classes in the thirteenth-century Com­
mons prevented Parliament from being paralyzed by the mutual jeal­
ousies of the four orders or from becoming the mere instrument of an 
aristocratic caste (SH, 248). The moral power of the middling orders 
was no less decisive a force in encouraging political development. 
Puritanism drew its greatest strength from their support. Its greatest 
attraction lay in its (distinctly un-Carlylean) promotion of greater 
social equality (SH, 458-59). The Puritans' seventeenth-century tri­
umph marked the point at which "national opinion" had become 
what it remained ever since: "the supreme irresistible force in English 
politics" (HEP, 4:116). Green, needless to say, approved this force as 
heartily as Carlyle condemned it. Green also appreciated the way 
these classes kept alive the "old piety" through ages of ecclesiastical 
abuse and neglect and saw real value in the Methodist revival of moral 
and philanthropic zeal that sprang from their midst in the late eigh­
teenth century (SH, 707). In his eyes more than crass self-interest had 
brought men of business into conflict with Whig monopoly at this 
same time: their earnestness was outraged by bribery and corruption, 
their patriotism by the politics of personal gain, their sense of effi­
ciency by government mismanagement (HEP, 4:283). Green tacitly 
invited his readers to see in the Reform Bills of the nineteenth century 
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the eventual triumph of this particular part of the English people; it 
was a moral as well as a political victory. Although no apologist for 
Philistinism, Green, like Macaulay, saw in the extension of the fran­
chise a vindication of the inherent superiority of English political 
traditions. In the place of drums and trumpets he offered the Victo­
rian middle classes a history of their own: a Whig view of the peaceful 
revolution which, through centuries of slow development, had fi­
nally brought them to power and seemed to identify their strengths 
and interests with the best qualities of the nation at large. 
It would be misleading to suggest that this saga of political freedom 
constitutes all or even the most important part of national identity for 
Green. Freedom was for him what authority was for Froude and Car­
lyle: the central theme of his reading of history. The struggle of the 
English people to emerge as an independent nation and then to real­
ize personal liberty in all its forms is the underlying pattern to which 
all else eventually relates. Green's inquiry into cultural evidence is no 
mere appendage to his political account, but the warp in his weave of 
national identity. "The Universities," "The English Towns" "The 
Friars," "The New Learning" demarcate essential features in En­
gland's progress toward its modern liberty of conscience, thought, 
and action. Green's eye for detail was omnivorous but not indiscrim­
inate. He remains the "philosophical" historian who views every da­
tum he includes in relation to this maturation of English liberties. 
Green reads domestic detail for lessons more egalitarian than Ma­
caulay's or Froude's. He notes the ingenuity and beauty of the Roman 
villa, but also reminds his readers of the squalid huts of serfs that once 
adjoined their frescoed walls, offering a silent indictment of the "un­
ion of material wealth with social degradation that lay like a dark 
shadow over the Roman world" (M, 45). The sumptuary laws that to 
Froude demonstrate the moral restraint of the upper classes reveal to 
Green their selfish anxiety about the laborer's and farmer's progress 
in comfort and wealth; he notes with satisfaction that such laws could 
do little to stop this progress as wages continued to rise after the 
Plague (SH, 295). In the display of commercial wealth that Froude 
reads as a sign of moral decay, Green finds the origins of the "pecu­
liarly English" conception of domestic comfort. The rise of the com­
mercial classes during Elizabeth's time improved the "mean appear­
ance" of medieval towns with parapeted fronts, carved staircases, and 
quaint gables. The transition from medieval fortress to Elizabethan 
hall constituted an advance because it testified to the extinction of the 
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feudal character of the noblesse; gilded turrets replaced battlements 
and Italian gardens replaced moats because comfort and refinement 
attained a greater priority than defense. Green's satisfaction with 
these signs stems not from Macaulay 's relentlessly material standards 
of judgment, still less from his contempt for barbarity overcome. For 
one thing, to Green such architectural details are not relics of a world 
superseded; "we still gaze with pleasure" (SH, 400) on those gables 
and fretted fronts and in gazing possess them as something yet living. 
Even where he can no longer see the evidence of earlier stages of civili­
zation, he affirms their contribution to present life and liberties. Once 
assimilated into English identity, earlier modes of life cannot be re­
pudiated without denying identity itself. 
From Green'^consideration of literature, education, and religion 
emerges an analogous pattern of the gradual unifying and democra­
tizing of English culture. Because progress in England's earliest days 
was aided by the development of a national literature, Green takes 
note of the "popular poetry" inspired by Ealdhelm (M, 337) and the 
expansion and consolidation of the Chronicle under Alfred, both of 
which helped unify national consciousness.23 Layamon's.English 
expansion of "Brut" demands attention despite its worthlessness as 
history because it shows that the language remained uncorrupted by 
one hundred and fifty years of Norman and Angevin rule. Green 
makes it symbolize the spirit of national resistance soon to triumph in 
Magna Charta (SH, 147). He most emphasizes those forms of litera­
ture that illuminate the spirit of the age and gauge its intellectual 
development. He finds in Cadmon "a type of the new grandeur, 
depth and fervor of tone which the German race was to give to the 
religion of the East" (SH, 64). Shakespeare represents the last flower­
ing of the English Renaissance, Milton the "completest type of Puri­
tanism," Dryden the reaction of the critical intellect against the Puri­
tan temper. 
Like his predecessors, Green placed great value on the ability of 
literature, especially popular literature, to "disentomb" the "com­
mon daily life of the past," and urged his fellow historians down the 
"bye-ways" of literature to learn how men had really lived (OS, 180). 
But he is really more interested in the sociology of literary develop­
ment than in the lives these sources reflect. Literary evidence serves as 
a barometer of intellectual advance. If devoid of literary value, the 
homilies, grammars, and lesson books that poured out in the late 
tenth century testified to a "quickening of educational zeal among the 
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people at large" (C, 298). Despite the "intellectual decay" of the fif­
teenth century, the popularity of compendia and abridgments 
showed that "literature was ceasing to be the possession of a purely 
intellectual class" (SH, 307). He attributes the impact of the Puritan 
Bible to the fact that at the time it was "the whole literature which was 
practically accessible to ordinary Englishmen"; it gave a loftiness to 
vulgar speech while it purified the temper of the whole nation. 
Green traces the democratization of intellect even more directly in 
the history of university and Church. His analytical eye is trained on 
the social and political importance of religious institutions, not on 
the transcendent truths those symbols of spiritual health might have 
disclosed to Carlyle and Arnold. He finds the early Church significant 
because it poured a new spirit of manhood into a people crushed and 
degraded by Roman imperialism; it freed and invigorated man's 
moral and intellectual faculties and kept alive in its internal structure 
"the free democratic traditions of a world strangled by Caesarism."24 
Its administrative hierarchy later helped unify warring tribes into a 
single nation (M, 311-12), and its parish structure preserved the gov­
erning principles of the village moot (C, 16). In sharp distinction to 
Carlyle, Green characteristically gives greater emphasis to the 
Church's role in subverting outworn authority than in conserving 
tradition. Ostensibly purely ecclesiastical bodies, the universities 
played as significant a role in threatening feudalism with their demo­
cratic organization as they did in challenging the narrowness of medi­
eval doctrine with their spirit of intellectual inquiry. Not surpris­
ingly, Green's version of the Reformation differs significantly from 
Froude's. The new religion is for both an outgrowth of the new learn­
ing, but Green sees the Renaissance spirit struggling to triumph in 
spite of the narrowness and anti-intellectualism of reformers like 
Luther. In his eyes Henry championed the reformed Church not be­
cause of a conversion to its truer faith but as a further instrument of 
his tyranny over "old English liberties." Nonetheless, "the new spirit 
of inquiry, the new freedom of thought and discussion" awakened by 
Henry's imposition of a new religion eventually helped to break the 
spell of "the New Monarchy" over popular imagination in spite of 
him (SH, 366). 
In short, for Green England's political development is only the 
most prominent feature in a landscape contoured by intellectual, so­
cial, and religious forces. Each stratum has contributed to the profile 
of the whole. For the English people, progress had meant the transi­
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tion from barbarism to civilization, from tribal jealousies to national 
unity, from oligarchy to democracy, from class privilege to class re­
sponsibility. It was made possible by the triumph of reason over su­
perstition, self-determination over tyranny, public opinion over mon­
archical fiat. This victory of righteousness was no less inevitable and 
no less satisfying for being so thoroughly secularized. Green sought 
to demonstrate that the freedom of thought, the social justice, and the 
national identity he valued most highly in the present were the pro­
duct of an organic development that affirmed these as deeply tradi­
tional and justified their continued advance in the future. He had 
gazed at the past with democratic eyes, and history had thrown back 
his own liberal image. 
II 
Green was more sensitive than earlier historians to the increasing 
strain between popular and professional historiography. Froude's 
wide popular success was a source of greater controversy to self-
proclaimed professionals than to Froude himself. His assumptions, 
his talents, his conscious choices naturally aligned his priorities with 
those of the "literary" historians. Professional attacks bothered him, 
but not enough to make him question those priorities. To Green be­
ing a successful historian meant satisfying the expectations of both 
popular and professional audiences. His unconventional analyses of 
English history made this goal all the harder to achieve. It was a cen­
tral concern of his career that his sociocultural syntheses would make 
history attractive to a wider audience and also gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of serious scholars. His situation was the opposite of Freeman's: 
Green's problem was to prove to professionals that popular history as 
he conceived it could be intellectually sound, Freeman's to overcome 
popular resistance to the ponderous detail of his scholarship. 
The nature and scope of Green's research was determined by his 
sense of audience as much as by his increased emphasis on social and 
cultural history. Because the Short History and the History of the 
English People were aimed at "English readers of a general class" 
(SH, iv), Green eliminated footnotes in favor of chapter headnotes 
that briefly assessed the merits of the major secondary sources he had 
consulted. He also confined his research primarily to accounts in 
English. Although he hoped The Making of England and The Con­
quest of England would also appeal to a general audience, he in­
tended these books to break new scholarly ground. The Making of 
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England, for instance, demonstrates how archaeological and geolog­
ical studies could be incorporated into the reconstruction of En­
gland's origins. The citations in both works give evidence that Green 
had read widely in specialized medieval scholarship. Nonetheless, 
these texts still draw almost exclusively from printed materials, even 
if some, like Bede, are used to furnish social evidence hitherto ne­
glected. How Green might have extended his research had he lived is 
not clear; as things stand, however, there is little evidence in his work 
of the minute study of original sources that became a trademark of 
professionalism. 
Green was a synthesizer by design. His desire to reach a large au­
dience stemmed from his earnest belief in history's educational value, 
a value that could not be exploited fully so long as historical instruc­
tion remained so closely associated with dull primers and frivolous 
antiquarianism.25 In writing the Short History and the Short Geo­
graphy, he was inspired in large part by the plight of students for 
whom a study that should awaken the sympathies and train the mind 
too often amounted to little more than "a dry rattle of names and dates" 
(LG, 303). As a Saturday reviewer, Green was a stern critic of the 
"hric-a-brac" histories of superficial popularizers;26 this made him all 
the more keenly aware of the needs of that growing middle class au­
dience who "cry aloud for decent histories, and can't get 'em" (LG, 
249), and all the more anxious to market his works at a price they 
could afford.27 As a general editor, he valued Macmillan's projected 
series of short histories as a chance "to get right notions into the heads 
of the Many-Folk, of Herr Oranes" (LG, 445) and was even willing to 
admit a few drums and trumpets provided they won people's atten­
tion and interest to more "peaceful" subjects (LG, 475). 
Finding the right voice for his ideal narrative cost him no little 
effort in the Short History. His pursuit of readability ("the thing I 
care about" LG, 384) had its perils. When Freeman and others criti­
cized early drafts of the book for being too much in the Saturday Re­
view style, Green repeatedly rewrote large sections already stereo­
typed. Freeman still thought that Green had sacrificed too much of 
the "real stuff" of history to his "power of brilliant talkee-talkee."28 
In later years Green himself admitted that earlier portions of the Short 
History were marred by a fatal tendency to "essayism": to fall into a 
series of vignettes and slur over the uninteresting parts (LG, 445). On 
the other hand, he also had to satisfy critics like George Grove of 
Macmillan's, who judged an early draft of chapter one "too heavy" 
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for" 'the upper forms in schools and for general readers' " (LG, 255). 
Green rewrote again to eliminate much of the detail he had packed so 
tightly. However, he stuck by his plan to replace the conventional 
political chronology with one based on social and cultural develop­
ment—stuck by it despite criticism by Freeman and others that this 
made the narrative difficult to follow, especially for the beginning 
student.29 
Although Green's concern with style stemmed largely from his de­
sire to attract a large audience, he too shared the romantic assumption 
that the power of mind, spirit, and emotion in history demanded a 
creative method able to do justice to them. "There are times," Green 
wrote, "when poetic insight is the truest philosophy of history" (LG, 
148), times when the historian's ability to feel with the subject yielded 
a more profound understanding than could analytical shrewdness. 
His advice to Kate Norgate suggests what his own creative method 
was like: 
When criticism has done its work comes the office of the imagination, 
and we dwell upon these names till they become real to us, real places, 
real battles, real men and women—and it is only when this reality has 
struck in upon us and we "see" that we can so describe, so represent that 
others see too . . . write when you feel they are real and life-like to 
you, do not be afraid of exaggeration or over-rhetoric (that is easily got 
rid of later on), but just strive after realisation and you will write his­
tory. (LG, 448-49) 
Here are the familiar concerns with resuscitation and identification, 
with the constitutive power of the historian's vision. 
Given the scantiness of legitimate historical sources for early his­
tory, like Arnold and Freeman Green turned to legends and traditions 
to serve the needs of insight and sympathy. Here too his advice to 
Norgate reveals his own approach. To "realize'' the character of Fulc 
the Black, he wrote, "Help yourself by using the legends about him— 
telling them as legends, disproving their historical accuracy, if it be 
needful, but gathering from them the conception of character which 
after days formed of him, and using them as colour for your picture" 
(LG, 470). Green helps his reader to "see" Dunstan by coloring his 
own account with one such legendary detail. A brief digression into 
present tense restores to us one morning when, as Dunstan bends over 
his work, "his harp hung upon the wall sounds without mortal touch 
tones which the excited ears around frame into a joyous antiphon" 
(SH, 86-87). He similarly admits us into the Viking mind by contrast­
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ing the warrior's dauntlessness at sea with his superstitions about the 
land: "The boldest shrank from the dark holts and pools that broke 
the desolate moorland, from the huge stones that turned into giants in 
the mists of nightfall . . . and from the fell shapes into which their 
excited fancy framed the mists at eventide, shapes of giant 'moor-
steppers,' of elves and trolls, of Odin with his wind-cloak wrapped 
round him as he hurried over the waste" (C, 56). 
Nevertheless, Green leaves no doubt that "excited fancy" produced 
such impressions. For all his eagerness to hold the reader's interest, he 
was as concerned as Arnold and Freeman to make clear the line be­
tween fact and fiction—perhaps more so, since he felt his credibility 
more vulnerable. When James Bryce suggested that he use the Norse 
sagas to supplement the meager sources for early England, Green re­
fused, saying that they were "unhistorical," and that he couldn't 
appear to trust them or to mix up authentic history with what was 
possibly fable.30 Characteristically, he uses legendary evidence to es­
tablish the contemporary conception of historical figures or for socio­
logical insights into the time. Alfred's traditional burning of the oat 
cakes, even "if nothing more than a tale, could never have been told of 
a man without humour," and is worth including for this insight (SH, 
82). Carlyle would have used the miraculous return of Bishop Erken­
wald's body to London to assess the age's capacity for hero-worship; 
Green recounts this story because it for the first time brings us face to 
face with the new burghers of the city, who struggled successfully 
against the religious houses for possession of the Bishop's remains (C, 
455-56). 
Green's most impressive examples of historical "seeing" involve 
his use of geological and archaeological detail to re-create a past. Like 
Arnold and Freeman, he was convinced that "History strikes its roots 
in Geography; for without a clear and vivid realization of the physical 
structure of a country the incidents of the life which men have lived in 
it can have no interest or meaning."31 Like Macaulay and Carlyle, 
Green considered on-site visits essential, as much to verify details as to 
relive famous events in his imagination. But particularly in his ac­
count of England's earliest days, geographical evidence is far more 
than an aid to memory or imagination. In the absence of written evi­
dence adequate to restore the past, Green taught his audience to read 
the story of England's origins in the physical record. As a Times re­
viewer put it, to Green a single geographical fact became like a single 
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bone to Cuvier: it permitted the historical scientist to reconstruct the 
entire skeleton of a vanished organism.32 
In the early pages of the Making of England, for instance, Green 
superimposes the terrain of ancient England over modern landmarks, 
noting how the distribution of wood and clearings controlled early 
settlement and determined the path of Saxon invasions (M, 8, 46). He 
gives a conventionally picturesque account of the "wild beauty" of 
Ebbsfleet, replete with landmarks that situate the modern reader on 
the scene. But he then goes on to use a detailed analysis of its terrain to 
confirm the tradition that this spot first felt the tread of English feet 
(M, 29-30). To Green, archaeological remains become so many clues 
to reading the mysteries of the past. The extension of Roman roads 
and towns tells how rapidly Britain was incorporated into the Em­
pire; Camulodum's size and massive walls argue for its prominence in 
East Saxon society. From details of recent excavations, Green extrap­
olates the wretched decline of the Yorkshire cave-dwellers, refugees 
from the English invaders. The few enameled brooches and dainty 
sword hilts of ivory and bronze caught up by the fleeing provincials 
stand in pathetic contrast to the silent chronicle of their degeneration: 
"A few charred bones show how hunger drove them to slay their 
horses for food; reddened pebbles mark the hour when the new vessels 
they wrought were too weak to stand the fire, and their meal was 
cooked by dropping heated stones into the pot" (M, 68). In Green's 
hands even place names disclose the unfolding drama of civilization. 
Teutonic roots in village names corroborate the extermination of the 
Celt; the Comditch and Ayleswood that reflect the wild state of the 
land give way to the Knolton and Beaminster that record the spread of 
tunmoot and Church. Through an act of historical conjuration, "the 
birththroes of our national life" materialize from the dim territory 
formerly filled with "battles of kites and crows." Even more con­
cretely than Arnold, Green merges the land itself into a living histori­
cal record. 
Green's other triumph of historical vision lay in his realization of 
the daily reality of past worlds. His interest in domestic minutiae goes 
beyond Macaulay's and Froude's desire to particularize change with 
picturesque detail. His reverence for quotidian ritual goes beyond 
Carlyle's attraction to the costumes of Tradition. Green makes the life 
of the people the imaginative as well as the intellectual center of his 
historical explanation. In his hands the customary, the routine, the 
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conventional emerge from the background to constitute the pattern of 
life itself; the focus closes in on "society" long enough to resolve its 
surface regularity into a myriad of concrete types. Green loves to en­
umerate the humble occupations that compose the common expe­
rience of the past. He lingers over the customary duties of the hay­
ward, wood-ward, and bee-ward of Alfred's day (C, 330), over the 
spinster, ox-herd, cow-herd, and barn-man of the Saxon farm (M, 186­
87). He notes with satisfaction the "characteristic figures" of mill and 
smith, hall and church, that prove Ecgbehrt's world already recogniz­
ably English (C,7). Green's social reality is literal and solid where 
Carlyle's is metaphorical and suggestive. Both value the anonymous 
routine of daily life, but where Carlyle prizes its silent obscurity as a 
sign of social health, Green wishes to feel "the quick pulse of popular 
life," to experience its robustness. There is something more distinctly 
Macaulayean in Green's proliferation of stereotypes in "Oxford Dur­
ing the Eighteenth Century." Employing a welter of detail from dia­
ries, letters, newspapers, and incidental literature, Green raises up the 
crowded fabric of daily life: the coffee house lounger and the servitor, 
the "smart" and the freshman bumpkin, the belles who serve as the 
"toast" of the day; Oxford eating, drinking, sleeping and dressing, 
brawling in the streets and rhyming in the taverns. But if these types 
are exaggerated, they are never caricatured. Green senses too keenly 
the common humanity of the figures he creates to patronize them. 
It is not always the familiarity of the past that Green stresses. The 
foreground of his eleventh-century Chester is recognizable enough: 
the "new commercial life" of the towns takes palpable shape in the 
sturdy burghers who tread their way among the piles of cheeses, ban­
nock bread, and fish crates. But the motley crowd they confront is 
frankly exotic: the Dane who "strove in his northern tongue to draw 
buyers to his gang of slaves," the Welsh kerne wrapped in his blanket 
who "chattered as he might with the hardly less wild Cumbrian from 
the lands beyond the Ribble" (C, 443). Green's attraction to such 
scenes stems not from Macaulay's condescension to the barbaric but 
rather, as Burrow notes, from a real enthusiasm for frontier culture.33 
Green's purpose in superimposing the Oxford of the thirteenth cen­
tury on that of the nineteenth is not to stress the superiority of the 
present. Indeed, to understand that older world we must "dismiss 
from our minds all recollections" of the new. From the venerable col­
leges and stately walks, "history plunges us into the mean and filthy 
lanes of a medieval town." Hundreds of boys, clustered around 
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teachers as poor as themselves, take the place of the brightly colored 
train of doctors and Heads. The shock induced by this "stereoscopic" 
contrast leads us not to j udge the past but to feel its reality more fully. 
Abandoning our modern preconceptions allows the thirteenth cen­
tury to spring to life once more: "Now a mob of clerks plunges into 
the Jewry, and wipes off the memory of bills and bonds by sacking a 
Hebrew house or two. Now a tavern row between scholar and towns­
man widens into a general broil, and the academical bell of St. Mary's 
vies with the town bell of St. Martin's in clanging to arms" (SH, 159). 
For Green "the quick pulse of popular life" beats too exuberantly to 
allow condescension. 
Works like the Short History and even the expanded History of the 
English People combined great fullness with great compression. 
Green had mastered the stylistic shorthand of the sketch—the firm 
outlines and few salient traits that projected the whole from a few 
parts. But what this style gained in vividness it often lost in subtlety 
and variety. To some readers the effect of reading the Short History 
was that of a "uniformity, sometimes almost a monotony, of pictur­
esqueness; . .  . we sometimes feel a fatigue like that which is expe­
rienced in turning over the pages of a picture-book."34 The de­
scription is apt. Green's accounts often have the simplicity, assertive­
ness, and unmediated emotional appeal of the story book. Bede's 
death, for instance, is made intentionally hagiographical. In his final 
hours, completing the translation of John's Gospel parallels the wan­
ing of his own life. The symbolism is transparent, the incremental 
repetitions deliberately elegiac, the pathos overt: 
"There is still a chapter wanting," said the scribe, as the morning drew 
on, "and it is hard for thee to question thyself any longer." "It is easily
done, "said Baeda; "take thy pen and write quickly." Amid tears and 
farewells the day wore on to even-tide. "There is yet one sentence un­
written, dear master," said the boy. "Write it quickly," bade the dying
man. "It is finished now," said the little scribe at last. "You speak
truth," said the master; "all is finished now." (SH, 74) 
Also typical is the way Green's elliptical brevity condenses Joan of 
Arc's martyrdom into prophetic melodrama: "Soon the flames 
reached her, the girl's head sank on her breast, there was one cry of 
'Jesus!' 'We are lost' an English soldier muttered as the crowd broke 
up, 'we have burned a saint' " (SH, 293). Green's battle scenes possess 
the same compressed specificity and rapid pace. His brief account of 
Hastings drives forward with clipped, paralleled phrasing: "At three 
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the hill seemed won, at six the fight still raged around the standard. 
. .  . As the sun went down, a shaft pierced Harold's right eye." He 
looks aside from the main thrust of the action only for the most 
picturesque traditions. Taillefer tosses his sword and chants the Song 
of Roland, William rallies the Breton troops: " Hive!,'shouted Wil­
liam, as he tore off his helmet, 'and by God's help will conquer yet!' " 
(SH, 108-9). In a single page, Green concentrates an account Freeman 
lingered over for fifty. There is no time for elaboration or qualifica­
tion; in the brisk assertiveness of relentless action, he necessarily sacri­
fices shading for the sake of dramatic outlines. 
The weaknesses of this method become most apparent when ap­
plied to major characters. Green has a good eye and ear for the telling 
gestures and turns of phrase that can fix individuals in a single stroke. 
A few sentences from his version of Cromwell taking the mace from 
the table restore the man in all his imperious rectitude and blunt 
audacity: 
"Come, come," replied Cromwell, "we have had enough of this;" and, 
striding into the midst of the chamber, he clapped his hat on his head, 
and exclaimed, "I will put an end to your prating!" In the din that 
followed his voice was heard in broken sentences—"It is not fit that you 
should sit here any longer! You should give place to better men! You 
are no Parliament." (SH, 564) 
But this constant assertion of the typical leaves characters more vivid 
than complex. Green's penchant for enumeration enriches his char­
acterizations quantitatively more than qualitatively. His usual pat­
tern includes a list of salient physical and intellectual traits, illus­
trated by a few representative actions and interspersed with the 
revelatory observations of contemporaries: "The very spirit of the sea-
robbers" from whom William of Normandy had sprung 
seemed embodied in his gigantic form, his enormous strength, his sav­
age countenance, his desperate bravery, the fury of his wrath, the ruth­
lessness of his revenge. "No knight under Heaven," his enemies owned, 
"was William's peer." . . . No man could bend William's bow. His 
mace crashed its way through a ring of English warriors to the foot of 
the Standard. He rose to his greatest heights when other men despaired. 
His voice rang out as a trumpet when his soldiers fled before the En­
glish charge at Senlac, and his rally turned the flight into a means of 
victory. In his winter march on Chester he strode afoot at the head of his 
fainting troops and helped with his own hand to clear a road through 
the snowdrifts. (HEP, 1:125) 
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The tight rhythms of the paralleled phrases reinforce the sheer weight 
of particulars being piled up here. Sir Thomas More is similarly item­
ized, Holbein's portrait captures "the inner soul of the man, his vivac­
ity, his restless, all-devouring intellect, his keen and even reckless wit, 
the kindly, half-sad humour"; the New Learning seemed incarnate in 
"his gay talk, his winsomeness of manner, his reckless epigrams, his 
passionate love of music, his omnivorous reading, his paradoxical 
speculations, his jibes at monks, his schoolboy fervour of liberty" 
(SH, 326). 
It is not that either man is caricatured. We see William's humanity 
as well as his savagery; we are shown More's stern inflexibility as well 
as his touching affection for his children's pets and games. But the 
shades of personality that put both darks and lights into perspective 
are usually missing. The endless stream of dazzling specifics over­
bears rather than convinces. The rapid parallels that underline Eliza­
beth's vanity and voluptousness are the tools of the Macaulayean es­
sayist and entail their drawbacks: 
No adulation was too fulsome for her, no flattery of her beauty too 
gross. "To see her was heaven," Hattan told her; "the lack of her was 
hell." She would play with her rings, that her courtiers might note the 
delicacy of her hands; or dance a coranto, that the French ambassador, 
hidden dexterously behind a curtain, might report her sprightliness to
his master. . . . Personal beauty in a man was a sure passport to her
liking. She patted handsome young squires on the neck when they
knelt to kiSs her hand, and fondled her "sweet Robin," Lord Leicester, 
in the face of the court. (SH, 376) 
The temptation is always to reap the dramatic benefits of sensational 
detail before or instead of taking judicious measurement. Although 
Green usually does not succumb to Macaulay's penchant for brittle 
paradox, characters for whom he lacks sympathy sometimes verge on 
caricature. He may admit that James I possessed much natural ability 
and learning, but it is "his big head, his slobbering tongue, his 
quilted clothes, his rickety legs, his goggle eyes . . . his gabble and 
rodomontade" (SH, 471) that stay in our memories. Once anatomized 
in this way, characters often struggle in vain to recover their integrity. 
Green did strive for a deliberate balance in his characters. He ob­
jected to the hero-worship that lifted individuals "out of the sphere of 
human sympathies into a perfection that is simply uninteresting and 
unintelligible."35 He was equally averse to the "herophobia" typical 
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of the Philistines, "your 'right-and-wrong,' your 'truth and false­
hood' people,'' who would sooner reduce a William of Normandy to a 
melodrama villain than allow his mixture of greatness and inhuman­
ity to upset their simplistic categories (LG, 247). Itemization was a 
middle ground, but too often it left personalities inventoried rather 
than integrated. Green's characters are vivid and memorable, but they 
seldom seem more than the sum of their parts. Their characteristic 
turns of phrase and action do not resonate with a Carlylean sugges­
tiveness of the intangible; these traits are not metaphors for a more 
complex whole. But then, Green had consciously chosen the style of 
information and instruction, not of prophecy and divination. He 
brought a much warmer humanity to this style than did Macaulay, 
but that did not entirely compensate for the kinds of oversimplifica­
tion, the sacrifice of depth to breadth, that it encouraged. 
The controversy over Green's reputation was less fierce than it had 
been over Froude's, but it was more complex, at least in part because 
Green was himself more self-conscious about the conflicts involved 
in trying to satisfy two different readerships. Its scope and tone 
marked the Short History as primarily a popular work; for reviewers 
it exemplified the strengths and weaknesses of the entire genre. Mrs. 
Oliphant applauded Green for clearing away the "scaffolding" of 
sources and footnotes; the Short History's ability to trace the conti­
nuity of social life concealed within the "outer husk" of history made 
it for her "simply the ideal history we have been looking for."36 Its 
accessibility to a wider public made it more valuable to The Living 
Age than "many books making higher claims to research and 
science."37 The Athenaeum similarly complimented Green for his 
success in presenting "all the newest knowledge upon a very large 
section of history . . . in such a style that every one may read it with 
little effort."38 The Making of England and The Conquest of En­
gland possessed similar virtues for F. A. Paley.39 
On the other hand, the Athenaeum also complained that the Short 
History doled out ideas ready-made rather than encouraging inde­
pendent thought and judgment.40 John Brewer's Tory hysteria over 
Green's supposedly revolutionary sympathies was uncharacteristi­
cally extreme, but his general complaint—that works like The Short 
History placed dangerous views in "the hands of the young and 
incautious"—was one frequently lodged against popular history.41 
More typical was Brewer's suggestion that Green's desire for dramatic 
effect led him to invent unverifiable details.42 Green's most formida­
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ble critic, James Rowley, made similar claims about the "exaggera­
tions as culpable as misstatements that Mr. Green has been betrayed 
into by his unconscionable rhetoric." It was pure invention, Rowley 
argued, for Green's Jenny Geddes actually to fell the preacher with 
her stool and for his bishops to fall to their knees at the deathbed of 
Charles II.43 
More damaging was Rowley's voluminous list of outright errors. 
Altough he implied that these resulted from Green's superficial prep­
aration, most were minor mistakes that could have been corrected 
with an errata sheet. John Morley, who turned down Rowley's letters 
when first submitted to the Fortnightly, correctly perceived that his 
object was less to avenge truth than to avenge Froude. Although 
Green had himself deplored Freeman's attack on Froude, his close 
association with both the Saturday and with Freeman added to the 
glee with which critics pounced on the blunders of this more vulnera­
ble member of "the Freeman school." Even Green's friends did not 
defend his reputation for accuracy in minute detail. His lack of verbal 
memory, the disruptive circumstances in which his books were com­
posed, and the rapidity with which he revised them made many 
blunders inevitable. Green was aware of this and was grateful even to 
critics like Rowley for pointing out errors that could be removed in 
later editions. Although he was still not scrupulous enough with his 
corrections to satisfy S. R. Gardiner, Gardiner joined Stubbs and 
Henry Adams in confirming what Green himself believed of the Short 
History: that his mistakes did not undermine the cogency and sound­
ness of his historical interpretations and that minute accuracy was 
impossible given the vast and comprehensive range of his books and 
the current state of specialized studies.44 
Nonetheless, in many ways the scope of Green's work was the crux 
of the controversy. Freeman and James Bryce pointed to a more 
general problem than accuracy per se when they blamed Green for 
being too assertive about what could only be inferred or conjectured, 
especially in works like the Short History that afforded no space to 
discuss uncertainties. Stubbs was similarly dubious about how much 
success Green could achieve in synthesizing history for periods where 
the necessary specialized studies remained to be done.45 Green's 
methodological choices were deliberate and made with full knowl­
edge of how they challenged the prevailing assumptions of profes­
sional scholarship. He respected the efforts of men like Gardiner "to 
bring out the actual political facts and clear away loose talk." So 
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much nonsense had passed under the name of "philosophies of his­
tory" that Green realized his own attempts to arrange facts on a philo­
sophical basis might strike such men as "an attempt to bring the loose 
talk back again" (LG, 426). Despite his regret over the disapproval of 
the professionals, Green still intended his works to be an explicit pro­
test against many of their assumptions about historical writing. He 
had long been averse to continental models for the new scholarship— 
to the tendency of French historians to limit themselves to the "etude" 
or specialized study, and to the exclusive concentration of German 
"pragmatic" historians on political documents. To Green the former 
approach smacked of "intellectual cowardice," the refusal to provide 
a comprehensive explanation of national life.46 The "pragmatic" ap­
proach, on the other hand, did not look below the level of documents 
to the individual will or national spirit that produced them; it was too 
objective, too impersonal, to seize the real dynamic of change. What 
allies Green with the "literary" historians is less the picturesqueness 
of his style than this belief in the need for didactic judgments by the 
historian and his acknowledgement of the primacy of will and spirit 
in the historical process. 
Green tried to bridge the gap between popular and professional 
expectations more directly when he became involved in the early 
planning for England's first "purely Historical Review." Plans for 
such a publication first surfaced in conversations between Green, W. 
Hunt, and James Bryce in early 1867, and later included A. W. Ward. 
From the beginning Ward and Bryce wanted what Germany and 
France possessed, "a purely scientific organ of historical criticism," 
one whose character was to be scientific and not popular, and in 
which "literary tone" was to be subordinate to critical rigor (LG, 
433). Green, on the other hand, advocated a more popular format, 
both because he felt material of broader interest would be necessary to 
"float" the serious scholarship in the commercial market and because 
he had high hopes for the didactic potential of such historical writ­
ing. Although his journal would have maintained the strictly schol­
arly nature of original essays and reviews, it would also have de­
manded literary excellence of all submissions and included articles of 
greater topical interest to the general reader: background histories of 
current issues, "philosophical" biographies of eminent contempo­
raries, a quarterly summary of European events. He admitted, how­
ever, that such a scheme would likely fall between two stools: too 
scientific for the general reader and too popular to win the support of 
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scientific scholars. The desire for commercial success would inevita­
bly tend to make the review become more and more popular in tone 
and perhaps push it nearer to a distinct political line, moves sure to 
alienate serious writers still further. Green correctly perceived his 
own unsuitability as editor for such a review. Finally turning down 
Macmillan's offer of the post in 1876, he explained that he did not 
possess the confidence of historical scholars essential to such a posi­
tion, and feared that he would be looked upon as a person imposed 
merely in the hope of securing a popular circulation. Moreover, he 
felt he would be able to pursue his particular approach to history 
more freely if not placed in official relation to writers so clearly un­
sympathetic to it (LG, 436). 
It is no less true that Green felt keenly the criticism of those who 
refused to consider him a serious historian because of his populariz­
ing and synthetic approach. He never expected the Short History to 
win him "historic fame" with the professionals, and in fact had con­
tinued his studies of the Angevin Kings while completing it in the 
hope of eventually winning their regard for his scholarly abilities in 
that way (LG, 258-59).47 Disparagement of the Short History as a mere 
popularizing of other people's ideas spurred him to write The Mak­
ing of England. Only with that book's success did he note "the cessa­
tion at last of that attempt, which has been so steadily carried on for 
the last ten years, to drum me out of the world of historical scholars 
and set me among the 'picturesque compilers' " (LG, 482). 
His scholarly efforts notwithstanding, Green's sympathies re­
mained with "literary" historians, and he achieved his greatest suc­
cesses as a popularizer. His greater narrative genius enabled him to go 
farther than either Stubbs or Freeman in rescuing early England from 
the hands of the antiquarians and romancers and making it a living 
reality for his audience. "Philosophical enough for scholars, and 
popular enough for schoolboys,"48 the Short History in particular 
was able to tap the widest possible segment of the later Victorian au­
dience. According to Philip Gell, it survived the censure of the early 
professional school at Oxford, materially advancing the new popu­
larity of historical study and widely influencing a whole generation 
of younger students: "It used to be said that when men leaving Oxford 
wished to improve their minds, if they were rich they traveled, and if 
they were poor they read Green's Short History."49 At once compen­
dious and accessible, the Short History enjoyed success as a school 
text and was no less attractive to nonacademic audiences, including 
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the ever-increasing ranks of lower class readers newly educated at the 
Board schools and eager to gain useful knowledge. 
Green's works struck many responsive chords in later Victorian 
thought. His drive for synthesis, if at odds with incipient specializa­
tion, nourished the still vital longing for a comprehensive "philo­
sophical" ordering and control of facts.50 His expanded history of 
culture harmonized well with the more complex conception of na­
tionalism developing in Europe.51 He offered convincing historical 
confirmation of the evolutionary concepts rapidly becoming com­
monplace in the mind of the time. If some found his liberalism a bit 
too enthusiastic, his version of the development of England's free­
doms still enjoyed a wide appeal in the more egalitarian atmosphere 
of late Victorian society. Green moralized democracy even more thor­
oughly than Arnold. He had greater need to do so; deprived of its 
religious underpinnings in an increasingly sceptical age, ethical ad­
vance by itself was far too vulnerable a concept. Like Macaulay's, 
Green's story of temporal success served quasi-religious ends. He 
showed how evidence of political and social progress might satisfy his 
readers' longings to believe that the struggles of the race had made 
them better people, brought them to a more perfect world. Those 
many late Victorians troubled by orthodoxy and uneasy even with 
Carlyle's nondoctrinal mysticism could find in Green's secularized 
saga of continuous progress what the Times did: reassuring evidence 
that "in no chapter of the world's history is the truth of Hamlet's 
sentence more plainly proved than in that of England—'There's a 
divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will.' "52 
Green's role in late nineteenth-century scholarship remains a sig­
nificant one. The idea of writing history as an integrated narrative of 
national civilization has become so commonplace that Green's 
achievement loses some of the impact it had at the time. In the compe­
tence and comprehensiveness of its account, the Short History broke 
new ground. Ironically, it was his very comprehensiveness and reori­
entation of historical priorities that distanced Green most signifi­
cantly from the concerns of professional scholarship in his day. Spe­
cialization seemed increasingly necessary to achieve the minute accu­
racy of detail, the command of original sources, and the qualified 
judgments essential to professional standards. The breadth of Green's 
analyses demanded a level of generalization that made minute preci­
sion and qualification virtually impossible. To many serious schol­
ars, his efforts to reach a popular audience with a readable narrative 
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further compromised the objectivity and restraint they felt were essen­
tial to historical truth. Green's inaccuracy undoubtedly gave support 
to their fears, even though more of his errors were caused by his own 
disadvantages in time, health, and memory than by his desire for rhe­
torical effect or the need to generalize. 
Green's shortcomings should not detract from the importance of 
his efforts to bridge the gap between general and specialized audi­
ences. He had in effect to become a crusader for an audience earlier 
historians had taken for granted. There was no way he could escape 
being controversial; his position by definition challenged assump­
tions crucially important in the formative stages of professional iden­
tity. In the view of Frederic Harrison, himself poised between popular 
and professional positions, Green had usefully counterbalanced the 
weight of the new scholarship. Harrison lamented in 1898 that 
the historians of the present century, under the influence originally of 
Ranke in Germany, of Guizot in France, and Sir Henry Ellis and other 
editors of the Museum and Rolls records in England, have devoted 
themselves rather to original research than to eloquent narrative, to the 
study of special institutions and limited epochs, to the scientific prob­
ing of contemporary witnesses and punctilious precision of minute 
detail. The school of Freeman, Stubbs, Gardiner, and Bryce has quite 
displaced the taste of our grandfathers for artistic narrative and a glow­
ing style. Where the older men thought of permanent literature, the 
new school is content with scientific research. Would that J. R. Green 
had lived out his life!53 
Few works of literary merit comparable to Green's succeeded in carv­
ing out a satisfactory middle ground between the rising tide of vulgar­
ized history for the masses and the increasingly specialized literature 
of the professionals in the last quarter of the century. Few appealed so 
successfully to a large popular audience while building on such solid 
and extensive foundations. Few provided j udgments of such genuine 
authority while avoiding the aridity and diffuseness that became the 
stereotype of much professional scholarship. Would that John Rich­
ard Green had lived out his life, if only to show whether it would have 
been possible to prevent the irreconcilability of popular and profes­
sional interests from becoming in many respects a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in the years to come. 
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HISTORY AS PAST POLITICS 
I have chosen to conclude with Freeman because of the extent to which he is at once traditional and transitional. He self-conscious­
ly placed himself in the tradition of Arnold's moralized historiog­
raphy. An enthusiastic devotee of the late-Victorian cult of compara­
tive method, he overlaid Oxford School medievalism with the "unity 
of history" and elaborated a full-scale "science" of historical, cycles 
and racial continuity. He was a Whig who claimed Macaulay as a 
model, a romantic philhellene, an ardent (if somewhat abstract) dem­
ocrat. He saw himself in the vanguard of modern historiography but 
was by temperament kindred to older, even ancient, traditions. Better 
than any contemporary, Freeman exemplified the ambiguities in­
volved in defining a new status for the historian. Green was keenly 
sensitive to the conflicts between his own priorities and the require­
ments of "scientific" historiography; he made his choices. Freeman 
wanted popular acclaim, but on his own terms: he expected to succeed 
by making the general reader respect his professional authority. He 
intended much of his work to be popularizing in the most construc­
tive sense—that is, devoted to correcting the general public's miscon­
ceptions about principles fundamental to western history. He was 
at once too condescending and too self-righteous a crusader to avoid 
alienating that audience. His violent attacks on Froude and other 
"amateurs" combined with his weighty erudition to make him the 
stereotype of a professionalism by definition hostile to the general 
public's needs and interests. 
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At the same time, if Freeman was a far more vocal publicist for 
professional history than William Stubbs or S. R. Gardiner, he was a 
considerably less successful practitioner thereof. His formidable dis­
play of laws and comparative method constituted the same wish-
fulfilling imposition of order as earlier "unscientific" men of letters 
had indulged in. His "history for its own sake" was a moralized anti­
quarianism, his exacting scholarship a means of turning true facts 
into ultimate Truths. The Whig theorizing and Aryan mythmaking 
on which he based his claims for a scientific historiography were pre­
cisely what branded his work unscientific in the eyes of later scholars. 
His very contradictions make him more useful for my purposes, how­
ever, because they forecast wider issues in the evolution of profes­
sional identity, issues that I will return to at the close of my 
discussion. 
Born in 1823 Freeman, like Green, began to break away from his 
conservative roots at an early age. The young boy's sympathy for 
Greek independence first undermined his relations' Tory influence 
and set the pattern for his later support for Aryan efforts to overthrow 
alien masters. At Oxford in the early forties, he was deeply impressed 
by Arnold's lectures but found much more compatible the religious 
principles of Newman. Yet Freeman was never tempted by conver­
sion; indeed, unlike most historians I have discussed, he seems never 
to have experienced any serious challenge to his traditional High 
Church faith. The Oxford Movement's more important influence 
was indirect; it encouraged his interest in ecclesiastical architecture 
and medieval history. The latter bore early fruit in his 1845 essay, 
"The Effects of the Conquest of England by the Normans," which 
demonstrates how early he had formulated the central tenets of his 
interpretation of the Conquest. His contributions to Poems Legend­
ary and Historical (1850) and Original Ballads by Living Authors 
(1850) show a different but no less characteristic side of his historical 
interests: his imaginative indulgence of a romanticized patriotism 
and a love of legendary heroism. These works were in effect his Lays 
of Ancient Rome, Another lifelong interest was evinced by his first 
significant publication, A History of Architecture (1849), predictably 
devoted to the glorification of Gothic. Freeman was active in deliver­
ing papers to local archeological societies throughout the fifties, and 
developed early that particular merger of architecture, archaeology, 
and municipal history that characterized his many later articles in the 
Saturday and other reviews. He played a role as a "conservative re­
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former" at Oxford in the early fifties, in favor of correcting abuses but 
hostile to those aspects of reform that he felt undercut a broadbased 
liberal education and encouraged superficial views of history. When 
he served as an examiner in the new School of Law and History dur­
ing 1857, he had already begun to nurture ambitions to win one of its 
professorial chairs—ambitions that would have to wait thirty years 
for fulfillment. 
He stood unsuccessfully for Parliament several times in the late fif­
ties, styling himself a candidate in harmony with "the more advanced 
section of the existing Liberal party,"1 and was a vociferous cam­
paigner against the Bulgarian atrocities in the seventies. But his po­
litical interests were channeled more and more directly into the writ­
ing of history in his middle years. The first volume of a projected 
History of Federal Government (1863) outlined the "federal princi­
ple," one of those characteristic forms of Aryan political structure 
whose demonstration would occupy so much of Freeman's efforts in 
later years. Hoping to make himself a more attractive candidate for 
the Regius Professorship of Modern History at Oxford, he began his 
History of the Norman Conquest in 1865—a five-volume project not 
complete until 1876. This attempt to define the nature and origins of 
Aryan/Teutonic institutions spilled over into The Growth of the 
English Constitution (1872), Comparative Politics (1873), and the 
Reign of William Rufus (1882). During the same period he was en­
gaged in several works of a more popular nature, among them Old-
English History for Children (1869), General Sketch of European 
History (1872), and History of Europe (1875)—both part of Macmil­
lan's series for the schools—and The Historical Geography of Europe 
(1881), not to mention a voluminous outpouring of articles for the 
Saturday and other reviews, many of which were later collected in his 
four volumes of Historical Essays. The prestige of his historical doc­
trines was confirmed in 1881, when in a lecture tour of the United 
States, he had the satisfaction of finding his favorite motto, "History 
is past politics, politics are present history," adopted as the epigraph 
for the new Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Po­
litical Science. Freeman's contribution to the first volume (1882) 
characteristically treated American government as yet another reali­
zation of the Aryan impulse. 
When Freeman finally attained the Regius Professorship of Mod­
ern History in 1884, he used the chair both to address theoretical ques­
tions (in lectures collected as Methods of Historical Study, 1886) and to 
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continue his exploration of European medieval history. But his dis­
taste (and lack of audience) for compulsory lectures and his failing 
health led him to put in increasingly less time and energy at Oxford as 
the decade waned. The final installments in his investigation of 
Aryan history comprised the History of Sicily (1891-92), and post­
humous histories of Western Europe in the Fifth Century and West­
ern Europe in the Eighth Century and Onward (1904). He died in 
Alicante, Spain, in 1892. 
Despite the staggering output of Freeman's career—eight major 
historical studies and eight shorter popular ones, seven major essay 
collections, not to mention literally hundreds of review essays, lec­
tures, and architectural studies—the major components of his theory 
of history are relatively few and static. Relying on the comparative 
method to establish the scientific legitimacy of his theories, Freeman 
expanded Arnold's belief in the unity of western history into a full-
blown myth of Aryan dominance and superiority. In the process of 
reconstructing an Aryan family tree of representative democracies, he 
formulated what sounded like a classic Whig view of its most illus­
trious branch, the Teutonic. But beneath the familiar rhetoric of con­
tinuity through compromise and identity in progress operated a time­
less kind of monism. Freeman was driven by a craving for order and 
unity deeper even than Arnold's. The dominant pattern that emerges 
from his elaborate blueprint of historical cycles is less one of progress 
than of eternal recurrence.2 He paid lip service to the relativism and 
ambiguity necessary in historical judgments but could tolerate 
neither. His urge to classify, to subordinate to law, easily conflated 
scientific and ethical order. His overbearing display of objective in­
vestigation and scholarly authority protected moral absolutes that ef­
fectively prejudged all. 
From his earliest inquiries into historical knowledge, Freeman 
sought to give his moral convictions the sanction of "scientific" order. 
As a young man, he withdrew from all dealings with the Royal Ar­
chaeological Institute because he felt that it was wrong to apply "to 
higher matters the merely antiquarian tone which belongs to inferior 
ones"; the Institute treated "consecrated things" like ecclesiastical art 
and architecture "merely as facts, curiosities, antiquities" (LF, 1:96). 
When he came to expand these charges against "archaeologians" as a 
group in the History of Architecture, he had already begun to link 
their impiety to their lack of "philosophical" perspective. In their 
enthusiasm for new artifacts, they recorded a "newly discovered 
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Anglo-Saxon charter . .  . as a curiosity side by side with a newly 
discovered 'low-side window.' "3 That is to say, not only did they 
consider an old barn no less important than a Christian minster, but 
they failed to recognize that their antiquarian pursuits should be 
means to a higher end: the study of man's political development. 
Their hostility to any attempt to mold theories or develop general 
principles from the details they amassed represented a failure of 
moral as well as philosophical insight. In Freeman's eyes such theo­
ries were "the vital principle" giving meaning to the "inert mass" of 
facts.4 Only when the historian properly subordinated facts to the 
illustration of patterns and to the formulation of laws was he func­
tioning in a "scientific" rather than in a merely antiquarian spirit. 
The study of coins, weapons, tools, and inscriptions became histori­
cal—and of moral value—only insofar as they contributed to the un­
derstanding of "man as a member of a political community."5 
Declaring that "history is past politics" did not limit historical 
study so much as it might appear, for to Freeman political and moral 
action were in the highest sense one. Like Arnold, he believed that the 
study of history meant "the study of . .  . man in his highest 
character"—that is, man acting "in his political capacity . . . as the 
member of an organized society, governed according to law."6 In 
elaborating on the nature of "political science," he conveniently 
blurred the distinction between moral and methodological criteria. 
He had quite practical reasons for insisting that "right ruling" was a 
question of ethics, not expediency; arguing that "the same eternal 
laws of right and wrong" applied to present politics as to past was the 
basis of his opposition to Derby and Disraeli's pragmatic support of 
the Turks.7 But he presented his position as being more valid because 
it was more philosophically sound. He argued that the "science of 
right ruling" meant something "higher" than following self- or 
party-interest precisely because it taught us "how to judge of causes 
and their effects . . . to judge of the character of acts, whether done 
yesterday or thousands of years ago." In the ability to recognize and 
apply valid analogies lay history's practical value: "The past is stud­
ied in vain, unless it gives us lessons for the present."8 
In his own work, it is difficult to separate the moral from the politi­
cal aspects of these lessons. With a self-conscious display of Whig 
practicality, Freeman, like Macaulay, professed to avoid the arbitrary 
dogmatism of "abstract" theory by deriving the laws of political be­
havior from the historical record and by allowing for contemporary 
174 
Edward Augustus Freeman 
values and circumstances when applying them. In practice the only 
laws he saw were the ones he looked for, and his own sympathies 
determined whether their validity was absolute or relative in a given 
instance. He ransacked history for "illustrative examples" that 
showed "what course, whether of true growth or of backsliding, the 
mind of man was taking" at any given time.9 His preconceived stan­
dards of progress and decline blunted an historicist appreciation of 
past events and closed off inductive insights. Like Arnold and Macau-
lay, Freeman assumed that democratic governments were more 
moral, more characteristic of a politically "mature" society, than 
other political systems. While arguing that historical study "hin­
dered the growth of any narrow political partizanship,"10he did not 
consider it partisan to assume that man appeared in his "highest 
form, as the citizen of a free commonwealth." In his eyes the record of 
despotic government hardly constituted "the history of a people at 
all."11 
He acknowledged the dangers of substituting "abstract right" for 
an appreciation of the "circumstances, the habits, the beliefs, the 
prejudices, of each man's time" (HE, 1:119; see also HE, 1:109, 115) 
and even admitted that Arnold sometimes set too high a standard by 
failing to consider the weight of prevailing mores. But then, the 
values of others were always "abstract" in a way "the touchstone of 
morals" to which he brought all political questions (LF, 2:121) was 
not. Toleration, he argued, must not confound mere differences of 
opinion with "moral crimes"; tyranny was not just a political alter­
native for Freeman, but the "overthrow of all right" (HFG, xv). In 
opposing British aid to the Turks, he claimed the sanction of a 
"common morality"; his "scientific" study of history had taught him 
to view the Eastern Question as no less than a strife between Western 
civilization and Eastern barbarism, so that any aid to the "foul tyr­
anny" of the Turks became simply "the work of the devil."12 
His own attempts to correct modern censure by appealing to con­
temporary standards were often indistinguishable from special plead­
ing for his Teutonic heroes. While relying on "universal" moral 
standards to condemn actions against his enemies, Freeman de­
manded of partisans of the right side nothing higher than the prevail­
ing political morality of their age. He tried to mitigate the brutality of 
Frederick I of Italy, "a high and pleasing type of the pure Teutonic 
character," by comparing his actions with far greater atrocities in 
later history (HE, 1:280-84). To decide whether Godwin was guilty of 
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treachery in the death of the Atheling Alfred, he resorted to precisely 
the kind of arguments that outraged him when Froude made them. 
He assumed that "an English patriot" of Godwin's stature simply 
could not be guilty of any wrong more heinous than acting like "a 
wary and hard-headed statesman" instead of a "sentimental and im­
pulsive hero."13 Like Froude's, Freeman's relativism was employed to 
protect higher absolutes—to vouch for the righteousness of all in his 
Teutonic pantheon. If his pretensions to scientific method were 
greater than those of fellow historians, so too was his dogmatism. He 
might at times treat laws as if they denoted only practical rules of 
thumb,14 but in practice only a set of axioms could brace the rigid 
polarities of his world view. 
In arguing for history's scientific nature, Freeman was caught be­
tween conflicting positions. He could not assume the essential unity 
of moral and physical truth as had Arnold; he could not dismiss out of 
hand history's claims to be scientific as had Froude. Although he 
wished to claim for the historian a professional status commensurate 
with the scientist's, for moral and intellectual reasons he needed to 
free historical study from the determinism of both Positivism and 
physical science. He actually shared a great many of the moral biases 
of his nemeses, Froude and Kingsley. He considered history a form of 
the "protest of mind against matter in a material age" and held up the 
study of man as inherently nobler than the study of rocks and tides 
(LF, 1:118-19). He distrusted a positivistic science of history in large 
part because he suspected that "it has very little to do with the grand 
personal drama" of human life,15 since it treated men as "mere walk­
ing automata" (HE, 1:51), enslaved to inflexible law. Like Froude, 
Freeman argued that the existence of free will made it impossible to 
reduce historical actions to any "grand scientific law" such as that 
favored by "the school of Mr. Buckle" (HE, 1:50). 
If Freeman wanted to prevent history's annexation by pseudo­
science, he was just as concerned to claim for his studies a place 
among legitimate sciences. He objected to "the strange way in which 
the name of science is often confined to certain branches of knowl­
edge" in order to assume "some special merit and dignity" for them 
(M, 118). In reaction to this "unfair monopoly of a name," Freeman 
purposefully returned to the older sense of scientia and was thus able 
to treat history's claims to be a science as "a question of words and 
nothing else" (M, 152). While appearing to acknowledge the author­
ity of the scientific, Freeman actually diluted the scientist's truths un­
176

Edward Augustus Freeman 
til they offered no significant challenge to the historian's. Like the 
physical sciences, he argued, history assigned outward facts or phe­
nomena to the working of certain laws or principles. But in both cases 
these laws were "only generalizations from instances, a high class of 
probabilities" (LF, 1:118). The physical scientist could not claim a 
"mathematical certainty" for his laws either, Freeman opined, so that 
his "deductions from experience" differed only in degree from those 
of the historian (M, 150). 
In fact, Freeman charged, the natural philosopher could only de­
scribe how effects followed causes—he could not explain why they 
did so. When pushed back to a first cause, he had nothing more pal­
pable than "Force" to refer to—an explanation that Freeman dis­
missed as no more philosophical than a reliance on personal will or 
an omnipotent being (M, 147).16 In this regard the historian might 
have more difficulty establishing facts, but once they were established 
he was in a better position to assess "the real causes of the facts," for 
"surely," Freeman asserted with bland confidence, "We know more 
about the human will than we know about Force" (M, 152). He was 
content to assume that in the study of human affairs, "We can reach 
that high degree of likelihood which we call moral certainty"—the 
same certainty on which men were content to base their daily actions 
(M, 151). "Moral certainty" was of course for Freeman's purposes far 
more useful than "mathematical certainty." It was quite compatible 
with the free will necessary to release history from determinism, but it 
also permitted valid generalizations about human nature. A science 
of history possessing "moral certainty" combined the best of both 
worlds: freedom and order. 
In theory Freeman distinguished between narrative histories and 
the "political science" that abstracted lessons from them. The first 
was the obvious arena for the "grand personal drama" of human life. 
Although heroes, especially Aryan ones, towered over Freeman's own 
narratives, he stopped short of a Carlylean hero-worship, asserting 
that "the course of history is not a mere game played by a few great 
men."17 Rather, Freeman professed the "old-fashioned belief" that 
God had created a world in which "every man, however obscure he 
may deem himself, has laid upon him . .  . a historical responsibil­
ity, a share in guiding the course of the world for good or for evil."18 
The exercise of each man's will helped determine the common will, 
his unconscious acts the spirit of the age. The actions of the great 
differed only in degree from those of the lesser. In Freeman's "practi­
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cal" way of looking at heroes, the great man was able to lead his 
nation only to the extent that he was thoroughly identified with its 
virtues and limitations.19 
In practice the "grand personal drama" of history interested him 
only insofar as it reenacted the larger patterns discovered by "political 
science." Harold and William provide imaginative foci to the Nor­
man Conquest, but they function less as autonomous individuals 
than as vehicles of racial destiny. Freeman's deepest engagement lay 
not with the individual fact, but with the system of historical mean­
ing to which it belonged. He controlled the multitudinousness of ex­
perience by subordinating each datum to a master plan. The next best 
thing to the permanence he longed for was the constant duplication 
of the same patterns. This duplication accounted for the fact of 
change without having to surrender the security of the eternal. 
Nowhere are his strategies clearer than in the grandiose theory of 
racial continuity he based on the comparative method. The philo­
sophical prestige of comparative studies at the time made them the 
natural choice of a mind that wished to endow its craving for analogi­
cal system with scientific status. This approach seemed already to 
have revealed the geneaology of Indo-European language and myth 
in the same way that evolutionary theory had explained the develop­
ment of physical life. In an early essay Freeman compared the method­
ology of comparative philology to that of geology and noted with 
approval its gradual triumph over obscurantists who had originally 
tried to deny linguistic evidence, just as others had tried to deny the 
paleontological evidence against special creation (HE, 2:244-45). 
Despite Freeman's pretensions to a similar scientific objectivity 
and disinterestedness, he had clearly chosen this method because it so 
convincingly validated his foregone conclusions. He pronounced the 
comparative method "the greatest intellectual achievement of our 
time" because it had brought "a line of argument which reaches 
moral certainty into a region which before was given over to random 
guess-work."20 "Moral certainty" was vital for two reasons. First, the 
comparative method enabled the historian to extrapolate with confi­
dence a meaningful pattern into what might otherwise be an un­
charted void or a jumble of disparate evidence. He could use analogies 
revealed by comparative study to provide internal "proof" of the or­
ganic continuity of Aryan development—a continuity for which no 
external evidence could be found. Secondly, the comparative method 
justified the historian in basing cultural identity on factors subject to 
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free will—always the realm of "moral certainty"—rather than limit­
ing him to traits subject to the determinism implicit in "mathemati­
cal certainty." 
Freeman wanted to define race philologically so that he could treat 
"national character" and "spirit of the age" as "undoubted facts" 
without also having to equate these with "unchanging physical 
forces, over which personal agency has no control."21 He intended this 
definition to be a scientific advance over popular theorizing about 
race, but he was also concerned to disassociate racial theory from the 
materialist ethnology of scientists like T. H. Huxley. As early as 1865 
Huxley had exposed the fallacies in trying to treat community of lan­
guage as proof of racial unity in the physical sense and opted instead 
for a zoological definition based on skull shape and related traits. In 
later years he more specifically refuted arguments for Teutonic and 
Aryan purity similar to those held by Freeman.22 Freeman's own 
"Race and Language" (1877) acknowledged these counterarguments 
but continued to defend his "historical" definition of race. No nation 
could claim purity of blood from a physiological point of view, 
Freeman argued; nevertheless, for all "practical" purposes, political 
or historical (HE, 3:226), such communities could be defined by a 
common stock of cultural traditions, chief among them language. 
The real issue of course was that Freeman considered ethnology a 
purely physical science, based on traits over which man had no con­
trol. Language, on the other hand, depended upon behavior perhaps 
"unconscious" but still "unconstrained." Thus, he could assume 
that philology concerned itelf with "the aggregation of endless acts of 
the human will" (M, 61). Freeman went on to argue that although 
community of language was no certain proof of community of blood, 
it provided the same degree of "moral proof" available in other areas 
of human history and thus provided a valid working definition of 
race. 
Practicality, scientific order, moral certainty—what higher rec­
ommendations did Freeman's theory of Aryan continuity need to 
claim intellectual prestige in the late nineteenth century? Here was 
the "vital principle" that vindicated the lesson he had first learned 
from Arnold: that the political life of the western world constituted 
"one living whole" (M, 7). Here was the organic unity that allowed 
history to be read "not as a mere chronicle of events . . . but as the 
living science of causes and effects" (HE, 2:234). A cyclical pattern 
further reinforced this unity. Like Arnold, Freeman rejected as artifi­
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cial the distinctions between ancient and modern history, arguing that 
"the later days of a people, amidst countless differences of detail, may 
have more real likenesses, more identity of principle, with its very 
early days, than with intermediate times from which . . . they are 
separated by much slighter differences" (HE, 4:250). The laws of po­
litical cause and effect remained valid because the same political forms 
reconstituted themselves from age to age of Aryan development. 
Freeman devoted a major part of his work to tracing the common 
descent of Aryan constitutions from Greece, through Rome, and by 
way of the Teutons to the most recent British parliament and Ameri­
can congress. So compelling was the genetic metaphor that he believed 
he could "describe either an Homeric [assembly] or an English mickle­
gemot all the better for having seen a [Swiss] Landesgemeinde" (LF, 
1:417). He naturally saw ontogeny recapitulating philogeny in the 
American colonies as well: colonial governments had reproduced 
Teutonic institutions prevalent in the fifth and sixth centuries, thus 
giving new life to traditions that "in their older home had well nigh 
died out."23 Everywhere the "germ" of Aryan government was 
planted, it generated the same species of constitution. 
Although Freeman's philhellenic enthusiasms produced conflicts 
of interest,24 he was a self-proclaimed panegyrist for the Teutonic 
branch of the Aryan family tree. In an early pamphlet concerning the 
new school of modern history at Oxford, he lamented the exclusive 
concentration on ancient history and called on his countrymen to 
recognize "that the soil of Teutonic Christendom has brought forth 
as glorious works of art and genius, as mighty deeds of national and 
individual greatness, as aught that southern heathendom can boast" 
(LF, 1:120). Freeman's History of the Norman Conquest and related 
works aimed not merely at correcting this neglect, but at demonstrat­
ing that the political traditions unique to the despised "barbarian" 
Teutons were in fact directly responsible for the stability and great­
ness of modern England. 
In pursuit of this end he joined forces with Green and Stubbs to 
build for the Whig view an historical foundation in the Middle Ages. 
Not content with ruling out all taint of Roman absolutism in English 
institutions, he went on to argue that England became "in the days of 
its earliest independence, a more purely Teutonic country than even 
Germany itself" (HE, 1:51). Among all the nations of modern Eu­
rope, England could still claim for "its political institutions the most 
unbroken descent from the primitive Teutonic stock" (CP, 45). Free­
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man's peculiar emphasis in the Whig debate fell on his insistence that 
the Conquest had made "no formal change whatever" in the constitu­
tion. It was a turning point, not a beginning. William had "claimed 
the Crown by legal right," and "he professed to rule . . . according 
to the laws of his predecessor and kinsman King Eadward."25 Even 
William's tyranny was conducted under legal forms that tacitly legit­
imized the very freedoms he sought to stifle. Freeman assigned some­
thing like the status of a "fortunate fall" to the Conquest. "Had there 
never been a time of foreign tyranny," he claimed, "our liberties 
might have crumbled away without our knowing it" (HNC, 5:459). 
As it was, the Conquest did not "crush or extinguish the Old-English 
spirit" but rather invigorated it. The Normans, once "washed clean 
from the traces of their sojourn in Roman lands" (HNC, 3:405), re­
turned to the Teutonic fold as worthy proselytes (HE, 1:52). 
Although more explicit about the dangers of false analogies be­
tween parliaments of the ninth and nineteenth centuries, like other 
Whig medievalists Freeman held that in principle "there is absolutely 
no gap between the meeting of the Witan of Wessex which confirmed 
the laws of Aelfred . . . and the meeting of the Great Council of the 
Nation" in 1873 (CP, 47). True, as Burrow points out, Freeman at 
times resorted to an implicitly discontinuous series of revivals or re­
storations in order to preserve this continuity. The English reformed 
by "falling back on a more ancient state of things," by "calling to life 
again the institutions of earlier and ruder times," by casting aside 
"the slavish subleties of Norman lawyers" and "the innovations of 
Tudor tyranny and Stewart usurpation" (GEC, 21). Still, restorations 
did not negate the principle of continuity; if anything, they made 
more explicit the mythic dimensions of this loss and recovery of na­
tional identity.26 And of course they also created classic examples of 
modern periods that shared more "identity of principle" with the dis­
tant than with the nearer past. 
For Freeman as for other Whigs, there were greater modern advan­
tages to reading English history not as a series of purifications but 
rather as a palimpsest in which all emendations could still be read, or 
to figuring the constitution as a building that had often been repaired 
but never razed and rebuilt (GEC, 55-56). The paths of precedent had 
always been for the English the paths of progress because they had 
early learned how to reform without destroying, unlike the "clever 
constitution makers" of France (CP, 234). Altogether "guiltless of 
political theories," England's "stout knights and citizens" had pre­
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served the fabric by mending it before it tore. Because political change 
in England had always been "conservative because progressive, pro­
gressive because conservative," Freeman could claim ancient English 
history as the true possession of the "Liberal, who, as being ever ready 
to reform, is the true Conservative, not of the self-styled Conservative 
who, by refusing to reform, does all he can to bring on destruction" 
(GEC, 55, viii). By also portraying the English constitution as an or­
ganism growing "almost in obedience to a natural law" (GEC, 66), 
Freeman turned change into a fulfillment of genetic destiny, the mat­
uration of the "germ" into the fully realized organism. 
More importantly, he made this genetic destiny part of a larger, 
implicitly providential pattern. With a chauvinism typical of his age, 
Freeman taught that only the Aryans possessed a "history in the high­
est sense."27 Western culture was synonymous with the successive 
achievements of Greek, Roman, and Teuton. Each had championed 
the progressive side in the eternal struggle for light against darkness, 
freedom against bondage, civilization against barbarism.28 Like Ar­
nold, Freeman imposed on Aryan legatees the responsibility for sus­
taining the upward spiral of progress on behalf of the whole world. In 
widening the franchise or opposing the Turks, the Victorians were 
reenacting that eternal struggle. Their achievements and their duties 
became charged with a cosmic significance. 
Dignifying the temporal with the eternal is, in more or less explicit 
form, the standard means by which the Victorian historian reconciled 
progress to permanence. In Freeman's case that juxtaposition of tem­
poral and eternal conceals conflicts that ultimately belie the whiggish 
present-mindedness and relish for progress he seems otherwise to ex­
emplify. Burrow skillfully illuminates the contradictory nature of 
Freeman's devotion to the past, a devotion "so intense as to amount to 
a reluctance to recognise it as irrevocably past."29 His elaboration of 
Aryan cycles simply enacts on the largest scale an obsession with par­
allels pervasive enough to constitute something close to typological 
or figural thinking. For such a mind it is always a short step from 
analogy to identity, to the collapsing together of types that makes the 
past eternally available. This is also the appeal of his two models for 
change, restoration and continuity. Both were "forms of triumph 
overtime . . . because they offered alternative images of eternity: the 
tying of the ends of history into its eternal circles and the architectural 
palimpsest as the symbol of the co-existence of all ages."30 Freeman 
did not, like Macaulay, value the past because it had made possible 
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the present success. Rather, he defined success in terms of its accurate 
recapitulation of tradition. In this respect his reverence for the past 
had more in common with Carlyle's. But where Carlyle allowed— 
indeed, required—the building to be razed so that the traditional 
could be re-created in new forms, Freeman could be secure only with 
palpable permanence: either the old building with all its repairs, or a 
return to the purity of the ur-form. If he was guilty of anachronism, it 
was not because he applied his contemporary political beliefs to the 
past, but because "apart from history he had no contemporary poli­
tics at all."31 
Freeman resists easy classification. Among the most enthusiastic 
champions of modern methodology, he was in a more profound sense 
the least reconciled to modernity of the six authors here discussed. A 
vocal public proponent of greater rigor and objectivity, he was driven 
by a private mythology that imposed its own evaluative criteria on 
all judgments. If the contradictions run deep, they are only the most 
extreme examples of ambiguities that in fact pervaded the transition 
to professionalization. It was his longing for a unitary standard of 
truth, some key that would make all phenomena morally intelligible, 
that made Freeman the sage and Freeman the scientist one and the 
same. Like Arnold, he wished to co-opt scientific methodology so that 
it served, not threatened, the moral function of history. So convinced 
was he of the truth of his reading of western history that it never oc­
curred to him that he had put the cart before the horse—chosen the 
methodology to justify, not to verify, the teleological pattern of his­
tory, and thus compromised the objectivity of the historian in the very 
process of trying to vindicate it. 
II 
If we consider in more detail Freeman's strategies as a practicing 
historian, we find his affinities to the "literary" tradition even 
stronger. The apparent contradictions in Freeman's position arise 
less from what he actually did as an historian than from his self­
consciously polemical role in the late Victorian debate over old and 
new models of historiography. It was in his public personae as the 
Regius Professor, the Froude-Slayer, the scholarly heavy that he 
gained the reputation as chief antagonist to the "literary" cause. His 
unfortunate penchant for rhetorical overkill obscured what was in 
fact the main thrust of his efforts as a publicist: to aggrandize, not to 
belittle, the traditional aims of historical study. 
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Consider, for example, his position on the reform of historical edu­
cation at Oxford: it was weighted much more to older conventions of 
liberal education and didactic historiography than to specialized pro­
fessionalism. He objected to the founding of a school of modern his­
tory in the early fifties not just because it would distort the underlying 
unity of history and deal with periods still too controversial for bal­
anced judgment, but also because the specialism it encouraged would 
subvert the ideals of liberal education. He believed that the main pur­
pose of undergraduate study in history should be to train students' 
minds in the principles of historical philosophy, and felt that this 
could be achieved simply by approaching the curriculum of the old 
school of Literae Humaniores in a more scientific (that is, compara­
tive) spirit. The passing of the Oxford Act and the Examination Sta­
tute over the objections of Freeman and others meant that when he 
returned as Regius Professor in the eighties, he found an educational 
system conducive to neither sound tutoring nor a research professor­
iate. Examinations had degraded teaching into a trade, he charged, 
and were driving students from the generalist college tutor to the spe­
cialized "combined lecturer," affiliated with no college and therefore 
dispensing education in a moral and social vacuum.32 These lectures 
also usurped the role of the professors, who, because they had little 
control over examinations and their lectures "did not pay in the 
schools," often found themselves, as did Freeman, speaking to almost 
empty benches. The heavy lecturing duties attached to the Professor­
ship further undermined its effectiveness and authority. To require 
of a professor forty-two lectures a year was to make research not less 
but more difficult—indeed, downright "penal."33 
Freeman declared that the professor's duty was not to prepare stu­
dents for examinations but to be a representative of learning, to guide 
those interested in knowledge for its own sake to the study of "origi­
nal authorities" (M, 16). He actually valued the close reading of 
primary texts not as a source of original research but as an heuristic 
model closest to that of the old school of Literae Humaniores: the 
"old-fashioned study of 'books' " represented an antidote to the "de­
lusive" pursuit of "subjects" and "periods" (M, 36). Far from styling 
himself a professor in the German mode who was "bound to utter 
something new every time he officially opens his mouth" (HE, 4:201), 
he felt it entirely appropriate to use the Regius Chair to outline "the 
great periods of history" (M, 38) or to summarize the historical back­
ground of topical issues. He considered an understanding of basic 
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principles more important to accuracy than the exhaustive research 
"the last German book" could boast of (M, 289). His quite traditional 
priorities were summed up at the end of his Inaugural lecture, where 
he declared that enabling his listeners better to play their part in the 
present by providing clearer knowledge of "those earlier forms of 
public life out of which our own has grown" was an object higher 
than the "search after truth for its own sake" (M, 40). 
Freeman drew the battle lines between the old and new historio­
graphy much more broadly when addressing the position of history 
outside the academy. But his very willingness to play so active a role 
in the wider public debate was a sign of a commitment to an ideal 
broader than professionalism alone. Endowing the historian with 
professional status was a way of cementing his traditional authority, 
not of defining its replacement. Freeman took on the crusader's role 
with relish. From his earliest essays for the Saturday Review, he never 
tired of insisting that the serious historian should, like any other pro­
fessional, be expected to master the methodology of his science before 
beginning his work and to meet scholarly standards in executing it. 
His harrying of Froude was only the most notorious instance of his 
broader assault on dilettantes who had taken up history because they 
had nothing better to do and whose works belonged in the drawing 
room, not on the historical shelf.34 As we have seen, the physical 
scientist provided a ready model for the kind of authority Freeman 
desired. He regretted that the wide popularity of historical writing 
made it much harder to convince readers of the importance of "scien­
tific" levels of expertise. The public assumed that the scientist's posi­
tion was backed by an expertise that admitted of no challenge from 
mere laymen. But history possessed nothing like science's technical 
terminology to "frighten away fools" (LF, 2:202); England had no 
equivalent to the German Gelehrten to expose imposters and render 
authoritative judgments (LF, 2:185). When the historian ventured (as 
Freeman so often did) to correct misconceptions, he was charged with 
pedantry; the public assumed that in historical controversies, every 
side had "an equal 'right to their own opinion' " (M, 86). As a result, 
although crackpot scientific views had been rooted out of sources 
"laying any claim to a scientific character," the historical equivalent 
of "flat earth" theories still flourished in "publications of consider­
able pretensions" (M, 90). 
Freeman linked the issue of authority to the broader one of au­
dience expectation and discrimination. He lamented that readability 
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was more important than accuracy to the general reader and that the 
historian who wished to reach an audience that read for pleasure and 
amusement was thus tempted to sacrifice fact for effect (M, 99). Free­
man was particularly zealous in lauding the virtues of men like 
Stubbs and Finlay, who sacrificed popularity to the painstaking, me­
ticulous work of "real" scholarship.35 He was particularly resentful 
of an audience whose taste for pretty pictures and lively paradox made 
Froude a best seller, while it condemned the scrupulous Gardiner to 
obscurity (M, 100-102), and he was particularly hard on men like 
Charles Kingsley, who discredited the Regius Professorship by bring­
ing history "down to the lowest level of the sensational novelist" in 
The Roman and the Teuton.36 In part Freeman's animus against 
popular writers may be attributed to repeated criticisms of his own 
dullness and pedantry,37 heaped on top of his disappointment at be­
ing so long passed over himself for a professorship. But we should 
also remember how easily his attempt to raise the standards of histori­
cal writing would have appeared to him as no less than a defense of 
truth against falsehood, of good against evil (M, 102-3, 112). 
The crucial point about Freeman's role in this debate is that pre­
cisely because the promulgation of truth was so important to him, he 
could not accept J. R. Seeley's remedy to the professional's identity 
crisis: "To make sure of being judged by competent judges only, we 
ought to make history so dull and unattractive that the general public 
will not wish to meddle with it."38 He might applaud the efforts of the 
Rolls Series to provide reliable texts for serious students of history,39 
but he was not willing that scholars should abandon the general 
reader to the rising tide of popularized history that flooded the mass 
market in the second half of the century. The circulating libraries and 
the middle class thirst for self-help were creating a lucrative business 
for the practitioners of "the art of history made easy"—topical and 
often sensationalized farragoes of romance and history, detail and 
digressions—all the more pernicious because their uncritical au­
dience took their statements on trust.40 It was not history's populari­
zation that Freeman objected to, but its vulgarization in this way. 
Accepting the expectation of the general public that some kind of 
history be "served up to it," Freeman proclaimed it the duty of the 
serious historians "to improve its taste, to guide its voice, and to teach 
it to speak the right way."41 
In attempting to practice what he preached, Freeman displayed a 
broader range of styles than his defense of professionalism might 
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suggest. In the seventies he contracted to write a series of short histo­
ries for Macmillan's Historical Course for the Schools, hoping there­
by to supplant "the many wretched compilations and epitomes 
which misled and bewildered the minds of young readers by their 
blunders, and disgusted them by their dullness" (LF, 2:31). Old-En­
glish History for Children he designed as an experiment to prove that 
"clear, accurate, and scientific views of history . . . may be easily 
given to children from the very first"—specifically, that they could be 
taught "to distinguish true history alike from legend and from willful 
invention."42 This did not mean excluding those legends that had so 
often usurped the place of true history, but presenting them as did 
Arnold, in the antiquated style of the King James Old Testament. 
Freeman was particularly concerned to promulgate his theory of 
Aryan continuity in a form accessible to the general reader. He aimed 
to make his History of Federal Government "instructive and interest­
ing to any thoughtful reader, whether especially learned or not," by 
avoiding "technicalities" in the text and relegating discussion of de­
tailed points to notes that he hoped would satisfy "the requirements 
of the most exacting scholar" (HFG, xv). He left the Growth of the 
English Constitution in the form of its original "popular lectures," 
hoping that its "more highly wrought shape" would catch the atten­
tion of readers and lead them to the "proper sources of more minute 
knowledge" (GEC, vi). The History of the Norman Conquest itself 
was to be a major scholarly work, but one he also hoped would attract 
that "strangest of beings, the general reader" (LF, 1:336). His goal was 
to clothe "with flesh and blood the dry bones" of his old English 
heroes, whose "living personal interest" had up until then been ob­
scured by "fantastic legends" or "summaries of the most repulsive 
dryness" (NC, l:xvi-xvii). Even Stubbs's recent constitutional history 
would need to be "translate[d] . . . into thunder and lightning" 
(LF, 2:88) in order to impress the true greatness of English continuity 
on the public mind. 
Far from ruling out imagination in historical research, Freeman 
agreed with contemporaries that—under proper restraint—it was es­
sential to perceiving history's patterns (M, 282). Far from believing 
excellence of style to be incompatible with excellence of matter, he felt 
that combining both was the best way of winning over the serious 
reader to the cause of truth.43 He objected to the spasmodic excesses of 
historical sensationalism precisely because they reduced great mo­
ments to tawdry bombast (HE, 1:326-27). But to acknowledged mas­
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ters of historical narrative like Arnold and Macaulay, he accorded 
higher honors than to their more scholarly German brethren. 
Though concerned to improve the historian's image in the public 
eye, Freeman's goal was not professionalism for its own sake. Al­
though he recognized the legitimacy of a separate genre for fellow 
specialists, he devoted his major efforts to upgrading popular histori­
cal writing—to mediating, not widening, the gap between popular 
and professional audiences. In styling the historian a professional, he 
was trying to combine, not to replace, the Victorian sage with the 
historical scientist. 
Freeman's own research techniques, for example, were essentially 
conventional rather than innovative. He might have lauded facts 
"drawn from the fountain-head" as the appropriate corrective to 
crude theories promulgated by "the philosophical school or the pic­
turesque school,"44 and have styled himself merely an illustrator or 
harmonizer of original texts: "I wish no one to read me instead of my 
authorities" (M, 270). But the voluminous History of the Norman 
Conquest was more a synthesis of existing accounts than a compila­
tion of original research. His command of the narrative sources of 
Anglo-Saxon history was unrivaled at the time, but his repugnance to 
working in libraries kept himtrom consulting any "original authori­
ties" not available in print. He would often hold up the painstaking 
drudgery of the plodding dryasdust as the virtue that separated the 
scholarly sheep from the dilettante goats. Yet he felt the German in­
sistence on mastering every scrap of the whole historical Literatur for 
every issue to be an unreasonable one,45 and excused his own less than 
exhaustive analysis of Domesday, for example, by saying that only an 
editor would sit down to read it through, word for word (NC, l:xi). 
He believed that he provided evidence voluminous enough to al­
low readers to double-check him and draw different conclusions if 
they wished. But he seldom realized how much he distorted that evi­
dence by trying to force syntheses from contradictory accounts or the 
extent to which his own assumptions biased his choice of data.46 His 
forerunners on the Norman Conquest, Thierry and Palgrave, he 
found guilty of failing to distinguish the relative value of different 
authorities in their eagerness to support their own theories (NC, 
l:xv). Freeman dutifully cautioned his readers against the panegyric 
excesses of English sources, but too often his own critical method 
amounted to little more than examining the English account of some 
fact and then comparing the "Norman perversion of it" (NC, 2:4 n.). 
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English encomium was usually allowed to presuppose some legiti­
mate basis for praise, Norman invective to result from "interested in­
vention" (e.g., NC, 2:21, 1:472). He never tired of holding up Froude 
as the classic case of the gullible amateur, a "confiding innocent" 
who took Henry's royal proclamations and acts of parliament at face 
value. No experienced historian could be so naive, Freeman scoffed. 
Yet he used documents in a similar way to prove "parlimentary sub­
serviency" in an age of Tudor "unlaw."47 The methodology of those 
who disagreed with him always struck him as less professional than 
his own. 
Freeman's treatment of myth and legend offers the most illuminat­
ing parallels to earlier historians. On the one hand, myth was funda­
mental to his reconstruction of Aryan nationalism; on the other, it 
would appear a primary obstacle to a scientific reading of history. As 
early as 1866, Freeman had pinpointed the tendency to prefer ro­
mance to fact as the bane of popular historical writing and attempted 
to lay down guidelines for distinguishing between the two (HE, 1:1­
39). At times this involved verifying details by known facts or analyz­
ing their internal consistency. More often, it meant using compara­
tive methods to expose similar accounts as imitations of a genre. 
Freeman noted with a kind of grim satisfaction that the result of tex­
tual criticism was "to tear away all shreds of likelihood, all shreds of 
possibility, from the choicest, the most beautiful, the most cherished, 
legends"; still, he resented the fact that "this often makes our studies 
unpopular; people quarrel with us because we rob them of their be­
loved fables, and they . . . say that they will believe the fables in 
spite of us and our evidence" (M, 139-40). The serious historian might 
permit readers their artistic pleasure in pretty stories, but he had to 
insist that belief was a matter of fact, not taste. 
For all the self-righteous severity Freeman mustered in the persona 
of the embattled professional, it is important to see that here too his 
motives were the same as Arnold's and Carlyle's: to try to establish a 
groundwork of fact upon which a legitimate hero-worship might be 
raised. His real objection to sacrificing history to "silly stories" was 
that as a result, "the real actions of very remarkable men are utterly 
forgotten" (HE, 1:8). For England in particular, substituting history 
for legend "almost always tends to exalt instead of to depreciate the 
ancient heroes of our land." For "truths like these it is worth while to 
surrender a few pleasant fables," Freeman argued; "but on the other 
hand, we must beware lest sound criticism degenerate into indiscrim­
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inate scepticism" (HE, 1:39). Their precise historical accuracy might 
remain in question, but mythic accounts should still be allowed some 
germ of truth that testified to Aryan ideals. Freeman thus parted ways 
with Grote, who censured all attempts to pin down historical truth in 
Trojan legends. He likewise drew the line at theories (like Max 
Muller's and G. W. Cox's) that reduced all Aryan myths to expres­
sions of natural phenomena, fearing that "if Achilleus and Odysseus 
are ruled to be the sun, later heroes of mythology and romance, Ar­
thur and Hengist and Cerdic and the Great Karl himself, may some 
day be found out to be the sun also" (HE, 1:2). If this naive literalism 
was largely a pose, it did not rule out a quite serious concern that too 
thoroughgoing a scepticism about early history might erode respect 
for genuine tradition as a legitimate historical source. Like Arnold, 
Freeman used scientific methods not to discredit myth and legend, 
but rather to give authority to the "right" ones. It was all the more 
gratifying to praise famous men when imagination and fact were thus 
joined. 
Myth, superstition, and folklore also played an important role in 
Freeman's re-creation of the mind or spirit of the age. "The history of 
opinions about facts is really no small part of the history of those 
facts" (M, 267), he reminded his readers. Hagiography, outdated his­
tories, and popular literature also helped reconstruct that opinion. 
Even traditional documents like Domesday had a double value, pro­
viding the legal record but also letting the reader behind the scenes: 
"Every human relation, every position of life . . . the wail of the 
dispossessed, the overbearing greed of the intruder, the domestic de­
tails of courtship, marriage, dowry, inheritance, bequest, and burial, 
all are there" (NC, 5:44). Most often, the mind of the time served 
Freeman as it did Froude and Macaulay. He was too obviously the 
judicious lawyer highlighting detail that supported his case, leaving 
in shadow what did not. References to daily life in Domesday are 
muted except where they demonstrate the injustice of Norman rule 
(e.g., 5:44-45); legendary accounts are brought to the fore mainly when 
they argue for his good opinion of Teutonic heroes (e.g., NC, 3:361). 
Freeman might (in appendixes) insert disclaimers about the reliabil­
ity of superstition and folklore, but in the text he takes full advantage 
of the rhetorical weight they lent to his own interpretations. He ma­
nipulates "the feelings of those times" about oaths in such a way as to 
condemn William for making Harold swear fealty, rather than fault­
ing Harold for breaking the oath (NC, 3:252). To heighten the porten­
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tousnessof William's last year of life, he lets "our ancient tongue . . . 
set forth the full horrors of such a time" (NC, 4:695). Quoting the 
words of the chronicler and going on to cite other catastrophes that 
popular belief anachronistically placed in the same year allows 
Freeman to reinforce, without actually having to credit, the sense that 
some ritual revenge was being wrought upon the usurper. 
Despite the vast detail of Freeman's major work, there is little of the 
texture of daily life, few of the individual faces of custom, that cap­
tured Macaulay's and Green's imaginations. Lack of data was a fac­
tor, although Green overcame the same liability with significant suc­
cess. We might also argue that "history as past politics" necessarily 
meant that only lead actors deserved center stage. The more persua­
sive explanation lies in the demands of Freeman's mythology. His 
focus is always on the archetype, not on the individual, on the public 
spectacle, not on its private contexts. The universalizing pull of his 
cycles flattens into insignificance the quotidian and the personal. It is 
the infrastructure rather than the "pulse of life" that attracts him 
most. When he makes significant detours from the main course of the 
political narrative, it is to linger in places where the historical record 
has in effect solidified; in the streets of cities, in the surrounding 
terrain. 
Freeman's contributions to "comparative urban history and histor­
ical travelogue" were substantial.48 He credited Green with first 
teaching him that towns too had personal lives with relevance to the 
principles "animating" their architecture. The Norman Conquest is 
studded with capsule histories of towns along the way (e.g., IV, 87, 
196, 202), and his frequent travels abroad yielded dozens of travelogue 
"middles" for the Saturday Review. For Freeman, capturing the "lo­
cal character" of a town seldom meant resuscitating its teeming street 
life as it had for Green. He is more interested in establishing "its posi­
tion in the history of the world"—its role in the wider drama of Aryan 
history (HE, 4:v). He cherishes the physical structure of cities as a 
literal palimpsest that preserves in miniature all strata of cultural 
evolution. Nothing fascinated him more than finding spots where he 
could see the whole history of the world "stamped for ever on the 
stones of a single building" (M, 316). Like Carlyle's inventory of 
Cromwell-land, his capsule histories become catalogues of the fam­
ous men and deeds associated with place. Yet the effect of Carlyle's 
stereoscopic imposition of perspectives is to draw the past into the 
immediacy of the present. Freeman valued place less for the dynamic 
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immediacy of its history than for the monumental fixity that consti­
tuted permanent presence. The effect of his miniature travelogues in 
the Norman Conquest is not to make us feel time's evanescence, but to 
stabilize—even immobilize—us in the density of the historical record. 
The cross threads of universal history actually wind up muting local 
color. When Freeman conducts us on a walking tour of Falaise, where 
legend joined William's parents for the first time, like Carlyle he posi­
tions us as "the traveller [who] gradually ascends to the gate of the 
castle, renowned alike in the wars of the twelfth, the fifteenth, and the 
sixteenth centuries" (NC, 2:177). But associations that for Freeman 
enrich the scene—Talbot's tower leads on to his role in Aquitaine, the 
castle's keep to Henry's siege—diffuse the focus of the reader who 
could not glimpse the private patterns that ordered this relentless 
cross-referencing. Freeman's allusive density enriched an otherwise 
sketchy period in the Norman Conquest, but the tendency to turn 
coincidence into connection became to some an exasperating man­
nerism.49 
Where the land itself was concerned, it was also for Freeman less a 
case of seeing how the organic shaped human history than of learning 
to read the marks of "deathless history . . . written for ever on the 
everlasting page of the soil, the hills, the sea" (M, 319). Again he cred­
ited Green with helping him appreciate the importance of terrain to 
military history; Green or their mutual friend, the geologist Boyd 
Dawkins, often accompanied Freeman in on-site visits, by then de ri­
geur for "the finished historian" (M, 314). But Freeman valued geo­
graphy mainly for its reinforcement of political distinctions. He 
never tired of correcting popular misunderstanding of geograph­
ical—and hence political—divisions and devoted his entire Histori­
cal Geography of Europe to tracing the major contours of political 
geography from the days of early Greece to the present. Not surpris­
ingly, the Geography became a tedious chore long before its final 
appearance in 1881. Freeman lacked the attachment to landscape that 
for Arnold galvanized streams and rivers into the veins and arteries of 
a living being. To climb a mountain for any reason other than a better 
view of historical sites seemed pointless to him. The effect of geo­
graphical detail in the Norman Conquest is static rather than dy­
namic. Such evidence simply fixes a site with more precision (e.g., 
Harold's landing place at Porlock, NC, 2:322) or thickens the density 
of allusion. The felsen or steep rocks from which Falaise took its 
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name acquire value not from their sublimity but because there "the 
good old Teutonic speech still lingers in local nomenclature" (NC, 
2:178). Freeman's nature, like his cities, is no more than the fixed 
repository of a fossil record. 
In his early reviews of the Norman Conquest, Green had taken 
Freeman to task for neglecting the "moral, social, and intellectual 
advance of man." Freeman protested in private that such was not his 
"mission,"50 but he responded in the final volume with a survey of the 
Conquest's "local," "social," and "ecclesiastical effects," and of its 
impact on culture. If this section (or the appendixes touching points 
of social and cultural history along the way) does little to restore the 
organic relationship between social and political life that pervades 
Green's work, Freeman's analysis is far more substantial than the sur­
vey either Froude or Macaulay provides at the outset. If the needs of 
Freeman's political argument dominate this discussion, so too did 
theirs. But by putting this section last, Freeman does underline its 
subordination to his political interests. Although he acknowledges 
the interaction of custom and innovation, we sense this data less as 
part of a living environment than as so many more analogical layers 
of artifacts, deposits of the same political glacier. Social and ecclesias­
tical change he treated so as to document the working of that same 
"general law" of continuity (NC, 5:505) that we see everywhere; the 
Conquest simply furthered changes already under way. His discus­
sion of its impact on language, literature, and art (which he equates 
with architecture) duplicates familiar paradigms as well. Noting that 
he will treat philology "only as it illustrates the political history" of 
the time (NC, 5:vi-vii), he dutifully uses the predominance of Teu­
tonic vocabulary and syntax to buttress his claim that Norman influ­
ence represented only an infusion into a dominant stock (NC, 5:538). 
Here, however, the fossil record showed evidence of catastrophic de­
struction that uniformitarian arguments could not rationalize away. 
Freeman could not help feeling that these infusions "marred for ever 
the purity of our ancient tongue" (NC, 5:651). His penchant for 
choosing germanic over latinate words, which became an obsession 
in later life, represented his personal attempt at reparation. The same 
sense of corruption and loss hangs over his discussion of literature. 
The tameness of the Roman de Rou is contrasted with the old heroic 
songs of the English folk (NC, 5:586-88); the translator of Wace is 
condemned for unleashing a flood of "wretched fables" to drive out 
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"the true history and worthier legends of our fathers" (NC, 5:590). 
Burrow quite rightly detects "an un-Whiggish sense of irrevocable 
disinheritance" behind all this mourning.51 
Freeman is luckily able to find more consoling evidence of both 
purity and continuity in architecture. The argument permits full in­
dulgence of his earliest and deepest love. He rummages through the 
architectural record of all western Europe, comparing, classifying, 
ranking, until each specimen has been securely placed in one vastly 
branching family tree. In the process he is able to defend the "primi­
tive Romanesque" of pre-Conquest England as not a corruption, but 
a more perfect carrying out of the true Roman form (NC, 5:603-4). 
The Norman Romanesque that replaced it still kept English architec­
ture in the family, and insofar as that replacement had begun with 
good King Edward, Freeman could still argue that the Conquest had 
merely given a fresh impulse to causes already at work; once again, it 
was a turning point, not a beginning. 
In turning to consider Freeman's stylistic strategies, we must to an 
extent distinguish between the different audiences he served. His 
most avowedly popularizing works—the outlines and school texts— 
were by their very nature largely devoted to summary and synthesis. 
Freeman could make few concessions to good stories for their own 
sake in such works. Old-English History, which he originally wrote 
for his own children, is an important exception. It tells at length se­
lected legends like the story of King Edwin "because it is such a fam­
ous and beautiful tale," but it brackets such stories apart from the rest 
of the text and consciously antiquates the style to distinguish them 
from "true history" ("Then Aethelfrith sent unto Raedwald, saying, 
'Slay me Edwin mine enemy, and I will give thee much gold and 
silver.' But Raedwald would not hearken").52 In Freeman's own nar­
rative voice there is much of the confiding dogmatism of the earnest 
schoolmaster. He coaxes the naive reader along in a story-telling 
singsong, prompting the correct judgments ("You will perhaps say 
that our forefathers were cruel and wicked men . .  . but you must 
remember . . . that it is not fair to judge our fathers by the same 
rules as if they had been either Christians or civilized men") and 
gently but firmly inculcating the lessons of the Aryan catechism ("We 
should always think with reverence of our own fathers and kinsfolk, 
and think what great nations have grown out of the people who were 
then looked down upon as Barbarians").55 
Freeman's grand style is more dignified but no lighter in its touch. 
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He was a great admirer of Macaulay's "English undefiled" (M, 105) 
and claimed that it had taught him the need for clarity, simplicity and 
judicious repetition.54 The results of Freeman's imitation would 
scarcely have flattered Macaulay. Freeman's attempts at lucidity 
translated into a doggedly insistent prose that hammered home the 
same ideas in the same simplistic cadences and virtually unvaried 
phrasing. His conviction that what every schoolboy knew was a jum­
ble of anachronisms and misnomers turned Macaulay's breezy allu­
siveness into labored antiquarianism, his easy authority into an over­
bearing dogmatism. Freeman strove for dignity and grandeur but 
achieved at best what Green called "a sort of undertaker-solemnity," 
all anthems and no timbrels (LG, 302, 222). Freeman's limitations 
were in part temperamental. Subtlety of any kind irritated him. He 
could trust the black and white garishness of Macaulay's prose, but 
instantly suspected Froude's elegant nuances. Not surprisingly, his 
taste for fiction was highly limited. His essential dogmatism admitted 
no toleration for alternative realities. He was also the least novelistic 
of my six historians. The aesthetics of sympathy brought one a bit too 
close to familiarity. Freeman was jealous for the reputations of his 
Aryan pantheon and required a conventionally histrionic heroism to 
keep them larger than life. 
The History of the Norman Conquest in England was first and 
foremost a patriotic epic, the latest in a long chain of Aryan sagas: for 
Freeman, part of both a literary and an historical tradition. He had 
begun his career as a composer of ballads celebrating Aryan heroes; 
when it came time to tell the story of his own nation in prose, he 
naturally adopted the same mode. However often he might acknowl­
edge the weight of relative standards of behavior, he measures the 
stature of any individual with pretensions to greatness against 
centuries-old ideals of military valor and honor. Whenever he wishes 
to deepen the resonance of important moments, he automatically 
borrows analogies from that tradition: the battle of Maldon naturally 
struck him as having a "thoroughly Homeric character," its record in 
verse as breathing "the true fire of the warlike minstrelsy common to 
Greek and Teuton" (NC, 1:273-74). Such conscious parallels helped 
not only to make good his claim that the achievements of Teutonic 
Christendom rivaled those of the ancient world, but also to aggran­
dize England's special providential role in Aryan history. 
Casting English history in terms of this epic tradition necessarily 
meant stressing the importance of individuals, in refutation of Posi­
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tivist claims against individual freedom. Despite his disclaimers 
about hero-worship, Freeman was instinctively attracted to "great 
man" explanations: to situations where the "spirit of a gallant army" 
could be "foully damped by the malice of a single traitor" one year, 
and rallied to victory in the next by "the efforts of a single hero, boldly 
struggling against every difficulty" (NC, 1:322). On the other hand, if 
individuals hold the center stage in the History, judgments always 
reach beyond the individual. Freeman's handling of men and events 
encourages us to gauge their stature as silhouetted within ever widen­
ing frames of perspective: to judge their significance first to English, 
then to Aryan, and finally to Universal history. William and Harold 
play the leads in the "great drama" of the Conquest, but it is their role 
in the "great struggle of nations and tongues and principles" that 
gives them interest, not vice versa (NC, 1:532). Freeman begins, rather 
than ends, with a summation of Harold's and William's vices, virtues, 
and political significance. There is little or no sense of a character 
evolving in either man. The moral and political estimates of each are 
fixed at the outset, the rest of their characterization tailored to vindi­
cate these. As a result they do not come home to us as personalities in 
the way that Carlyle's Cromwell or even Froude's Henry does. This ef­
fect derives partly from the amount of verifiable detail Freeman had at 
his disposal, but is more a question of his own narrative choices and 
abilities. Lengthening the field of focus necessarily subordinated 
individual personalities to the larger pattern. The principles he rep­
resents, not the man himself, emerge as the real source of dramatic 
interest. 
Harold's place in the ranks of English heroes is assured from the 
beginning. Freeman casts him not as the usurping Godwinson but as 
"the hero and the martyr of our native freedom" (NC, 2:37), a con­
summate military commander and an even more accomplished states­
man whose goal was ever to keep England free from foreign domina­
tion. He was in all things Teutonic: even those foreigners he 
promoted were "natives of . . . kindred Teutonic lands" (NC, 2:41). 
Freeman takes great pains to keep his motives as pure as his lineage. 
He devotes a substantial portion of the narrative in volume 3 to the 
most controversial point of Harold's reign, whether or not he had 
sworn an oath to place William on the throne after Edward's death. 
He continues his special pleading in lengthy appendixes, content 
only when he can turn the final blame against William. 
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Freeman's usual strategy for aggrandizing Harold's position con­
sisted not of directly refuting "Norman calumny" but of magnifying 
the terms of comparison. He begins by comparing Harold, the 
"champion of England against the Southern invader," (NC, 2:44) to 
Constantine Palailoges, who fell, sword in hand, defending his native 
Greece against invading Turks. Freeman consciously heightens the 
drama surrounding Harold's election and reign, enlarging their 
scope until he seems a political leader of international proportions. 
Referring to the Bayeux tapestry, Freeman lingers for five pages over 
the hesitant expression on Harold's face when he is formally offered 
Edward's crown. He attributes to him a conception of its political 
significance clearly more Freeman's than Harold's. By noting that 
Harold was not of noble blood, Freeman isolates him in world his­
tory; by measuring him against a rogue's gallery of tyrants, he easily 
inflates Harold's distinction: 
For him, no son of a kingly father, no scion of legendary heroes and of 
Gods of the elder faith, to see with his own eyes the diadem of Ecgbehrt 
and Cerdic ready for his grasp, was of itself a strange and wondrous 
feeling, such as few men but him in the world's history can have felt. He 
was not like others before and since, who by fraud or violence have risen 
to royalty or more than royalty. Harold was not a Dionysios, a Caesar, a 
Cromwell, or a Buonaparte, whose throne was reared upon the ruins of 
the freedom of his country. He was not an Eastern Basileus, climbing to 
the seat from which a fortunate battle or a successful conspiracy had 
hurled a murdered or blinded predecessor. (NC, 3:22) 
Having suitably intensified the awe with which Harold must have 
viewed the English crown, "freely offered in all its glory and great­
ness," (NC, 3:23), Freeman then turns to other reasons for Harold's 
hesitation: to his consciousness of assured challenges by Tostig, his 
brother, and by William, to his memory of the ignominious oath he 
had sworn to the latter and would now have to break: "No wonder 
then if, as the picture sets before us, he looked at the Crown at once 
wistfully and anxiously, and half drew back the hand which was 
stretched forth to grasp the glittering gift. And yet the risk had to be 
run. A path of danger opened before him, and yet duty no less than 
ambition bade him to enter upon the thorny road" (NC, 3:24). By 
arguing on Harold's behalf that William would challenge the throne 
regardless of who held it, and that only Harold was an adversary 
mighty enough to protect it, Freeman casts his decision in the light of 
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self-sacrifice rather than self-interest: "The danger then had to be 
faced. The call of patriotism distinctly bade Harold not to shrink at 
the last moment from the post to which he had so long looked for­
ward, and which had at last become his own. The first man in En­
gland, first in every gift of war and peace, first in the love of his coun­
trymen, first in renown in other lands, was bound to be first alike in 
honour and danger" (NC, 3:25). Arnold himself could not have con­
jured up a more noble set of motives for a silent hero. 
Freeman maintains the note of quavering sanctity through Har­
old's coronation, the highlight of which was the voiced consent of the 
people to his election: a classic Whig anachronism, here intensified 
into a moral victory: "Never was there a more lawful ruler in this 
world than Harold, King of the English and Lord of the Isle of 
Britain—King, not by the mouldering titles of a worn-out dynasty, 
not by the gold of the trafficker or the steel of the invader, but by the 
noblest title by which one man can claim to rule over his fellows, the 
free choice of a free people" (NC, 3:47). Harold's endorsement by the 
most hallowed traditions of English political life is made more poig­
nant by their imminent disruption. To drive home Harold's position 
in the saga of English liberties, Freeman pauses in the account of his 
final laying to rest at Waltham for one of those parallels that were his 
trademark. He looks forward two hundred forty years to the day when 
the body of Edward I lay temporarily at Harold's side. In Freeman's 
hands comparison becomes typological, and coincidence reveals the 
major contours of English liberty: 
With Harold, our native Kingship ends; the Crown, the laws, the liber­
ties, the very tongue of Englishmen, seem all fallen never to rise again. 
In Edward the line of English Kings begins once more. After two 
hundred years of foreign rule, we have again a King bearing an English 
name and an English heart—the first to give us back our ancient laws 
under new shapes. . .  . In the whole course of English history we 
hardly come across a scene which speaks more deeply to the heart, than 
when the first founder of our later greatness was laid by the side of the 
last kingly champion of our earliest freedom. (NC, 3:521) 
If a man be judged by the company he keeps, Harold's good reputa­
tion would be assured by the way Freeman frames his portrait. Held 
fast in the interlocking circles of English history, Harold becomes by 
implication larger than life, a martyr to causes most sacred to the 
Whig view. 
Notwithstanding Harold's symbolic importance, it is William who 
198 
Edward Augustus Freeman 
is the more personally realized—and not just as the villain of the 
piece. This is true in part simply because Freeman had more materials 
to work with: one of the perquisites of success was more and better 
press. William's characterization draws more fully upon the conven­
tional materials of the Victorian historian: we see his portrait in the 
later years of his reign (NC, 4:622), hear his voice in direct quotations 
(NC, 4:707), are treated to the detailed deathbed scene (NC, 4:708-9), 
and mythic alternatives to the standard biography. Although Free­
man wants us to remain at an awestruck distance, his efforts to make 
William larger than life work at cross-purposes with his political 
sympathies. Only the highest superlatives quite satisfy him: "No man 
that ever trod this earth was ever endowed with greater natural gifts; 
to no man was it ever granted to accomplish greater things" (NC, 
2:164-65). But knowing that this sheer force of character helped crush 
old English freedoms necessarily qualifies Freeman's admiration. He 
casts his qualifications in ethical rather than political terms, how­
ever. Only when William's actions are looked at "without regard to 
their moral character" may he "fairly claim his place in the first rank 
of the world's greatest men." William's preeminence, like Harold's, 
earns him the right to be judged by international standards. But Wil­
liam is hardly a match for the much more punishing competition of 
the world's "pure patriots." Harold easily looked good in the exclu­
sive company of tyrants; William, if not damned, is at least compro­
mised, by much fainter praise: 
If we cannot give him a niche among pure patriots and heroes, he is 
quite as little entitled to a place among mere tyrants and destroyers. 
William of Normandy has no claim to share in the pure glory of Timo­
leon, Aelfred, and Washington; he cannot even claim the more mingled 
fame of Alexander, Charles, and Cnut; but he has still less in common 
with the mere enemies of their species, with the Nabuchodonosors, the 
Swegens, and the Buonopartes, whom God has sent from time to time 
as simple scourges of a guilty world. (NC, 2:165-66) 
Although admitting that considering his upbringing and the mores 
of his time, William was to be commended for not being worse, Free­
man never lets relativism devalue the moral and patriotic hierarchies 
that structure history. Finally, of course, these hierarchies are one and 
the same: it was because William "stretched forth his hand to grasp 
the diadem which was another's" that he was not "one of the best, as 
well as one of the greatest, rulers of his time" (NC, 2:171). 
Another strategy Freeman uses to universalize the moral judgments 
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against William is to let the eye of contemporaries see the hand of God 
in policies Freeman wished to condemn as immoral. Freeman's own 
well-publicized campaign against fox hunting undoubtedly encour­
aged him to find William's laying waste of populated lands to create 
the New Forest especially blameworthy. He allows contemporaries to 
draw conclusions from the fact that William's son was to be treach­
erously murdered there: "Our age shrinks, and it is often wise in 
shrinking, from seeing the visible hand of God in the punishments 
which seem, even on earth, to overtake the sinner. The age of William 
was less scrupulous: the men of his own day . . . saw in the life of 
William a mighty tragedy, with the avenging Ate brooding over the 
sinner and his house" (NC, 4:610). Freeman goes on to elaborate the 
classical analogy. At "the highest pinnacle of earthly greatness . . . 
the pride of greatness and victory overcame him. They led him on to 
those deeds of greater wrong by which the avenger, as in the tales of 
old Hellas, was wont to punish earlier deeds of lesser wrong." In the 
view of the eleventh century, the disgraces of William's later years 
were "so many strokes of the sword of the avenger," (NC, 4:610-11) 
punishing William for harrying Northumberland, allowing the 
death of Waltheof, and desolating Hampshire for his own pleasure. 
"To speculations beyond his range the historian can say neither Yea 
nor Nay," Freeman sagely cautions. This would-be disclaimer hardly 
obscures the fact that Freeman willingly chooses to see a "poetic jus­
tice" (NC, 4:701), if not an outright act of divine vengeance, in the 
tragic downfall of a once mighty ruler whose base actions had low­
ered him to the level of meaner men. The condemnation gains more 
authority by being modeled on a paradigm of western culture. In 
condemnation, as in celebration, the terms of comparison assume 
maximum breadth of judgment. 
The Battle of Hastings (or of "Senlac," as Freeman rechristened it), 
the thematic as well as literal center of his major work, provides us 
with the set piece that most effectively demonstrates Freeman's han­
dling of events. Apart from the conventional devices of Victorian mil­
itary history—speculations on the thoughts of soldiers, citation of 
battle cries and dialogue, notes on the modern appearance of the 
field—we are struck most forcefully by the Homeric echoes that sound 
throughout the account. This was the crux of the "great struggle of 
tongues and nations and principles"; its importance in world history 
demanded a suitably grand style of presentation, one that gave great 
warriors and great nations their due. The handling of details, focus, 
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and action is calculated to convince us that this epic of Norman and 
Teuton equals in gravity and splendor any in the Aryan canon. 
Like Carlyle at the battle of Dunbar, Freeman begins by allowing 
us behind the lines on the night before the fighting. The Normans, 
"under the influence of that strange spiritual excitement which had 
persuaded men that an unprovoked aggression on an unoffending 
nation was in truth a war of religion" (NC, 3:454), occupied them­
selves with prayer and devotion. What the French source slightingly 
refers to as "singing and drinking" in the English camp, Freeman 
converts into the symbolic moment when "spirit-stirring strains of 
old Teutonic minstrelsy" were heard for the last time "in the air of a 
free and pure Teutonic England.'' To underline this point, he specu­
lates that "they sang, we well may deem, the song of Brunanburh 
and the Song of Maldon; they sang how Aethelstan conquered and 
how Brihtnoth fell." He thus converts a Norman slight into a sol­
emnly patriotic preparation for battle, as fitting as all the "pious ora­
tory" on the other side. Paralleled accounts of the morning's prepara­
tions follow: the generals' speeches to their men, a survey of the 
troops, a closeup shot of each side as battle positions were taken up. 
Freeman closely follows the Roman de Rou in its account of the no­
bles who rode with William, but he characteristically pauses to allude 
to each man's past or future significance in the saga, to weigh up his 
vices and virtues, before passing on. We glimpse Robert Montgom­
ery, who would found a mighty house in the conquered isle, Roger of 
Norfolk—"a man false alike to his native country and its foreign 
King"—and Eustace of Boulogne, who had murdered unarmed En­
glishmen on their hearthstones and would soon bear the ignominy of 
being the only man to show craven fear (NC, 3:460-61). The effect is 
not so much to personalize the account as to make it resonate with 
historical associations: in this moment lay the intersection of many 
strands of personal and national history. The surveying eye moves on, 
noting the regional identities and characteristic weapons of the 
common soldiers as they approached the field of combat. It reserves 
the closeup for William and Odo, leaving them dramatically spot­
lighted at "the innermost center of the advancing host": "There, in 
the midst of all, the guiding star of the whole army, floated the conse­
crated banner, the gift of Rome and of Hildebrand, the ensign by 
whose presence wrong was to be hallowed into right. And close be­
neath its folds rode the two master-spirits of the whole enterprise, 
kindred alike in blood, in valour, and in crime" (NC, 3:463). After a 
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description of each leader, the perspective widens back out again, to 
close with a roll call of "the chivalry of Normandy, the future nobility 
of England": the men who gained a foothold by wrong but whose 
children would win the rights of the Great Charter (NC, 3:466). 
In turning to the English side, Freeman had no such record as 
Domesday to aid him: "The heroes who fought against [the French] 
for hearth and home are nameless" (NC, 3:467). After giving a para­
phrase of Harold's exhortation to his troops, he fills in by taking time 
to refute Norman aspersions cast on English conduct. He then fol­
lows with a parallel survey of the weaponry and battle positions of the 
English, and similarly closes in, first on the ensign bearing the 
Dragon of Wessex—"the sign which had led Englishmen to victory at 
Ethandun and at Brunanbuhr, at Penselwood and at Brentford"— 
and then to the leaders beneath it. Freeman gradually constricts our 
focus, slowing the action with self-conscious repetition and paral­
leled phrasing, to apply maximum concentration on the hero at the 
center of this scene, as he is at the center of the History itself: 
There, as the inner circle of the host, were ranged the fated warriors of 
the house of Godwine. Three generations of that great line were gath­
ered beneath the Standard of its chief. There stood the aged Aelfwig, 
with his monk's cowl beneath his helmet. There stood young Hakon 
the son of Swegen, atoning for his father's crimes. And, closer still than 
all, the innermost centre of that glorious ring, stood the kingly three, 
brothers in life and death. There, in their stainless truth, stood Gyrth 
the counsellor and Leofwine the fellow-exile. And there, with his foot 
firm on his native earth, sharing the toils and dangers of his meanest 
soldier, with the kingly helm on his brow and the two-handed axe 
upon his shoulder, stood Harold, King of the English. (NC, 3:474-75) 
The stage is now set for the fighting to begin. Freeman admits the 
traditional account of Taillefer's throwing his sword in the air and 
striking the first blow, but decidedly deflates its picturesque appeal 
with a no-nonsense observation: "A bravado of this kind might serve 
as an omen, it might stir up the spirits of the men on either side; but it 
could in no other way affect the fate of the battle" (NC, 3:477). He 
skims through the first Norman assault, ending with balanced paral­
lels that underscore the literal and symbolic opposition in the scene: 
"Javelin and arrow had been tried in vain; every Normal missile had 
found an English missile to answer it. The lifted lances had been 
found wanting; the broad-sword had clashed in vain against the two-
handed axe; the maces of the Duke and of the Bishop had done their 
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best. But . . . the old Teutonic tactics . . . proved too strong for 
the arts and the valour of Gaul and Roman" (NC, 3:479-80). As one 
would expect, hereafter the. battle focuses on individual combat. 
Freeman relates the story that William, seeing the Breton troops in 
retreat, personally rallied them by baring his head to show that he still 
lived and exhorting them to return to the fray. He chooses the version 
that has William kill Gyrth with his own mace for similar reasons: 
these hand-to-hand struggles were the stuff of epic heroism and made 
overt the symbolic significance of the battle. The epic parallels be­
come explicit in Harold's reaction to his brother's fall: "The deed of 
Metaurus had been, as it were, wrought beneath the eyes of Hannibal; 
Achilleus had looked on and seen the doom of his Patroklos and his 
Antilochos. The fate of England now rested on the single heart and 
the single arm of her King" (NC, 3:485). So important to Freeman was 
"the great personal struggle which was going on beneath the Stan­
dard" of the English that he attributed a similar preoccupation to the 
English troops: this explained why the French were able to penetrate 
the barricade for the first time. He completes the account of how 
Norman "craft," in the form of a false retreat, allowed French troops 
finally to break through the shield wall with another sampling of the 
"more remarkable" instances of hand-to-hand combat from Wace 
(NC, 3:492). 
Despite the fact that his audience was well aware of the battle's 
outcome, Freeman tries to maintain suspense to the end. With the 
Breton retreat, "for the moment the day seemed lost" (NC, 3:481); 
even after the French breakthrough "the fight was still far from being 
over. It was by no means clear that some new chance of warfare might 
not again turn the balance in favour of England" (NC, 3:491-92). Not 
until that one arrow "more charged with destiny than its fellows" 
pierced Harold's eye is the cause conceded as lost (NC, 3:497). All that 
is left to do is to "call up before our eyes the valiant deaths of those few 
[English] warriors of Senlac whose names we know" (NC, 3:500). 
Compared with one of Carlyle's battle pieces, Freeman's seems pecu­
liarly static, almost ritualized. We are clearly watching a pageant, not 
participating in one. Freeman's intention is not so much to duplicate 
the experiential reality of the fighting as to sing his song of arms and 
the man in terms befitting its importance: to convince his audience 
that "never was a battle more stoutly contested between able generals 
supported by more valiant soldiers" (NC, 3:505). His main tactic is 
not to strive for imaginative originality, but to sound echoes of time­
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honored conventions of epic heroism; not so much to personalize the 
battle as to universalize it. 
When the History of the Norman Conquest began first to appear, 
periodicals like the Athenaeum and the Pall Mall Gazette hailed 
Freeman for delivering England's early history from the hands of triv­
ializing romancers and dryasdust chroniclers alike. They praised the 
life and spirit of his prose and appreciated his success in raising the 
tone of historical writing.55 But Freeman ended by pleasing neither 
general nor professional audiences. The same journals soon began to 
weary of his prolixity and repetitiveness.56 Despite Freeman's obses­
sion with the laws of political science and his dislike of excessive spe­
cialization, he became in public eyes a classic example of the new 
scholar who rejected all synthesis until every fact had been cata­
logued.57 Although he recognized the importance of style to history, 
the violence of his attacks on Froude and Froude's readers stereotyped 
Freeman as hostile to any literary concessions. Frederic Harrison's 
"The History Schools (An Oxford Dialogue)" caricatured Freeman's 
supposed positions in the manuscript-sifting pedant, Aethelbald 
Wessex.58 Harrison also pointed out the ways Freeman's almost ex­
clusive attention to the Aryans and to history before 1300 undercut the 
very "unity of history" he touted.59 Instead of being converted by the 
Aryan gospel, reviewers resented Freeman's assuming "the tone of a 
prophet of a new revelation."60 The Athenaeum pronounced his ar­
gument for Aryan continuity self-defeating.61 The intemperance of 
his Francophobia discredited his analyses for some, the fulsomeness 
of his praise for liberty and its Teutonic defenders strained his hero-
worship for others.62 Freeman's tendency to "treat modern politics 
like an archaeologist" demonstrated how very unpractical a politi­
cian he was.63 With so few converts to his credit, Freeman had good 
reasons for feeling a baffled messianism.64 
If the general audience found his antipathies and enthusiasms too 
intense for sound views, one can imagine how fellow professionals 
reacted. C. H. Pearson matched him source for source in questioning 
Freeman's idealization of Harold, and ended by paying him the dubi­
ous compliment of finding him a more vivid portraitist precisely be­
cause he was such a prejudiced special pleader.65 J. H. Round's fero­
cious pedantry and professional jealousies quite outdid anything 
Freeman had inflicted on Froude. After criticizing Freeman's battle of 
"Senlac" in excruciating detail, Round dismissed Freeman's work in 
terms echoing Freeman's own criticisms: blinded by democratic zeal 
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and carried away by his "homeric" dramatization of heroes, Freeman 
had drawn more upon the "resources of his imagination" than on the 
judicious analysis of sources.66 Others agreed that the epic poet in 
Freeman was incompatible with the "calm and unprejudiced ob­
server" the historian should be and wrote him off as merely the last of 
those who wrote history as romance.67 For the new school of Maitland 
and Tout, it was Freeman's anachronistic attempts to justify present 
politics by past precedent that discredited his scholarship.68 While 
maintaining an attitude of respect, the English Historical Review 
treated him more as a synthesizer than an original researcher.69 
Freeman was in a sense a casualty of changes in audience expecta­
tions, but much more so of his own inherent strengths and weak­
nesses. His popular success was limited not because he cared too little 
for general readers, but because he had too much invested in his mes­
sage to them. His immersion in private myths blinded him to measure 
and proportion in his public elaboration of them. What were to him 
analogies that demonstrated the master plan struck his audience as 
irrelevant pedantry; the lengthy analyses of sources intended to sal­
vage truth more often convinced them of its elusiveness and made 
Freeman out a casuist. Having converted his own beliefs into moral 
absolutes, he self-righteously attacked the disagreement of others as 
defiance of a common morality. His avenging zeal more than once 
carried him beyond the limits of good taste and good judgment. To be 
sure, Freeman did serve his audience well in more general ways. Al­
though the continuity of English history had by then become a com­
monplace, it was still reassuring to have it made "scientific" by such 
an authority. The public could and did take comfort in the thumping 
assurance of his patriotism and appreciated his giving the Conquest 
the full-dress treatment it had long deserved. And surely for every one 
reviewer who deplored Freeman's simplistic partisanship, there were 
a dozen readers secretly comforted by his reduction of all western his­
tory to one vast psychomachia: to a clearcut struggle between good 
and evil in which England—provided she forsook the Turk—could 
place herself complacently on the side of faith, civilization, and 
70 progress.
Freeman revealed the central imperatives of Victorian historical 
writing all the more openly because he thought that he had justified 
his positions by scientific scholarship alone. Just as much as Arnold 
and Carlyle, he was concerned to rescue the past from obscurity and 
determinism, to endow historical study with the "moral certainty" 
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that made human action possible and meaningful. He needed to 
argue for the unity of history in order to vindicate the universality of 
his own assumptions about political behavior. He advocated the most 
exacting methods of source criticism in order to set his hero-worship 
on a firmer basis. His scholarship was more scientific—in the sense of 
being more thorough and more self-conscious—than that of his men-
of-letters predecessors, but the important point was that he adopted 
the guise of the new German professionalism in order to aggrandize, 
not to undercut, the emotional authority of the Victorian sage. Like 
those predecessors he signalled his request for a belief that went 
beyond mere credence by adopting a self-consciously "literary" 
approach—an epic style that justified the awe and reverence his vi­
sion deserved. 
By pointing up how easily traditional Victorian assumptions 
about history's cultural value could be assimilated to the new aca­
demic professionalism, Freeman's career forecasts a pattern distinc­
tive to England. At the ancient universities, the power of historical 
thinking would continue to outweigh the command of specialized 
skills in the study of history. History's main purpose would remain 
the teaching of useful lessons. The historical scientist's research 
would have to be "applied," not "pure," if he were to fulfill his high­
est duties. To an extent unprecedented elsewhere, English historians 
remained responsive to the wider society's demand for practical and 
uplifting history. Freeman demonstrates the resulting contradictions 
between public and professional priorities in their most flagrant 
form: the further ramifications of those contradictions will be the 
subject of my epilogue. 
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I f the nineteenth century was the age of history, histories themselves were a genre that most efficiently reconciled the contradictory 
needs of Victorian consciousness. Victorian histories asserted the au­
thority of the real but provided the satisfactions of romance. They 
emplotted the actual so as to demonstrate the triumph of good over 
evil, recovery over loss, identity over disinheritance. As art that could 
both entertain and educate, histories escaped the evangelical disap­
proval and Utilitarian scorn that "mere" literature aroused. Macau-
lay's penchant for conjuring up historical romances while at the same 
time insisting on the clear distinction between fact and fantasy pro­
vides the classic example of the tension between imagination and rea­
son, escapism and pragmatism. Historical study satisfied even so ra­
tionalistic a mind as Macaulay's by uniting "the clear discernment of 
truth and the exquisite enjoyment of fiction." It satisfied the exacting 
consciences of Arnold and Carlyle for similar reasons: they could 
counter fears of self-indulgent escapism by turning their histories 
into "tracts for the times." 
Even more important was history's ability to reconcile faith with 
reason. In the hands of these writers, history brought the facts of the 
past to bear on the truths of belief. It confirmed with law the order 
posited by faith. In an increasingly secular age, history took the place 
of dogma as the mainstay of meaningfulness. Without knowledge of 
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his past, man became for Carlyle an "aimless exile" from the spiritual 
community, deprived of a soul because he was deprived of a history. 
The very process of studying history satisfied quasi-religious needs by 
reestablishing this spiritual community and paying tribute to its 
ideals. Arnold defined the "power of connecting ourselves with the 
past" as "one of the very divinest parts of our nature." Studying his­
tory became an act of reverence toward all things "noble and just, 
and wise and holy" in human achievement. For Carlyle and Froude 
this meant hero-worship. The Whig might revere institutions more 
than individuals, but his alternative faith had similar purposes: to 
locate a teleological order in the past and to create a tradition that 
demanded and inspired emulation in the present. What was true for 
Macaulay, the most rationalistic of the six, was to an extent true of 
them all: the scenes of major historical events replaced religious 
shrines as the holy ground of a modern faith. History provided the 
sacred text and a secularized communion of saints for a religion in 
which "Admiration, Hope, and Love" bolstered the orthodox creed. 
As Arnold's Christian teacher, Carlyle's poet-seer, or even Free­
man's professional, the historian became the high priest for this reli­
gion, an interpreter who was supposed to provide consolation, direc­
tion, and inspiration for his flock. Arnold viewed his historical work 
in the same light as his clerical responsibilities: both were ways of 
wrestling actively with the doubt and scepticism of the secular world. 
For Arnold the priest and the historian were one because all knowl­
edge was one. Victims of Truth's fragmentation, Froude and Green 
chose the latter vocation after failing at the first. Carlyle struggled 
with increasing difficulty to make historical study affirm the proph­
et's voice. Freeman succeeded by refusing to acknowledge a distinc­
tion between his moral and scientific messages. By devoting himself 
to historical writing, Macaulay retreated from his public duties and 
private griefs into a world of controllable experience. Like the others, 
he sought there a realm of more stable ideals and more conscious 
order than he found in the present. 
For all six, public mission as well as private needs made objectivity 
and impartiality suspect if not irresponsible. Where ethical issues 
were concerned (and for the Victorians, where were they not?) impar­
tiality became "unworthy indifference." Like Green, all six histori­
ans considered moral judgment "the very soul of history." Not just 
understanding but belief itself was at stake in historical investigation: 
the penalty for failing to make the past intelligible was scepticism. 
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Carlyle evinced the most anxiety about the difficulties of discerning 
landmarks in history's dark void, but even Freeman feared that being 
too critical in analyzing sources threatened to make us despair of find­
ing any reliable record of human achievement. There was in this 
sense no such thing as a search for truth "for its own sake." 
For twentieth-century thinkers, one's way of knowing determines 
what one can know. For the Victorians what one believed determined 
one's way of knowing. Spiritual facts were revealed to the eye of imag­
ination. There was a certain practical motive in supplying history 
with rousing narratives and purple patches: history had to have "the 
interest of romance" in order to retain its hold on "imaginative and 
moral feelings"; it needed art to "brand" lasting instruction on the 
mind. Here Arnold and Macaulay were in essential agreement. 
Choosing to downplay their scholarly apparatus in order to preserve 
readability appeared natural to them. This choice had become more 
polemical for Freeman and Green. Still, both were willing to make 
concessions in professional standards in the hope of holding the at­
tention of the general public. However, far more significant in deter­
mining the literary shape of historical narrative was the conviction 
that imagination was necessary to understanding, that "poetic in­
sight" was often "the truest philosophy of history." Given the com­
plexity of great personalities, only poetry was adequate to re-create 
them. Given the fragmentary nature of the historical record, only an 
act of imagination could reconstitute the "scattered bones" into an 
organism, transform the "shot rubbish" into a reflection of the cos­
mic whole. To bridge the gap between past and present conscious­
ness, the historian had often to project what he could not confirm. 
Carlyle was not the only one who felt that some invention could pro­
duce a truer, because more fully realized, picture. Verisimilitude often 
had greater persuasive power than "hard facts" because meaning in 
history was the domain of the suprarational—of inspiration, of sym­
pathy, of will. The literary coherence of the Victorian history was an 
invitation to belief: a pact between the writer, the reader, and the past. 
The different registers of Victorian history correspond to the differ­
ent levels at which the reader could enter and experience. If engaging 
what Arnold called "poetical feelings" in itself enlarged one's mind, 
merely witnessing the pageant of great individuals engaged in great 
deeds was inspiriting to the reader—all the more when he could be­
lieve such romantic scenes had "really" happened. Purple prose and 
the grand style were intended to overawe the worshipper in the same 
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way as did ecclesiastical pomp. But recognition of the familiar com­
pelled a more powerful belief than did pageantry. In a secularized 
faith, sympathy did the work of conversion, and sympathy rested on 
the acknowledgement of a shared humanity. Glimpses of the private 
man or woman—More showing off his children's rabbit hutches, 
Cromwell troubled by hypochondria—did more than merely high­
light or round out their portraits. They asserted the authenticity of 
common experience, the basis of claims that these characters were 
"friends and brethren." The fabric of common experience extended 
far beyond individuals to domesticate an alien world. The landmarks 
of daily life were as important as those of city and battlefield to force 
the reader from observation into participation. Through the minute 
documentation of the "life-method" of ordinary people, the historian 
proved that by-gone ages "were actually filled with living men."Be­
lieving that these ages would be unintelligible without some under­
standing of the shared consciousness that characterized them, he 
gladly stooped to materials formerly beneath "the dignity of history." 
The proliferation of quotidian detail authenticated this conscious­
ness as it made the past habitable by imagination. In its "faithful 
representing of commonplace things," the Victorian narrative his­
tory aimed at asserting the authority of the ordinary in the same way 
as did many novels of the period. The crowded canvasses of both 
genres also testify to the multi-dimensionality and complexity of the 
historical process, the novel through its minutely detailed back­
grounds, panoramic scale, and interwoven plots, the history through 
its layering of the private and public, the political and the social, the 
individual and the mass. 
Belief in history's imaginative truths led to art; belief in its philo­
sophical truths led to Wissenschaft. Order finally made claims more 
urgent than individuality. Imaginative realization of the historical 
datum was a means to an end, for history's meaningfulness rested on 
patterns accessible by law. Unlike the thinkers of the eighteenth cen­
tury, the Victorians sought laws that subordinated detail without 
denying its particularity. They viewed society not as a machine but as 
an organism. It was not man himself but the process of social evolu­
tion that was the same. Recognizing resemblances in the development 
of different societies confirmed history's "continuity," its interre­
latedness. It introduced system into the historian's work, making it 
scientific rather than merely antiquarian. The attraction of modeling 
historical change on nature lay partly in its reconciliation of identity 
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with growth, permanence with variation. If change were in effect sea­
sonal, even the most violent contrasts corresponded to a deeper regu­
larity. If present were related to past as the man to the boy, the tree to 
the sapling, history could claim unity without uniformity. Manifes­
tations of early stages of development were not scorned as backwards 
but appreciated as appropriate to their context and essential to 
growth. The historian could acknowledge the validity of relative 
standards of conduct without abandoning himself to them. More im­
portantly, "natural" change conveniently secularized teleology. The 
dynamic behind the historian's version of evolution was not random 
mutation but the fulfillment of genetic programming. The growth of 
the germ into the organism became a realization of lineage, the per­
fecting of something innate. In some (usually) unarticulated sense, 
this development was predetermined, subject to higher, ultimately 
benevolent, laws. The distinction between process and progress was 
more useful for being ambiguous. The historian could manipulate 
the determinism and regularity of the system to serve his own ends. 
Notwithstanding his willingness to borrow the authority of the 
natural, each historian imposed a system of absolutes on the freedom 
and relativism of the organic. Nature was not self-sufficient; nurture 
made the man intellectually superior to the boy, the tree more fruit­
ful than the sapling. Cycles were not self-validating. History spiraled 
toward some goal. For each historian that goal was defined differ­
ently, but once defined, it ordered history according to its own priori­
ties. Ultimate truth might be served by submission to authority or 
growth into self-determination, by the triumph of silent faith or of 
rational talk. In either case the definition of truth rationalized 
blindspots and made some ages more "immediate to God" than oth­
ers, based on the extent to which they furthered a desired conception 
of progress. 
Such a conception of change gave the historian an argument for 
reshaping society in his own image. He interpreted the political and 
social structure he desired for his own society as the issue of a progress 
that conflated the fulfillment of God's will with the maturation of the 
organism. This interpretation exploited the coercive power of both 
the providential and the natural. God's will would ultimately tri­
umph, but man still had to decide whether or not to help further His 
scheme. Nature would take its course, but growth could lead to dis­
ease or deformation if maturation were obstructed. So long as people 
cooperated with the natural course of change, the evolution toward 
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the good society was guaranteed. Defy that process, however—resist 
the Reform Bill or shirk the responsibilities of a true aristocracy—and 
social chaos would come again. 
Implicit in such explanations is a tension between a benevolent 
determinism and a responsible free will that structures the treatment 
of causation in all six historians. Only Macaulay went so far as to 
insist that the spirit of the age acted independently of even the greatest 
individuals—that "without Copernicus we should have been Coper­
nicans." But the others managed to escape this conclusion only by 
fusing the hero with the spirit of his time or people. Human progress 
advanced unconsciously in a tide that the hero might guide or the 
genius epitomize, but that neither originated nor really controlled. 
Even Carlyle's heroes were modelers, revealers, guides, not creators. 
By making the spirit of the age a manifestation of the divine plan and 
the choice of whether to cooperate with it a meaningful one, these 
historians robbed the "force of circumstances" of its tyrannical influ­
ence. If the great man were merely the most prominent specimen of 
this spirit, his actions still gained significance from their contribu­
tion to progress. Victorians feeling lost in the rapid tide of change in 
their own day could take comfort in history's assurance that the direc­
tion of change was ultimately toward the good. Meanwhile, the pos­
sibility of retribution or temporary breakdown prevented a fatalistic 
abandonment to circumstance and kept up the pressure for continued 
individual struggle. 
It was not so much their deficiencies as researchers as the control­
ling power of their desired patterns that made Victorian historians 
seem amateur by later standards. Although it is true that most of them 
relied heavily on standard secondary sources for their data, Macaulay 
and Carlyle made significant use of original documents, and Froude 
undertook extensive archival research. They all helped to expand his­
torical understanding by widening the scope of investigation to in­
clude geographical, artistic, intellectual, economic, and religious 
forces. Their treatment of historical sites, mythic and popular litera­
ture, religion, and race bespeaks a conception of historical explana­
tion beyond the reach of the Enlightenment. And yet despite the 
greater complexity of their analyses, various factors prevented them 
from realizing the full importance of such sociocultural factors and 
from fully integrating them into historical explanation. This was in­
evitable given the breadth of their syntheses and the fragmentary state 
of research materials at the time. The real problems were more polemi­
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cal than practical, however. Sociocultural evidence possessed no real 
autonomy in historical explanation because it became simply another 
means of vindicating the historian's preconceived sense of order. No 
inductive revelations were likely given the strength of the patterns al­
ready in the historian's mind. Each selected data to condone or con­
demn the mind of the time; each ransacked culture for analogues to a 
schema already imposed by his own political and moral precepts. 
The Victorian need to demonstrate order and purpose in history 
made it difficult for the historian to appreciate any fact for its own 
sake, to understand any event entirely in terms of its context. Finally, 
only what still "reached to the surface" of the present was worthy of 
preservation; nineteenth-century needs and interests controlled the 
historian's perception of what survived. Froude and Carlyle took a 
"Whig view" of history as much as did Macaulay, Green, or Freeman 
in this respect: all of them judged and ordered events according to the 
priorities of the present. They overlooked the specific historical con­
text of events in order to fashion them into anticipations or proto­
types of issues decisive for their own society. Preaching the virtues of 
objectivity and impartiality as so many of them did was no guarantee 
of either. All were aware of and attempted to practice the scientific 
analysis prescribed by Ranke. But their foregone conclusions about 
the righteousness of certain causes made them truly critical of only 
what contradicted these conclusions. The coherence of history de­
pended upon the timelessness of the values by which they judged it. 
Seldom could they accept opposing j udgments as a matter of intellec­
tual disagreement rather than sinful indifference to Truth. Their 
need to impose value-laden schema on the past finally made their 
capacity for romantic empathy highly selective and discredited their 
claims to what later ages would mean by "scientific" accuracy. 
This is precisely why they served their audience so well. Each histo­
rian projected his ideal version of modern order back onto the past: 
each concentrated on materials most easily shaped to mirror that 
order. The historian devised a genealogy to make recognizable the 
traits of modern society. The Victorian history promised the general 
public that insofar as they could endorse and emulate the values of a 
designated tradition, its history could become their own; they became 
part of the fulfillment of Teutonic, Protestant, and middle-class des­
tiny. Works so conceived put history's own seal of approval on se­
lected aspects of Victorian success and offered a rationale for con­
tinued progress in the same direction. The historian's highest duty 
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was to make sense of the past in order to make sense of the present. In 
reality he reversed this process, first asserting a desired present and 
then assembling a past to justify it. If his powerful impulse toward 
order undercut historical objectivity and distance, it provided some­
thing of much greater use for society at large: a place and purpose in 
the flux of time. 
The Victorian historian's desire to be both sage and scientist was 
the ideal of an age whose central task was reconciliation, the reconcil­
iation of its different ways of knowing and of its different intellectual 
and social constituencies. Like other Victorian thinkers, the histori­
an was engaged in defining some communality of vision for a society 
whose traditional unities were breaking down. When Matthew Ar­
nold placed the authority of a universal culture over the anarchy of 
individual judgment, when John Henry Newman reaffirmed the ex­
istence of timeless truths overriding perennial change and falsehood, 
when George Eliot tried to replace truth of doctrine with truth of 
feeling, each was asserting the integrative power of some "idea of the 
world" over the "multitudinousness" of existence, the power of some 
common Reality over the increasing number of individual realities. 
The historian was similarly a mediator: his address to a wide audience 
was the counterpart of his belief in a shared order; his integration of 
the rational, the moral, and the imaginative made possible his refusal 
to surrender truth to relativism. The compartmentalization of intel­
lectual life in the next century was the most prominent sign of the 
erosion of shared certainties. As a teacher the historian sustained the 
cultural ideals of an earlier age. His continuing belief in the human­
izing power of history—a Victorian legacy—preserved to him an in­
tegrity of vision fewer and fewer professionals could claim (or wish to 
claim) in the multinormative world of the twentieth century. 
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AMATEUR IDEALS AND
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The last fifty years have witnessed great changes in the management of Clio's 
temple. Her inspired prophets and bards have passed away and been suc­
ceeded by the priests of an established church; the vulgar have been excluded 
from the Court of the Gentiles; doctrine has been defined; heretics have been 
excommunicated; and the tombs of the aforesaid prophets have been duly 
blackened by the new hierarchy. While these changes were in process the 
statue of the Muse was seen to wink an eye. Was it in approval, or in derision? 
In his anxiety to defend "Clio, A Muse,"1 G. M. Trevelyan was too hasty in proclaiming the Gdtterddmmerung of "literary" history. 
John Osborne uses Trevelyan's own success to convince us of the con­
tinued vigor of the belletristic tradition in the twentieth century.2 
Perception is often more important than reality in shaping public 
debate, however. Trevelyan's metaphors suggest how much was 
thought to be at stake in the new revelation, and why the public an­
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tagonism between the rival faiths had reached such a high pitch by 
the turn of the century. The most important issue in defining profes­
sional identity was not the historian's methodology or expertise perse 
but his relationship to his audience. The professional's public image 
was formed less by the actual traits of his work than by his claims 
about that work. Pluralism undermined the status professionals were 
trying to claim for themselves; in order to safeguard their new author­
ity, many felt they had to repudiate the old one. Public expectations 
about writing and evaluating history had to be rejected lest they com­
promise that new authority. My purpose here is to examine both the 
rhetoric and the reality of the debate that surrounded the profession­
al's struggle to define his position. I will argue that in England the 
continuities between the amateur and professional traditions were 
more significant than the apparent conflicts. The ideals of the old 
faith were decisive in forming the responsibilities of the new. Particu­
larly at Oxford and Cambridge, historical study developed in ways 
that necessarily qualify generalizations about the professional's 
growing alienation from the needs and interests of a more general 
public.3 Many mourned the death of the amateur tradition too soon. 
On the face of it, the professional's credo did challenge the assump­
tions of the "literary" tradition in explicit ways. For the historian as 
man of letters, a network of values connected the separate facts of 
history and gave them meaning. Insight and imaginative identifica­
tion enabled the historian to see the truth more clearly than analysis 
and criticism. His authority rested on his effectiveness as a moral 
teacher; his first priority was to shape history to attract and instruct a 
wide general public. Professional status rested on different assump­
tions. For the professional the new research ideal of advancing 
knowledge outweighed the liberal ideal of training mind and charac­
ter as the goal of learning.4 To support professional standards, his­
tory had to be viewed as a body of objective and systematic knowledge, 
attained by technical training whose standards fellow experts deter­
mined. Although the certification of this training came more and 
more to mean university study leading to an academic career, the ex­
act course of training and employment was less important than the 
expertise such experience guaranteed. This expertise would provide a 
basis for attempts to convince the public that only the professional 
was qualified to make and evaluate historical judgments and to de­
termine the priorities that should direct historical study.5 
The clearest of those priorities was epitomized in the cult of origi­
216

Epilogue 
nal research. Freeman paid lip service to this ideal; William Stubbs 
was a more important convert since he actually practiced what Free­
man only preached. In his Inaugural Lecture as Regius Professor at 
Oxford in 1866, he looked forward to founding an historical school 
that would join "with the other workers of Europe in a common task" 
and build "not upon Hallam and Palgrave and Kemble and Froude 
and Macaulay " but on newly collected records and manuscript mate­
rials.6 The opening of archives and the outpouring of published texts 
and documents in the second half of the century provided the new 
researcher with plenty to do. So great became the volume of available 
manuscript materials that by 1895 Lord Acton feared "a lifetime spent 
in the largest collection of printed books would not suffice to train a 
real master of modern history" in his own day. Nevertheless, he stood 
by his claim that "history, to be above evasion or dispute, must stand 
on documents, not opinions."7 
The cult of original research had important implications for the 
shape of historical writing. The exigencies of the research ideal mil­
itated against the broad-scale syntheses beloved by the "literary" 
school. Stubbs, like S. R. Gardiner and Frederic Maitland, two other 
early professionals, was prominent as an editor. The more synthetic 
works of such men concentrated on specialized subjects like legal his­
tory that lent themselves to minute documentation. Early examples 
include Stubbs's Constitutional History of England (1873-78), Mait­
land's History of the English Law before the Time of Edward I. (with 
Frederick Pollock, 1895), and Domesday Book and Beyond (1897). 
When a professional undertook a more comprehensive political nar­
rative like S. R. Gardiner's History of England from the Accession of 
James I. to the Outbreak of the Civil War (1863-87), he carefully dis­
tinguished his approach from the conventions of "literary" history. 
Resisting the conjectures of a Macaulay or a Hume, Gardiner pre­
ferred simply to present the evidence in as much detail as possible, 
leaving final judgments to the persevering reader. To avoid the dis­
tortions of the Whig view, he steadfastly refused to foreshadow re­
sults; to prevent his knowledge of the outcome from influencing his 
reconstruction of events, he sent his drafts off to the publisher before 
continuing the narrative. He considered picturesque detail untrust­
worthy and, even if true, trivial. Rather than trying to make the reader 
feel like an eyewitness, Gardiner instead asked his audience "to 
supply a chorus of doubt, and to keep in mind that they read, not an 
account of that which certainly happened, but of that which appears 
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to me to have happened after such inquiry as I have been able to 
make."8 
Histories of Gardiner's scope were becoming the exception rather 
than the rule in the professional camp, however. More typical in some 
respects was the Cambridge Modern History, organized according to 
a "judicious division of labour" among specialists who were en­
joined by Acton to be strictly impartial: "This is essential not only on 
the ground that impartiality is the character of legitimate history, but 
because the work is carried on by men acting together for no other 
object than the increase of accurate knowledge."9 In its most extreme 
form, the research ideal militated against any kind of conclusive ex­
position at all. The assumption that having to produce written re­
sults for the public took time away from research was a central argu­
ment of those supporting the reallocation of college funds to endow 
research at the universities in the late nineteenth century.10 Mandell 
Creighton claimed that Stubbs resented all distractions from editing 
manuscripts, and "wrote his Constitutional History more because 
something was expected of him than because he enjoyed doing it."11 
J. H. Round, who had proclaimed in 1895 that in history as in science 
" 'the minute sifting' of facts and figures is the only sure method by 
which we can extend knowledge," grew increasingly resistant to 
summarizing any results. He turned down Acton's invitation to con­
tribute to the Cambridge Modern History on the grounds that prepar­
ing even such a specialized synthesis would be "alien" to his com­
mitment to research.12 And Acton himself despite (or perhaps because 
of) his prodigious erudition left only brilliant fragments behind him. 
Whatever practical constraints new standards for research imposed 
on the historian's work were finally less influential than assumptions 
about audience in molding professional identity. The rising chorus 
of criticism directed at "literary" historians from the seventies on re­
flected less a debate over style than over professional authority. Pro­
fessionalism required that history be shaped not by the demands of 
the marketplace but by the criteria of what J. R. Seeley called a "suffi­
cient corps of specialists . . . to whose judgment historians might 
appeal with confidence."13 H. A. L. Fisher viewed the problem in the 
same light: "So long as history is allowed to be concerned with truth, 
the true historian will prefer to be judged, not by the public, who 
enjoy his style, but by the one or two specialists who can test his 
facts."14 But as Freeman's case makes clear, too much was at stake for 
early professionals to rest content with a separate but equal audience 
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for their work. Professional authority depended upon convincing the 
public that serious history was an undertaking only trained scholars 
could conduct and whose merits only they could judge. The great 
influence exercised by "literary" historians like Froude constituted a 
rival authority, one that would-be professionals like Freeman felt 
compelled to discredit in order to distinguish their own postion. Rhe­
torical exaggeration on both sides of the ensuing debate rapidly 
moved the alleged incompatibility of popular and professional 
standards toward a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Part of this exaggeration was inspired by changes in the late Victo­
rian reading public, changes that increased professional anxiety 
about defining and maintaining standards. The rise of mass culture 
and the rise of specialization were not only contemporaneous but in 
important ways mutually reinforcing. In the same period that histor­
ical study was being professionalized, a rapidly expanding lower-
middle class, educated in the Board schools and newly enfranchised, 
was becoming affluent enough to create a market for an accessible 
literature that could both entertain and further educate them.15 The 
concerns of professional historians about the type of writing that at­
tracted such audiences were typical of more general fears. Many 
commentators believed that the dramatic growth of popular litera­
ture in the second half of the century had drastically reduced its over­
all quality.16 In the same vein, Stubbs blamed the stream of "trashy 
books" and superficial journalism on publishers trying to exploit the 
taste of the "half-educated" for "sensational and picturesque" 
historical writing.17 Professionals came to feel that they had to coun­
teract not only the influence of Froude, Carlyle, and Macaulay, but 
also that of the inferior popularizers whom their success had encour­
aged. Freeman's defense of Macaulay and Gardiner's of Green not­
withstanding, most "literary" historians were held guilty by associa­
tion with vulgarized history. If Macaulay simply mirrored the most 
Philistine prejudices and Green provided ideas "ready-made," how 
much more superficial must the latest Mudie's favorite be? If writers 
of Froude's and Carlyle's genius misled readers with "dangerous" 
views, if the "striving for pictorial effect" warped the judgment of 
even the best minds, what damage might really unscrupulous popu­
larizers do? 
Fine distinctions were soon lost in the assault on all writing en­
joyed by an audience whose frivolous taste and short attention span 
seemed to pose grave threats to the quality of all serious literature. 
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Criticisms of specific "literary" historians tended to harden into the 
categorical position that artistic imagination and compelling narra­
tion were completely incompatible with objective scholarship. The 
artist, Fisher argued, was too easily carried beyond the boundaries of 
his evidence: he might be tempted "to add a touch here and a touch 
there, ignore the inconvenient little facts, and traduce the inconve­
nient little persons, until his canvas ceases to represent the original, 
although it may be full of power and beauty and psychological in­
sight."18 Picturesque history was labeled superficial by definition, 
producing what Mandell Creighton called "a purely external view of 
the course of affairs."19 J. R. Seeley stated the professional complaint 
in its baldest form: "History only becomes interesting to the general 
public by being corrupted, by being adulterated with sweet, unwhole­
some stuff to please the popular palate."20 
With battle positions like these being drawn, it is no wonder that 
the self-proclaimed dullness and aridity of works like Creighton's 
History of the Papacy or Stubbs's Constitutional History were held 
up as tokens of their professionalism, or that the English Historical 
Review felt compelled to proclaim in its first issue that "no allure­
ments of style will secure insertion for a popular rechaufee of facts 
already known or ideas already suggested."21 There was continued 
anxiety that the Review might be "too popular," but Mandell 
Creighton, its first editor, discounted that possibility: "My fear is lest 
it die of dullness; but oh how the dullards croak with dread lest the 
atmosphere in which they live should by any chance be rarefied."22 
Although early issues still included some materials of interest to "an 
educated man, not specially conversant with history,"23 true to 
Green's prophecy Creighton decided that the Review could not be 
popularized "without entirely changing its character and making it 
useless to students."24 
And yet, the exaggerated rhetoric of this debate implied more dra­
matic distinctions between popular and professional styles than ac­
tually existed. We have seen that beneath Freeman's crusty profes­
sionalism lurked the epic poet manque. J. B. Bury's pronouncement 
that "history is a science, no less and no more," did not preclude a 
significant role for literary art and imagination.25 Maitland was ac­
claimed as a stylist even by those who did not read him; modern ap­
preciations of Stubbs reveal far more artistry than his own disclaimers 
allowed for.26 The length and detail of professional histories limited 
their audience, but the professionals' well-publicized disparagement 
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of popular taste did far more than the quality of their prose style to 
alienate the general reader. While the boundaries of professionalism 
were still being drawn, many of the new historians adopted a harder 
public line about the literary dimensions of history than their own 
work justified in order to stake out new ground for themselves. 
In the process, of course, they made the public all the more protec­
tive of its own turf. The resentful reactions of readers whose taste and 
judgment were so widely impugned joined with professional fears of 
appearing "too popular" to accentuate further the differences be­
tween the two positions. The public's treatment of Gardiner and 
Stubbs, for example, makes clear that despite the rebuffs of the profes­
sionals, they were slow to accept their dismissal as qualified judges of 
what constituted "good" history. The Saturday Review and the En­
glish Historical Review might approve of Gardiner's leaving out the 
"tawdry trappings" and "tinsel embroidery" that vulgarized popular 
works; for them and for the Academy Gardiner's admitted deficiencies 
as a writer in no way detracted from his qualifications as historian.27 
But more middle-brow periodicals resented Gardiner's failure to ful­
fill their expectations about historical writing. Finding "the actors 
depicted in a small weak way," the Athenaeum for instance disputed 
Gardiner's protest that the period in question was "wanting in dra­
matic interest"; even had that been true, the reviewer went on to note, 
"the writer should have concealed the fact with the utmost art." Gar-
diner apparently took to heart other criticism of his disproportionate 
detail and somewhat improved the readability of later volumes of his 
History. But readers continued to plead in vain to know "his 
thoughts" and the moral of his story. If some reviewers finally ac­
knowledged Gardiner's stature as a scholar, they continued to believe 
that his lack of proportion, conclusiveness, and vivid characterization 
prevented him from being an historian in the full sense of the word.28 
Stubbs found himself in a similar position: the "casual critics" of 
history whom he attacked in his Oxford lectures "had their revenge in 
deciding that my writings were not literature."29 The Saturday Re­
view and the English Historical Review might be predictably com­
plimentary of his achievements, but more popular journals labeled 
him rather an editor and lexicographer than an historian.30 
Defenders of "literary" history went on the offensive as well. We 
have seen how popular audiences made their preference for Macaulay 
and Froude a challenge to scholarly detractors of their favorites. 
Among the high popularizers of the nineties, men like Augustine Bir­
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rell, Andrew Lang, and Hugh Crothers attacked professional works 
for leaving the reader "adrift, without human companionship, on a 
bottomless sea of erudition" and called for more readable narratives 
in which the audience could be uplifted and emotionally involved.31 
Lang was far from defending the rhetorical excess preferred by the 
"vile herd," considering it as injurious to good art as to good science. 
But he warned that "from Mr. Froude the public will never be won, 
till some scientific historian writes about his topic as agreeably, with 
less bias and more accuracy."32 
It was not just history's literary value that was at stake here: the cult 
of objective research seemed to threaten the very intelligibility of the 
past. At the turn of the century, even fellow professionals worried 
because "many of the ablest and most learned historians restrict their 
efforts to the determination of the facts by scientific process and deem 
it futile to attempt more."33 It was this position that Frederic Harri­
son parodied in Aethelbald Wessex, the tutor of the Freeman school 
who insisted that no synthesis could take place until every fact had 
been catalogued; he went so far as to wish that "histories were not 
published at all in the current English of literature, but were plain and 
disconnected propositions of fact." Satire aside, Harrison was con­
cerned that the "paleo-photographic" method of research might be 
able to accumulate vast amounts of data but made it impossible to 
master or use them.34 John Morley, just as aware of the shortcomings 
of "literary" history, concurred with Harrison's reservations about 
"history for its own sake." Like so many Victorian readers, Morley 
did not "in the least want to know what happened in the past, except 
as it enables me to see my way more clearly through what is happen­
ing today." From his point of view, scientific history was simply be­
coming "narrow, pedantic and trivial. It threatens to degenerate from 
a broad survey of great periods and movements of human societies 
into vast and countless accumulations of insignificant facts, sterile 
knowledge, and frivolous antiquarianism."35 The hostility and mis­
trust of the general public inspired the stereotype of the scholar who 
was incapable of decisive judgments and feared that practical appli­
cations sullied his pure intellectuality.36 They were also at the root of 
suspicions that researchers sought merely sinecures, so that "the en­
dowment of research may degenerate into the research of endow­
ment."37 
In addition to being interpreted as a renunciation of the historian's 
responsibility to the general public, pronouncing "literary" history 
222 
Epilogue 
and scientific scholarship to be incompatible actually worsened the 
very situation the early professionals had wanted to correct. As Lang 
put it, "Men of real information are demoralised by writing for the 
public, while the non-specialist (the abandoned 'populariser') is a 
person of contemptible character."38 The quality of popularized 
work tended to sink rather than improve as the market expanded. The 
merchandizing of history unleashed a deluge of what Trevelyan des­
cribed as "publishers' books" of the type "generically known as 
'Criminal Queens of History,' spicy memoirs of dead courts and 
pseudobiographical chatter about Napoleon and his family. . . . 
The public understands that this kind of prurient journalism is his­
tory lightly served up for the general appetite, whereas serious history 
is a sacred thing pinnacled afar on frozen heights of science, not to be 
approached save after a long novitiate."39 Trying to strike a happy me­
dium between popular and "scientific" history became considerably 
more of a challenge once "literary" history had been tarred by the same 
brush as this kind of vulgarization. This situation left those readers 
who had in earlier years formed the audience for the great reviews and 
Victorian histories with far less literature of comparable excellence, 
and further emphasized the fragmentation of the norm for serious 
history, once identical with the literary masterpieces of Macaulay, 
Carlyle, and Froude. 
This fragmentation placed the early professionals in an anomalous 
position. They were struggling to win public acknowledgment of 
their authority, but found their definition of that authority contra­
dicting the public's. The amateur ideal had taught the public to mea­
sure the historian's authority by the moral uplift and practical guid­
ance he provided. Professional authority was based on specialized 
expertise, applied to advance knowledge for its own sake. The suscep­
tibility of the amateur ideal to vulgarization only reinforced the pro­
fessionals' inclination to limited research rather than broad synthesis, 
to address fellow professionals rather than cater to the public. The 
general audience might be willing to acknowledge the authority of 
professional expertise, but insofar as they saw it as by choice exercis­
ing no relevant power over their lives, they withheld the cultural au­
thority of the historian from men who were to them "merely" schol­
ars. The winning of professional authority at the expense of this 
cultural authority was an outcome few early professionals were will­
ing to accept. Freeman's example confirms a wider pattern. Attacks 
on "literary" amateurs were a publicistic way of aggrandizing the 
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historian's position; calls for more professional levels of training 
were a way of increasing his authority. But for many of those who 
waged such attacks, what gave the historian his stature in the first 
place was still conventional Victorian assumptions about history's 
function and value. I have shown how the exigencies of public debate 
exaggerated differences between "literary" and professional histori­
ans where style and audience were concerned. If we turn to consider 
the professional in his native habitat, the History School, we find a 
similar situation. The triumph of the research ideal was in many 
ways more apparent than real; especially at the ancient universities, 
the enduring vitality of liberal education provided a medium in 
which traditional assumptions about history's practical and moral 
importance continued to thrive. Historical study within the academy 
provided a way of salvaging the most important goals of "literary" 
history without the problematic literary form, but it also complicated 
the question of professional identity. Their continuing allegiance to 
history's preeminent importance as a moral and political guide in the 
service of a wider society prevented many Oxbridge historians from 
becoming alienated from the needs and interests of a more general 
public in the sense that many American and European scholars did. 
On the other hand, this allegiance left them implicitly at odds with 
professionalism's call for an audience of experts and the pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake. In either case I would argue that the tran­
sition from "literary" to professional history in England was less a 
break than a continuum in which, by and large, the demands of pro­
fessionalism accommodated themselves to the assumptions underly­
ing "literary" history rather than vice versa. 
The university was the natural home of the new professional histo­
rian, and virtually all of the early professionals held academic posi­
tions from the eighties on. From the beginning, however, historical 
study at Oxford and Cambridge was divided between the liberal ideal 
and the research ideal in ways that paralleled the rivalry between "lit­
erary" and professional historiography outside the academy. The 
first step toward professionalization had been to gain recognition of 
history as a distinct academic discipline, apart from moral science or 
humane letters. The first set of university reforms established an ex­
amination school in modern history at Oxford in the 1850s; a separate 
Historical Tripos was established at Cambridge in 1873. Attempts by 
the first Oxford Reform Commission to empower a German-style 
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professoriate met with vigorous and ultimately successful opposition 
from the tutors, however. The key issue was whether history was "to 
provide useful citizens of the State, or furtherers of historical re­
search."40 To the tutors, who defended the liberal ideal of education 
as character formation, men whose major purpose was the advance­
ment of knowledge and the training of fellow professionals were "un­
suitable and even dangerous instruments" for the moral education of 
the young.41 Their position weighed most heavily in the Oxford Uni­
versity Bill of 1854. New schools and chairs were created, but the tu­
tors were able effectively to exclude the professors from having any 
significant impact on college governance or the examination process, 
especially after mandatory lecture attendance was dropped in 1861. 
Their continued strength foiled efforts to enhance the power and sta­
tus of the professoriate in 1872, preventing professors from becoming 
ex officio chairmen of the new Boards of Faculties and influencing 
the colleges to reduce the funds reallocated to the professoriate.42 Here 
was a case where the tutors' status as professional teachers conflicted 
with the professoriate's desire for institutional power commensurate 
with their own status as professional scholars. It is true that part of the 
tutors' increasing professionalism involved some specialization on 
their part—e.g., many of them became the "combined lecturers" who 
prepared students for exams in the new schools.43 But this special­
ization remained compatible with and subordinate to the college-
based ideal of liberal education. The professors might have gained the 
apex of the pyramid of academic prestige, but the Oxbridge tutors 
continued to exercise effective control over the educational process. 
Thus from the beginning ambiguity existed about who controlled 
historical knowledge and for what ends. 
In the case of history, this control placed significant limits on pro­
fessional training. When Charles Firth became Regius Professor at 
Oxford in 1905, he renewed the call for professional training on a par 
with that of the continent. His suggestion that the History School 
require a thesis based on original sources—something he viewed as a 
necessary preliminary for postgraduate work—met with concerted 
resistance from tutors and lecturers, who charged that it was incom­
patible with the chief purpose of the Honors School: "a liberal educa­
tion through history."44 Even Firth's claims that the School could 
accommodate both forms of education failed to mollify them, and his 
proposals met with little success in his lifetime. He and Paul Vino­
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gradoff did conduct two postgraduate seminars at Oxford, but Vino­
gradoff complained that his students did not take to this continental 
style of education.45 
At Cambridge the professors met with more success in accommo­
dating the Tripos to specialized research, but some of the same con­
flicts arose.46 From the late nineteenth century, two views opposed 
one another. One group valued history for its practical uses in prepar­
ing citizens and statesmen for their duties in society. Its proponents— 
men like J. R. Seeley and Oscar Browning—felt that study should be 
organized around subjects about which a student could formulate 
and test theories, theories that would in turn form the basis of a "po­
litical science." A. W. Ward represented the "pure" historians, who 
believed that history should be studied for its own sake, an aim best 
served by specifying periods whose facts had to be determined and 
mastered. The political scientists controlled the shape of the 1873 
Tripos. Attempts to accommodate both approaches in the reforms of 
1897 were mutually unsatisfactory, resulting in what to Maitland re­
sembled "rather the programme of a Variety Show than the sober 
programme of an Historical School."47 Although emphasis on out­
lines increased under Acton and on research techniques under Bury, 
not until the 1929 reforms was the domination of political science 
conclusively broken. And even then, the sections on economic and 
constitutional history tended to remain issue-oriented and encour­
aged practical rather than professional aims. 
With these constraints on graduate study, postgraduate schools 
grew only slowly at the ancient universities. It was rather the civic and 
provincial universities, from the beginning dominated by the profes­
soriate and more heavily influenced by the occupational profession­
alism of scientific and technical fields, that provided the first signifi­
cant support for post-graduate work. During the first quarter of the 
century, the History School shaped by T. F. Tout at Manchester be­
came "a Mecca for serious-minded young scholars from the older 
universities."48 Albert Pollard's hopes of founding a research center 
in London were realized in 1921 when the Institute for Historical 
Research first opened its doors. Although dismissed at first as a mere 
"Ph.D. factory," the Institute gradually gained support and recogni­
tion as a center for advanced work. 
The slow progress of a more professional training at the ancient 
universities was in significant ways reinforced by many of the profes­
sors. For Freeman, as we recall, the discovery of practical political 
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lessons was more important than "the search for truth for its own 
sake." His proselytizing for "original authorities" notwithstanding, 
as a teacher he much preferred the old-fashioned mastery of great 
books. At Cambridge J. R. Seeley shared as much in Freeman's practi­
cal view of historical education as he did his peevish irritation at dilet­
tantes. Seeley's belief that history was first and foremost "the school of 
statesmanship" (a school whose "laws" similarly endowed his own 
prejudices with "scientific" status) worked against specialized schol­
arship and an appreciation of the contemporary context of events in 
the same ways as had "literary" history. Sheldon Rothblatt makes 
clear that Seeley advocated more rigorous intellectual standards as a 
means of producing better leaders, not better historians; he was him­
self a better example of the professional teacher, rather than the pro­
fessional scholar.49 
Even men with more compelling professional credentials con­
tinued to let the practical priorities of the larger society dictate the 
ends of historical study. Stubbs shared Freeman's belief that scientific 
scholarship was only a means to an end. In the same Inaugural lecture 
where he called for the founding of a research school on the continen­
tal model, he also stated that his aim was "to train not merely students 
but citizens . . . to be fitted not for criticism or for authority in mat­
ters of memory, but for action" in the greater community. He viewed 
history as "next to Theology itself . . . the most thoroughly reli­
gious training that the mind can receive."50 Acton echoed Stubbs's 
views thirty years later when he became Regius Professor at Cam­
bridge. He thought modern history had a particular value for "men in 
general" because it was filled with "inestimable lessons" still relevant 
to the present. He rated its gift of "historical thinking" higher than 
that of "historical learning" because better adapted to the "formation 
of character and the^  training of talent." Notwithstanding his call for 
strict impartiality, he enjoined his students "to try others by the final 
maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no 
cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to 
inflict on wrong."51 At the turn of the century, Firth at Oxford and 
George Prothero at Edinburgh were other advocates of original re­
search who also acknowledged history's importance as a moral and 
political guide. H. W. C. Davis was making the same claim as Regius 
Professor at Oxford in the twenties, and his successor, Maurice Po­
wicke, publicly encouraged amateur writing.52 
The attitude prevalent in Seeley's time—that Regius Professors had 
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a message to convey to the world at large—never really died out, de­
spite a gradual upgrading of the scholarly credentials of appointees. 
Maitland turned down the chance to succeed Acton in 1901 for this 
very reason: "The Regius Professor of Modern History is expected to 
speak to the world at large,'' he argued,' 'and even if I had anything to 
say to the W. at L., I don't think I should like the full houses and the 
limelight. So I shall go back to the Year Books."53 Gardiner likewise 
had rejected the chance to succeed Froude because he could not face 
the lecturing requirements.54 Given the public mission associated 
with many professorial chairs, it was quite appropriate that Charles 
Oman and G. M. Trevelyan should win them after distinguishing 
themselves as popular historians. Up to the present, men of such sta­
ture as George Kitson Clark and R. W. Southern (who became Chi­
chele Professor at Oxford in 1961) continue to defend general educa­
tion as the primary end of historical study at their universities and to 
lament the loss of direction earlier furnished by the belief in history's 
practical importance.55 
The belief in this importance by no means ruled out more profes­
sional standards of scholarship. But it did operate in British historio­
graphy to compromise objectivity and critical perspective, in large 
part because it was so inextricably intertwined with the kind of 
anachronisms implicit in the Whig view. Stressing the preservative 
nature of historical innovations and reconstructing a series of pre­
cedents linking past logically and directly to present gave the subject 
a ready-made continuity, itself taken as proof that history was a 
"scientific" discipline, not a random collection of facts. In the work 
of Stubbs and Freeman, the specifics of the Whig view had won the 
early professional seal of approval. Bury and Acton were less partisan, 
but their reading of western history as the progress of political and 
intellectual freedom offered less provincial and less immanent ver­
sions of the same assumptions.56 If there was gradual recognition of 
the Whig view's particular anachronisms and fallacies of intentional­
ity among early twentieth-century professionals like Pollard and 
Tout, the belief in history's political relevance was kept alive by the 
continued emphasis on constitutional development and political 
science in the History Schools. The increased prestige of bureaucratic 
efficiency in government at the turn of the century simply encouraged 
new anachronisms as administrative historians rehabilitated absolut­
ism in an attempt to reconstruct the origins of the modern state and 
civil service.57 In other words the details of the interpretation 
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changed, but the impulse underlying the Whig view—to use evidence 
of precedent and tradition to explain and thus legitimize a present or 
desired political order—remained unquestioned. 
In some respects early professional research methods actually en­
couraged rather than eliminated present-mindedness. By isolating 
historical phenomena from other relevant aspects of their context, 
narrow specialization made heteronomous interpretations more 
rather than less likely.58 The continued reliance on facts speaking for 
themselves made unconscious value judgments all the harder to de­
tect.59 The compatibility of political apologetics with professional 
scholarship had been demonstrated by Ranke himself. Georg Iggers 
points out the ways Ranke's "hermeneutical" emphasis on political 
documents and on the self-justifying "individuality" of the state con­
structed from them served inherently conservative ends by excluding 
as irrelevant to historical understanding factors such as the economic 
or social analyses offered by socialism. It is noteworthy that this "clas­
sical" model of historical study remained firmly entrenched in both 
England and Germany well into the twentieth century, despite chal­
lenges raised elsewhere by a variety of more sociologically-informed 
approaches to history.60 
Persisting belief in its practicality helps explain why history be­
came the "queen of the liberal arts" at least temporarily in the early 
twentieth century. In the first quarter of the century, nearly one third 
of the undergraduates at Oxford were reading for the History School; 
as many as two hundred took the History Tripos each year in the late 
twenties and early thirties.61 As Kitson Clark points out, however, few 
of these viewed themselves as future historians: history had become a 
haven for students who "were not clear what else they wanted to do." 
Many of these were destined to fill posts in domestic and imperial 
administration at a time when the British government was assuming 
new functions at home and abroad. History seemed suited in a 
number of ways to serve their needs. In addition to providing a ge­
nealogy for the new bureaucratic elite, it also afforded a more general 
frame of reference from which to view and to understand the prob­
lems they would encounter. G. N. Clark argues that it was in part a 
shortage of modern studies capable of supplying such background 
that motivated the Cambridge Modern History, a work aimed, in Ac­
ton's words, "to bring home to every man . . . the ripest conclusions 
of international research." It was precisely because of his conception 
of its audience that Acton intended it not as a chronicle of facts for 
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their own sake, but a compendium whose proportions were shaped by 
what he j udged to be their relative philosophical importance to world 
history. The History represented not so much a scholarly advance as a 
codification of nineteenth-century assumptions about what consti­
tuted "universal" history.62 
Remarks by R. W. Southern suggest a more important class dimen­
sion to history's early twentieth-century popularity. In his eyes the 
tutors' success in keeping historical education general and unsystem­
atic worked to "enlarge the minds of men who would meet just such 
conditions in the world they were to rule." Historical study "met a 
large variety of intellectual and practical needs in the last days of Brit­
ish supremacy in the world."63 It provided not only an ideologically 
stabilizing view of the national past, but the kind of mental training 
and character development that certified the new ruling elite. As Phil­
lip Elliott has pointed out, opening the competition for the Home 
and India Civil Service in the late nineteenth century wound up giv­
ing the universities a new purpose at a time when they seemed to have 
lost their sense of direction.64 The ideal candidate for higher level 
administration was not the specialist but the generalist, the man 
whose liberal university education had cultivated in him the mental 
properties that would enable him to handle any situation. This 
model of leadership drew far more from the older ideal of the gentle­
manly professional than from the occupational professionalism of 
the expert or specialist. It tended not to open the governing elite to the 
business and commercial classes, but to institutionalize the connec­
tion between the new professional classes and the older social elite.65 
History had from the earliest days been one of the subjects for the 
Civil Service examinations. The method its study entailed was even 
more significant than its content. It had the advantage of providing 
practical information while offering the kind of intellectual disci­
pline and character formation that distinguished liberal education 
from utilitarian training. The Oxbridge history schools were all the 
more effective in continuing to train the gentleman professionals of 
the future precisely because they failed to make themselves more pro­
fessional from the historian's point of view. The increased rigor of 
historical studies benefitted these men not as future historians but as 
the future custodians of an increasingly diverse society, a society 
where control depended upon a more complex but not necessarily a 
more technical or specialized understanding of problems and issues. 
Such attitudes also suggest reasons for the more rapid development of 
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specialized and technical training in history at the provincial and 
civic universites, since these were patronized by the classes largely 
shut out of the ancient universities and less influenced by the stigma 
attached to utilitarian training.66 
In the culturally dominant ancient universities, professionaliza­
tion of historians meant first and foremost professionalization of lib­
eral educators in history. The Historical Association, founded in 
1906, reflected this bias: its original purpose was to improve historical 
teaching, especially in the secondary schools, although professionals 
like Pollard, Firth, and Tout succeeded in moving it toward more 
scholarly concerns in later years.67 The control and upgrading of sec­
ondary education was a priority of early professionals in Germany 
and America as well, but the extent to which the ends of liberal educa­
tion continued to exert their control over the way history was taught 
in England is distinctive. At the ancient universities, specialization 
and rationalization accommodated themselves to liberal education, 
not vice versa. In history as in other disciplines, a professional hier­
archy developed with the more research-oriented professoriate at the 
top. But this hierarchical principle was implicitly challenged by the 
egalitarianism of the tutorial ideal, in which equality was based not 
so much on specialized expertise as on an equality of "voice and sta­
tus among qualified practitioners."68 Research achievements were 
never the sole or even most important criterion for rewards within 
this system. These factors help account for the continued high prior­
ity placed on teaching over research at these universities. A. H. Halsey 
and M. H. Trow's generalizations about British academics today hold 
true with particular force for historians: "They reinforce and reflect a 
set of attitudes which may be distinguished from professional career-
ism through specialised research and which encourage a way of aca­
demic life emphasizing teaching and, in the best sense, amateur­
ism."69 
In another respect, of course, their commitment to teaching made 
historians like other academics members of "the key profession," to 
borrow H. J. Perkin's term. In the early twentieth century, they began 
to control the process by which other professionals were selected and 
educated. But in the case of history they controlled it by supplying 
mental discipline more than a body of expertise. Rather than rein­
forcing the theoretical underpinnings of professional knowledge, the 
"historical power" of judgment provided by undergraduate educa­
tion prolonged pragmatic and anachronistic assumptions implicitly 
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at odds with history's claims to be scientific. This suggests that late 
Victorian fears about history and the historian were somewhat mis­
aimed. Rejecting "literary" style as inappropriate did not entail loss 
of faith in history's moral and political utility. Many historians did 
turn away from the needs and interests of the general public, but not 
to the needs and interests of fellow professionals exclusively. They 
aided the process—implicit in professionalization—whereby knowl­
edge became the domain of an elite, but not by establishing a monop­
oly of expertise over knowledge in precisely the way other profession­
als did. Making historical study more rigorous enhanced its prestige 
more than its autonomy; that prestige attracted more members of a 
social elite seeking credentials of general intellectual ability than it 
did future historians. The "literary" historians had assumed that his­
tory's purpose was to make the world morally and intellectually intel­
ligible to a wide audience; for the Oxbridge historians, historical 
study became a primary means by which a liberally educated ruling 
class could command society.70 The withdrawal of historians into the 
academy did not signify so much a break with the wider society as a 
different way of influencing it. It is no coincidence that history's 
popularity as a field of study began to decline after 1930. With the 
final dissolution of the constitutional bias of historical study and of 
the credibility of the Whig view, history could no longer offer the 
same comprehensive explanation of the past. At the same time, the 
new research methods introduced by scholars like Namier only un­
derscored the growing intractability of professionals where such ex­
planation was concerned.71 
Other factors distinguished the early development of professional­
ism in England from that in Europe and America. Joseph Ben-David 
notes that the dominance of the ancient British universities ruled out 
the kind of competition that spurred advances in research and techni­
cal training in Germany.72 Felix Gilbert cites the importance of gov­
ernment support and control in stimulating historical study and 
shaping the educational and archival bureaucracies on the continent. 
He also notes that the acceptance of critical methods and scholarly 
standards in England was imitative and incomplete because it "did 
not arise from a need to adjust the universities to the requirements of a 
changed political structure" in the sense that this was true in Eu­
rope.73 Doris Goldstein argues that the relative lack of support from 
government and universities made all the more important the role of 
voluntary organizations like the Royal Historical Society and the 
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British Academy in developing a sense of community among British 
professionals.74 In the United States, the hopes of Herbert B. Adams 
that the American Historical Association would provide a "channel 
through which the aristocracy of culture might, in historical matters, 
exert a vigorous, uplifting influence on national policies" never 
materialized. Without such an alliance between the patrician intellec­
tuals and the academicians as existed in England, the professionals 
turned inward to their own concerns and the men of letters stopped 
writing of their own accord.75 The prestige of the German research 
model had been higher from the start in the United States, and gradu­
ate study developed much more rapidly.76 By 1910 sixteen American 
universities were training doctoral candidates in history, and had al­
ready produced approximately two hundred fifty Ph.D.s in history.77 
The more egalitarian nature of the American university kept teaching 
an important function, but did not give it the prestige it enjoyed in 
Britain. 
The assimilation of history to the liberal ideal helps explain why 
the status contradictions between teaching and research, endemic in 
academic professionalism, never became so acute in the case of En­
glish historians. It also testifies to the lasting influence of the amateur 
tradition in endowing the British historian with continuing cultural 
authority—the kind of authority that many disciplines forfeited as 
the price of professionalization. The animating ideals of the amateur, 
the sage, the man of letters, the "literary" historian, lived on in their 
twentieth-century successors who continued to measure historical 
knowledge not in terms of expertise alone—who by believing in his­
tory's humanizing power helped to make that power a continuing 
reality. 
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33. Levine, Boundaries of Fiction, pp. 130-31. 
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33. Freeman first used the term "constitutional inaccuracy." "Froude's 
disease" was coined by Charles Langlois and Charles Seignobos, Introduc­
tion to the Study of History, trans. G. G. Berry (London: Duckworth, 1898), 
p. 125. 
34. Freeman, "Froude's Reign of Elizabeth—Vol. I l l ," p. 519 and 
"Froude's Reign of Elizabeth [First Notice]," p. 81. 
35. Freeman, "Froude's Reign of Elizabeth [Concluding Notice]," p. 143. 
36. Smith, "Froude's History of England—Vols. V-VIII," p. 247-48. 
37. See, e.g., Lilley, "The New Spirit in History," p. 629 and Montague 
247 
Notes 
Burrows, "Mr. Froude's Queen Elizabeth," Quarterly Review 128 (April 
1870):544. 
38. Henry Reeve, "Mr. Froude's History of Queen Elizabeth," p. 21. 
39. William Donne, "Froude's History of England," Fraser's Magazine 54 
(July 1856):33. 
40. Frederic Harrison, "The Historical Method of Froude," in Tennyson, 
Ruskin, Mill and Other Literary Estimates (London: Macmillan, 1899), 
p. 233; Andrew Lang, "Freeman vs. Froude," Corn hi II Magazine 93 (Febru­
ary 1906):251. 
41. Langlois and Seignobos offer the best examples of the rejection of "lit­
erary" history, while A. B. Hart defends the importance of imagination in his 
presidential address to the American Historical Association, "Imagination in 
History," AHR 15 (January 1910): e.g., 237-38, 250-51. 
42. Harrison, "The Historical Method of Froude," p. 230. 
43. Holmes, "Mr. Froude and His Critics," p. 187. 
44. "Mr. Froude's Appointment," Saturday Review, 9 April 1892, p. 411. 
45. James Anthony Froude, "Preface," The Nemesis of Faith, 2ded. (Lon­
don: Chapman, 1849), p. xii. 
46. Quoted in Dunn, Biography, l:ix. The speaker is Mrs. William Harri­
son, Kingsley's daughter. 
47. Harrison, "The Historical Method of Froude," p. 224. 
CHAPTER V: JOHN RICHARD GREEN 
1. The publication data for the Short History, cited by York Powell and 
Charles Firth, "Two Oxford Historians," Quarterly Review 195(1902):542n., 
does not include the authorized and unauthorized American editions of the 
book, or the substantial circulation of the History of the English People, 
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Augustus Freeman. Each of them, she finds, 
built his public role on a private, essentially 
Romantic, attachment to the past. But though 
they recognized the importance of imagina­
tion to historical reconstruction, all under 
stood and accepted the new standard o 
thoroughness and critical analysis dernande< 
of the historian who would establish his fact 
on a "scientific" basis. 
Ultimately, however, the responsibility o 
the "literary" historian to shape, to judge, am 
to justify was incompatible with the kind o 
detachment and induction mandated by pro 
fessiorral history; for his primary obligatioi 
was, after all, not to his facts, but to his func 
tion and purpose as a teacher. The object o 
the "literary" historian was not history for it 
own sake, but for the sake of a wider society in 
increasing and even desperate need of guid 
ance and reassurance. When, therefore 
emerging professionals began to shift thei 
allegiance from the needs of the general au 
dience to the demands of their peers, they 
seemed to be repudiating a vital cultura 
function. It is to measuring fully the dimen 
sions of that function that this remark-*^ 
book is addressed. 
Rosemary Jann is Assistant Professor o 
English at Rutgers University. 
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